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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation concerns the concept of category. The term 
"category" in popular usage means "class" or "group." In ordinary 
language it is used for any large group of similar things and even 
more generally as a synonym for "class." In philosophy, though, the 
term has acquired more technical meanings. Some of these will be ex-
plored in this investigation. 
The philosopher generally credited with introducing the first 
of these special meanings is Aristotle. He used in special senses 
the Greek word kt\\~to@~' which originally meant "accusation." The 
task here will include demonstrating these technical meanings. One 
may anticipate also seeing that he retains the original meaning of 
"accusation." Basically, however, Ko,"!~~oplo.. received new significa-
tion at the hands of Aristotle, as did several cognate words, for 
example, KO\'i'~ l opg.\y, "to accuse," used for "to predicate," KCX.1~­
fofo4.£e.yOS, used for "predicate," K~l'~~oflK~ 1\~oTa<fLS for "af-
firmative proposition," etc. Since the time of Aristotle, then, "cate-
gory" has signified a philosophical concept which with the centuries 
has become traditional. 
Accordingly, this dissertation has as its subject a traditional 
philosophical concept. As a matter of fact, it is concerned with 
what has long been considered one of the traditional problems in 
metaphysics. The choice of subject needs some explanation, if not 
1 
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defense, in view of the current ban on traditional metaphysics in many 
philosophical circles. 
No entry will be made here into the arena to contend with those 
who announce the death of metaphysical discussion in its traditional 
form. In justification of the chosen subject, note is taken simply of 
the neglect of the categories by philosophers, especially in recent 
years. Few will deny that preoccupation with language is a notable fea-
ture of contemporary philosophy. The ramifications of this recent philo-
sophical development have included studied neglect, if not open rejec-
tion, of traditional metaphysical problems, including the problem of the 
categories. Albert Hofstadter has stated this in these words: 
What is a category? What problem does metaphysics try 
to solve in offering a . system of categories? There is 
surprisingly little in the literature specifically di-
rected toward answering these questions.l 
Hofstadter, however, does not approve this trend and so adds: 
I can think of nothing that would be as healthy for the 
present state of metaphysical inquiry as a thorough air-
ing of the question of the categories.2 
But few have heeded his suggestion, and the literature is still sparse. 
There is agreement among those who have produced this literature 
that the problem of the categories is one of great scope and difficul-
ty. The space of a large book is needed to explore the claim that there 
are categories, to analyze the nature of a category, and to describe all 
1





the categories. The inherent difficulty in philosophical discussion 
of these matters has not escaped those who have heeded them. Two in-
stances will suffice to illustrate. The French philosopher Charles B. 
Renouvier, born in 1818 and noted for an imposing treatment of the 
categories, is said to have remarked toward the end of his life in 1903: 
The problem of the categories is the most arduous one 
which can present itself to a philosopher. It is the 
key to everything. I have studied it, so to speak, all 
my life; yet I have not studied it sufficiently.l 
The second instance is Everett W. Hall, the contemporary American phi-
losopher, who has said in a paper on "The Metaphysics of Logic": 
I cannot here attempt to say positively what a cate-
gory is. I think, in fact, that it is one of the most 
difficult of all philosophical tasks; perhaps it is 
the source of most philosophical perplexities.2 
Restriction in Scope of the Problem of the Dissertation 
Quotations such as these make it seem wise here to narrow the sub-
ject down from the broad, difficult problem of categories in general. 
One may be able to work within narrower limits with profit and possibly 
with less difficulty. Practical considerations dictate this policy 
also. There are several philosophers whose thought on the problem of 
the categories one might consider. The chief ones among western think-
ers are Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. Recent thinkers, in addition to 
1Quoted in Carroll Sibley, "The Problem of the Categories," Philo-
sophical Review, XL (1936), 283. 
2Philosophical Review, LVIII (1949), 24. 
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Renouvier, who might be considered are Borden Parker Bowne, Alfred 
North Whitehead, and Nicolai Hartmann. This list is very short com-
pared to the potential number of philosophers since Aristotle who 
might have coped at length with the categories. But it is still too 
long a list, especially if one favors going into detail. So one must 
select and limit. 
The choice is to concentrate on three philosophers--Aristotle, 
Kant, and Bowne. Aristotle is selected as the chief original source 
of the doctrine of the categories, Kant as the thinker who next made 
significant contributions to the doctrine, and Bowne as a more recent 
thinker who sought to accommodate the doctrine to a personalistic meta-
physics. The present writer is attracted to the search for the meaning 
of the doctrine of category. In particular, he would like to know its 
original form in Aristotle's thought, to discover how the doctrine 
fared in the hands of Kant, and to see how a pioneer American person-
alist reacted to the doctrine in both its Aristotelian and Kantian 
forms. 
Study of the doctrine of category held by these three thinkers is 
still a very comprehensive subject. Hence, one is inclined to restrict 
oneself further. The goal to be sought, then, is to determine how Aris-
totle, Kant, and Bowne defined a category. An investigation such as 
this will, of course, involve discussion of other related topics, but 
its primary purpose will not be to explore these fully. This means a 
deliberate steering away from many matters, such as describing fully 
each category according to Aristotle, Kant, and Bowne, or philosophers 
in general, or entering into the discussion of whether or not there are 
5 
categories. The desire here is to make a contribution, if possible, 
to discussion of the categories . To determine with some assurance 
what three significant thinkers defined a category to be is no small 
task, and completing the task may make the contribution desired. 
Exclusion of Plato 
It may seem strange that Plato was not mentioned as a philosopher 
to consider for the doctrine of the categories. The conviction of the 
present writer on this subject is merely stated here without elabora-
tion . He is convinced that the categories of Aristotle have little in 
common with the so-called "greatest classes111 of the Sophist or with 
the "common properties"2 of the Theaetetus . It may be granted that 
Plato recognized abstract notions of substance, quality, quantity, re-
lation, activity, and passivity . But his allusions to them are iso-
lated and never connected systematically to form any doctrine of cate-
gories . It seems likely that Plato ' s recognition of these abstract 
notions aided Aristotle in his thought. But one can concede this with-
out contending that there is an Academic doctrine of categories re-
fleeted in Plato's works . 
Previous Literature 
Previous literature justifies the subject of this dissertation. 
There has been no research based on all relevant texts to determine 
1Being and not-being, rest and motion, same and other. See 
25la-254d. 
2tikeness and unlikeness, being and not-being, identity and dif-
ference, odd and even, unity and number. See 185. 
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exactly how Aristotle, Kant, and Bowne defined a category. Investiga-
tions have in every case not been based on an exhaustive analysis of 
the texts concerned nor have they included all three philosophers. An 
illustration is the dissertation by Sister M. Marina Scheu published 
as The Categories of Being in Aristotle and St. Thomas.l Even the more 
exhaustive researches of William David Ross fail to trace the concept 
of category through the Aristotelian corpus. How Aristotle, Kant, and 
Bowne defined a category has not been investigated. 
Procedure 
The problem of this dissertation, therefore, is to determine how 
Aristotle, Kant, and Bowne defined a category. The procedure will be 
to examine those passages in the works of each philosopher where the 
concept of category appears . This is likely to be a considerable task. 
It is anticipated, though, that certain works of these thinkers will be 
more important for this purpose than others. Accordingly, it is planned 
to concentrate on these and deal only briefly with the others. Note 
will be taken of indications of possible agreement with or divergence 
from Aristotle in Kant, and of Aristotle and Kant in Bowne. A chapter 
will be devoted to each philosopher, followed by a fourth chapter in 
which findings will be summarized and conclusions drawn. 
lwashington: Catholic University of America Press, 1944. 
CMP~RI 
THE DEFINITION OF CATEGORY IN ARISTOTLE 
This investigation begins with Aristotle. The preceding Intro-
duction has attempted to justify doing so. What validity it has rests 
mainly on the fact that Aristotle has remained one of the focal points 
of philosophical discussion on the subject of the categories. Further-
more, as was noted, there is justification for holding that Aristotle, 
not Plato, is the main source of subsequent speculation on the subject. 
Having decided to start with Aristotle, we must now determine 
where in Aristotle's works to begin. Unfortunately, we cannot settle 
' this easily by starting at the beginning. The main reason is the dif-
ficulty in determining the exact chronological order of Aristotle's 
works. In addition, category appears in many of them. 
But despite these problems, it will be best for us to take up 
the relevant works of Aristotle in what appears to be their chrono-
logical order, This will enable us to see the development, if any, 
of Aristotle's thought on the subject of category. In fact, the pro-
cedure will be helpful when we consider the doctrine in Kant and Bowne, 
and it certainly has wide support in other similar investigations. 
A. In the Categories 
One conceivable though superficial approach to the problem of 
7 
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where to begin in Aristotle's writings in determining his thought on 
category is to be guid~ by the titles of the extant works. If this 
were adopted, our attention would likely be first directed to the 
small treatise titled the "Categories" (\(~l'q~op(a(). This work of 
fifteen chapters is part of the collection of Aristotle's writings 
on logic traditionally called the "Organon"1 and comprising the 
Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, 
Topics, and On Sophistical Refutations. It does indeed appear from 
this list of titles that the Categories is material quite relevant 
to our purpose. But, of course, one can hardly be guided by titles 
alone and not primarily by content. In addition, we have to deter-
mine whether the Categories is the first in chronological order. 
1. The Question of ~xtual Authenticity 
However, there ~ is another question about the Categories which 
takes precedence over both chronology and relevance. This is the 
question of genuineness. It is pressing because many modern scholars 
have doubted that Aristotle wrote the Categories. Unless we can see 
cause to question such a judgment, we should dismiss the Categories 
and pass to authentic materials. Renee an excursus into the debate 
over authenticity of the Categories must be made before anything more 
!Alexander of Aphrodisias, early Greek commentator on Aristotle 
about 200 A.D., is credited with first applying the word "Organon" or 
"instrument" to logical doctrine. The term was subsequently applied 
to the collection of Aristotle's logical works as the "instrument" 
of science and scientific reasoning. William David Ross places this 
in the sixth century (Aristotle [4th ed. rev.; London: Methuen and 
Co. Ltd., 1945] 1 pp. 91 20). 
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is said on either chronology of composition or relevance of content to 
our purpose. 
A large number of modern scholars have questioned whether Aris-
totle is the author of the Categories. This is in sharp contrast to 
most students of Aristotle in antiquity and to the series of Greek 
commentators on Aristotle, beginning with Porphyry in the third cen-
tury A.D., who accepted the work as genuine. In general, those who 
recently have questioned the genuineness of the Categories fall into 
two groups--those who regard the whole book as spurious and those 
who suspect only the closing chapters 10-151 the so-called Postpre-
dicaments. One is impressed by the number of scholars who in modern 
times have claimed the entire book is not authentic. It includes such 
names as Brandis, 1 Rose, 2 Prantl,3 Gercke, 4 Dupr~e1, 5 Gohlke, 6 Jaeger,7 
1christian August Brandis, "Ueber die Reihenfolge der BUcher des 
Aristotelischen Organons," Abhandlungen der Berlin Akademie1 (1833) 1 
p. 267. 
Zvalentin Rose, De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine et Auctoritate 
Commentatio (Berlin: Reiner, 1854), pp. 232-235. 
3carl Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande (4 vols. in 2; 
Leipzig: s. Hirzel, 1855-70) 1 I, 90n. 1 911 204-2061 243. 
4Alfred Gercke, ''Ursprung der aristotelischen Kategorien," Archiv 
fUr Geschichte der Philosophie1 IV (1891) 1 424-441. 
5E. Dupr~el, "Aristotle et le Trait~ des Cat~gories," Archiv fUr 
Geschichte der Philosophie, XXII (1909) 1 230-251. 
6paul Hermann Eduard Gohlke, Die Lehre von der Abstraktion bei 
Platon und Aristoteles (Halle: Niemeyer, 1914) 1 pp. 61-63. 
7werner Wilhelm Jaeger, Aristotle, trans. Richard Robinson (2d 
ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), pp. 46n.-47n. 
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and Mansion. 1 Likewise a notable number of modern scholars have held 
that the last six chapters are not genuine. Such, for example, is the 
opinion of Waitz, 2 Zeller, 3 Maier, 4 Gomperz, 5 Ross, 6 Robin,7 and Mure.8 
In contrast, relatively few modern scholars outside the scholas-
tic tradition have argued for the traditional view which credits Aris-
totle with writing all fifteen chapters of the Categories. Isaac Husik 
defended both the authenticity and unity of the work in an article pub-
lished in the Philosophical Review in 1904.9 In 19391 thirty-fiv~ years 
later, he wrote again on the subject and claimed to be in,"the unenviable 
!suzanne Mansion, "La premi~re doctrine de la substance: la 
substance selon Aristote," Revue Philosophique de Louvain, XLIV (1946), 
366-369. 
2Theodor Waitz, Aristotelis Organon Graece (2 vols.; Leipzig: 
Hahn, 1844-1846), I, 266. 
3Eduard Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, trans. 
B. F. c. Costelloe and J. H. Muirhead (2 vols.; London, New York, and 
Bombay: Longmans 1 Green, and Co. 1 1897) 1 I 1 64n.-66n. 
4Heinrich Maier, Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles (3 vols.; TU-
bingen: H. Laup1 1896-1900) 1 II, 291 and n • . 
5Theodor Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, trans. G. G. Berry (4 vols.; 
London: John Murray, 1906-1912) 1 IV, 514. 
6Ross 1 Aristotle, pp. 101 24. 
7L~on Robin, Greek Thought and 
Spirit1 trans. M. R. Dobie (London: 
Co., Ltd., 1928) 1 p. 246. 
the Origins of the Scientific 
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and 
8Geoffrey Reginald Gilchrist Mure, Aristotle (London: Ernest 
Benn Ltd., 1932), pp. 178, 268n. 
9Isaac Husik1 "On the Categories of Aristotle," Philosophical 
Review, XIII (September, 1904) 1 514-528. 
11 
position of being in a minority of one in regarding the entire trea-
tise, including chapters 10-15, as genuine."l This is not exactly so, 
for Gohlke, who is not mentioned by Husik, shifted his position to fa-
vor genuineness in his Die Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik pub-
lished in 1936.2 However, it is quite true that for many years Husik 
received little or no support in his defense of the judgment which 
antiquity placed on the Categories. He now has support, though, es-
pecially in W. D. Ross, the distinguished Aristotelian scholar. The 
1939 article led Ross to consider Husik 1 s arguments for genuineness 
and as a whole to be convinced by them . 3 There has been belated 
recognition, too.4 Since the case for genuineness has revived recent-
ly, it seems appropriate to consider some of its main features briefly 
before passing judgment on the question. 
a. The Argument for Authenticity from External Evidence 
Those 'tvho argue for genuineness do so from external and internal 
1Isaac Husik, "The Authenticity of Aristotle's Categories," Jour-
nal of Philosophy, XXXVI (August, 1939), 427-431. Both articles have 
been reprinted in conjoined form in a collection of Husik 1 s writings 
edited by Milton c. Nahm and Leo Strauss and published under the title 
Philosophical Essays--Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern--by Isaac Husik 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952). 
2see Paul Hermann Eduard Gohlke, Die Entstehung der aristote-
lischen Logik (Berlin: Junker and DUnnhaupt, 1936), pp. 26-27. 
~-lilliam David Ross, "Conunents and Criticisms: The Authenticity 
of Aristotle's Categories," Journal of Philosophy, XXXVI (August, 
1939), 431-433. 
~.,g_., in Joseph OWen~ .• The Doctrine of Being in the Aristote-
lian Metaphysics (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 
1951), pp. 328-329. 
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evidence. First, on external evidence, it is claimed that the authen-
ticity of the Categories is well attested. The work was accepted as 
genuine by almost all of the ancient scholars, one specific exception 
being the unnamed critic mentioned in Scholia 33a28.1 Also a series 
of commentaries on the book which assumed its genuineness was produced, 
beginning, as was mentioned above, 2 in the third century A.D. with Por-
phyry and continuing with Dexippus, Ammonius, Philoponus 1 Simplicius, 
Olympiodorus, Elias, and David down to the sixth century. 3 Actually, 
external evidence goes back to Andronicus, head of the Lyceum £!• 40 
A.D., who rejected the Postpredicaments and by implication accepted 
4 the major part of the Categories as genuine. It appears, though, 
that some early doubts were entertained, since several of the Greek 
commentators concerned themselves with refuting arguments against its 
genuineness based on supposed contradictions between the Categories 
and other works of Aristotle. See, for example, Philoponus 12.34-
13.51 Simplicius 379.7-380.151 and Olympiodorus 22.38-24.20. The 
general impression, however, which emerges is that the case for au-
thenticity is strongly supported by external evidence. 
lin Vol. IV of the Prussian Academy edition, Immanuel Bekker 
et al. (ed.), Aristotelis Opera (5 vols.; Berlin: G. Reimer, 1831-
1870). 
2 p. 9 .. 
3Ross dates Porphyry £!• 233-303, Dexippus £!• 3501 Ammonius 
ca. 4851 Philoponus £!• 490-5301 Simplicius £!• 533, Olympiodorus 
ca. 535, Elias £!• 550, and David £!• 575 (Aristotle, p. 296). 
4scholia 8la27. 
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b. The Argument for Authenticity from Internal Evidence 
The argument from internal evidence is more complex. Husik has 
developed it along three lines--style, terminology, and doctrine--and 
states the gist of it in the following paragraph: 
An examination of the treatise of the categories and 
a comparison thereof with the Topics, in respect of 
terminology, style, and doctrine, proves conclusively 
that they are either the work of one author or that 
one was a close and deliberate imitator of the other. 
The same examination shows that the Categories was 
written before the Topics. Hence, since no one doubts 
the genuineness of the Topics, the Categories must be 
equally genuine, for no one has suggested that some 
one before Aristotle wrote the Categories, which 
Aristotle imitated in the Topics.I 
The style of the Categories is indeed unusual and has been a 
main point in the recent argument against authenticity. For Rose, Prantl, 
and Dupr~el, "the diffuseness2 of style and the 'senseless' repeti-
tions of the Categories are unworthy of Aristotle and unlike him," 
to use Husik's words.3 Also mention may be made of the dogmatic tone 
and the rather cut-and-dried method of treatment found in the Cate-
gories which contrast, say, to the Metaphysics. But one may admit 
these differences in style, tone, and treatment without being driven 
to the extremity of denying genuineness, say the champions of authen-
ticity. Thus Husik has argued that the Categories "is so strikingly 
1 Journal of Philosophy, XXXVI (August, 1939) 1 429. 
2corrected from "differences" by Husik, ibid., p. 427n. 
)philosophical Review, XIII (September, 1904), 517. 
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similar to that of the middle books of the Topics 1 1 both in tone1 style, 
and method of treatment, that one cannot help feeling that they belong 
to the same period."2 Zeller had earlier noted the parallel to the 
Topics in tone3 and agrees fundamentally with Ross 1 who compares the 
book to On Interpretation and Prior Analytics 1 4 that style1 tone, and 
treatment in the Categories are due to its being an early writing by 
Aristotle on logic. 
Surely no one can fairly settle a debate over style or tone with-
out fully sampling and savoring the materials. Here, however1 there 
is space only to report an opinion formed after doing so. In my 
judgment, the Categories and the Topics are remarkably alike in style1 
tone, and treabnent of materials, so much so that the two works seem 
to be products of the same period of logical writings by Aristotle. 
As no question has been raised about the genuineness of the Topics 1 
style and tone, then, constitute no conclusive argument against au-
thenticity of the Categories and may even be viewed as support for it. 
The argument for authenticity from terminology appeals to cer-
tain purely linguistic similarities. It is claimed that there are 
certain words and phrases common to the Categories and the Topics 
which are not much used elsewhere by Aristotle. As counted by Husik, 
these are seven in number--two single words and five phrases. 5 Thus, · 
1Husik cites fourteen passages in the Topics, mainly in Books IV, 
v, and VI, which exhibit the same diffuseness and repetitiousness so 
characteristic of the Categories (ibid., pp. 517-518). 
3I, 66 n. 4Aristotle, p. lOn. 
5philosophical Review, XIII (September, 1904), 518-519. 
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for example, the phrase ava ~(aoy is used exclusively in the ~­
goriesl and Topics2 to signify the intermediate or mean between con-
traries, whereas generally in the Physics and Metaphysics the term 
used is ,A.£:1'0}0. Another case is the word ..«..f.Lc:.J¢1) translated 1\:lim-
inution." This is used in the Categories3 and Topics4 as the opposite 
U~ A' of auyq'flS or "increase," while invariably ~!;jL<J'L) is used for "dim-
inution" in Aristotle's scientific and metaphysical works. Hence, the 
impression created by language, so runs the argument, is that the Cate-
gories is an early work by Aristotle belonging to the same period as 
the Topics. One notable feature of the linguistic argument as pre-
sented by Husik, though, is that the two words and five phrases com-
mon to the Categories and Topics have usually only a single instance. 
This does not destroy the argument, for its claim and the instances 
cited can be verified; but it does reduce its weight in establishing 
the case for authenticity. Mention also may be made here of Jaeger's 
counter argument that "the Categories cannot be an early work because 
the Lyceum is given as an example of the category of place."S This 
use of the term "Lyceum," however, is no proof that the work is late, 
for, as Mure bas well said, "the Lyceum was a haunt of Socrates. 11 6 
1A total of seventeen times, namely, in~· 12a2,3,9.10,11,17, 
20,23,24; 12b28,30,32,35,36; 13a7,8,13. 
2A total of sixteen t~es, namely, in Top. 106b4,5,8,10,11; 
123bl8,19,23,25,27,29; 124a6,7; 158b7,22,38. 
3cat . 15al3-14. ~op. 122a28. 
Sp. 46n. The instances are Cat . 2al and llbl4. 
6p. 268n. See also OWens, pp. 328-29. 
16 
The argument for authenticity of the Categories based on doctrine 
is considerably more complex and Lmportant than any from style and tone 
or terminology. In fact, the argument from doctrine occupies the major 
portion of Husik's paper. 1 Here, regrettably, there is room only to 
summarize and sample the doctrinal defense made for genuineness of the 
categories. 
The argument from doctrine contends that the numerous points of 
contact between the Categories and the Topics convey the impression 
that the Categories as a whole was written first by Aristotle and served 
as a doctrinal basis upon which Aristotle in the Topics built. Husik 
advances seventeen points supporting this thesis. Some classification 
of them is introduced by noting that these points include (1) twelve 
distinctions and definitions presupposed in the Topics as already es-
tablished in the Categories, (2) three doctrines in the Categories 
further developed in the Topics, and (3) two refutations of arguments 
against authenticity. In what follows, one sample from each group will 
be presented, with only mention made of the remainder. 
The way synonyms are referred to in the Topics can be considered 
an illustration of presupposed distinctions and definitions. Aristotle 
in Topics 109b7 states that genera are predicated synonymously of their 
species; for the latter admit both the name and defi nition of the 
former.2 It is here assumed that this condition constitutes synonymity. 
1Philosophical Review, XIII (September, 1904), 519-28. 
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As such this appears to be a tacit reference to the definition of syno-
nyms in Categories la6 to the effect that "things are said to be named 
'univocally' which have both the name and the definition answering to 
the name in common. 111 Moreover, almost the same words of Topics 109b7 
may be found in another place in the Categories, namely 3b2.2 Further, 
Topics 148a24 also gives the same definition of synonyms but does so 
merely in passing as if it were already known. 3 A similar case is 
found in Topics l62b37. These points support the claim that Aristotle's 
references to synonyms in the Topics presuppose a definition of synonym-
ity and in particular the one found in the Categories. In general, sim-
ilar reasoning is advanced for the eleven other distinctions and defini-
1E. M. Edghill 's rendition of quywvtJua JE. 4e~e.'\al ~\! To :rg, 
\( \ \ C \ 11 ~ 1 ,.. l ' < ) ,. 
OVQ#A KOlYCV @l o Kg.'T£ "j'OVVQ.llld\ Ap'JO~ Tf. OOG'l'*J 0 GU'N~ 1 • • • 
in Vol. I of the Oxford translation (J. A S ith an W. D. Ross (eds.], 
The Works of Aristotle, [12 vols.; London: Oxford University Press, 
1908-52]). Subsequent quotations from Aristotle's works in English 
will be from the Oxford translation unless otherwise indicated. 
3,~or terms whose definition corresponding to thei r common name 
is one and the same, are synonymous." 
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tionsl cited by Husik2 as doctrinal evidence that the Categories is an 
earlier, genuine book presupposed by Aristotle in the Topics. 
As an example of a doctrine in the Categories further developed 
in the Topics, one may cite the treatment of logical difference. First, 
it may be observed that Topics l07bl9 repeats almost word for word what 
Categories lbl6 says on this subject, as paralleling reveals even in 
the English of different translators in the Oxford edition: 
Cat. lbl6 
If genera are different and 
co-ordinate, their differen-
tiae are themselves different 
in kind. Take as an instance 
the genus 'animal' and the 
genus 1knowledge.•3 
Top. 107bl9 
Now since of genera that are 
different without being sub-
altern the differentiae also 
are different in kind, e.g. 
those of 'animal' and 'knowl-
d I 4 e ge ••• 
In addition, the way the Topics passage is introduced conveys the im-
lNamely, (l) ~· lal2-15 view of derivatives presupposed in Top. 
109b3-11; (2) Cat. la20-30 distinction between being "predicable of a 
subject" and "present in a subject" assumed in Top. l26a3, 127bl-4, and 
144b3l; (3) Cat. lbl0-15 principles that genus applies to species and 
individual, a~that individual belongs to species ~ genus assume~ 
in Top . l2la20-26; (4) f!!· lb25-2a3 list of 10 categories repeated in 
Top. 103b22; (5) Cat. 6b28-32 treatment of reciprocity between rela-
tives and correlatives referred to in Top. 125a5 and 149b4-12; (6) ~· 
10b26-lla discussion of qualities admitting variations similar to Top. 
127bl8-25; (7) Cat. lla23-36 distinction between "relative to oneself" 
and "relative to~e genus" presupposed in Top. 120b36-12la9, l24bl5-
26, l46a36, and 173b2; (8) ~· l2a20 description of means designated 
positively and negatively presupposed in Top. 123b20; (9) Cat. l2a29 
definition of "privation" referred to in Top. l06b27 and l43b35; (10) 
Cat. llbl6, l4a26, and l4b24 discussion of "property" presupposed in 
Top. l3lal4-l5; and (11) ~· l4b33 definition of "coordinate member 
of a division" presupposed in Top. l36b3, 142b7, and l43a34. 
2Philosophical Review, XIII (September, 1904), 520-21, 523, 525-
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pression of a direct reference to the Categories. Aristotle's doctrine 
here is that, regarding different genera which are not subordinated one 
to the other, the differences are different in species. But in a later 
passage found in Topics 144bl2 Aristotle corrects this view by adding 
that the differences in such a case need not be different unless the 
different genera cannot be put under a common higher genus. Still fur-
ther on in Topics 153b6, Aristotle adds more qualifications to make it 
clear that the word "different!' ( !'TtfW1'1) in the phrase "genera that 
are different" ("fwl/ ~1e~w ~Esi:iv) must not be understood as including 
contrary genera; for with them the case is different. If contrary 
genera can be included under the same genus, then some or all their dif-
ferences are contrary also. But if contrary genera belong to higher 
contrary genera, their differences may be all the same.l Thus the im-
pression is created that the Topics builds on a foundation laid pre-
viously in the Categories. The same may be said of the treatment of 
homonyms2 and opposites,3 to complete the three doctrines further de-
veloped mentioned above. 
One group of doctrinal points favoring authenticity remains. As 
was noted, it comprises refutations of specific arguments against au-
thenticity, and sampling it will complete this survey of the case for 
1" ••• of things whose genera are themselves contraries it may 
very well be that the same differentia is used of both. • " 
2Homonyms are defined and illustrated in Cat. 
whole chapter devoted to them in Top. l06al-107b37. 
sophical Review, XIII (September, 1904), 519-520. 
lal-6 but have a 
See Husik, Philo-
3cat. llb34-12al9 is the basis of the fuller treatment of oppo-
sites found in Top. 106a36-b2l, 109bl7-24, 123bl8-l24a9, 124a35-b7, 
143b35. See Husik, ibid., p. 526. 
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genuineness of the Categories based on internal evidence. The argument 
to be noted here1 is one Prantl based on the corrected definition in 
Categories 8a32 of the category of relation.2 He argues that the~-
gories could not have been written by Aristotle before the time of the 
later Stoic Chrysippus3 because in Categories 8a32 occurs the Stoic 
, " }/ 4 phrase '!\~OS "rt UW) t'K,t\Y • It is Prantl 's opinion that there would 
I I • be no occasion before Chrysippus to ask whether oeo} )t ~s the same as 
, , 'II 
'i\IOS ')t ]t.>S E.)_lJV • The latter expression, he asserts also, never oc-
curs elsewhere in works attributed to Aristotle. Hence Prantl concludes 
the author of the Categories was a late Peripatetic influenced by Stoic 
doctrine.5 
Husik's refutation of this argument against authenticity is in 
two parts.6 First, by linguistic analysis he shows that the phrase 
, " " ~pos ~( ~WS e)pY is best viewed as a condensed phrase implyi ng knowl-
edge of Categories 8a32 by the Stoics. Husik contends the Stoics 
judged the category of relation should be divided into two classes, 
I I 
and they retained the name "j\eos 'tt for the first. But to name the 
lThe other is one based on the mention of 6 kinds of motion in 
Cat. 15al3-14 instead of 3 as given in Physics 225b8-226b9, 243a7, and 
260a27. See Husik, Philosophical Review, XIII (1904), 527-28. 
2 ,, ' I L , ,. ,, ) , , 
£0"1'l TO. '"'9os ?t OtS lo uvo.<. "i'"o..o ·jov E.(J\l T!f l\Ios j<. 
'RQ.!$ t);EW • • • transi ted "those things only are properly cal ed 
relative in the case of which relation to an external object is a 
necessary condition of existence." 
3chrysippus is usually dated 280-209 B.C. 
4prantl has reference to the Stoic division of existents into 4 
1 
, , , , , , )/ 
c asses, O'ilOK£-\).l£:Y"-, 'UoL4 , 'ii~os 1c , and 'D(o) \t 1\AA) ~oy \fl. • 
5Geschichte der Logik, I, 201. 
6Phi1osophical Review, XIII (1904), 524-25. 
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second they abbreviated the corrected definition found in Categories 
8 32 d ....... ~ ~ ,, a to rea u po5 'fc "ii!JS ~<>v Hence their usage of the phrase sug-
gests acquaintance with the Categories as written by Aristotle, not 
Stoic authorship of the book. 
Secondly, regarding the claim that the phrase never occurs else-
where in Aristotle, Husik replies by noting that earlier Waitzl had 
pointed out its occurrence in Topics 142a29 and 146b4. Furthermore, 
Zeller, 2 writing after Prantl, noted occurrence in Physics 247a2 
and 247b3 and in Nicomachean Ethics ll0lbl3, and Husik himself3 adds 
Topics 170b30 and 170b39. 
This is a type of doctrinal argumentation and rebuttal whose 
merits can be determined only after a careful scrutiny. But it must 
suffice here to report that in my judgment after scrutiny Husik has 
fully refuted Prantl 1 s argument. There is also considerable assur-
ance in the fact that W. D. Ross now shares the same opinion.4 
An additional argument for authenticity may be derived from 
considering all the preceding arguments for genuineness . In fact, 
an impressive argument arises when one contemplates as a whole the 
many considerations of style and tone, terminology and doctrine which 
favor authenticity of the Categories. Such a cumulative argument is 
not only separate but in some respects the most forceful. Comparable 
1In his Aristotelis Organon Graece (Leipzig: Hahn, 1844-1846), 
I, 266. 
2Aristotle, I, 65n.-66n. 3philosophical Review, XIII (1904), 525. 
~oss says that "Professor Husik is completely successful in 
pointing out (1) that the phrase does occur elsewhere in Aristotle 
••• and (2) that the Stoic usage is best explained as a brachylogy 
implying knowledge of the passage 8a32 by the Stoics" (Journal of 
Philosophy, XXXVI [August, 1939], 432). 
to it is the case for the modern theory of evolution which combines 
reasoning based on different lines of evidence to produce an argu-
ment similarly cumulative and impressive. 
2. The Question of Chronology and Relevance 
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We may now return to our postponed questions of chronology and 
relevance. Should we begin with the Categories as the earliest genuine 
work bearing on Aristotle's definition of category? 
First, let it be affirmed that this book does appear to be one 
of the earliest writings of Aristotle. This point has been illus-
trated a number of times in the preceding survey of debate over its 
authenticity. We noted a number of arguments developed from strik-
ing resemblances in style and tone as well as terminology and doctrine. 
Such arguments combine to place the Categories not only in the same 
early logical period as the Topics but at the basis of subsequent 
development in the latter. We should feel no serious question now 
about placing the Categories before the Topics and agreeing with 
Husik that it is "one of the earliest attempts of Aristotle."1 
However, it is more important to determine whether the Cate-
gories is really relevant to our task. Here it may be mentioned that 
1Philosophical Review, XIII (1904), 528. 
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in Topics 103b20-27 occurs the only complete list of the ten categories 
to be found in Aristotle apart from Categories lb25-2a3. Most note-
worthy, though, is the fact that they are not defi ned in the Topics 
passage1 or, for that matter, elsewhere in the book. This suggests 
that the categories are not treated in the Topics for the first time 
and that we may perhaps find their definition in the earlier Catego-
~· This remains to be seen, but the suggestion appears likely 
enough to warrant turning to the Categories as the earliest of the 
relevant materials we should consider. 
3. Evidence Furnished by the Categories 
Aristotle begins his early work titled categories by noting 
certain linguistic facts. He devotes his first chapter in lal-15 to 
describing what we would call homonyms, synonyms, and derivatives. 
Then in lal6 he distinguishes between simple2 and composite3 expres-
sions. This he illustrates by saying '~xamples of the latter are 
such expressions as 1 the man runs, ' 'the man wins'; of the former 
'man, 1 'ox, 1 'runs, 1 1wins. 1 "4 Obviously here Aristotle is dis-
tinguishing single words from more complex sentences. 
lwhich reads, "Next, then, we must distingui sh between the 
classes of predicates in which the four orders in question are found. 
These are ten in number, Essence, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, 
Time, Position, State, Activity, Passivity . For the accident and 
genus and property and definition of anything will always be in one 
of these categories: for all the propositions found through these 
signify either something's essence or its quality or quantity or some 
one of the other types of predicate." 
2 ' ... '( / \. \ \ / 
"'ja KG , a ,Lit] ¢£,f.L{Il y Q)JLLfll\aK•lY at.-,tvx~ 
3 ~, ~ \ \ \ \ , 41 17 19 
. ~ I< lA\ 10. !J)~M 111\ o lfkp' "~ a - • 
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In now familiar Aristotelian fashio~ this distinction is followed 
by several others, filling Chapters 2 and 3. The manner of presenta-
tion is indeed cut-and-dried, but more notable is that Aristotle ceases 
discussing verbal expressions to dwell on 1b. ~'1/lo.. or "the things that 
are meant," as Cooke puts it in the Loeb Library translation.l Actually, 
the remainder of Chapter 2 is devoted to distinguishing between things 
which are (1) predicable of a subject,2 (2) present in a subject,3 
(3) both predicable of and present in a subject, 4 and (4) neither pred-
icable of nor present in a subject. 5 Aristotle here is dividing the 
entities to which verbal expressions refer into four groups--classes of 
substances, individual qualities, types of qualities, and individual 
substances--as Ross has noted.6 Chapter 3 next advances two claims 
1Aristotle1 The Organon, trans. Harold P. Cooke, et al. (2 vols.; 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938-1945), I, 15. 
2 Aristotle's phrase refers to the relation of universal to par-
ticular. Thus his illustration is that "man" is predicable of the in-
dividual man (la21-23). 
3Aristotle means the relation of an attribute to its possessor. 
Note his definition of the phrase in la23-24: "By being 'present in 
a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but 
being incapable of existence apart from the said subject." Aristotle's 
illustration in la25-26 is that an item of grammatical knowledge is 
present in the mind but not predicable of any subject. 
4-Knowledge, for example, is present in the human mind and also 
predicable of grammar (lbl-2). 
5For example, an individual man (lb5). 
6w. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics (2 vols., 2d ed. rev.; 
London: Oxford University Press, 1953), I, lxxxvii n. 
25 
likewise not primarily on the subject of verbal expressions, namely, 
what is predicable of the predicate is predicable of the subject,l and 
differentiae of species in one genus are not identical with those in 
another, unless one genus is included in the other.2 
It is with Chapter 41 though, that Aristotle resumes the topic 
of simple verbal expressions and introduces the categories. The pas-
sage merits quotation in full: 
Expressions which are in no way composite signify 
substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, 
position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my 
meaning roughly, examples of substance are 'man' or 
'the horse,' of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits 
long' or 'three cubits long,' of quality, such attri-
butes as 'white,' 'grammatical.' 'Double,' 1 half1 1 
'greater,' fall under the category of relation; 1 in 
the market place,' 'in the Lyceum,' under that of 
place; 'yesterday,' 'last year,' under that of time. 
'Lying,' 'sitting,' are terms indicating position; 
'shod ' 'armed 1 state· 'to lance ' 1 to cauterize ' 
' ' , ' ' 3 action; 'to be lanced,' 1 to be cauterized,' affection. 
While the word "category (l'o."l'~)O p(a.) does not appear in this 
passage in the Greek4 nor in the Categories until Chapter 8,5 there 
is no doubt that Aristotle is here speaking of the categories. He 
is identifying the categories with the meanings of incomplex words 
and phrases and illustrating a list of ten such meanings, namely: 
1lbl0-15. 
4As Ross 




suggests in translating the ~p05 '\( d£. o't().., d<'i\>..~qto'( 
"'Double,' 'half,' 'greater, fall under the category 
Cooke avoids using "category" here in his translation 













quality (tro ~ 6 ~) 
relation <y t51 rc.) 
place (1F"c G) 




action (Tot. eL,v) 
affection 4 (n9ao~6L.y) 
There is disappointment in store for all who read on in the 
Categories after Chapter 4 expecting Aristotle to define more ex-
plicitly the notion of category he has introduced. Obviously, he 
proceeds to discuss the meaning of the categories in his list, but 
nowhere in Chapters 5 through 9 is there any formal definition of 
category. Nor can any be found in Chapters 10 through 151 the so-
called Postpredicaments concluding the book. But while creating 
difficulties, the absence of clear definition of category does at 
least provide point for this part of our investigation. 
1or date, Ross translates in his Aristotle, p. 21. 
2
or posture, both Ross (ibid . ) and Cooke (I, 17) suggest. 
3or possession (so Ross, Aristotle, p. 21) or condition (so 
Cooke, I, 17). 
4or passivity (so Ross, Aristotle, p. 21.) 
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We may observe, then, that Aristotle first discusses the cate-
gory of substance in as long a chapter1 as one will find in the Cate-
gories. Subsequent chapters of varying length take up in order quan-
tity,2 relation, 3 and quality. 4 Chapter 9 comprising llbl-14 deals 
much more briefly with the four categories remaining. Aristotle here 
employs the now familiar device of referring his readers to his orig-
inal presentation on time, place, and state in Chapter 4, 5 but the 
6 
single paragraph involved and quoted above obviously lacks any ex-
planation. Aristotle's Categories, then, provides neither a formal 
definition of category nor a full discussion of all ten categories.? 
However, despite the shortcomings of this early writing, it con-
tains evidence on Aristotle's view of category, as will be shown. 
First, we may note that Chapter 5 dealing with substance is by far 
the most important in the Categories. In fact, it may be said that 
the whole discourse turns on Aristotle's fundamental doctrine of in-
12all-4bl9, which fills 7 .pages in the Oxford translation by 
Ross. 
24b20-6a35. 36a36-8b24. 48b25-lla39. 
5"As for the rest, time, place, state, since they are easily 
intelligible, I say no more about them than was said at the beginning, 
that in the category of state are included such states as 'shod,' 
'armed,' in that of place 'in the Lyceum' and so on, as was explained 
befor~' (llbl0-14). 
6p. 25. 
7T. Case explains the latter by classing the Categories as an 
uncompleted work "in which the main part on categories is not fin-
ished" ("Aristotle," Encyclopaedia Britannica [24 vols.; 11th ed.; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910], II, 509.) 
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dividual substances presented therein. We observ~ then, that in 
Chapter 5 Aristotle first distinguishes primary substance from second-
ary substance. Primary substance is said to be 11 that which is neither 
predicable of a subject nor present in a subject, 111 ~-~·' individual 
men or horses. Secondary substance is identified with the species 
and genera in which primary substances are included, 2 ~-~·'a par-
ticular man is included in the species "man, 11 which in turn is in-
eluded in the genus 11animal." By this important distinction substance 
is divided into two parts and the view advanced that individual sub-
stances form the primary subdivision of the first category. 
The remainder of Chapter 5 in the Categories is devoted to 
describing substance in both its types. Aristotle distinguishes 
five characteristics. Substance can be described as (1) being no ac-
cidental attribute, 3 (2) predicated unambiguously, 4 (3) individual, 5 
(4) possessing neither contrary nor degrees, 6 and (5) admitting con-
trary qualities.7 Aristotle then devotes Ghaptera 61 7, and 8 to in-
12al2-13. 
211But in a secondary sense those things are called substances 
within which, as species, the primary substances are included; also 
those which, as genera, include the species11 (2al4-16). 
32al9-3a32. This is true of both primary and secondary sub-
stance. 
4 3a33-3b9. Only of secondary substance is this said. 
53bl0-24. This is true only of primary substance. 
63b25-4a9. Aristotle is speaking of both primary and second-
ary substance. 
74al0-4bl9. Here only primary substance is described. 
quiring whether these features are possessed by quantity, relation, 
and quality . Many of them are, he finds, but only the fifth char-
acteristic of admitting contrary qualities is a feature of all pri-
mary substances and nothing else . Nevertheless, we will pass over 
these details about the other categories to concentrate on what 
is said about substance in Chapter 5 . The central importance of 
this topic both in the Categories and in Aristotle's thought as a 
whole makes this seem a justifiable procedure. 
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Following his division of substance into two types, Aristotle 
discusses in Chapter 5 what we would describe as the difference in 
relations between essential and accidental attributes and their sub-
jects . In the case of essential attributes, he claims, "both the 
name and the definition of the predicate must be predicable of the 
subject . " 1 For example, the name "man" and its definition are ap-
plicable to the individual man . But in the case of accidental at-
tributes, as a rule " ••• neither their name nor their definition is 
predicable of that in which they are present . " 2 These observations 
on attributes prepare us for the next claim that everything except 
primary substance is either an essential or an accidental attribute 
of primary substance . 3 Thus , to use his examples, the genus or sec -
ondary substance "animal" is predicable as an essential attribute of 
the species "man" and therefore of the individual man or primary sub-
stance . Likewise, color as an accidental attribute may be said to 
12al9-21 . 2 2a28- 29 . 3za34- 36 . 
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be present in body and therefore in individual bodies, "for if there 
were no individual body in which it was present, it could not be pres-
ent in body at all. 111 Undoubtedly, the most important contention 
among these is that primary substance is never an attribute, neither 
essential nor accidental. 
To continue with the content of the fifth chapter of the cate-
gories, we observe that Aristotle next makes six additional points 
under the general claim that substance is never an accidental attrib-
ute. His remarks deal mainly with secondary substance in a somewhat 
disjointed and repetitious manner, as even a summary such as the fol-
lowing shows. The first of Aristotle's six additional observations 
on secondary substance is that species are more truly substance than 
are genera. This is so, argues Aristotle, because species are (1) 
closer to primary substance and (2) in the same relation to genera 
as subsists between the underlying primary substances and everything 
else.2 Secondly, all species not genera are substance to the same 
degree, and similarly all primary substances are substances in the 
same degree. 3 Thirdly, only species and genera can be called sec-
ondary substances,4 for they alone of all predicates convey knowl-
1 2b2-3. 
22b7-22. This suggestion of a hierarchy among secondary sub-
stances advances on the claim in 2al4-16 that secondary substances 
are species and genera (quoted above, p. 28n.). 
32b23-29. Neither claim has been made previously. 
4Aristotle is repeating the claim in 2al4-16. 
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edge of primary substances. 1 Aristotle's fourth point is that the 
relation of primary substance to secondary substance and to all other 
predicates is the same as that of secondary substance to all other 
2 predicates. In his fifth point, found in 3a6-21, Aristotle claims 
that substance in both its types is never an accidental attribute; 
for primary substance is never an attribute, 3 and secondary substance 
requires that both name and definition be applicable to the subject 
4 
whereas an accidental attribute does not. The sixth and last point 
made in this part of 6hapter 5 is that the differentiae of species 
also are not accidental attributes. 5 
We may pause here to state the gist of what has emerged so far 
in Chapter 5 of the Categories. Aristotle has claimed that there are 
two types of substance--primary substance comprising individual par-
ticulars and secondary substance consisting of species which include 
such individual entities and of genera including such species. Sub-
stance, both primary and secondary, is never an accidental attribute. 
Furthermore, primary substance is never an essential attribute where-
as secondary substance always is . 
22b38-3a5, the first sentence of which reiterates the conten-
tion in 2bl5-17 that primary substances underlie and are subjects of 
everything else. 
3Aristotle is repeating the important point made in 2a34-36. 
4As was said in 2a28-29. 
5 3a22-28. 
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The rest of Chapter 5 in the Categories is devoted to stating and 
describing more briefly the characteristics primary substance possesses 
in addition to being no attribute. First, however, Aristotle observes 
further about secondary substances (species and genera) and differen-
tiae that they may be predicated univocally or unambiguously.l He re-
sumes his task by next noting that all substance appears to be indi-
vidual. Yet, Aristotle adds, only primary substance is truly described 
as individual. The words we use may suggest that secondary substances 
also are individual, but the suggestion is not true; for "a secondary 
substance is not an individual, but a class with a certain qualifica-
tion; for it is not one and single as primary substance is."2 Thus, 
in addition to being no attribute, primary substance alone is indi-
vidual,3 while secondary substance is the qualification of that which 
is individual.4 
Next we are told that substance has no contrary. In fact, 
Aristotle claims, both types of substance as well as all definite 
quantitative terms have no contraries.5 Then he says that no sub-
stance can be what it is in varying degrees.6 This contention does 
not contradict the previous suggestion7 of a hierarchy among substances 
in which some are more truly substance than others; for in denying 






7rn 2all-b22. See p. 28 above. 
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stance admits of variations of degree within itself as does, for exam-
ple, a quality. 
The last characteristic of primary substance noted in the ~­
gories is that it admits contrary qualities. 1 This feature Aristotle 
finds to be the most distinctive of all; for only of primary sub-
stances may contrary qualities be predicated. 2 The same one color, 
for example, cannot be both white and black, but the same primary 
substance can be warm at one time and cold at another. Statements 
and opinions, which admittedly can be both true and false, only seem 
to be exceptions to this rule about contrary qualities. Primary sub-
stances admit contrary qualities because the substances themselves 
undergo change. Thus, Aristotle illustrates, 11 ••• that which was 
hot becomes cold, for it has entered into a different state."3 In con-
trast, statements and opinions remain unaltered, as only the facts of 
the case change. Hence "the statement 'he is sitting' remains unal-
tered, but it is at one time true, at another false, according to cir-
cumstances."4 
We conclude this section with a summary of the evidence on 
Aristotle's definition of category found in the Categories. The 
main points as noted above are: 
14al0-4bl9. 
2Ross conveys the erroneous impression that secondary substances 
also admit contrary qualities with his statement that this character-
istic "alone is found to be true of all substances and of nothing else" 
(Aristotle, p. 24). 
34a31-32. 44a37-4b2. 
l. There are two types of verbal expressions--single words 
and more complex sentences. 
2. The entities to which verbal expressions refer fall into 
four groups--classes of substances, individual qualities, 
types of qualities, and individual substances. 
3. Simple verbal expressions which signify substance, quan-
tity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, 
action, and affection are the categories. 
4. Substance, the first and most discussed of the categories, 
exists in two types--primary substances, !·~·' individual 
particulars, and secondary substances, !·~·' species and 
genera in which such individual particulars may be in-
cluded. 
5. Secondary substance is characterized by being an essential 
but not an accidental attribute, being unambiguously pred-
icable, and possessing neither contrary nor degrees. 
6. Primary substance, more importantly, is never either an 
essential or an accidental attribute, is individual, pos-
sesses neither contrary nor degrees, and, uniquely among 
all the categories, admits contrary qualities. 
These, then, are the claims in the Categories bearing most on 
how Aristotle defined category in this early writing. But while this 
may be an adequate summary of what Aristotle says, it is still far 
from clear what he means by these statements. To this pressing ques-
tion we now pass, searching for what "category" meant to Aristotle 
when he wrote Categories. 
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4. The Meaning of the Evidence Furnished by the Categories 
Aristotle's doctrine of the categories bas been unusually puz-
zling. It bas generated considerable discussion and controversy, much 
of which bas centered on the formulation of the doctrine in the Cate-
gories. The continuing uncertainty about Aristotle's meaning is the 
result of several causes. Among them is the absence of any definite 
information on Aristotle's precise purpose in formulating the view. 
Another is the fact that nowhere in Aristotle's extant works is the 
doctrine to be seen in the making. As we saw in the preceding sec-
tion on the content of the Categories, Aristotle expounds at length 
a rather developed view of the categories as part of that work 
written in his early period. Moreover, in later works such as 
the Prior Analytical and On the Soul,2 he alludes to the doctrine 
of the categories as familiar.3 We do not know in detail, then, 
either why or how Aristotle developed his category doctrine found 
1For example, in 49a7-101 which reads, "The expressions 'this 
belongs to that' and 'this holds true of that' must be understood in 
as many ways as there are different categories, and these categories 
must be taken either with or without qualification, and further as 
simple or compound: the same holds good of the corresponding nega-
tive expressions." 
2rn 402a23-251 which reads, nFirst, no doubt, it is necessary 
to determine in which of the summa genera soul lies, what it is; is 
it 'a this-somewhat,' a substance, or is it a quale or a quantum, or 
some other of the remaining kinds of predicates which we have dis-
tinguished?" See also 410al3-15 where Aristotle says of the word "isn 
that "it may be used of a 'this' or substance, or of a quantum, or of 
a quale1 or of any other of the kinds of predicates we have distin-
guished." 
3aoss says the preceding three references "may be definite ref-
erences to the Categories" (Aristotle's Metaphysics, I, lxxxii n.), 
but whether to that specific work or not, the allusions to the cate-
gory doctrine as familiar are clear. 
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first in the Categories. No wonder that centuries later there should 
exist doubt about his meaning. Hence in proceeding we tackle a fair-
ly formidable problem of interpretation. 
a. Trendelenburg's Theory 
We may begin by exploring the merits of F. A. Trendelenburg's 
theory on the course of thought which led Aristotle to his tenfold 
list of categories . The German philosopher and philologist was the 
first to suggest that Aristotle derived his distinctions between the 
categories from grammatical considerations. The categories, Trendelen-
burg advocated in a series of writings, 1 were originated during Aris-
totle 1s investigation of grammatical functions. In addition, there 
exists a correspondence between the categories and the parts of speech 
in Greek. Listing Trendelenburg's specific claims on this point, we 
are confronted with the following: 
category Part of SEeech 
1. substance (oo(t{~ ) corresponds to the substantive noun 
2. quantity ('Ro<fO'I ) corresponds to the adjective of quantity 
3. quality (1)o{oy ) corresponds to the adjective of quality 
4. relation <~(?fs 'f(, ) corresponds to the adjective of the com-
parative degree 
5. place (1\'ov) corresponds to the adverb of place 
lparticularly in his De Aristotelis Categoriis (Berlin: August 
Petschi, 1833}, in Elementa Logices Aristotelicae (Berlin: Weber, 
1836), and in Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, which is the first 
volume of his Historische Beitr~ge zur PhilosoEhie (3 vols.; Berlin: 
G. Bethge, 1846-1867). 
6. time (1\o'I'E) corresponds to the adverb of time 
7. position (K elo-eo.c ) corresponds to the intransitive verb 
)I 
8. state (E'X,€t v) 
9. action (1\o<. ~'i'v ) 
corresponds to the pluperfect tense of 
the verb 





affection (1\0.0X£1V) corresponds to the passive voice of the 
verb 
This plausible theory enjoyed considerably more support when 
first advanced than it does at present. The criticisms advanced by 
Herman Bonitzl have done the most damage, but it would be rash to 
say that Trendelenburg's theory has been exploded. Our appraisal 
of its merits will be aided if next we summarize the chief criticisms 
made by Bonitz and reiterated by later critics such as Zeller2 and 
Ross.3 First, Aristotle does not unmistakably show that he arrived 
at all of his categories through grammatical distinctions. Indeed, 
the data supplied by the Categories may be quite differently inter-
preted. Second, there was no complete list of parts of speech avail-
able to Aristotle. In the Categories he does not distinguish the 
adverbs and, in fact, recognizes in his writings only the noun and 
verb4 and the conjunction and article.5 Third, the two series--cate-
lin ''Uber die Categorien Aristotelis," Sitzungsbericht der 
Wiener Akademie, X (1853), 591-6451 and in "Aristotelische Studien," 
Sitzungsbericht der Wiener Akademie, XXXIX (1862) 1 183-280. 
2Aristotle, I, 280 n.-281 n. 
3Aristotle, p. 22; Aristotle's Metaphysics, I, lxxxiii. 
4In On Interpretation 16a20-16b26. 
Sin Poetics 1456b20-1457al01 the authenticity of which is much 
in question, says Ross (Aristotle, p. 22 n.). 
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gories and parts of speech--do not correspond to the extent we ex-
pect. (a) Many substantive nouns do not designate substance in the 
primary Aristotelian sense, as Aristotle himself insists in Chapter 
5 of the Categories,l citing the nouns "color," "action," "state-
ment," and "opinion."2 (b) Quantity and quality are as well expressed 
by nouns <!:.•i• 1 "whiteness") and verbs ("he has lvhitened") as by ad-
jectives. (c) For "relation" actually no granunatical form can be 
found. (d) Time is designated by adjectives also ("yesterday's"), 
not only by adverbs. (e) Action and affection are conveyed by nouns 
such as "transaction" and "suffering," and not merely by the active 
and passive voice of verbs. 
This, indeed, is impressive criticism of a plausible theory. 
One cannot escape the cumulative force of Bonitz 1 three main conten-
tions--that grammatical derivation of the categories is textually 
not beyond doubt1 that to Aristotle some parts of speech are lacking, 
and that missing for us is complete correspondence of categories and 
parts of speech. In addition, it is significant how many able critics 
have sided with Bonitz. Trendelenburg 1 s theory has been rejected by 
such scholars as E. Zeller,3 H. W. B. Joseph1 4 R. Adamson1 5 and W. D. 
Ross.6 All this creates the impression that the case against Tren-
14al0-4b3. 2see p. 33 above. 
3Aristotle, I, 280n.-28ln. 
4An Introduction to Logic (2d ed. rev.; Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1931) 1 p. 60. 
5ucategory1 " Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed. 1 V1 509. 
6Aristotle1 p. 22; Aristotle's Metaphysics, I 1 lxxxiii. 
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delenburg is conclusive, and it certainly is difficult to think other-
wise. 
However, the evidence seems to impose the difficulty. The main 
flaw in the above case against Trendelenburg is the claim that for 
"relation" no grammatical form can be found. This is not true. At 
the beginning of Chapter 7 in the Categories where "relation" is dis-
cussed, Aristotle calls "relative" those terms which in Greek (1) have 
a genitive dependent upon theml and (2) which call for a prepositional 
phrase dependent upon them.2 While this distinction can only be para-
phrased in an English translation3--no single English form doing jus-
tice to Greek use of the genitive--it is still based on Greek grammat-
ical distinctions. The latter were involved, then, in the derivation 
of at least one category. Hence wholesale rejection of Trendelenburg's 
theory seems unwarranted, and one is inclined to agree with c. M. Gil-
lespie that the theory "has been unduly depreciated by later writers."4 
Yet we must conclude also with Gillespie that Trendelenburg's 
suggestion "does not carry us very far."5 The other criticisms of 
la > ' " 1 '" .1 '5' \" o<So. aO'i'a. anef E.O"i'W £'\'~e~" ~lV~H A£lr;l'at(6a36-37). 
2 (f t " {I \ l/ ) ~ o'?wcrovy aA~ft.!5 "eos t:7£pov (6a37-38 • 
3As both Ross and Cooke recognize in notes to their translations 
of 6a36-38. The clearer paraphrase by Ross of the passage reads: 
"Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of 
something else or related to something else, are explained by reference 
to that other thing." 




Bonitz remain untouched and block any further defense. To them may 
be added the observation that it is not apparent Aristotle derived 
the category of relation from the comparative adjective. One would 
have expected Trendelenburg to suggest genitive forms instead. There-
fore, in conclusion, what seems true is that Aristotle derived only a 
small part of his list of categories from grammatical considerations. 
At best, though, Trendelenburg 1 s theory in its most acceptable 
form explains only the derivation of Aristotle 1 s category doctrine, 
not its meaning. The genesis of this doctrine is an important ques-
tion still unanswered, but it requires the type of historical inves-
tigation with which we are not concerned primarily. We are seeking 
to determine what Aristotle meant by category in his completed Cate-
gories, not the process by which that level of meaning was reached. 
b. Category as Classification of Namable Realities 
We address our problem directly, then, by first recalling that 
the categories are introduced by Aristotle in connection with simple 
verbal expressions.l In fact, the doctrine is presented as a classi-
fication of the meanings of words and phrases as contrasted to more 
complex sentences or judgments. Equally significant, however, is 
Aristotle 1 s concern with the entities to which simple verbal expres-
sions refer. As we noted also,2 he classifies such entities into 
four groups,3 and this suggests his interest is logical, not merely 
1see pp. 23-26 above. 2p. 24 above. 
3classes of substances, individual qualities, types of quali-
ties, and individual substances. 
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grammatical. His approach to the classification of what we call ob-
jects of thought is by considering the words we use to symbolize 
them. This naturally led Trendelenburg to suggest the doctrine was 
based entirely on grammatical considerations. But Aristotle in the 
Categories is concerned with objects of thought as well as the names 
for them. The doctrine of the categories is actually presented as 
a classification of the meanings of simple words and phrases, but 
these are meanings which refer to entities describable as objects of 
thought. 
Bearing this in mind, let us proceed by reflecting upon the 
terms Aristotle uses in stating his category doctrine in the Cate-
gories. This approach at once may register itself as unduly arid, 
but such a first impression may prove to be another false one. In 
the Categories Aristotle uses the rather general word 1£v~ ("kinds") 
to refer to the categories. However, this occurs only twice.l His 
preferred term is k'o.'i' ,.O e (a , 2 and this word in the plural as well 
as with variants appears frequently in his later works. The noun 
K"o.'i' q"6o p(a. is derived from the verb KO.'\'~~opE.\V normally meaning "to 
predicate." This suggests that Ko,i~~op (a. means either "predication" 
or "predicate," and, as a matter of record, instances of each mean-
llla38 and llbl5. 
2Found in 3a35, 3a37, 10b20, and 10b22. 
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ing may be found in Aristotle's other works.l 
There are reasons, however, for holding that neither meaning ex-
, 
presses the full import of 1<0. --rn~op1a.. in the Categories. It must be 
acknowledged, though, that this claim does not cover the two occurren-
ces of the term in 3a35 and 3a37. These appear while Aristotle is con-
tending in 3a33-b9 that secondary substances may be predicated unam-
biguously, and they are cases where either 11predication" or "predicate" 
will serve as a translation.2 So our attention is confined to the re-
maining two (£!!. l0b20 and 10b22) and to the general claim that Aris-
1 
totle does not mean "predicate" in his use of "category" (ko. 'l'q!oVta) 
in these specific places or elsewhere in the Categories where the idea 
but not the term is employed . 
In support of this contention, we may note, first, that the 
1 Kos'1"~~~(~ as "predication" occurs 8 times, namely in On In-
terpretatio fa29, in Prior Analytics 4la4, 4lal2, 4lb31, 44a34, 
45b34, 57bl9, and in Posterior Analytics 84al. Kc::l'i'r)~O~t~ as "pred-
icate" occurs 3 times, namely, in Prior Analytics 52a 5, Posterior 
Analytics 96bl3, and in On Coming-to-Be and Passing-Away 318bl6. 
There are 4 other insta~ces where the context allows either transla-
tion, specifically, Posterior Analytics 82a20, Topics l09b5 and l4la4, 
and Metaphysics 1007a35. Ross has collected these instances in his 
Aristotle's Metaphysics, I, lxxxiii n. 
2Ross says this (ibid.) and uses "predicate11 in his Oxford 
translation, as does Co~in the Loeb. The passage containing both 
instances as rendered by Ross reads: "It is the mark of substances 
and of differentiae that, in all propositions of which they form the 
predicate [K'IATY)~O~krt], they are predicated univocally. For all such 
propositions have for their subject either the individual or the 
species. It is true that, inasmuch as primary substance is not predi-
cable of anything, it can never form the predicate [Ka "i' ~~ Df(t~..] of any 
proposition" (3a33-37). 
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\ I ( I 
regular term for "predicate" is 'i'o Ko. '!' 1loeou.u.£vol.) not ~ K'41 1 q)o~ 14. • 
Secondly, Aristotle 1s illustrations suggest that the classification in 
the Categories is not a classification of predicates. As we saw,l his 
. . \ \ ( ; \ ' 
examples of sunple verbal express1.ons--ro. Ko/\'4 ,a qMiJ+ £4'\1 O'(.lu.1l"P~Y 
b s; a~:f"i..\ld.. -- are "man," "ox1 11 "runs, 11 "wins, u2 and such a list includes 
subjects of propositions as well as predicates. Thirdly, substance, 
the first category, is divided into two parts, of which the primary 
one is said to be that which is neither predicable of a subject nor 
present in a subject.3 What is more, this view that individual sub-
stances, ~·~·' an individual man or horse, comprise the primary sub-
division of the first category is consistently maintained by Aristotle 
in later works. It seems a regular feature4 of his category doctrine 
and one not compatible with the view that "category" means "predicate" 
in the Categories. 
It is considerations such as these that led the able critic 
I Bonitz to reject such a definition of f<6\'l'q11l~lo.. . He adds that in 
certain passages5 outside the Categories where the category doctrine 
/ is not at stake, KC\'I' ~ ~Of ! t\ means "name" or "designation" rather than 
"predicate." Bonitz believes that it was from this sense that the 
lon p. 23 above. 2lal7-19. 32al2-13. See p. 28 above. 
4And not an excrescence, as Otto Apelt holds in his BeitrHge zur 
Geschichte der Grieschen Philosophie (Leipzig; Teubner, 1891), pp. 142-
45. 
5The clearest ones are On Sophistical Refutations 18lb281 Physics 
192bl7, Parts of Animals 639a301 and Metaphysics 1028a28. 
technical meaning of "category" developed. Therefore the categories 
in this early work are a classification of the meanings of names. 
The list in the Categories classifies namable objects of thought, 
and among these naturally are included individual primary substances 
as well as those entities which can serve as predicates. According 
to this line of thought, "category" in the Categories does not mean 
"predicate" but "classification of namable realities." We are called 
upon to divorce the technical meaning of the word from its natural 
meaning as "predicate." 
This, indeed, is a serious summons and comes with no little 
support. However, it seems basically unwarranted and calls for a 
refutation. Here we only make such a judgment and briefly state the 
grounds of our dissatisfaction while seeking a more adequate view. 
First, it is no serious charge to note that Aristotle does not use 
the regular term for "predicate" or employs "category" to mean 
"name" or "designation." Serious students of Aristotle know that 
regularity in vocabulary usage and consistency in meaning are not 
among his few literary virtues. Secondly 1 while admittedly his il-
lustrations of simple verbal expressions in lal7·19 include both 
subjects as well as predicates, it may be urged in reply that this 
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is not the definitive passage. The latter is the fuller list of 
examples in lb25-2a4,l where there is a greater emphasis by Aristotle 
and the possibility of plausible interpretation in terms of predicates, 
as will be shown below. 
lQuoted on p. 25 above. 
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c . Category as Ultimate Type of Predicate 
The third objection stated abovel is by far the weightiest. It 
is the contention that primary substances do not fit properly into 
Aristotle ' s category doctrine, since they as individual substances 
are always subjects and never predicates . Hence the ban on defin-
ing category in terms of predicates appears . But this is not an ac-
curate interpretation of the Categories . Those making the latter 
claim would admit, however, that primary substances as described by 
Aristotle are not predicates but subjects . Socrates himself or cal-
lias the art patron of the Protagoras or Coriscus the Academician- - to 
cite men used in examples elsewhere in the Organon2--are not properly 
predicates on Aristotelian principles. But "substance" itself can be 
viewed as a predicate. This is possible by following through a certain 
type of questioning. If, for instance, we seek to determine what "Soc-
rates" is, we could begin by asking, ''What is this thing?" A conceiv-
able reply is "A man . " ''But \-7hat is a man?" "An animal . " "And what 
is an animal?" "A substance . " "Substance" is the last predicate we 
reach if we complete this line of inqu~ry, and in similar fashion 
the other categories may be reached. Therefore, if we ask what 
"Socrates" is, the ultimate ans\·7er--ultimate in the sense of the most 
1 P . 43 . 
2socrates is used in Topics 103a30 and 160b27-28 and in On So-
phistical Refutations 166b34 and 183b7. Coriscus appears in On So-
phistical Refutations 166b32; 173b31, 38; 175bl9-23, 25; 176a7; 
179al-2; 179b2-3,9,28,33; 18la10; 182a20-21 . Callias is referred 
to in On Sophistical Refutations 176al, 8 and 179a5 . 
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general--is the predicate "a substance." Similarly, if we ask what 
"red" is, the ultimate answer is the predicate "a quality." The 
categories, then, may properly be called "predicates," in fact, pred-
icates par excellence, for technically they are the broadest pred-
icates we may use of entities. Now, in specific reply to the above 
objection, we can say that primary substances are covered by the 
category of substance not because they are substances but because 
substance is the broadest predicate that can be predicated of them. 
This statement expresses the view that by "category" Aristotle at 
the stage of the Categories meant the ultimate type of predicate 
which is predicable of namable entities. 
We are suggesting, then, that beginning with the Categories 
" Aristotle gave to K<a"j'~ 'fOP( -. a technical meaning not entirely divorced 
from its natural import of "predicate." Of course, a claim of this 
sort needs more than plausibility for support. One wonders, indeed, 
if Aristotle did engage in the type of inquiry suggested above which 
supposedly issued in an ultimate type of predicate. This is not 
easily settled, for it takes us into that uncharted period before 
the Categories about which the pressing questions are why and how 
Aristotle developed his category doctrine.l But while some specula-
tive excursion is unavoidable, let us proceed, guided by the evidence 
in the Categories itself, to determine the merit of supposing that 
Aristotle found in the categories the broadest predicates attachable 
to entities. 
1As we noted on pp. 35-36. 
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/ First, we recall the two instances of Ka"l' q ~ optt\. in 10b20 and 
10b22. These were singled outl as cases perhaps not conveying the 
usual sense of "predication" or "predicate." Now, as a matter of 
fact, these instances actually reveal the transition from the ordinary 
/ 
meaning of Ka'\' q~orta. to the technical meaning for which we are argu-
ing. Aristotle says in the passage in lObl?-23, according to Ross2: 
If one of two contraries is a quality, the other also 
will be a quality. This is clear if we try the other 
predicates [T~S" {i,\Ae,s: K4i~~o~Co.~]; ~·.&· if justice 
is contrary to injustice, a a ustice is a quality, 
injustice also is a quality: for none of the other 
predicates [1'lJV qt),wy kGt"i'lltop! 4iV] will apply to in-
justice; for neither quant y nor relation nor place 
nor any of the terms of this sort will apply, but only 
quality. 
Here the first occurrence of i<0{\'11¥or(w means such predicates in the 
ordinary sense of the word as justice and injustice, whereas the 
second occurrence refers to a special group of predicates and spe-
cifically includes quality, quantity, relation, and place. 
Next we find support for our contention in the list of illustra-
tions of the categories found in lb25-2a4, the important passage3 
which deservedly may be quoted again: 
Expressions which are in no way composite signify 
lon p. 42 above. 
2In his Aristotle 1 s Metaphysics, I, lxxxiv. This translation 
brings out the contrast in meanings more sharply than he did in his 
earlier Oxford translation. 
3quoted on p. 25 and referred to on p. 44 above. 
substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, 
position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my 
meaning roughly, examples of substance are 'man' or 
'the horse,• of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits 
long' or 'three cubits long,' of quality, such attrib-
utes as 'white,• 'grammatical.' 'Double,• 1half1 1 
'greater,' fall under the category of relation; 1 in 
the market place,• 1 in the Lyceum,• under that of 
place; 'yesterday,' 'last year,• under that of time. 
'Lying,' 'sitting,' are terms indicating position; 
1 shod1 1 'armed,' state; 1 to lance,• 'to cauterize,• 
action; 'to be lanced,' 1 to be cauterized,' affec-
tion. 
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Here, as we noted,l Aristotle is identifying the categories with the 
meanings of simple verbal expressions and illustrating ten such mean-
ings. His illustrations are obviously more specific than the mean-
ings or categories cited, !:·~·~ "white" and "grammatical" are not as 
extensive in implication as "quality," the category of which both are 
said to be examples. Further, it is not too difficult to view Aris-
totle 1 s illustrations as predicates. Admittedly, this is easier in 
the case of some, "two cubits long," for example, being more obvious-
ly a predicate than "man.'' Yet the general impression conveyed by 
the list is that these illustrations are specific predicates pre-
sented as examples of broader meanings. It seems plausible to infer, 
then, that these broader meanings or categories are predicates also, 
though in a wider sense. 
It is possible, moreover, to speculate on the origins of Aris-
totle 1 s categories in a fashion that fits this general interpretation. 
One can postulate with C. }1 . Gillespie,2 for instance, that the whole 
lPp. 25-26 above. 2classical quarterly, XIX (April, 1925), 75-84. 
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doctrine owes its origin to the logical analysis of predication . l 
This hypothesis suggests that Aristotle's category scheme was built 
up through investigation of the types of predicates which could be 
attached to one subject at the same time . Aristotle felt, it is 
claimed, the necessity of overcoming difficulties arising from the 
application of Eleatic principles in the area of knowledge. Specifi-
cally, the possibility of rational discussion had been challenged in 
the name of logic . The question raised was how one could give more 
than one name to one thing. A thing is itself and not anything else . 
One may rationally say "man is man" and "in the market place is in 
the market place"; but one cannot say "man is in the market place" 
without seemingly some equivocation in the use of the verb "to be ." 
An Eleatic objection of this type, however, was met by an appeal to 
experience. Experience showed that within limits many names may be 
applied to one thing without destroying its unity . When this viewpoint 
was developed by Aristotle, the scheme of the categories resulted. 
This reconstruction, while plausible, still remains speculative 
and open to disagreement. Much more certain is what Aristotle does in 
the passage under consideration . When we view this list of illustra-
1cillespie specifically contends that "the scheme of the Cate-
gories was evolved in the course of efforts to establish a doctrine 
of judgment which should settle the difficulties raised by Megarian 
and other critics; that the application to the solution of the larger 
metaphysical problems was a later development; that the foundations 
of the scheme were laid in the Socratic tradition of the Academy; 
that the completed scheme is probably Aristotle's own; and that the 
original working out of the scheme did not contemplate extension be-
yond the metaphysics implied in predication to the more fundamental 
metaphysics of the First Philosophy" (ibid., p. 76). 
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tions as a whole, it becomes apparent that the subject of which they 
are asserted is an individual man. Aristotle does mention 11 the horse" 
as an example of substance, and some of what we are calling his predi-
cates are equally applicable to a horse; but only an individual man 
could be described by all in the list. Such a person would naturally 
be designated by a proper name such as Socrates, Callias, or Coriscus, 
though admittedly this is not done here. Choice of such an individual 
man as subject would hardly be accidental. The proper name was ap-
plied by Greeks to human beings and viewed as a mere label attached 
to a "this" and not directly implying any "what. 11 Hence, it was 
normally subject and not predicate. In order to refute Eleatic critics 
who denied many predicates could be asserted of the same thing, it 
was necessary to develop a scheme with an identical subject through-
out. This could be done, as the Categories passage suggests, by taking 
some particular man like Socrates or Callias as subject and working 
through the list of predicates suggested. Furthermore, by being the 
most complete and concrete object known, a human being would be a most 
suitable subject in developing an exhaustive scheme of predication; 
for to him only could moral and many psychological predicates be at-
tached. 
Now when we view Categories lb25-2a4 as describing a particular 
individual man in order to illustrate wider predicates, a serial order 
is discernible. True, Aristotle does not always list the categories 
in the same order or even completely; 
which this passage first illustrates. 
yet there is an average order 
One may see this by listing in 
order of their appearance the predicates here describing a particular 
man, one such as Socrates: 
1. predicates describing Socrates as a whole in the category 
of substance ("man" illustrating "substance") 
2. predicates indicating quantitative and qualitative aspects 
of Socrates himself ("two cubits long" and "three cubits 
long" illustrating "quantity"; "white" and "grammatical" 
illustrating "quality") 
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3. predicates implying determinate relations of Socrates to 
others ("double1 " "half, " "greater" illustrating "relation") 
4. predicates describing variable relations of Socrates to the 
world around ("in the market place" and "in the Lyceum" il-
lustrating "place"; "yesterday" and "last year" illustrat-
ing "time") 
5 . predicates indicating that Socrates as a complex body can 
vary the position of his limbs to each other and to other 
objects ("lying" and "sitting" illustrating "position") 
6 . predicates suggesting that Socrates in a certain sense in-
cludes all he calls his, particularly clothes and instru-
ments ("shod" and "armed" illustrating "state") 
7. predicates indicating that the relations of Socrates to 
determinate things in his environment may be those of an 
agant ("to lance" and "to cauterize" illustrating "action") 
or of a patient ("to be lanced" and "to be cauterized" il-
lustrating "affection") . 
Such an ordered list of predicates presents an individual man 
as a namable entity who is a going concern in a changing environment. 
Thus Aristotle in the Categories refutes the claim that many predi cates 
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cannot be asserted of the same thing and shows that these particular 
predicates fall under broader headings. The latter are the categories. 
They are defined at this stage, then, not as classifications of namable 
realities but rather as ultimate types of predicates attachable to such 
namable entities. 
We naturally next question whether Aristotle retained this def-
inition of category in writings after the Categories. But before an-
swering, let us, in good Aristotelian style, draw a distinction. Aris-
totle's other books in which category is mentioned fall into two groups~-
those in which the treatment of the subject is not definitive and those 
in which it .is. The first group comprises several books, including 
others in the Organon, but the second group . contains only one, name-
ly, the Metaphysics. 1 This late work is for our purposes the most rele-
vant of all Aristotle's later writings. Comparison quickly dispels 
any doubt that the two main sources of data on the definition of cate-
gory in Aristotle are the Categories and the Metaphysics. This claim 
is widely recognized and can be seen demonstrated in discussions of 
the subject in print2 as well as in what will follow here. Hence, if 
we continue to consider materials chronologically and take up · 
1Ross has collected the evidence on the question of date in his 
Aristotle's Metaphysics, I, xiv-xv. One is inclined to agree that 
the Metaphysics is "among the latest of all Aristotle's works" (I, 
xv) because of the preponderance of considerations suggesting so. 
Among them, for example, are the facts that the Metaphysics does 
not refer forward to any of Aristotle's work and does refer back to 
the Posterior Analytics, Physics, On the Heavens, On Coming To Be 
and Passing Away, and Nicomachean Ethics. 
2such as Joseph, An Introduction to Logic, pp. 48-65, and Ross, 
Aristotle's Metaphysics, I, lxxxii-xciii. 
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most important ones first, we must pass from Aristotle's Categories 
to his Metaphysics. Other materials of earlier date but lesser mo-
ment than the Metaphysics may be reserved for briefer treatment later. 
B. In the Metaphysics 
Aristotle's work called Metaphys ics shows the work of his edi-
tors. Soon after Aristotle's death in 322 B.c., editors arranged 
his manuscripts in the form of the present corpus of his works. Sev-
eral treatises were placed immediately "after the Physics" <r·iUZ\ TO\ 
+~lK~), whence their title Metaphysics. It is also commonly recog-
nized that the Metaphysics is not a single finished work. It seems 
rather to be a collection of treatises composed by Aristotle at dif-
ferent times and intended as lectures either for a Platonic circle 
at Asses in Mysia or perhaps later for his own school at the Lyceum 
near Athens. This suggests there is a different problem about the 
text of this book than confronts one in the Categories. The extent 
to which this is true should be determined, and this we consider 
next. 
1. The Question of Textual Integrity 
The text of Aristotle's Metaphysics as we know it today contains 
fourteen books. Traditionally these have been designated and ordered 
as AaBrAEZHQIKAMN. But the most cursory examination makes clear that 
this collection is not a single finished work meant to be read in its 
present form. Many of the books lack the continuity of thought one 
expects in a single work, and manifestly Books_!, 6. , and K are ob-
vious intrusions. Book .2, for example, by its very title, "Alpha 
1 the less," betrays that it is a late addition inserted after the 
other books were numbered. It clearly interrupts the connnection 
between A and B, and its content suggests it is completely out of 
place in a work on metaphysics. Many, in fact, have subscribed to 
Jaeger's view that Book.! contains a series of notes made by Pasi-
cles of Rhodes on a discourse of Aristotle preliminary to the study 
of physics, not metaphysics. 
This suggests the possibility that perhaps none of the Meta-
physics is by Aristotle. And a natural reaction of the reader of 
this chapter would be to wonder whether there looms another many-
paged posing and answering of the question of textual authenticity. 
Since we are concentrating on the Metaphysics, it would seem we 
must also do what we did with the Categories, that is, first estab-
lish the genuineness of its text, if in doubt. But this is not 
necessary; for there is basically no serious question about the 
genuineness of the Metaphysics. Granted some portions are as sus-
pect as Book ~~ yet by far most of the work is currently accepted 
without hesitation. There just is no pressing problem of textual 
authenticity about the Metaphysics. For this we may all be grate-
ful because it relieves us of a task and authenticates a definitive 
document. 
l A EAATTOV (993a29). 
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There is, however, another problem about the Metaphysics of 
which we must be aware. This problem is the question not of textual 
authenticity but of textual integrity. The distinction here means 
that the fundamental textual problem about the Metaphysics is not 
whether the parts are genuine but how they are to be ordered. A 
sample of points made in discussion of this thorny problem will con-
vey some of its difficulty. 
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The basic textual fact about the Metaphysics needing explanation 
is that it clearly is not a single connected treatise. As we noted, 
"Alpha the less" is a later addition put between A and B for want 
of a better place. Book A, a philosophical lexicon, is out of place 
in a metaphysical treatise. K is simply a shorter version of parts 
of B, f' , and E, and of Physics ii, iii, and v. Book .h in its first 
five chapters covers much the same ground as ZH, though the subject 
of substance is treated more tersely in the manner of the Physics. 
The other ten books and the remaining chapters vi thru viii of Book il 
seem to be parts of one enterprise, though they too: can be broken 
up into smaller groups whose parts belong more closely together. 
The usual arrangement is into five groups as follows: 
1. ABrE -- preliminary treatises determining the subject 
matter of metaphysics 
2. ZHQ -- treatises dealing with substance together with 
potentiality and actuality 
3. MN treatises criticizing Platonic theories in various 
stages of their development 
4. I treatise concerned with unity and kindred attrib-
utes of substance 
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5. A vi-viii -- treatise offering proof of the existence of 
a prime mover 
Undoubtedly, these facts alone make clear that the Metaphysics is 
not a single connected treatise meant to be read in its present form. 
Why it is not, of course, is still unexplained, but into this diffi-
cult problem we need not go at this point. Nevertheless, the definite 
question about textual integrity of the Metaphysics must be remem-
bered as we next consider data in the document on the definition of 
category. 
2. Evidence Furnished by the Metaphysics 
It is no slight task to determine the facts of Aristotle's 
usage of "category" in the Metaphysics. Not only is the Metaphysics 
much larger than the Categories but at its later date the concept 
seems to have played a larger role in Aristotle's thinking. There 
are many more references to category in the books of the Metaphysics 
than in the chapters of the Categories . Of course, not all are of 
definitive importance, but the larger number of references in the 
Metaphysics does create quite a problem of presentation. 
In the face of this, our procedure will be first to set forth 
concisely the usages of Aristotle in the Metaphysics by which he con-
veys the idea of category. This will be done in a manner so as to 
achieve brevity in demonstration of the range of usage. Then, in 
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order to avoid the peril of mere word-counting, attention will be 
given to the details of the more significant passages where defi nitive 
instances seem to occur. All this should move us toward the main mat-
ter to be discovered, namely, the meaning Aristotle attached to the 
concept of category at the stage of the Metaphysics. 
First, then, what terms does Aristotle use in the Metaphysics 
to express the idea of category? The reply is that mainly he uses 
/ ~ 
the noun ka'l'~)'op/a... ("category") and the verb Ka1~~o fgtJ ("to predi-
cate"). In addition, these words are used in combination with other 
words, and also other nouns and verbs are used. The range of terms 
and frequency of usage can be seen in the following table: 
Term used Times used 
I 
1. noun Kq'1'~1C>f /A. ("category") 
a. Used without distinctive modifiersl . . . 22 
b. Used with distinctive modifiers 
(1). / "' v 2 t£41'~o~t.l1oo OV'TD} ("category 
of b ng"). • • • • • • • • • • • 4 
(2). ~ - I 3 ("f• f ~¥a. 'T~~"K'a11:Jlap'a~ 1gure o pre icati ) • • • • • • • • • • 6 
(3). ("line 
2 
11004a29, 1007a35, 1018a38, l028a28, l029a22-23, 1029b23, 103la2, 
l032al5, l034blO, l034bl4, l047a23, l047a34, l054al4, 1065b9, 1066al7, 
l068a8, 1070a35, 1088b4, 1089a9, l089a27, 1089b22, l089b24. 
21024bl3, l045b28, 1065b8, 1093bl9. 





noun '601~f9'Lo..l ("category"). • • • • • • • • • 2 
passive participle Kq"i'~~oroop.. e:vos 2 ("predicate") 11 
4. / , verb KO,"\q~optf4A ("to predicate") 
a. used alone3 ••••••••••••••••• 13 
b. used with E-1\t )W~ 4 ("to be predicated of"). 5 
c. used with Ko.1tl 1'WCS 5 ("to be predicated of) 6 
5. verb 1i'~o} KO.l~~oefw 6 ("to predicate") • • • 1 
6. / noun 'te.vo5 (ngenus") 
a. used alone7 ••• . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
b. used with ftewros 8 ("highest genus"). • • 7 
This table makes clear that the term Aristotle employed most in 
/ 
his Metaphysics to express category is the feminine noun K~11q¥oft~ 
used unmodified. Its twenty-two occurrences appear in eight of the 
fourteen books9 and usually in the plura1.10 We may add also that 
the translation Ross prefers in the Oxford edition is "category" rather 
ll028a33, 1053bl9. 
2l003alO, l003al6, l017a25, l028al3, l030a20, l039al, l043a6, 
l049a35, l070bl, l084b3l, 1085b8. 
3987al8, 995b35, 999a5, 999a33, 100la29, l007bl81 l029a23, 
1017a22, l053b21 1 l063b26, l088b6, l088bl2, l088bl3. 
4998bl6, 998b24, 999al5, 1040a24, l040a26. 
S999a20, l023b3l, 1029a21-22, 1060b5, l063b20, l088b5. 
61054al6. 7998bl8, l054a5, 1089b28. 
8995b29-30, 998bl5, 998b20, 999al, 999a22-23, 999a32, 1034b9. 
9 Ko.\q"6o~ltt is not found in Books A, _!1 B, E, H, and M. 
lOplural number occurs in 16 of the 22 instances. 
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than "px:edicate," save in six instances . 1 
The important point to be established about such a table, how-
ever, is not the distribution of terms but which meanings are de-
finitive. We anticipated, and correctly so, that many of the in-
stances listed would not be crucially important. As a matter of 
fact, most of the ones cited can be so classed. They are instances 
where some sort of meaning is assumed but not clearly specified. 
But there are also cases where a definite meaning is conveyed and 
which appear important . In short, there seem to be major and minor 
meanings attached to the concept of category in the Metaphysics . 
Our task now is to separate the two groups and then to determine 
whether the important meanings in the Metaphysics agree with the 
earlier Categories where category was found to be defined as ulti-
mate type of predicate. 
3. The~eaning of the Evidence Furnished by the Metaphysics 
Let us begin with a summary of our findings in advance before 
considering the supporting evidence. The meanings implied by the 
usages listed in the above table fall into four groups. If we ar-
range these starting with the least important, we confront groups 
of instances where the meaning seems to be: 
1. not clear 
2. predicate, though not clearly of ultimate type 
1 Namely, 1004a29, 1007a35, 1028a281 1029a22-231 1047a23, and 
1047a34. 
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3. genus, both as highest and as proper 
4. type of essential being 
We note also in advance that the dividing line between minor and ma-
jor here falls after No . 2 and before No . 3. 
We may quickly dispense with Group 1 . It contains unclear in-
stances--twelve in numberl--where Aristotle refers to category but 
without any unmistakable indication of the exact significance of the 
concept . Of course, any claim that passages are opaque can only be 
verified by careful study of each in its context . This will not be 
undertaken here, though we do add that the charge springs from our 
scrutiny of each instance . Instead we merely cite an example. Thus 
in 1089b24 Aristotle says, "In the categories other than substance 
there is yet another problem involved in the existence of plurality." 
It is transparent that in this passing reference no exact definition 
of "category" is conveyed . \Uth this we move on to more significant 
cases, and next to those where category seems to mean predicate. 
a . category as Predicate but Not Ultimate Type 
This second grouping is by far the largest of the four we see 
in the data supplied by the Metaphysics . It embraces 
11028a33, 1029b23, 103la2, 1032al5, 1034bl4, 1066al7, 1068a8 , 
1070a35, 1070bl, 1088b4, 1089b22, and 1089b24. All are cases where 
~A1~o@(4 without distinctive modifiers is used, except for 1028a33, 
whic. LS an ~n~tance of the ~oun K~T~¥At~44, and 1070bl, where the 
passLve partLCLple KAXq~orov4eto~ occurs. 
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forty-one1 of the instances ci ted in the above table of usage. What 
makes them a group is that they are places where Aristotle has used 
many of the varied terms he prefers in the Metaphysics to express the 
idea of predicate, seemingly in reference to category. The main point 
to be determined, though, is whether in speaking of category as predi-
cate Aristotle means here what he does in the Categories. Do the 
references to category as predicate at this later stage have the ear-
lier technical meaning of ultimate type of predicate which could be 
asserted of a namable entity? This we must answer. 
Careful inspection of these forty-one supposed references to 
category as predicate suggests a distinction . It is one which clas-
sifies them in a manner dear to their original author while also sim-
plifying our treatment in a fashion probably just as dear to our 
readers . These forty-one cases fall into two unequal groups, namely, 
those in which the terms employed suggest the idea of predicate: 
1 . but not in any specialized sense; 2 
1Namely, 987al8 1 995b35 1 998bl6 1 998b24, 999a5 1 999al5 , 999a201 
999a33 1 l00la29, l003al01 1003al61 l004a29, l007a351 i007bl8 1 1017a22, 
l023b31, 1028al3, l028a28, 1029a21- 221 l029a22-23, l029a23, 1030a20, 
l039al, l040a24, l040a26, l043a6, l047a23, l047a34, l049a3~, l053bl9, 
1053b21, 1054al6, l060b5, l063b20, 1063b26 1 l084b3l, l085b8 1 l088b5 , 
1088b6, 1088bl2, and 1088bl3 . Seven of the twelve terms employed 
in the Metaphysics occur in this group . No instances are included 
here where Aristotle has used fC4ttgopls. yu Qy'fo$ , CU~M.Il. •ijs 
, , ,.. ; ; kA.'f~¥0(1&45, (tVcM'Ol'tl-4. 1:t}J kA't,¥~'4>' '6f-YO.S, or JE.VO,S 'itfW~ • 
2There are thirty of these, found in 987al8, 995b35, 99tlb16 1 
998b241 999a5, 999al5, 999a331 lUU3aLu, 1U03al6, l004a29, 10U7a351 
1UU7b1~, 1017a22, l023b3l, l028a28, 1039al, 1040a24, l04Ua26, l043a6, 
l047a23, l047a34, l049a35, l063b20, l063b26 1 l084b31, 1U85b8, 1088b5, 
l088b6, 1088bl2, and l088bl3. 
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2. possibly in the technical sense of ultimate type of 
d . 1 pre ~cate. 
This first group comprises thirty cases l.'lhere Aristotle in the 
noun and verb torms he prefers in the Metaphysics conveys the ordi-
nary meaning of "predicate" and "to predicate." No technical sense 
seems implied nor is any formal detin~t~on presented. The group in-
, 
eLudes passages where K~1tUOf<Q. is used to reter to predicates which 
are not the same as those identified earlier as the categories. 2 For 
example, in 1047a20-24 Aristotle says, 
••• it is possible that a thing may be capable of 
being and not be, and capable of not being and yet 
be, and similarly with the other kinds of predicate 
[1f3v A),bwv KA1~~c0iv]; it may be capable of walk-
ing and yet no alk, or capable of not walking and 
yet walk. 
None of the states here labeled predicates are in the list of ten 
called categories in the earlier work of the same name. This first 
group of thirty passages also includes eight where the participle 
and noun preferred mean predicate in the usual sense but without 
reference to other types of predicate. 3 The balance is made up of 
cases where the verbs Aristotle uses express predication also in its 
1There are eleven of these, namely, 999a20, 100la29, 1028al3, 
1029a21-22, 1029a22-23, 1029a23, 1030a20, 1053bl9, 1053b21, 1054al6, 
and 1060b5. 
2 See 1004a29, 1028a28, 1047a23, and 1047a34. 
3999a5, 1003alO, 1007a35, 1039al, 1043a6, 1049a35, 1084b31, 
and 1085b8. 
1 
usual sense. As an example we quote the last two instances in our 
list which occur in 1088bll-131 a passage which reads: 
How, then, in view of this, can number consist of 
few and many? Either both ought to be predicated 
[k4T~fEfa~t 1 of it, or neither; but in fact only 
the e £E the other is predicated [K~t~~of£l140· 
Remaining is the second subdivision of this grouping of data 
in the Metaphysics we have made. We have now to consider those 
eleven cases2 where category and predicate are conjoined but in a 
manner suggesting definition of category as ultimate type of predi-
cate. We summarize our findings on this subgroup by labeling them 
instances where the categories do seem designated as predicates but 
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not clearly and unmistakably predicates of the widest, most ultimate 
type, such as are seen in the Categories. Note, for example, that 
in 100la291 1053bl91 and 1060b51 Aristotle speaks of unity and being 
as predicated universally. However, it must also be recalled that 
neither concept is in the list of ultimate predicates found in the 
1987al8 1 995b35 1 998bl61 998b241 999al5, 999a331 1003al6, 
l007bl8 1 1017a22, 1023b311 1040a241 1040a261 1063b20, 1063b261 
1088b51 1088b61 1088bl21 and 1088bl3 . 
2999a201 100la291 1028al31 1029a21-221 1029a22-231 1029a231 
1030a201 1053bl91 1053b211 1054al61 and 1060b5. 
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Categories. 
The ambiguity of Aristotle's usage in this subgroup may be seen 
particularly well in the details of 1029a20-261 a passage in Book Z 
where substance as substratum is discussed. In the course of this 
discussion Aristotle defines matter and in so doing illustrates his 
thought of the categories as predicates, as the following quotation 
of l029a20-24 shows: 
By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a 
particular thing nor of a certain quantity nor as-
signed to any other of the categories by which being 
is determined. For there is something of which each 
of these is predicated [KA1'k~o@£'i1Ad 1 whose being is 
different from that of each b the predicates [~ 
KB1WfLWv ~K<lat~1 (for the predicates other than 
subs nee are predicated [1<41'410 f£( :r.ad of substance, 
while substance is predicated of matter). 
Aristotle is here stating that the being of matter is different from 
that of substance and of the categories because, whereas matter is 
not predicated of anything, substance is predicated of matter and the 
other categories are predicated of substance. The passage indeed sug-
gests category is being co~rued as predicate, but Aristotle's next 
sentence does not add that he has in mind only ten ultimate predicates. 
He says next in l029a24-26: 
Therefore the ultimate substratum is of itself neither 
a particular thing nor of a particular quantity nor 
otherwise positively characterized; nor yet is it the 
negations of these, for negations also will belong to 
it only by accident. 
Here the phrase "otherwise positively characterized" obviously suggests 
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other possible predicates, but not undoubtedly only those of the widest 
possible type. The latter may be what Aristotle means, but he does 
not say so in point-blank, unmistakable fashion. 
In sum, our final judgment on this largest group of data furnished 
by the Metaphysics is that Aristotle obviously preferred terms which 
convey the idea of predicate in conjunction with category. But in 
thirty of these cases no formal definition or technical meaning is 
conveyed, while in the remaining eleven the earlier definition as ul-
timate type of predicate may only possibly be implied. To these we 
prefixed twelve instances of transparently ambiguous usage, and thus 
we find ourselves to have surveyed fifty-three places where Aristotle's 
terms preferred in the Metaphysics occur . We have discovered in them 
no formal definition of category nor unmistakably manifest endorsement 
of the earlier view of category as ultimate type of predicate. But, 
as we have claimed, the meanings implied by the data in the Metaphysics 
fall into four groups, the first two of which are the least important. 
We turn now to the more important latter two. We do so, h~ver, with 
the revealing fact ascertained that in the Metaphysics Aristotle does 
not seem to have simply reiterated his definition of category from the 
earlier stage of the Categories . 
b. category as Genus 
The Metaphysics also reveals that Aristotle speaks of category 
as genus 1 as we noted in the table of usage .1 
/ The noun l'£ 'i 0 S trans-
1 Supra, p • 58 • 
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lated "genus" or "class" is used alone1 but occurs2 or is understood3 
most frequently with the adjective np411'os ("highest" or "primary") . 
We cite in particular the passage in l034b7-l0 where Aristotle says: 
But not only regarding substance does our argument 
prove that its form does not come to be, but the,argu-
ment applies to all the primary classes [~H1 ~pW~~ 
¥£VWV1 alike,_ i.e., quantity, quality, and the other 
categories ["tW'i fMwvk47~f•kNl • 
Here Aristotle is saying his argument regarding substance to the .e£-
feet that its form is not produced is one that applies to all the 
other "primary classes" or categories. Obviously, this statement, 
while affixing a label on the categories, does not state adequately 
what a category is. Nor, it should be added, do the other places 
, 
where ~LYQS occurs. The group of passages, though, does bear out that 
Aristotle in the Metaphysics thinks of category as genus , and in par-
ticular as highest genus . The difficulty with the group, however, is 
precisely in particular. To label as "highest genus 11 is a far cry 
from precisely defining a category. One is left wondering of what en-
tities is a category supposed to be the highest grouping . 
Fortunately, we can be helped by considering the other terms 
Aristotle employs in associating genus and category. In particular, 
1998bl8, 1054a5, l089b28. 
2995b29-301 998bl5, 998b201 999al 1 999a22-23. 
3999a32 1 1034b9. 
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f -- 11 1 d we mean his use o <rX¥-4 ~' ~p«a,> trans ate "figure of predica-
• I ,.. , 2 
t1.on" and C'NO'\Oi:tJA 'V~S K4'i'kl'6"~'"5 rendered "line of predication.u 
In the first of these passages, namely l016b31-35 1 Aristotle says that 
things are one in genus when they are those "to which the same figure 
of predication applies . " In effect, the passage treats genus as co-
extensive with category . Next, in 1024b9- l6 genus in one sense is 
identified with ~144 K41tJ109(aS, and the examples given show that the 
expression means a category. 3 The same identification of genus with 
category is implied in 1054b28-30 where Aristotle says things differ 
"in genus if the things have not their matter in collUllon and are not 
generated out of each other (i . e., if they belong to different figures 
of predication),.'' These three passages, then, also identify genus with 
category. 
, - ~ The same may be said of Aristotle's use of QY<ZtOWA 't't\S' k4't'\lCf«4S' 
("line of predication") in l055al and 1058al4. In the first of these 
l ~ , 
l016b34, 1054b29 . We also add 1024bl3 where ~4, Kll '\',Of'~ 
1"oO ~n~ occurs . This is the only passage in whichris totle ss 
this ph ase :, I';. f,s a compound of the more usual ~ 't~S KAU)f«f'S 
and kAXtflopta =roo 0'41'o$ • 
21055al, 1058al4 . 
3Aristotle says that "other in genus" is applied to things whose 
proximate substrata are different and cannot be analyzed one into an-
other or both into the same thing, e . g . , form and matter, or "things 
whicp belong to different categories of being [~44. lf4'i'~lOf,fas 
-tpU ~Y~QS ] (for some of the things that are said'o ·~ si ni yes-
sence, others a quality, others the other categories we have before 
distinguished" (l024bl2- l5). 
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passages , l Aristotle contends that contraries which are in the same 
"line of predication" are in the same genus. In 1058al4 contraries 
in the same genus are said to be in the same "line of predication."2 
Thus "genus" and "line of predication" are co-extensive terms . It 
seems natural also to identify the "line of predication" of 1055al 
with the "figure of predication" six lines earlier in 1054b29. Thus 
the suggestion grows plausible that all these passages support iden-
tification of genus with category. Moreover, the terms used--figure 
and line of predication--suggest that the genus with which category 
is equated is one of predicates . Also a u<n o['Ylc& itself is applied 
--
in the Posterior Analytics3 to a series of terms each of which is 
wider than that which comes under it . Here in the Metaphysics the 
term is used to describe the categories as genera of predicates , but 
also as genera which are the only ones which are not also species . 
In brief, this means the categories are the only genera proper. 
The view, then, which Aristotle ' s use of "figure of predication" 
and "line of predication" presupposes is that the categories are the 
lin 1054b31-1055a2, which reads, "Contraries are different, and 
contrariety is a kind of difference . That we are right in this sup-
position is shown by induction. For all of these, too, are seen to 
be different; they are not merely other, but some are other in genus , 
and others are in the same line of predication, and therefore in the 
same genus , and the same in genus . " 
2The passage in 1058al3-16 reads: '~ence also all contraries 
which are different in species and not in genus are in the same line 
of predication, and other than one another in the highest degree- -
for the difference is complete- -, and cannot be present along with 
one another . )" 
366b27, 66b35 1 79b7, 79b8, 80b27, 8la21, 87b6, and 87bl4. 
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highest types of classes under which all predicates fall. Thus we may 
consider the categories to be predicates par excellence, since they 
are the highest terms in the various "lines" of predication. But they 
may also be considered as genera proper, since they are the highest 
or widest group of predicates--ones so broad, in fact, that they are 
not also species under some still broader grouping. 
Now it should be plain that these references to category as 
highest genus and genus proper are quite akin to the earlier defini-
tion in the Categories. Here in the Metaphysics when speaking of 
category as "highest genus," "figure of predication," and "line of 
predication," Aristotle is also suggesting that a category is the 
ultimate type of predicate which may be predicated. His thought is 
that individual substances, for example, are in the category of sub-
stance not in the sense of themselves being predicates but in the 
sense that "substance" as an ultimate predicate is the highest, widest 
term that can be predicated of them. It can be predicated in the 
same sense in which, for example, secondary substances are said to 
be in the category of substance and particular qualities are in the 
category of quality. But whether Aristotle retains this Categories-
like view of category throughout the Metaphysics remains to be seen. 
c. Category as Type of Essential Being 
We have anticipated, as a matter of fact, what will be seen. 
The reader knows already our reply when asking whether Aristotle 
consistently views a category in the Metaphysics as a genus 
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in the highest and proper sense of the term. Host readers will recall 
the advance summary of our findings presented above on pp . - 59-60. 
There we contended that the relevant evidence, suggests two important 
meanings for category in the Metaphysics, namel~category viewed as 
highest genus and as genus proper, and category viewed as type of es-
sential being. We have surveyed the evidence for the first of these 
meanings and found it to present a view essentially similar to the 
earlier definition in the Categories as ultimate type of predicate. 
We must now demonstrate that in the Metaphysics Aristotle also defines 
a category to be a type of essential being as well as a type of predi-
cate. We must also, of course, explain what is meant by the additional 
view. 
The places in the Metaphysics where Aristotle refers to category 
1 
as type of essential being are twelve in number. They represent the 
remaining instances in our table of usage we have yet to consider. 
The group naturally includes cases where "category of being" (K<t'ft)Jo-
, .... , ) 2 p•Q fotl oyxos occurs but not to the exclusion of some of the other 
terms Aristotle prefers and we now recognize. 3 
It should be no surprise that some of these twelve instances are 
1Namely, 1017a23, 1017a25, 1018a38, 1026a36, 1045b28, 105la35, 
1054al4, 1065b8, 1065b9, 1089a9, 1089a2?, and l093bl9. 
2rn 1045b28, 1065b8, and 1093bl9 . 
3He uses ta1~0flA unmodified in 1018a38, 1054al4, 1065b9, 
108~9, and 1089a-; .J:!iZ; 1'i\& K<l1: 'ifPMs in 1017a23, 1026a36, 
105la35; and ~~,~po ______ 1n 1017 5. 
and 
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not definite in establishing our claim that Aristotle also views cate-
gory as type of essential being . We will note these briefly before 
focussing on those passages which seem more important . The less sig-
nificant group comprises five passages where there is only brief and 
passing reference to category with the meaning of type of essential 
being . These we cite as follows: 
1. 1018a38--"Since ' one' and 'being' have many senses, 
the other terms which are derived from these, and 
therefore 'same,' 'other,' and ' contrary, ' must cor-
respond, so that they must be different for each 
category . " 
2 . 105la35-- "The forms ' being' and 'non-being' are em-
ployed firstly with reference to the categories 
3 and 4 . 1065b8 and 9--"There is no movement apart from 
things; for change is always according to the cate-
gories of being, and there is nothing common to these 
and in no one category . " 
5 . 1093bl9--"For in each category of being an analogous 
term is found " 
II 
These passages indicate at least two things --first , that in the 
thought of Aristotle there is some connection between category and 
being, and second, that to discover exactly what the connectidn is , · we 
must look elsewhere in the Metaphysics . 
Specifical ly, our gaze on this broad expanse should f a l l on the 
passages which include 1017a23, 1017a25, 1026a36, 1045b281 1054al4, 
1089a9, and 1089a27. Taking these in order, let us consider the first 
two in their context, which is the passage in 1017a22-30. The latter 
is part of chapter 71 dealing with being in Book b. • As such, it may 
be recalled, 2 it is part of the philosophical lexicon titled ~ 
1comprising 1017a7-b9. 2From pp. 54-55 above. 
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which seems an intrusion in the Metaphysics. But, as may also be remem-
bered, there is no serious question about the genuineness of Book ~ • 
Ross summarizes scholarly opinion in saying "A is evidently out of place; 
where it is, and as evidently it is a genuine Aristotelian work. 111 Ac-
cordingly, we consider 1017a23 and 1017a25 as falling within an important 
chapter of a genuine book in special relatmon to the rest of the Meta-
physics. 
ln this chapter 7 of Bookb Aristotle discusses four "sensES of be-
ing," namely, accidental being (TO ~g&td, <fAA~~~kOS), essential being 
(1\ ¢1.ij1L41'4 ~ KAT~fl~), being as truth (tO ~S lu\~elS'), and being 
' (" , ) e.l ... ~- '\ 2 as potential and actual ('jp ouya.,u.£,L ktt( Y'l E.)(.tlLQ./. 
c 
His statements 
about accidental being in 1017a7-22 have the most bearing on what he says 
about essential being in lU17a22-30. We summarize them by saying that 
A.ristotle distinguishes three modes of accidental being in illustrating 
by propositions that what "is" may be accidental. We mayysay "the man 
is musical" and so illustrate a mode of accidental being because the 
predicate is an accident of the subject, and the subject is. We also 
may say "the musical is a man," and this too is a mode of accidental 
being because the subject is an accident of the predicate, and the predi-
cate is. Then we may say "the just is musical" and Ulustrate still 
1Aristotle 1 s Metaphysics, I, xxv. He adds also (ibid.) that~ 
"is a useful preliminary to the Metaphysics, but it is not preliminary 
to it in particular. Some of the notions discussed in it (KoA~qy, 
t~u6o~) are not appropriate to the Metaphysics, but it is apparently 
~r than the physical works while the rest of the Metaphysics, in 
its present form, is later." 
2The same four senses of being reappear in 1U26a33-b2. All ex-
cept accidental being appear also in l05la34-b2 and 1089a26-28. 
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another mode of accidental being because both "just" and "musical" are 
accidents of the same subject, and this is. The three modes of acci-
dental being Aristotle so describes can be stated in this form: X is 
accidentally Y when (1) Y is an accident of X, (2) X is an accident of 
Y, or (3) Y and Z are accidents of X. 
So far Aristotle has examined accidental being or the being im-
plied in a proposition like "the man is musical." This is being which 
is nothing but an accidental and perhaps only temporary connection be-
tween subject and attribute. He now proceeds to consider essential be-
ing which must, if the opposition be a true one, mean being which is a 
necessary connection. The important passage in which he does this is 
1017a22-30, which reads: 
The kinds of essential being are precisely those 
that are indicated by the figures of predicationl; for 
the senses of 'being' are just as many as these figures. 
Since, then, some predicates2 indicate what the subject 
is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, 
others activity or passivity, others its 1where1 1 others 
its 'when,• 1being 1 has a meaning answering to each of 
these. For there is no difference between 'the man is 
recovering' and 'the man recovers,• nor between 1 the man 
is walking' or 1cutting 1 and 'the man walks' or 'cuts'; 
and similarly in all other cases. 
This sense of essential being as a necessary connection is capable, 
like accidental being, of illustration by propositions. Four kinds of 
propositions reveal such a necessary connection, namely, those in which 
there is predicated of a subject its definition, its genus, its differen-
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tia, or its property.l Now, as the first sentence of the above quota-
tion states, essential being falls into kinds which are either identical 
with or correspond to the categories. But propositions of which the 
subject belongs to one category and the predicate to another will not 
readily lend themselves to a classification answering to the categories; 
nor will the connection of subject and predicate be in such a case one 
of the most direct, essential kind. Henc~ in cases where the predicate 
is a property of the subject, subject and predicate may be in different 
categories, so that it seems it is not propositions of this kind that 
Aristotle has in mind. Further, where the predicate is a differentia 
of the subject, they may be in different categories, ~·~·' the differen-
tia of a substance is a quality2; hence, such propositions are not in-
tended here. And where the predicate is the definition of the subject, 
the same difficulty arises, so far as the differentia included in the 
definition is concerned. Thus it appears that the only propositions in 
which from the nature of the case subject and predicate must be unam-
biguously in the same category are those in which the predicate is the 
genus of the subject. It seems, then, these are the propositions Aris-
totle has in view in 1017a22-30. 
Now as we have emphasized, this passage begins with the contention 
that being per se is asserted in as many different ways as there are 
categories. This seems to claim that if we examine propositions in 
which the B which A is said to be is the genus of A, we shall find that 
1cf. Topics, 10lbl7-25. 2so says Aristotle in 1020a33. 
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the being which is implied has different meanings according to the 
category to which subject and predicate belong. Consider, for exam-
ple, the proposition "man is an animal." Here "is" takes its meaning 
from the category to which the terms it connects belong. In the case 
of a different proposition such as "white is a color," though, "is" has 
a different meaning. Apparently Aristotle is claiming that if we take 
propositions of this type, ask about the subject the question "what kind 
of thing is such-and-such?", and press this question as far as we can 
go toward the most general answer possible, we will reach one or other 
of ten ultimate meanings corresponding to the ten ultimate kinds of 
things that are. 
Accordingly, if we so question the proposition (whose predicate is 
the genus of the subject) reading "man is an animal," we will be seeking 
the most general and final answer to the question "what is man per ,!!?" 
Our questioning in this fashion would run: ·~at is man per se? Man 
is an animal. What is an animal? An animal is a living thing. What 
is a living thing? A living thing is a substance. What is a substance? 
We can go no further and can only say that it is a kind of entity which 
is one of the ultimate kinds of things that are." Similar questioning 
about other propositions of this type where predicate is genus of sub-
ject will lead to the nine other most general answers possible to the 
question ''What kind of thing is such-and-such?" The categories, then, 
are the ten most ultimate typ~of answer to this question, and in this 
sense they may be said to be the ultimate kinds of essential being. 
Aristotle makes his meaning unnecessarily obscure in this key 
76 
passage by citing in 1017a27-30 propositions which do not assert essen-
tial being at all. "The man is recovering," "the man is walking," 
"the man is cutting" are accidental propositions similar to "the man 
is musical." But these propositions serve just as wel l as essential 
ones would to illustrate the point he is making at the moment, namely, 
that "is" takes its meaning from the terms it connects. Thus "the man 
is walking" means nothing more or less than "the man walks," and the 
kind of being that is implied can be learned only by considering the 
terms connected by "is." This is a case such as Ross describes in say-
ing, "It is much more in Aristotle's manner to use an example which 
while illustrating his immediate point obscures his main meaning."l 
Accidents, of course, fall within the categories,2 for the categories 
include everything that is. But it remains unaltered that Aristotle 
here views the categories as the most ultimate answers possible to the 
question ''What kind of thing is such-and-such?" and in this fashion as 
the ultimate types of essential being. 
Not all, however, have agreed with this interpretation of 1017a22-
30. Heinrich Maier viewed quite differently the occurrence of the exam-
ples the passage contains. He inferred from them that it is by inadvert-
ence that Aristotle associates the categories with essential being. Maier 
held that the classification of being according to the categories cuts 
1Aristotle 1 s Metaphysics, I, 308. 
2As Aristotle says in Topics 103b24-25, which reads, "For the ac-
cident and genus and property and definition of anything will always 
be in one of these [ten listed] categories." 
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directly across the classification of it into essential and accidental. 1 
But it is most unlikely that so important a statement such as we find 
in 1017a22-30 is due to carelessness. This judgment is borne out by 
the reference to category in 1026a36, the next we have to consider. It 
occurs in the first paragraph of chapter 2 in Book E where Aristotle re-
fers to his four "senses of being," one of which is the categories: 
But since the unqualified term 'being' has several 
meanings, of which one was seen to be the accidental, 
and another the true ('non-being' being the false), 
while besides these there are the figures of predica-
tion2 <!·~·' the 'what,' quality, quantity, place, time, 
and any similar meanings which 'being' may have), and 
again besides all these there is that which 'is' poten-
tially or actually:--since 'being' has many meanings, 
we must first say regarding the accidental 1 that there 
can be no scientific treatment of it.3 
Here, admittedly, there is only a passing reference to category at the 
beginning of a chapter devoted to showing that accidental being cannot 
be the subject matter of any science. But it is also apparent that 
Aristotle is alluding to category as it was employed in chapter 7 of 
BookA • This at least establishes that his view of category there 
as ultimate type of essential being is not a careless one which never 
recurs. 
As a matter of fact, the conception reappears in 1045b28 where 
1nie Syllogistik des Aristoteles, II, 328n. 
2, ;' ... ~ 
'tA ax.tyu-r<& TqS tco.-rrw'llf 
31026a33-b4. 
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there is also passing reference to "categories of being."1 The passage 
where this occurs is one introducing Book Q and its discussion of po-
tency and actuality, as the following shows: 
We have treated2 of that which is primarily and 
to which all the other categories of~eing are re-
ferred--ie., of substance. For it is in virtue of the 
concept of substance that the others also are said to 
be--quantity and quality and the like; for all will 
be found to involve the concept of substance, as we 
said in the first part of our work.3 And since 'being~ 
is one way divided into individual thing, quality, and 
quantity, and is in another way distinguished in respect 
of potency and complete reality, and of function, let4us now add a discussion of potency and complete reality. 
Here Aristotle observes he has dealt with primary being or substance 
to which all the other categories refer, and that since being is di-
vided according as it means potency ad complete reality as well as ·- ac-
cording to the categories, he has now to discuss potency and actuality. 
In these remarks Aristotle brings out that being is divided into "cate-
gories of being" belonging to the list now familiar to us. Hence the 
passage, while principally introducing another subject, supports in its 
passing references the view we find in 1017a22-30, namely, that a cate-
gory is a type of essential being. 
The next noteworthy place Aristotle refers to category in this 
1 , >l 
Ko:r~Y'P'" 'j'ou oacs 
2The reference is to Books ZH. 
3Aristotle is probably referring to Chapter 1 of Book Z in 1028a 
10-b7 where the point is made. 
41045b26-35. 
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fashion is l054al4 in the discussion of unity in Book I. Part of his 
argument in Chapter 2 is that unity in a sense means the same as being 
because (l) it is found in all the categories, (2) it adds nothing to 
the meaning of a term, and (3) for a thing to be one is to be the par-
ticular thing it is. These points are made in the following passage 
whose parentheses, however, are for our purposes the most important: 
That in a sense unity means the same as being is clear 
from the facts that its meanings correspond to the cate-
goriesl one to one, and it is not comprised within any 
category (;.~., it is comprised neither in 'what a thing 
is' nor in quality, but is related to them just as being 
is); that in 'one man' nothing more is predicated2 than 
in 'man' (just as being is nothing apart from substance 
or quality or quantity~; and that to be one is just to 
be a particular thing. 
This is another passage where something other than the categories is 
the main subject. But it is also apparent that Aristotle's first paren-
thesis relates being to the categories while his second one claims be-
ing does not exist apart from the categories. Side remarks such as 
these, while not elaborating, do support rather than oppose the defini-
tion of category as type of essential being. 
We have yet to consider two significant expressions of this view of 
category in the Metaphysics. They are l089a9 and 1089a27 and occur in 
Chapter 2 of Book N where Aristotle is criticizing Platonist claims. 
The point under attack is Plato's insistence on the existence of non-
being. He and his followers thought all things would be one if they did 
not oppose Parmenides 1 dogma and prove that non-being is. Hence, they 
held that if things are many, they must be composed of being and some-
31QS4al3-l9. 
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thing else. Aristotle criticizes Plato for hastening to maintain the 
existence of non-being without considering what sort of unity of all 
things Parmenides' denial of non-being implied--whether a unity of. sub-
stance, or of substance with all the other categories. 
This is the context for the passage where the reference to category 
in 1089a9 occurs. First, Aristotle asks, if being has many senses (sub-
stance, quality, quantity, and the other categories), what sort of unity 
will all things be if non-being does not exist? Secondly, could it be 
that all substances are one, all qualities one, etc., or do all the 
categories compose a unity embracing them all? Thirdly, Aristotle finds 
it impossible that one thing, namely, non-being, should cause the diver-
sity between the different categories. These main points he makes in 
1089a7-15, which reads: 
But, first, if 1being 1 has many senses (for it 
means sometimes substance, sometimes that it is of a 
certain quality, sometimes that it is of a certain 
quantity, and at other times the other categoriesl), 
what sort of 'one,' then, are all the things that are, 
if non-being is to be supposed not to be? Is it the 
substances that are one, or the affections and similar-
ly the other categories as well, or all together--so 
that the 'this' and the 1 such 1 and the 'so much' and 
the other categories that indicate each some one class 
of being will all be one? But it is strange, or rather 
impossible, that the coming into play of a single 
thing should bring it about that part of that which is 
is a 'this,' part a 'such,' part a •so much,' part a 
'here. 1 
Our concern with this paragraph of criticism is with its statements 
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about category, and again it turns out these have been assigned a 
secondary role. Aristotle only alludes to category in making his main 
points about the Platonist assertion of non-being, but once more the 
passing references are not without significance. He refers here to 
category as "sense of being" and "class of being" and "part of that 
which is . " The support of these remarks for a relationship between 
being and category is apparent. 
The same judgment applies to the very next paragraph in chapter 2 
of Book N where 1089a27 occurs . Here Aristotle asks what sort of non-
being combines with being to comprise the things that are and also as-
serts that non-being has different senses answering to the categories . 
Plato, he says, means by''non-being" the false. Hence it was said that 
we must presuppose something false, as geometers assume the line which 
is not a foot long to be a foot long . But, in fact, geometers assume 
nothing false, and this sort of non-being will not account for the 
generation or destruction of anything. It is from non-being in another 
sense, namely, the potential, that generation takes place, Aristotle 
concludes in the following: 
Secondly, of what sort of non-being and being do the 
things that are consist? For 'non-being' also has many 
senses, since 'being' has; and 'not being a man' means 
not being a certain substance, 'not being straight' not 
being of a certain quality, 'not being three cubits long' 
not being of a certain quantity . What sort of being and 
non-being, then, bl their union pluralize the things that 
are? This thinker means by the non-being, the union of 
which pluralizes the things that are, the false and the 
1The reference is to Plato in the Sophist, 237A1 240. 
character of falsity.l This is also why it used 
to be said that we must assume something that is false, 
as geometers assume the line which is not a foot long 
to be a foot long. But this cannot be so. For neither 
do geometers assume anything false (for the enunciation 
is extraneous to the inference), nor is it non-being in 
this sense that the things that are are generated from 
or resolved into. But since 'non-being' taken in its 
various cases has as many senses as there are categories,2 
and besides this the false is said not to be, and so is the 
potential, it is from this that generation proceeds, man 
from that which is not man but potentially man, and white 
from that which is not white but potentially white, and 
this whether it is some one thing that is generated or 
many.3 
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Here, too, Aristotle is saying that being has many senses, and these 
are recognized as the categories. He is also contending that non-be-
ing has as many senses as there are senses of being or categories. 
What is implied by these statements is a view of category which equates 
it with some type of being, and in view of what has preceded it, it 
would seem some ultimate type of essential being. 
The fact, though, that we cannot say this with absolute confi-
dence points to one of the conclusions we draw about Aristotle's 
treatment of category in general. At this point, however, let us sum-
marize our findings on his handling of the concept in the Metaphysics 
with the following: 
1. Aristotle refers to category in the Metaphysics more frequent-
I ly than in the Categories, especially using the noun lt<41'l')lO~I<a: and 
1However, Plato only says there cannot be the false unless there 




the verb !(q "\'~~P£1J among several words employed to express the concept. 
2. In the eighty-two places where these terms occur, Aristotle's 
meaning seems to be (1) unclear, (2) predicate but not of ultimate type, 
(3) genus, both highest and proper, and (4) type of essential being. 
3. Exactly half of these instances fall into the second of these 
groups. These passages do connect category with predicate but contain 
no formal definition nor manifest endorsement of the definition we find 
in the earlier Categories that a category is the ultimate type of predi-
cate attachable to a namable entity. In many places within the~-
physics, then, Aristotle does not repeat his first definition of cate-
gory. 
4. This technical meaning apparently was not, however, abandoned 
in the Metaphysics. There Aristotle also identifies category with 
.... - / , genus, and the special terms he uses (~ll, 1qs- k'o.iq1o~£4&' CJV<M'Ol'XJIL 
~~ K«Tq~opfas> suggest the genus is one of predicates. Specifically, 
these terms indicate that a category is (a) a highest genus of predi-
cates or one of the highest classes under which predicates may fall 
and (b) a genus proper or widest class of predicate not coming under 
any broader grouping. This conception of category as a predicate which 
is both highest genus and genus proper is quite similar to the earlier 
definition of category as ultimate type of predicate which may be 
predicated of a namable object. 
5. Also in the Metaphysics Aristotle speaks of a category as a 
type of essential being. The main passage where this additional con-
ception of category appears is 1017a22-30. Here the categories are pre-
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sented as the ten most ultimate answers to the question '~hat kind of 
thing is such-and-such?" Thu~ they are ultimate kinds of essential be-
ing as distinguished from expressions of the other types of being (ac-
cidental, truth, potential, and actual). 
6. There are other places in the Metaphysics where category as 
type of essential being appears, but in each case there is only brief, 
passing reference to this additional conception of a category nowhere 
elaborated in the Metaphysics. 
Further reflection on the implications of these findings is needed, 
of course, and will be forthcoming. But first let us recall the plan 
of procedure for this chapter. It may well have become obscured by the 
mass of detail. Our plan was to take up the most relevant works of 
Aristotle in their chronological order in search for his definition of 
category.l Hence, we began with the Categories, a work whose genuineness 
we feel was successfully defended by Husik2 and which is the earliest of 
the works most relevant to our purpose.3 In the Categories we found 
category defined as ultimate type of predicate attachable to namable 
entities. We naturally questioned whether Aristotle retained this defi-
nition in subsequent writings.4 In answer we passed over a number of 
books to consider next the Metaphysics, the only later work whose treat-
ment of the subject is supposedly definitive. In the Metaphysics we 
found the earlier categories' view of category to reappear along with 
another view, namely, category defined as type of essential being. Thus, 
in chronological order we have examined the data supplied by the Cate-
lsupra, pp. 7-8. 
4supra, p. 52. 
2supra, pp. 12-22. 3supra, pp. 22-23. 
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gories and the Metaphysics, an early work and a late work. There is 
still need, as we said, to reflect further on the implications of these 
two sets of data. But before this is done, we must consider the other 
materials of lesser moment we have passed over. In doing so, we keep 
a promise put in writing on p. 53 above. Thus, we turn now to see how 
a category is treated elsewhere in Aristotle and do so through a rapid 
survey of the other books by Aristotle where category appears. 
C. Elsewhere in Aristotle 
Our survey of additional materials, while rapid, will have to be 
fairly extensive. In a considerable number of books Aristotle uses the 
terms he customarily employs in the Categories and Metaphysics to mean 
category. But it will have to be determined whether or not he is con-
veying in those places the same meanings we have found category to have 
for him. 
The additional books to be considered with this point in mind are 
eleven in number. If we group them roughly according to subject matter 
and chronological order, we produce the following: (1) logical trea-
tises: On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, 
On Sophistical Refutations; (2) physical treatises: Physics, On the 
Heavens, On Coming-To-Be and Passing-Away; (3) psychological treatises: 
On the Soul; (4) ethical treatises: Nicomachean Ethics; and (5) other 
treatises: Rhetoric. 
These are the additional writings we must survey to determine how 
category is viewed by Aristotle. We have to establish whether the terms 
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he uses in these books express something different or the same meanings 
seen so far--ultimate type of predicate attachable to namable realities 
(in the Categories), and predicate though not of ultimate type, predi-
cate as highest genus and genus proper, and type of essential being 
(in the Metaphysics). 
1. On Interpretation 
Part of the collection of Aristotle's logical works called the 
"Organon" is the book called On Interpretation. In it Aristotle may be 
said to study the proposition in a preliminary manner. In fact, what 
occupies him chiefly is tracing the possible oppositions between propo-
sitions, starting with the existential proposition "man is" as the pri-
mary kind. 1 
It is not surprising, then, that On Interpretation is a book in 
which the category doctrine is not found. The terms employed, 2 judg-
ing from their context, do not suggest any of the more technical mean-
ings we find in the Categories and Metaphysics. In each instance the 
terms mean "predicate" or "predicated" in the usual, unspecialized 
sense. Inspection will confirm this and bear out our judgment that 
On Interpretation is an early writing on logic in which several of the 
terms associated with the category doctrine are used without the special 
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meanings they reveal elsewhere. Judged as regards our own "categories" 
of meaning for category in Aristotle as listed above, the usage in On 
Interpretation consistently suggests only "predicate though not of ul-
tima te type • " 
2. Prior Analytics 
The Prior Analytics, another treatise in the Organon, is one in 
which Aristotle sets forth the structure he finds common to all reason-
ing, namely, the syllogism. He seeks to exhibit its formal varieties, 
regardless of subject matter involved, and does so, in the phrase of 
Ross, "with unwearied care."l This lengthy treatise in two parts2 is 
basically a formal logic or logic of consistency and notably is the 
original work of this type. 
It should come as no surprise, then, to learn that in this logical 
work Aristotle uses his favored terms3 in their usual, nontechnical 
1Aristotle, p. 36. 
2Book I is devoted to the structure of syllogism, mode of dis-
covery of arguments, and analysis (a) of arguments into figures and 
moods of syllogism and (b) of syllogisms in one figure into another. 
Book II discusses properties and defec t s of syllogism and arguments 
akin to syllogism. 
3 / K~~hlD~\~ appears in 4la4, 4lal21 4lb321 44a34, 45b35, 47bl, 
47b2, 47b3, 4- a9, 52al6, and 57b20; te!~~os in 24bl8, 26b37, 
28al31 28al41 43a38, 65b36, and 68b28; __ w in 24al61 24bl8 1 
24b28, 24b29 1 25b39 1 26a24, 26b81 26blO, 2Gb ~i6bl4, 27a6, 27al9, 
27a22, 27a39, 27b5, 33a39, 4la8, 4lall, 4lal5, 43a26, 43a301 43a31 1 
43a34, 43b8 1 45b27, 47bl1 47b5, 47b6, 47b321 48bl, 48b24, 48b27, 
49al7, 49a23, 49a34, 5la4, 65b38, 68al7, 68a20, and 70al9; ~eos 
K''\1"g~£w is found in 25b23 and t.:Jtl f:m'i'~lo fE4> in 49a62. 
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sense and not as expressive of the category doctrine. The verb~­
~ 
._opE.4l, for example, occurs many times in the Prior Analytics, but al -
ways in its normal sense of "to predicate." Actually there is only 
one place in all the many pages of the Prior Analytics where"category," 
not "predica te, " is the appropriate translation1; but here it is not 
; 
clear just what meaning Aristotle attaches to k'd'f~opta...used 
special manner. Thus from our vi ewpoint the Prior Analytics 
in this 
is in 
the same class as On Interpretation . It does not elaborate on the 
category doctrine presented in the Ca tegorie;and, further, its sole 
reference to category is ambiguous. 
3. Posterior Analytics 
Passing from the Prior Analytics to the Posterior Analytics is 
moving from Aristotle's study of the syllogistic structure common to 
all reasoning to his analysis of the features distinguishing scien-
tific from popular reasoning. The two books composing the Posterior 
149a9, occurring in the passage which reads: "The expressions 
'this belongs to that' and 'this holds true of that' must be under-
stood in as many ways as there are different categories [f<a.'fttl\'!\(ad, 
and these categories must be taken either with or without qua~ ca-
tion, and further as simple or compound: the same holds good of the 
corresponding negative expressions . We must consider these points 
and define them better." (49a7-ll). 
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Analytics are recognized as falling into five parts: (1) Aristotle in-
fers from the nature of science the conditions which must be met by the 
propositions which are to be its premises1 ; (2) next he proves the 
characteristics of demonstration in its aim to show why properties be-
long to their subjects2 ; (3) then he examines the characteristics of 
demonstration considered as a means to the definition of properties3 ; 
(4) next he considers a variety of topics briefly mentioned in preced-
. t" 4 1.ng sec 1.ons ; and (5) finally he adds an account of the process by 
which the immediate propositions which are the starting points of demon-
stration come to be known. 5 
As this brief summary shows, the Posterior Analytics is concerned 
mainly with the presuppositions and method of science. In it the doc-
trine of the categories is no major subject nor, for that matter, sub-
topic, as perusal of the table of contents Mure furnishes in the Oxford 
translation suggests and examination of the text confirms. This does 
not mean the concept is completely absent; for were it1 we would not 
be considering the book at this point. Our claim is that the Posterior 
Analytics is a part of the Organon which is not definitive when it comes 
to determining Aristotle's definition of category. It is indeed a logical 
writing liberally sprinkled with the terms Aristotle favors when writing 
about the categories; but in the vast majority of these places in the 
Posterior Analytics ''predicate 1 " "predicable 1 " "predica ted11 are used as 
regularly employed in logical discussions. 
1Book I 1 chapters 1-6. 
3 II1 1-10. 
4 5 II 1 11-18. II 1 19. 
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There are, however, two passages where category appears--83al9-23 
and 83bl3-17. A possible third one is 100al5-b3. These we consider 
next to confirm our claim about the book as a whole and to determine 
what view of category they do suggest. 
The first two occur in chapter 22 where Aristotle is contending 
that predicates which are accidental cannot be unlimited in number. 
He had previously distinguished accidental predication from essential 
or natural predication.1 The former he finds alien to the method of 
demonstration. Hence, provided a single attribute is predicated of a 
single subject, all genuine predicates fall either under the category 
of substance or under one of the other categories. This is the setting 
for 83al9-23, which reads: 
We shall assume, then, that the predicate is in-
variably predicated strictly and not accidentally of 
the subject, for on such predication demonstrations de-
pend for their force. It follows from this that when 
a single attribute is predicated of a single subject, 
the predicate must affirm of the subject either some 
element constituting its essential nature, or that it 
is in some way qualified, quantified, essentially re-
lated, active, passive, placed, or dated. 
This passage is followed by another claiming that reciprocal predi-
cation cannot produce an indefinite regress because it is not natural 
predication. There cannot be an infinite ascent or descent of predi-
cates. Specifically, Aristotle contends that the ascent of predicates 
is finite because (1} all predicates fall under one or other of the 
1 Cf. 73b5-16. 
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categories, (2) the series of predicates under each category terminates 
when the category is reached, and (3) the number of categories is limi-
ted. This is his meaning in 83bl3-17: 
On the other hand--in proof of the impossibility of 
an infinite ascending series--every predication dis-
plays the subject as somehow qualified or quantified 
or as characterized under one of the other adjectival 
categories, or else is an element in its substantial 
nature: these latter are limited in number, and the 
number of the widest kinds under which predications 
fall is also limited, for every predication must ex-
hibit its subject as somehow qualified, quantified, 
essentially related, acting or suffering, or in some 
place or at some time. 
It is apparent that in these two quotations (1) a distinction be-
tween substance and the other "adjectival" categories is observed, 
(2) no formal definition of category is presented, but (3) the view 
of category implied is more akin to the Categories' definition as ul-
timate type of predicate than to the Metaphysic~ definition as type of 
essential being. The ascent of predicates ends with reaching the cate-
gories, the limited'humber of widest kinds under which predications 
fall. 111 
The third passage in the Posterior Analytics bearing on catego~y 
is 100al5-b3 and occurs at the close of the book. Aristotle has been 
occupied mostly with the method of demonstration, which presupposes a 
knowledge of first premises not themselves known by demonstration. Now 
at the end Aristotle asks how these are known. His answer calls atten-
183bl6. 
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tion to the faculty of perception, the discriminative power innate in 
all animals. The first stage in the development from sense to knowl-
edge is "memory," the persistence of sense-impressions in the soul. 
The next stage is "experience" or the framing of a conception or uni-
versal on the basis of repeated memories of the same kind of thing. 
The passage from particulars to universals, Aristotle strikingly sug-
gests, "is like a rout in battle stopped by first one man making a stand 
and then another, until the original formation has been restored."1 The 
transition is made possible by the fact that the perception itself has 
an element of the universal. We do perceive a particular thing, but 
what we perceive in it are characteristics which it shares with other 
things. From this first elementof universality we pass through higher 
and higher levels of universality to the highest universals of all: 
When one of a number of logically indiscriminable par-
ticulars has made a stand, the earliest universal is 
present in the soul: for though the act of sense-per-
ception is of the particular, its content is universal 
--is man, for example, not the man Callias. A fresh 
stand is made among these rudimentary universals, and 
the process does not cease until the indivisible concepts, 
the true universals, are established.2 
The passage from particulars to the universals implicit in them is in-
duction. The grasping of the universals which become the first premises 
of science must be the work of a higher faculty, and this, we are told, 3 
is intuitive reason. 
The point important to us in this quotation remains obscure, un-
1lOOal2-l3. 2 100a5-b3. 3rn lOObl0-14. 
93 
fortunately. Exactly what are the "true universals" known by intuitive 
reason? The language used suggests the grasping of concepts, and the 
"indivisible concepts" must then be the categories, the highest, un-
analyzable objects of conception. So Mure identifies in the Oxford 
I 2 translation. But1 as Ross has wisely noted1 this does not seem 
likely. A knowledge of the categories is not a sufficient starting-
point for demonstrative thought. Aristotle has claimed in chapter 10 
of Book I that the first principles of science are axioms, definitions, 
and assumptions of the existence of the primary objects of the science--
not categories. 3 Thus the passage is lamentably obscure. 
We leave the Posterior Analytics fairly emptyhanded as far as con-
cerns contribution to understanding the development of Aristotle's cate-
gory doctrine. Considering its size, the work has remarkably little to 
say on our subject. 
4. Topics 
The Topics is a work in the Organon which seems to fall into two 
main parts: (l) a collection of "topics" or commonplaces of argument 
found in Books II-VII and (2) an introduction and conclusion in Books I 1 
VII, 3-51 and VIII added later . In this work Aristotle endeavors to 
show how one may handle dialectical discussion with success, either as 
1His note to the phrase "the true universals" in l00b3 reads: 
"!·~·~ the categories, which are par excellence universal and are in-
divisible because not constituted of genus and differentia. • " 
2Aristotle, p. 55. 3cf. in particular 76bl2-16. 
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the main speaker who puts questions and argues from answers received 
1 
or as the opposing respondent. What is studied, then, is the dialec-
tical syllogism, which is one whose premises are merely probable. It 
is distinguished, on the one hand, from~e scientific syllogism whose 
premises are true and immediate and, on the other hand, from the merely 
contentious syllogism whose premises only seem probable or else whose 
reasoning is incorrect. As Aristotle sees it in the Topics, dialectic 
does not have the supreme value belonging to science, but it is not a 
valueless pursuit like arguing merely for argument's sake. In fact, 
the study of dialectic, we are told; has three main uses. It (1) pro-
motes mental gymnastics, (2) enables us to argue with people from their 
own premises, and (3) aids science by enabling us better (a) to recog-
nize truth and falsehood and (b) to approach the first principles of 
science which cannot be proved and are best sought in a study of com-
mon opinions such as dialectic provides. The first two of these three 
main reasons occupy Aristotle in the Topics; for actually he does 
little to show how dialectic can aid in the study of science. 
We may say essentially the same about the category doctrine in 
the Topics, since he does so little to show its ramifications. Thus 
the work joins our growing class of books by Aristotle not speaking 
much on the subject of category. The vocabulary favored elsewhere for 
the topic appears f~equently in the Topics, but is regularly devoid 
of category implications. There are two passages, though, constituting 
the exception to this rule. 
1lOOal8-22. 2 In 10la25-b4. 
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The less t important of these is the paragraph in l20b36-12la9 1 
found in chapter 1 of Book IV 1 where various rules for observing genus 
and species are presented. Nowhere in the passage is there any formal 
definition of category; but it is equally apparent that a category is 
viewed as a division within which a genus and its species should fall, 
and the divisions named suggest the categories first listed in the Cate-
gories. Witness the following excerpt: 
To speak generally, the genus ought to fall under the 
same division as the species: for if the species be a 
substance, so too should be the genus, and if the species 
be a quality, so too the genus should be a quality; ~·~·' 
if white be a quality! so too should colour be. Likewise, 
also, in other cases. 
A passage such as this as well as the chapter in which it is found gives 
little guidance in deciding whether in the Topics a category is an ul-
timate type of predicate or type of essential being or something else. 
The other passage in the Topics we mentioned is happily less am-
biguous. This more imp~rtant paragraph is 103b20-391 which is most of 
chapter 9 in Book I. It is preceded by Aristotle's consideration of 
the variety of relations between subject and predicate which may be ex-
pressed in the premises from which arguments proceed or in problems 
raised for discussion. The predicate of any proposition, we are told1 
is either convertible with the subject or it is not. If convertible, 
it either states the essence of the subject and is its definition, or 
does not, and is a property. If the predicate is not convertible, it 
1 12la6-9. 
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is either an element in the definition, in which case it is the genus 
of the subject, or it is not an element, in which case it is an acci-
dent. This is Aristotle's fourfold classification of predicables in 
the Topics. He refers to it in the clearer paragraph on the categories 
in 103b20-39 we cite and which reads: 
Next, then, we must distinguish between the classes 
of predicates in which the four orders in question [the 
predicables] are found. These are ten in number: Essence, 
Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Position, State, 
Activity, Passivity. For the accident and genus and proper-
ty and definition of anything will always be in one of these 
categories: for all the propositions found through these 
signify either something's essence or its quality or quanti-
ty or some one of the other types of predicate.! It is clear, 
too, on the face of it that the man who signifies something's 
essence signifies sometimes a substance , sometimes a quality, 
sometimes some one of the other types of predicate. For 
when a man is set before him and he says that what is set there 
is 'a man• or ~n animal,~ he states its essence and signifies 
a substance; but when a white colour isset before him and 
he says that what is set there is 'white' or is a 1colour1 1 
he states its essence and signifies a quality. Likewise, 
also, if a magnitude of a cubit be set before him and he 
says that what is set there is a magnitude of a cubit, he 
will be describing its essence and signifying a quantity. 
Likewise, also, in the other cases: for each of these kinds 
of predicate, if either it be asserted of itself, or its 
genus be asserted of it, signifies an essence: if, on the 
other hand, one kind of predicate is asserted of another 
kind, it does not signify an essence, but a quantity or a 
quality or one of the other kinds of predicate. 
This passage in the Topics is notable for containing the only com-
plete list of all ten categories outside of Categories lb25-27. It is 
more significant, though, that its discussion in relation to the predi-
cables suggests the conception of category as type of essential being 
found in the later Metaphysics. This is the import of the statements 
we have underlined to emphasize their stress on universality and essence 
~nderlining throughout the passage is mine. 
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as regards the ten categories. In this chief passage in the Topics a 
category is not one of the ultimate types of predicate to be asserted 
of a namable entity. Rather a category is viewed as one of the ten ul-
timate kinds of essential being which "the man who signifies something's 
essence signifies."1 
5. On Sophistical Refutations 
An appendix to the Topics is found in the shorter work called On 
Sophistical Refutations. Its final chapter is an epilogue to both trea-
tises and is preceded by a study of fallacies in general. 2 In warning 
against sophistical argument in this fashion, Aristotle is carrying on 
the Socratic tradition of attack on the Sophists, who taught the use of 
logical fallacy in order to make the worse cause seem the better. In 
On Sophistical Refutations Aristotle dassifies fallacies under various 
headings and falling into two groups--those which depend on the language 
used and those which do not. His classification, while not perfect, re-
mains the one on which all others are based. 
Regarding our concern, this study of fallacy in the Organon does 
not help us determine the nature of a category for Aristotle. The terms 
1103b28. 
2After two introductory chapters, On Sophistical Refutations falls 
into two main parts--discussion of perpetuation of fallacies in chapters 
3-15 and solution of fallacies in chapters 16-33--followed by the epi-
logue in chapter 34. 
98 
1 he favors and we have been noting do appear . But they occur infrequent-
ly and mainly in contexts where category as we know it from the Cate-
gories is not meant . 2 The passage containing 178a6 is an exception, 
though. It occurs at the beginning of Chapter 22 where Aristotle is 
discussing the solution to the fallacy arising from the use of identi-
cal expressions for things which are not alike. Aristotle claims that 
knowing what the various categories are will enable us to meet arguments 
turning on such expressions. 3 But whereas he alludes to categories such 
as are listed in the Categories and Topics, he nowhere defines or eluci-
dates specifically what he means by category throughout his attempt to 
show how this type of fallacy may be solved. 
6. Physics 
According to Aristotle, physics is a theoretical science concerned 
with things that have a separate existence but are not unchangeable. 
1~~appears in 178a6 and 18lb28; .. "Sin 166b321 
l67bl2, 1 a 4, 173b8, 179a9, and 18lb38; and=Tn l66b32, 
l67al9 , and l69b5. 
2 In one place (167bl2) even the original meaning of "accusation" 
or "charge" appears. 
3 
"It is clear also how one must meet those fallacies that depend 
on the identical expression of things that are not identical, seeing 
that we are in possession of the kinds of predications [Td )J~ 
~1k1vl. For the one man, say, has granted, when asked, t t a 
~~noting a substance does not belong as an attribute, while the 
other has shown that some attribute belongs which is in the Category 
of Relation or of Quantity, but is usually thought to denote a sub-
stance because of its expression •r. r (l78a4-9). 
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Specifically, he means physics deals with natural bodies which have in 
them a source of movement and rest. So defined, "physics" is actually 
expounded by Aristotle in a long series of works thought to form a unity. 
The first of these is the present work bearing the name and is followed 
by On the Heavens, On Coming-To-Be and Passing-Away, and the Meterolo-
gica. The Physics as the first of the series deals with natural body 
in general, special kinds being discussed in the other works. Book I 
of the Physics is concerned with the elements of a natural body, !·~·, 
matter and form. Book II deals mainly with the different types of cause 
studied by the physicist. Books III-VII discuss movement and the notions 
implied in it. The subject of Book VIII is the prime mover, which, while 
not a natural body, is the cause of movement in natural bodies. 
From the perspective of our concern, Aristotle's Physics is proper-
ly placed among works which shed little light on his category doctrine. 
Nowhere in its considerable length does the Physics offer either a formal 
definition of category or a full-fledged discussion of the doctrine. 
Throughout the work the latter is treated as something already estab-
lished, and in this the Physics is running true to form witnessed in 
other books. 
The references to category in the Physics are notable for their 
variety, if not precision and fullness. Most of the phenomena we have 
been observing in the other books are to be seen. For example, we find 
places in the Physics where the terms we noted in the Categories and 
Metaphysics appear without meaning category. Witness tso.=rt:tW~Gjj ("is 
predicated") in l86a34, t~lDP~lvQV ("predicate") in 190b29, and 
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" kq:t~~Qfi S ("designations") in 192bl8. 
Then we have examples in the Physics where the terms appear and 
category is meant but no specific meaning for the concept is indicated. 
We find four of these and cite them in the following manner to show how 





20lb25-28--" • •• the principles in the second column 
[of Pythagorean opposites] are indefinite because they 
are privative: none of them is either 'this' or 'such' 
or comes under any of the other modes of predication 
fka.TfttgpWvl " 
225b6-9 --"I~1 then1 the categories [m=r~ll~laL ] are 
severally distinguished as Being1 Quali ~Place1 Time1 
Relation1 Quantity1 and Activity or Passivity1 it 
necessarily follows that there are three kinds of mo-
tion- -qualitative1 quantitative1 and local" 
226a23-25--"Since1 then1 motion can belong neither to 
Being nor to Relation nor to Agent and Patient1 it re-
mains that there can be motion only in respect of Quali-
ty1 Quantity1 and Place" 
4. 242a35-36--"It [a motion] is generically the same if 
it belongs to the same category [ta.'i'q"\Of(«:SJ 1 ! . ~. 1 
substance or quality" 
More importantly also in the Physics occurs another reference to 
the ca t egories as 1'4, a,;~axca ~S fsA~l'f'~ It is in the sentence, 
'~1otion is one generically according to the different categories to 
which it may be assigned ."l The brevi ty of such a statement makes in-
terpretation nigh impossible, but it may be recalled2 that the phrase 
2From pp. 67-69 above. 
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"1Jfsa. flctr'tf1~ in the Metaphysics expresses the view of category as 
genus proper, the only genus which is not also species. The phrase 
here in the Physics may imply the same identification of genus with 
category. 1 
In addition, the Physics contains two passages which seem to sug-
gest the view of category as type of essential being. The wording and 
implications of the following bear this out, in our judgment: 
•• • one being a 'this , ' another 'so much1 1 a third 
'such, ' and similarly in each of the other modes of 
the predication of being [JYv Tov l,vrcs kA'IY\IPP'4ivl 2 
It is always with respect to substance or to quantity 
or to quality or to place that what changes changes. 
But it is impossible, as we assert, to find anything 
common to these which is neither 'this' nor quantum 
nor qua le nor any of the other predicates [~v gAh~v 
" ] 3 ftctrtr1c>p,n4M 
Neither passage elaborates the view of category, but1 as we said, no 
passage in the Physics does. It is a treatise ~-1hose importance is in 
other areas of Aristotle's far-ranging thought. 
7. On the Heavens 
The physical work next after the Physics is the one called On the 
Heavens . In moving to it from the Physics we pass from a study of 
natural body and change in general to an examination of local movement 
of special bodies . The first two books in On the Heavens deal with the 
1Ross is convinced it does. See his Aristotle's Metaphysics, I, 
305. 
2200b27-29 . 3200b33- -20la2. 
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movement of the heavenly bodies, the last two with movement of terres-
trial bodies. 
This description plus our experience with the Physics should pre-
pare us for few findings on the topic of category in the second physical 
treatise. The concept appears only four times and never in any defini-
tive or particularly informative manner. All four passages allude to 
/ 
the categories of quality and quantity, l&Y05 appears once meaning cate-
gory, but we learn little more than that the categories appear in~ 
the Heavens . Inspection of the following should bear this out: 
1. "For it is true in regard to quality, quantity, and 
place alike that any process of change is impossible 
which can have no end" (274bl4-15) 
2. "And this [there is some definite maximum time of things 
being and not being] is true in every category [~ 
o1\0lAyouv \(0:1'~~o v (o..y ] , whether the thing is, for example, 
1man, or 1whi e, or 'three cubits long,' or whatever 
it may be" (28la32-34) 
3. "One thing changes in quality, another in quantity: and 
so in place, a light thing goes upward, a heavy thing 
downward" (310b23-24) 
4. "But in our view the continent pertains to form and the 
contained to matter: and this distinction is present in 
every genusl [1\Q.oc To{~ ~Ey£fW ]" (312al3-14) 
Our judgment is that these passages are cases in which Aristotle refers 
to category incidentally in establishing some other point. 
lJ. L. Stocks, translator in the Oxford series here quoted, says 
in a note this means "in every category." W. K. c. Guthrie in the 
Loeb Library edition translated "all the categories." 
8. On Coming-To-Be and Passing-Away 
We have essentially the same opinion of the next physical work 
in Aristotle's series where category happens to be mentioned. This 
is the treatise titled On Coming-To-Be and Passing-Away . In it on the 
whole he deals with change which brings about generation and destruc-
tion . His discussion of these matters is such that category appears 
only three times and always subordinated to other concerns . Viewing 
the following quotations in context shows this best, but even alone 
they suggest the secondary consideration given category: 
1. "Now 1 unqualified 1 means either ( i~ the primary 
predication within each Category [~K4CJ1 ~v 
Ke.1'tU,lAV :naU ~rros l , or (ii) the universal, 
!·~0: he all comprehensive, predication" (317b 
6-8) 
2. '~ut that which is not a substance or a 'this' 
clearly cannot possess predicates drawn from any 
of the other Categories [1'Qy l~v oktkftt.-
kAfjifcpt43vl either--~ ._& . 1 we cannot attribute to 
it y quality, quantity, or position" (317b9-10) 
3. "The distinction here turns upon the difference of 
the Categories [k4~~~· For some things sig-
nify a this somewhat, o h rs a such, and others a 
so-much" (319all-13) 
It may be noted in addition that these passages without elaboration 
all link category with predicate . This hints of the earlier view of 
category we find in the Categories . 
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9 . On the Soul 
The first of Aristotle ' s works on psychology is the one titled On 
the Soul, a treatise in three parts . While the first of these parts 
is criticism of earlier thought to prepare for Aristotle's own views, 
it will be our chief concern; for it is the only part in which the 
concept of category appears . 
This occurs quite early in Book I. Aristotle at the outset says 
the object of psychology is to discover the nature and essence of soul 
and its attributes. The method of dealing with attributes for him is 
demonstration1; so he questions whether there is a corresponding method 
of discovering the essence of soul. Aristotle suggests division is a 
possible method2 and in effect adopts it . The first step, then, is to 
determine in which genus soul belongs and also whether it is a poten-
tiality or an actuality. This he states in 402a23-27, the passage first 
mentioning category in On the Soul: 
First, no doubt, it is necessary to determine in which of 
the summa genera [j{jy lf..\WvJ soul lies, what it is; is 
it 'a this-somewhat,' substance, or is it a quale or a 
quantum, or some other of the remaining kinds of predicates 
~"'~'r'wv J which we have distinguished? 
This passage, while obviously introducing another topic, also sug-
gests a category is considered a genus . Aristotle is advising the use 
of the method of division to locate soul properly, starting with genera 
we recognize from the descriptions as the categories; presumably, then, 
1402al5-16 . 2402a20 . 
the latter are genera which are the first ones to be consider ed by such 
such a method. Whether they are first because highest or widest is 
not clear. Nevertneless, cnis seems one passage outside of the Meta-
physics where Aristotle views a category as a genus. 
The only other place in On the Soul where category appears is in 
chapter 5 of Book I. Here Aristotle questions whether soul is a com-
pound of elements in the following fashion: 
Further, the word "is" has many meanings: it may be used 
of a 'this' or substance, or of a quantum, or of a quale, 
or of any other of the kinds of predicates [~1~~~tGyl 
we have distinguished. Does the soul consist of 1 of 
these or not?l 
Without going into Aristotle's answer, let us consider this pas-
sage as one foreshadowing the view of category as type of essential be-
ing. We feel secure in following Ross here. 2 Aristotle, it appears, 
is raising the question whether soul is compounded of all the kinds of 
being, not whether it is compounded out of all the sensesof "being."3 
Since the categories are obviously meant, it would seem that for Aris-
totle at this point a category is a kind of being. This suggests the 
later view in the Metaphysics of category as type of essential being. 
Thus On the Soul has scant mention of category; but it does sug-
1410al4-16. 2see his Aristotle's Metaphysics, I, xcn.--xcin. 
3Ross contends "it would be a mistake to infer from the use of 
forms like f\o.\M:X41j Af'l~tat ,b 8~ [in 410al4 ] that Aristotle's interest 
is in the meanings+of ~eing' rather than in the varieties of the ex-
istent" (ibid . , I, xc). 
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gest two views of the concept appearing later in the Metaphysics--cate-
gory as genus and as type of essential being. 
10. Nicomachean Ethics 
The only one of the ethical treatises we have to consider is Aris-
totle's Nicomachean Ethics, a work which is undoubtedly genuine and his 
most influential writing on ethics. 
His treatment of category in the book, however, is far from de-
finitive. There are only three places where category is mentioned. 
They are all found in one paragraph! in Book I where Aristotle is argu-
ing against Plato's claim for a Form of Good as the source of all good-
ness. In what follows here we quote this passage interpolating our com-
ments on the aspects of category revealed: 
••• the term 1 good 1 is used both in the category of 
substance and in that of quality and in that of rela-
tion, and that which is per ~~ !·~·' substance, is 
prior in nature to the relative (for the latter is like 
an offshoot and accident of being); so that there could 
not be a common Idea set over all these goods. [This 
passage, aside from recognizing the priority of substance, 
merely alludes to the categories.] Further, since 1 good 1 
has as many senses as 'being' (for it is predicated both 
in the category of substance, as of God and of reason, 
and in quality, !·~·' of the virtues, and in quantity, 
!·~·' of that which is moderate, and in relation, !·~·' of 
the useful, and in time, !·~·~ of the right opportunity, 
and in place, !·~·~ of the right locality and the like), 
clearly it cannot be something universally present in all 
cases and single; for then it could not have been predi-
cated in all the categories [~~7110~(~\t ] but in one only. 
(Here Aristotle in referring to t e irs four categories 
speaks of them as "senses of being." But it needs to be 
11096a20-29. 
specified further exactly what this means.] Further, 
since of the things answering to one Idea there is one 
science, there would have been one science of all the 
goods; but as it is there are many sciences even of 
the things that fall under one category [K41~aela.v ], 
~._g., of opportunity, for opportunity in wartudied 
by strategies and in disease by medicine, and the 
moderate in food is studied by medicine and in exercise 
by the science of gymnastics. [In speaking of the "cate-
gory" of "opportunity," Aristotle shows a less restricted 
use of fS41't}~o~ It&., than the preceding allusions imply.] 
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The Nicomachean Ethics, then, contains few references to category 
and ones which are neither consistent with one another nor definitive 
of the concept. 
ll. Rhetoric 
The last book we must consider because of its mention of category 
is the Rhetoric. This is a practical work which in essence is Aris-
totle 1 s manual for the public speaker. Category appears in only one 
passage. Discussing how to view actions which may or may not be acts 
of kindness, Aristotle says: 
In considering this subject we must look at all the 
'categories 1 fKdl'i'~~ kx..s ] : an act may be an act of 
kindness because } it lS ·a particular thing, (2) it 
has a particular magnitude or (3) quality, or (4) is 
done at a particular time or (5) place.l 
Obviously a passage such as this does little more than refer to five 
of the categories. 
11385b5-7. 
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We pause here before our final evaluation of Aristotle's treatment 
of category to summarize the findings of our survey covering eleven ad-
ditional works. Assuming we are correct about chronological order, oc-
currences of category and their meaning, certain points have become 
clear. First, the phenomena we noted in the Categories and Metaphysics 
reappear. Secondly, no new phenomena appear. 
The first of these points means that in the eleven books we have 
found the terms and views regarding category for which we were to look. 1 
Thus, we find category referred to as ultimate type of predicate attach-
able to namable realities--the view of the Categories--in two and pos-
sibly three places in the Posterior Analytics.2 Then, we find a prepon-
derant number of places where the terms used for category reappear mean-
ing predicate but not of the ultimate type. This is completely the case 
in On Interpretation3 and Prior Analytics, 4 dominantly so in Posterior 
Analytics,5 Topics,6 and On Sophistical Refutations,? and markedly true 
of the Physics.8 The view of category as genus shows up also once in the 
Physics9 and once in On the Sou1. 10 Then, we find the definition of 
category as type of essential being to be the import of four references 
--one in Topics,ll two in Physics,l2 and one in On the Soul.l3 In addi-
1see pp. 85-86 above. 
3see pp. 86-89 above. 
2see pp. 90-93 above. 
4see pp. 87-88 above. 
5see p. 89 above. 6see p. 94 above. 7see p. 98 above. 
8see pp. 99-100 above. 9see pp. 100-101 above. 
lOsee pp. 104-105 above. llsee pp. 95-96 above. 
12see p. 101 above. lJsee p. 105 above. 
tion, our survey pointed out a significant number of allusions to cate-
gory which are so brief or ambiguous as to defy classification.l 
The second point which our survey has made clear is that no new 
phenomena appear on the topic of category in the additional eleven 
books. No passage in them presents a· new definition of category. Nor 
does any passage offer a full discussion of the meanings attached to 
category in either the Categories or Metaphysics. Basically, the ad-
ditional books repeat in brief form points brought out in these two 
main sources of Aristotle's category doctrine. 
D. Evaluation 
We have at last arrived in this chapter at a final evaluation ot 
Aristotle's definition of category. As suggested, 2 we need to reflect 
further on our findings in the Categories and Metaphysics. This ~an 
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be done now in the light of the evidence just summarized coming from the 
other books. 
From this broader perspective we feel compelled to pass several 
judgments on what Aristotle says about category. The first of these 
we put in this fashion: Aristotle's category doctrine seems to have 
undergone a process of development which is neither completed 
lwe find 18 of these in all. We cite one in Prior Analytics on 
p. 88 above, one in Topics on p. 95, one in On Sophistical Refutations 
on p. 98, four in Physics on p. 1~ four in On the Heavens on p.l02, 
three in On Coming-To-Be and Passing-Away on p.103, three in Nicoma-
chean Ethics on pp. 106-107, and one in Rhetoric on p. 107 • 
2 On pp. 84-85 above. 
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nor described fully in the extant works. What leads us to make the 
first part of this claim is the fact that there is basically one view 
of category in the Categories and another in the Metaphysics. We do not 
mean to imply these two vi ews are diametrically opposed. Rather, it 
seems obvious that there is general similarity between the categories' 
stress on predicates which are the ultimate ones predicable of namable 
entities and the Metaphysics' emphasis on essential types of being con-
sidered the ten most ultimate answers possible to what something is. 
But one can hardly say that these two views of category are identical. 
The contrast between them suggests an evolutionary process from the 
early stage of the Categories to the later level of the Metaphysics. 
However, we also claim, this process was not completed, at least 
not in any writings that have survived . An early stage of it is repre-
sented by the definition of category in the Categories. This concep-
tion of category, while not retained as the sole view, was never aban-
doned completely. We have noted expressions of it in the Metaphysics, 
the very book in which the later definition of category as type of es-
sential being appears most fully. In addition, the earlier Categories' 
view is seen in some of the other works. Aristotle seems to have 
moved slowly from an early conception of category in which ultimate 
forms of predication are stressed toward a view which emphasizes ul-
timate forms of being. The written records we possess imply this 
movement but do not chart the complete process in detail. 
This last statement conveys another aspect of our first judgment 
on Aristotle's treatment of category. We judge also that Aristotle's 
category doctrine is not fully described in any of his surviving works. 
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This we find true of all the books where category appears including the 
Categories and Metaphysics, the so-called ttmain sources" of the doctrine. 
Aristotle constantly takes for granted that his category doctrine is 
established, alludes to it as familiar to his readers, yet nowhere 
elaborates on what it means . 1 We establish contact with the doctrine 
at the presumably early stage of the Categories, detect brief indica-
tions of that formulation as well as suggestions of another view in 
other books, and observe expressions of both views of category in the 
Metaphysics. Hence the beginnings of the doctrine, the detail of its 
articulation in moving toward another stage, and the final outcome of 
the whole process are largely unknown to us. It is no wonder there has 
been such perplexity as well as controversy over Aristotle's thought in 
this regard. 
Our second judgment about Aristotle's work in this area takes this 
form: What Aristotle does say about category is not very precise. No 
statement in the Metaphysics serves to reiterate or replace with pre-
cision an earlier formal definition of category; for there is no such 
definition in any of the other books. The fact remains that Aristotle 
nowhere offers a precise definition of category. Furthermore, in dis-
cussing the subject he seems to have developed no technical vocabulary 
for expressing the doctrine with precision. Repeatedly, terms he fa-
vors for category reappear in their normal guise innocent of special 
category meanings. We cited, 2 for example, thirty cases in the Meta-
physics, not to mention lpecifically most of the references in the 
1see pp. 35-36 above. 2on pp. 60-65above. 
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other books surveyed. Then our investigation has been plagued by in-
stances where these very same terms are used most ambiguously. 1 While 
we criticize Aristotle for not saying more about his category doctrine, 
we also charge him with failure to be precise in using terms when he 
did write on the subject. 
The final judgment on Aristotle we make in this chapter is in 
this form: Aristotle leaves many questions about category unanswered. 
Here we merely state some--Why are there only ten ultimate types of 
essent.ial being? Why is there no argJlDlent to show that the real must 
fall into these categories? Why isn't Aristotle consistent on their 
number? Did he conclude that position and state, which appear only 
twice, were not categories? Is the distinction between primary and 
secondary to be drawn in the other categories as well as in substance? 
Can Aristotle's list of categories be arranged systematically? What 
precisely is the role of the mind in the employment of the categories? 
The reader will recognize that several of these questions became 
quite pressing to Immanuel Kant. His struggle for answers led to sub-
stantial departure from Aristotle on the matter of definition of cate-
gory. To a consideration of Kant's more developed view of category 
we now pass. We know quite well, though, that Aristotle, despite the 
limitations of his treatment, laid the foundation for the doctrine of 
the categories in later ages. In this regard, as in so many others, 
Aristotle was the pioneer. 
1 See pp. 601 65- 661 821 and 109 above. 
CHAPTER II 
THE DEFINITION OF CATEGORY IN KANT 
A. In the Pre-Critical Writings 
Something must be said at the outset of a chapter on Kant's defi-
nition of category in defense of considering his pre-Critical writings. 
Survey of the Kantian works will reveal that the problem of the defi-
nition of category was first considered at length by Kant in the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason published in 1781. This point is borne out by 
scrutiny of the writings of Kant prior to that year. It is to be noted 
that the term "category" is first used by Kant in his extant materials 
in a letter to his friend and disciple Marcus Herz written on February 
21, 1772. 1 This first use falls within the years 1769-802 which may 
be termed Kant's semi-Critical period during which he was developing 
his Critical position and writing the Critique of Pure Reason. The 
1Immanuel Kants Werke, ed. Ernst Cassirer (11 vols.; Berlin: B. 
Cassirer, 1912-23), IX, 105; see Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to 
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (2d ed. rev.; London: Macmillan and 
Co., Ltd., 1923), p. 187. The letter has been translated by Arne 
Unjhem and printed with an explanatory introduction by Lewis White 
Beck in Philosophical Forum, XIII (1955), 96-110. 
2The argument for these dates rests on the facts that Kant's in-
augural dissertation De mundi sensibilia atque intelligibilis forma et 
principiis (hereafter referred to as the Dissertation) submitted in 1770 
reveals the new Critical approach to the problems, and that in letters 
to Garve (August 7, 1783) and Moses Mendelssohn (August 16, 1783), Kant 
speaks of having matured the views of the Critique of Pure Reason for 12 
years prior to having completed the work in "some four to five months." 
See Smith, xix-xx, for a fuller statement of the argument including 
translations of the relevant correspondence. 
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years prior to 1769 are Kant's pre-Critical period and are marked by 
publications beginning in 1747. Though Kant published twenty-six mono-
graphs, essays, and articles before the Dissertation of 1770, "cate-
gory" is not a term employed by him in any of them. His correspond-
ence from the period also supports this claim. There is need, then, 
to defend the further consideration of Kant's pre-Critical writings 
in a chapter on his definition of category. 
First, it must be granted that the initial appearance of the term 
''category" in Kant's writings does seem to be in the Herz letter writ-
ten in 1772 during the so-called semi-Critical period. However, the 
fact that there is no mention of the term does not mean that the prob-
lem of category and its definition is not raised at all; for the prob-
lem could conceivably be couched in other terms. This is a possibility, 
but one, it must be admitted, not realized in Kant's pre-Critical writ-
ings.! The problem of category is not raised by Kant because he was in-
terested in other problems which, when first reflected upon, did not im-
mediately suggest it. Kant's philosophical development has bearing here. 
This is no place to describe fully Kant's development as a philos-
opher, but it should be mentioned that Kant began his philosophizing 
primarily as a Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalist, though one with reserva-
tions. Until about 1760 he remained essentially a rationalist, though 
his doubts were continually increasing. From 1760 to 1769 his difficul-
ties with the rationalist position grew to the point where he almost 
completely relinquished it for empiricism . This philosophical growth 
1rt is so realized, however, in the semi-Critical Dissertation 
of 1770, as will be shown below. 
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then reached the stage where Kant felt he had either to abandon ra-
tionalism or else adopt an entirely new standpoint when it could be 
adapted to the doctrines of empiricism which he could not abandon. 
For Kant, of course, this process of evolution was hardly so simple 
as this account suggests, and the division of his thought into periods 
is largely arbitrary. Yet, by his own admission and the subsequent 
judgment of most scholars, 1769 was a crucial year in his philosoph-
ical development and one preceded by a period of increasing tension 
between the positions of rationalism and empiricism. 
The difficulties which gradually forced Kant to contemplate a 
choice between abandoning rationalism and adopting a new standpoint 
centered around two problems. Before 1769 Kant was mainly concerned 
in his strictly philosophical writings with the status of the prin-
ciple of sufficient reason and with the nature of space. According 
to Weldon, it is in terms of these two metaphysical problems that 
his pre-Critical thought is perhaps best understood.l On the first of 
these, it should be understood that Kant was well acquainted with its 
formulation by Alexander Baumgarten in his popularization of Leibniz 
interpreted by Wolff. Baumgarten's Metaphysics published in 1739 was 
a standard exposition in textbook form Kant constantly used. In it 
Baumgarten had "simplified" Leibniz by regarding the principle of suf-
ficient reason as derivative and demonstrable by means of the principle 
1T. D. Weldon, Introduction to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (2d 
ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), pp. 55-71. This does not preclude 
other interests which were of influence also. P. A. Schilpp has shown 
that Kant, for example, · was greatly interested in problems of ethics 
during the 1760's and claims that this interest gave much impetus to 
his inquiry into the epistemological and metaphysical problems recorded 
in the Dissertation of 1770 (Paul Arthur Schilpp, Kant's Pre-Critical 
Ethics, [Evanston: Northwestern University, 1938], pp. 90-98 1 171). 
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of contradiction. This led Baumgarten to blot out the distinction be-
tween the physical and the metaphysical and to make the self-contained 
monad an element in the physical world. Another implication drawn also 
by the disciple of Wolff was the familiar Leibnizian one that physical 
bodies were connected with one another only as members of a pre-estab-
lished harmony. This was a view inconsistent, of course, with the 
Newtonian doctrine of attraction and generated much discussion in Kant's 
first period. It is against this background and particularly Baum-
garten's obliteration of the distinction between the physical and the 
metaphysical that Kant examined the principle of sufficient reason. 
He made such an endeavor the substance of the Nova Dilucidatiol pub-
lished in 1755 as his habilitation essay at the University of KHnigs-
berg. In it Kant emphasizes the distinction between logical and real 
or causal necessitation. The ratio essendi of anything is not to be 
confused with its ratio cognoscendi; hence sequences in the real 
world in harmony with the law of cause and effect involve a different 
relation from that which holds between ideas in a process of inference. 
This criticism of the principle of sufficient reason is applied to 
other aspects of rationalism in the essay on the Four Syllogistic 
Figures2 (1762) and in the longer one on Negative Magnitudes3 (1763) 
1The full title is Principiorum primorum cognitionis meta-
physicae nova dilucidatio. 
lthe False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures, published 
in 1762. 
~ssay on the Introduction of Negative Magnitudes into Philoso-
~' published in 1763. 
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which reveals in particular his growing dissatisfaction with the ra-
tionalist account of causality. 
The problem of the nature of space was likewise a major concern 
for Kant during his pre-Critical years. His Monadologia Physical es-
say of 1756 deals with the antinomy between the infinite divisibility 
of space itself and the alleged indivisibility of the ultimate constitu-
ents of matter, suggesting in solution that particles need not be con-
ceived as occupying space but should be thought of as simply having 
position in it. In 1762 Kant entered the essay contest sponsored by 
the Berlin Academy, and the resulting Inquiry2 indicates that the prob-
lem of space was still attracting his attention. Even in the unusual 
Dreams of a Spirit Seer (1766) in which the doctrines of Swedenborg 
are critically examined, the problem of the nature of space is treated. 
In the last essay before the Dissertation, the one titled On the Pri-
mary Ground of Distinguishing Objects in Space and published in 17681 
Kant deals explicitly with the problem of space, recognizing the dif-
ficulties of the Newtonian and Leibnizian doctrines of space for his 
physical theory. 
The most important of Kant's philosophical writings from his 
pre-Critical period reveal a growing dissatisfaction with the ra-
tionalist account of the principle of sufficient reason and the nature 
of space. These philosophical interests may be taken to account for 
lMetaphysicae cum geometria junctae usus in philosophia natu-
rali, cujus specimen I continet monadologiam physicam, published in 
1756. 
2Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural 
Theology and Morals, published in 1764. 
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the absence not only of the term but also of the problem of category 
and its definition in Kant's philosophical writings up to 1769. Never-
theless, further attention needs to be given here to Kant's pre-Criti-
cal writings. The reason for doing so is that though the Inquiry of 
1764 does not deal with the problem of category as such, it does con-
tain material on the general question of definition in philosophy. 
At the outset of his Inquiry Kant notes that definitions often 
delude.l The essay, which deals with the question of certainty in 
theology and morals, proceeds by contrasting mathematical and philo-
sophical method and knowledge. Mathematics proceeds synthetically by 
constructing figures. It draws conclusions setting forth the implica-
tions of conceptions existing only because certain figures have been 
constructed. Hence it can never be in doubt whether these conceptions 
correspond to the facts or not. In philosophy, however, the procedure 
is analytical, endeavoring to clarify conceptions which are already 
given though in a confused manner. Philosophical certainty, therefore, 
is much more difficult to achieve and, Kant claims, is of the same 
character as that in every other branch of rational knowledge except 
mathematics. However, more important for our purposes are Kant's re-
marks regarding the point at which definitions should be introduced in 
mathematics and philosophy: 
lui shall trust neither the teachings of philosophers, the un-
certainty of which is precisely the occasion for our present task, nor 
definitions, which often delude" (L. W. Beck's translation in his£!· 
manuel Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral 
Philosophy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 262. 
In mathematics the definitions are the first thought 
I can have of the defined thing, because my concept 
of the object arises first from the definition;l 
In mathematics I begin with the definition of my ob-
ject, such as a triangle or a circle. In metaphysics 
I can never so begin, and here the definition is so far 
from being the first thing I know of an object that it 
is rather almost invariably the last.2 
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Even nominal definitions have no place at the start of philosophizing. 
This general requirement, however, has not been crippling, for: 
In philosophy and especially in metaphysics we can 
often distinctly and with certainty know very much 
about an object and derive sure consequences from it 
before we are in possession of its definition and 
even when we do not undertake to give one.3 
Kant is strongly convinced, therefore, that definitions come last in 
philosophy. In the Inquiry he makes this conviction "the first and 
chief rule" of the method for achieving the greatest possible metaphys-
ical certatnty4 and states it again in later writings, as will be shown 
below. 
In summary, Kant did not raise the question of the definition of 
libid., p. 267. 
2Ibid., p. 269. On this point James Ward says, "Both psychology 
and the~tory of thought bear Kant out completely in maintaining that 
such concepts are therefore just those which are not reached histori-
cally till the last" (Art. [1919], 6). In his Psychological Principles 
Ward holds that"· •• What is epistemologically the most fundamental 
is the last to be psychologically realised. This is not only true in 
fact; it is also true of necessity, inasmuch as the formation of more 
'concrete' concepts is an essential preliminary to the formation of 
others more 'abstract'--those most abstract, like the Kantian catego-
ries, etc., being thus the last of all to be thought out or understood." 
James Ward, Psychological Principles (2d ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1920). 
3Beck, p. 270. 4Ibid., p. 271. 
120 
category in his pre-Critical period from 1747 to 1769. In fact, the 
term "category" was not used once in twenty-six publications he pro-
duced during the period. The explanation for neglect of a topic he 
later deemed important is essentially preoccupation with other prob-
lems. Kant was occupied with the difficulties of rationalism, partie-
ularly those of the rationalist account of sufficient reason and of 
space. However, it is to be noted that on the general question of 
definitions in philosophy, Kant argues in his pre-Critical Inquiry of 
1764 that definitions are to be introduced last in philosophy and not 
first as in mathematics. 
B. In the Semi-Critical Writings 
Kant published little in the decade when he was bringing the 
Critique of Pure Reason to completion. His publications between the 
Dissertation of 1770 and the appearance of the first Critique in 
1781 are of little or no philosophical importance and have no bear-
ing whatsoever on the problem of the definition of category.l At-
tention is here restricted, therefore, to the Dissertation of 1770 
as the only writing of Kant's semi-Critical stage dealing with 
the subject.2 The Dissertation is a document of great importance 
lThey are a very short review titled "Review of the Writings of 
Moscati on the Difference of Structure in Men and Beasts" (1771) 1 an 
announcement of his lectures on physical geography called "On the Var-
ious Races of Mankind" (1775) 1 and three short articles on a philan-
thropic experiment in Dessau headed ·~eviews and Articles Concerning 
the Basedow Philanthropy" (1776-78). 
2smith says the Dissertation records Kant's semi-Critical posi-
tion (xx). This may be taken as Smith's classification of the Disser-
tation, although he does refer to it twice as pre-Critical (pp. 1851 
548). 
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since it alone reveals Kant's philosophical development during 1769-
1781 and links his pre-Critical and Critical doctrines. It is of no 
less importance for our purposes. This is true despite the fact 
that the term "category" is not mentioned; for in his Dissertation 
Kant discusses concepts which obviously are the ones that in 1772 
were first called "categories." 
The content of the Dissertation reveals a stage of temporary 
compromise between rationalism and empiricism reached by Kant. Spe-
cifically, Kant contends that our knowledge of time and space in 
general is not drawn from experience. Time and space are a priori 
representations with which we are endowed.l But this does not mean 
we possess in them a source of knowledge other than sense experience. 
As Kant states it: 
The object of sensibility is the sensible; that which 
contains nothing save what must be known through in-
telligence, is the intelligible. The former was called, 
in the schools of the ancients, phenomenon; the latter, 
noumenon • • • • things sensitively apprehended are rep-
resentations of things as they appear, while things in-
tellectually known are representations of things as they 
are.2 
Time and space, though a priori, are only a priori forms of human 
sensibility; they are universal and necessary ways human beings 
1
"But this formal principle of our intuition (space and time) 
is the condition under which anything can be an object of our senses" 
(Immanuel Kant, Kant's Inaugural Dissertation and Early Writings on 
Space, tr. John Handyside [Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1929], 
p. 50). 
2 Ibid., p. 44. 
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co-ordinate sense data. 1 Still, sensory knowledge is valid, as far as 
it goes: 
••• Although phenomena are, properly, appearances, 
not ideas, of things, and express no internal and ab-
solute quality of the objects, the knowledge of them 
is none the less quite genuine knowledge.2 
It is Kant's views in the Dissertation regarding the "intellect"3 and 
its concepts which are more important for our purposes here. In the 
Dissertation Kant specifically argues for the possibility of metaphys-
ics as a science professing to furnish information about reality not 
knowable in sense experience. The main argument he uses to support 
this view is the assertion that we are undoubtedly in possession of 
certain purely a priori concepts. By means of these pure a priori con-
cepts we can have not an "intuition" of intellectual things but a "sym-
bolic knowledge" of them. Hence, we do have some means of getting be-
yond sense experience, and metaphysics, in principle at least, is pos-
sible. 
When one turns to the Dissertation for full details of this posi-
tion1 one is greatly disappointed. The position of the later Critique 
of Pure Reason is much more carefully worked out. In the Dissertation 
lu ••• All the matter of our knowledge is given by the senses 
alone, whereas a noumenon1 as such, is not to be conceived through 
representations derived from sensations" (~.1 p. 50). 
2Ibid. 1 p. 51. 
3Intellectus. W. H. Walsh claims that the Critical distinction 
between understanding {Verstand) and reason {Vernunft) is not to be 
found in the Dissertation, hence "intellect" in the Dissertation, as 
in English, covers both Verstand and Vernunft ( W. H. Walsh, "Kant's 
Criticism of Metaphysics," Philosophy, XIV [1939] 1 320 n.). 
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Kant begins his argument by claiming that the intellect has a twofold 
use: 
••• The use of the intellect, that is, of the su-
perior faculty of the mind, is double. By the first 
use, the very concepts of objects or of relations are 
given, and this is the real use; by the second use, 
concepts, whencesoever given, are only subordinated 
to one another, the lower to the higher (the common 
marks), and compared with one another according to the 
principle of contradiction; and this is called the 
logical use.l 
The "logical" use of the intellect is concerned with the subordination 
and comparison of concepts and principles according to the law of con-
tradiction. What Kant means seems to be the formation of concepts, the 
grouping of subordinate and co-ordinate concepts, and the grouping of 
principles. For these operations something given is required, and the 
intellect in its logical use operates upon these data. But in its 
"real" use, it appears, the intellect does not operate upon but origi-
nates concepts itself. There are in the intellect certain pure con-
cepts of things or relations, 2 Kant says: 
When we come to the objects of intelligence which are 
1Handyside, p. 45. 
2There are three occurrences of similar descriptive phrases in 
the Dissertation: (l) vel rerum vel respectuum in #5; (2) tam objec-
torum, quam respectuum in #6; and (3) rerum et relationum in #23. 
Handyside incorrectly translates vel rerum vel respectuum as "of ob-
jects or of relations" instead of "of things or of relations" (ibid., 
p. 45). However, he does render the rerum et relationum in #23 as "of 
things and relations" (ibid., p. 72). In view of Kant's usage, it 
seems most accurate to speak of "pure concepts of things or relations" 
in referring to the pure intellectual concepts of the Dissertation. 
strictly such, in which the use of the intellect is 
!!!!, the concepts involved, whether of objects or re-
lations, are given through the very nature of the in-
tellect, not abstracted from any use of the senses, and 
do not contain any form of sensitive cognition as such.l 
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These pure concepts of things or relations can be discovered by the in-
tellect by reflecting on its operations on the occasion of experience. 
Kant states this as follows: 
Since, then, no empirical principles are to be found 
in metaphysics, the concepts there met with are not to 
be looked for in the senses, but in the very nature of 
pure intellect, not as concepts connate to it, but as 
abstracted (by attention to its actions on the occasion 
of experience) from laws inborn in the mind, and so to 
this extent as acquired. Concepts of this sort are: 
possibility, existence, necessity, substance, cause, 
etc., with their opposites or correlates.2 
After making these assertions, Kant does not hesitate to urge 
that the pure intellectual concepts are a source of knowledge other 
than sense experience and actually give us insight into an intelligi-
ble world of things in themselves.3 In the very next section4 the pure 
intellectual concepts of things or relations are declared to have two 
functions. First, 
In their critical use, they perform the negative 
service of keeping sensitive concepts from being 
applied to noumena. Though they advance knowledge 
2Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
3According to Vleeschauwer, Kant claims for them an "ontological 
value" (Herman J. de Vleeschauwer, La D~duction Transcendentale dans 
1 'Oeuvre de Kant, [3 vols.; Antwerp: "De Sikkel1 " 1934-37], I, 1631 
208). 
4#9 1 Handyside, pp. 49-50. 
not at all , they ret keep it free from the con-
tagion of errors . 
The pure intellectual concepts serve to expose the shortcomings 
of sensory concepts, revealing that the senses only give us knowl-
edge of appearances and thus preventing us from making the sensory 
the measure of true reality . Secondly, 
In their dogmatic use , the general principles of 
pure understanding, such as are dealt with in on-
tology or rational psychology, issue in some ex-
emplar, which is conceivable only by pure intellect, 
and is the common measure of all other things as far 
as real . This exemplar - - Perfectio Noumenon -- is 
perfection either in a theoretical or in a practical 
sense . In the former , it is the Supreme Being, God; 
in the latter, moral perfection . 2 
Kant's description seems to mean that our intellect gives us some 
sort of knowledge of what was called later an Absolute . This implies 
that the pure intellectual concepts constitute a source of knowledge 
distinct from sense experience -- the admission Kant needs to es-
tablish the case for the possibility of metaphysics. Presumably, 
the dogmatic use of the pure intellectual concepts is metaphysics, 
though this is not absolutely clear . 
The criticism that Kant's position in his Dissertation is 
not fully worked out is well illustrated here. Just how the pure 
intellectual concepts perform their "critical" function is not de -
lineated . Being concepts , presumably we use them and achieve the 
epistemological insight that empirical concepts are not adequate 
to reveal true reality; but even this is not explicitly ascribed to 




us, much less explained. Possibly, though, the pure intellectual con-
cepts are capable of this "critical" function because of their other 
"dogmatic" use. The latter is supposedly metaphysics, though this too 
could be made more explicit. In this interpretation, however, we meet 
with a different view of metaphysics from that in the subsection im-
mediately preceding. There Kant had defined metaphysics as "that part 
of philosophy which contains the first principles of the use of pure in-
tellect" and added that "no empirical principles are to be found in meta-
physics."l Kant's definition is suggestive more of epistemology than 
metaphysics and of the so-called "critical" use of pure intellectual 
concepts described here. Certainly the "dogmatic" use of the same con-
cepts comes as a considerable surprise after such a definition of meta-
physics. 
What Kant is claiming in his Dissertation perhaps can be summa-
rized briefly. He says that in sense experience we know a world which 
is investigated regarding its matter in the empirical sciences and re-
garding its form in mathematics. Over and above this, however, we are 
possessed of _a distinct source of knowledge of noumena in certain pure 
intellectual concepts which are a part of our mental equipment. These 
give us insight into another world, a world not of appearances but of 
reality,2 and because of this another science is possible. Presumably 
lrn subsection #8 (ibid., p. 48). 
211It is clear, therefore, that things sensitively apprehended 
are representations of things as they appear, while things intellec-
tually known are representations of things as they are" (ibid., p. 44). 
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this science is metaphysics, the culmination of which is the attainment 
of a conception of God. 
The preceding may suffice as a summary account of how Kant views 
the intellect in the Dissertation, but it does not determine exactly 
how Kant defines category at this semi-Critical stage of his thought. 
For that one must analyze Kant's usage in the text of the Disserta-
tion. The terms he used to mean category are quite relevant, but they 
must not only be ascertained but analyzed as to their exact meaning 
for Kant. It is here that Kant's statements regarding the nature and 
function of the categories are all important. It is only after such 
an investigation that perhaps it may be determined how Kant defined 
category in his semi-Critical period. 
First, with regard to the terms used in the Dissertation, it 
may be repeated that the term "category" as such does not occur.l 
Rather than this term, Kant uses thirteen others. These are indicated 
(arranged according to frequency of occurrence) in the following table: 
Term for Category Used Times Used 





universal concept (conceptus universalis) •••••• 
general concept (conceptus generalis) ••• 
intellectual mark (nota intellectualis) 
intellectual idea (idea abstracta) •••• 






6. abstract notion (notio abstracts) 1 
7. abstract idea (idea abstracts) •• . . . . . 1 
8. universal idea (idea universalis) 1 
9. pure idea (idea pura) •••• 1 
10. general principle (principius generale) 1 
11. intelligible concept (conceptus intelligibilis) • • 1 
12. primary concept (conceptus primitivus). • • 1 
13. intellectual notion (notio intellectualis). • • 1 
Total Times Used •••••••• 35 
The strongest support for such a table will be found when each instance 
is examined in its context. Then it will be seen that each case cited 
is one where Kant used the term when referring to what he later called 
category. This interpretation is also in line with recent comment on 
Kant's Dissertation, such as that of W. H. Walsh who has said, for ex-
ample, that "the pure concepts in §8 are all concepts of the under-
standing in the later sense"l and that 11 the categories of the Critique 
of Pure Reason descend from the 'pure intellectual concepts' of the 
inaugural Dissertation. 112 
It is apparent, then from the above table that the term used 
most to mean category in Kant's Dissertation is ,..intellectual concept" 
(conceptus intel1ectua1is). In fact, this term is used more times than 
lwa1sh1 Philosophy, XIV, 322. 
2Reason and Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947), 
pp. 163-64. 
the other terms combined and is used exclusively from subsection 
25 on.l In addition, there are three other instances where the 
129 
term "concept" is used but without "intellectual," yet where the con-
text makes plain that it is to "intellectual concepts" Kant is re-
ferring.2 Therefore, the term "intellectual concept," employed mostly 
lrt occurs 11 times in the 5 subsections from §25 to the end. 
This is apparent from the following which indicates the distribution 
of all 13 terms used (the number in parentheses being the times used 
in the subsection indicates): 
§1-abstract notion (1) 
universal idea (1) 
abstract idea (l) 
§2-intellectual concept (2) 
§5-intellectual concept (1) 
§6-intellectual concept (1) 
intellectual idea (1) 
pure idea (l) 
§9-intellectual concept (l) 
general principle (1) 
§10-universal concept (1) 
general concept (1) 
intelligible concept (1) 
§15-intellectual mark (1) 
universal concept (1) 
general concept (1) 
§23-primary concept (1) 
§24-intellectual concept (3) 
intellectual notio~ (1) 
intellectual mark (1) 
§25-intellectual concept (2) 
§26-intellectual concept (2) 
§28-intellectual concept (4) 
§29-intellectual concept (2) 
§30-intellectual concept (1) 
2They are: (1) in §5 where Kant says that "by the first use 
[of the intellect], the very concepts of objects or of relations are 
given, and this is the real use" (Handyside, p. 45); (2) in §6 where 
it is said that '~hen we come to the objects of intelligence which 
are strictly such, in which the use of the intellect is real, the con-
cepts involved, whether of objects or relations, are given through 
the very nature of the intellect, not abstracted from any use of the 
senses, and do not contain any form of sensitive cognition as such" 
(Handyside, p. 47); and (3) in §8 where Kant claims that "since, then, 
no empirical principles are to be found in metaphysics, the concepts 
there met with are not to be look for in the sense, but in the very 
nature of pure intellect, not as concepts connate to it, but as ab-
stracted (by attention to its actions on the occasion of experience) 
from laws inborn in the mind, and so to this extent as acquired" 
(ibid., pp. 48-49). 
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in the plural, is used in twenty-two out of thirty-eight instances in 
the Dissertation where category is meant. The testimony of Kant's 
usage as a whole in the Dissertation, then, is that in his semi-Crit-
ical period Kant generally called a category an "intellectual conc~pt." 
The question, of course, is exactly what Kant meant when he spoke 
of a category as an "intellectual concept" in the Dissertation. Re-
garding this problem a claim of Christopher B. Garnett, Jr. should be 
considered. Garnett has arguedl that in portions of the Dissertation 
Kant assumed that human beings have intellectual intuitions while in 
other portions of the same document he asserted explicitly that man 
has no intellectual intuitions. Kant, he claims, tried to superimpose 
the latter view upon doctrines which rested upon the former but sue-
ceeded only in creating confusion. This claim must be evaluated here 
because category will be differently defined if for Kant man has in-
tellectual intuitions. 
Garnett argues for his thesis by citing passages in the Disserta-
tion which affirm human intellectual intuitions2 and contrasting them 
with passages which deny human intellectual intuitions.3 This is fol-
lowed by argument to the effect that three of Kant's leading distinc-
tions in the Dissertation rest upon the assumption of intellectual in-
1
"Kant's Theory of Intuitus Intellectualis in the Inaugural Disser-
tation of 17701 " Philosophical Review, XLVI (July, 1937), 424-432. 
This article is reprinted with some unnoted omissions and changes in 
The Kantian Philosophy of Space (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1939), pp. 152-161. 
2subsections §11 2, 161 171 25 (in part). 
3subsections §101 25 (in part). 
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tuitions in man, namely, his distinction between a real and a logical 
use of the intellect, between a qualitative and a quantitative syn-
thesis, and between a whole of representation and a representation of a 
whole. 1 Furthermore, Garnett contends, when Kant adopted the contra-
dictory view that human beings have no intellectual intuitions, he 
tried to superimpose it upon these three distinctions.2 But he was not 
only unsuccessful but actually cut the ground from under them.3 To sum-
marize his argument, Garnett contends that each of the distinctions pre-
supposes a non-sensory as well as sensory material given to the mind. 
But since intellectual intuition supplying non-sensory material of the 
real world has been denied at least in some parts of the Dissertation, 
the basis for Kant's three distinctions has been destroyed. Garnett 
expands this contention only in regard to the distinction between the 
real and logical use of the intellect. He reasons that if there is a 
real use of the intellect yielding knowledge, then there must be ma-
terial given the mind to which such knowledge refers. If such materials 
concern the real, intelligible world, then intellectual intuitions are 
involved. Hence, if intellectual intuitions are lacking as Kant claims, 
the difference between the real and logical use of the intellect disap-
pears, leaving both uses to involve merely logical clarification. With 
the denial of the required non-sensory material, the supposed real use 
bas no function distinguishing it from the logical use of the intellect. 
The same basic charge of lack of required material is made against the 
1Garnett, Philosophical Review, XLVI, 424-428. 
2Ibid., pp. 428-431. 3Ibid. 1 pp. 431-432. 
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other two distinctions, though only in a sentence each. 
This is a serious indictment, indeed. Kant is charged not only 
with advocating contradictory positions within the same document, but 
of undermining his own distinctions. The indictment must be evaluated; 
for not only is the question of intellectual intuition important for a 
semi-Critical definition of category, but the questioned distinction 
between a real and a logical use of the intellect is a key one. The ap-
proach to this, as to all the many charges of inconsistency leveled 
against Kant, is first to examine the text cited in support of the pur-
ported contradictions. In this instance the results are surprising. If 
one examines carefully the subsections cited by Garnettl as being those 
in which Kant "assumed that there are certain intellectual intuitions 
available to the human mind,"2 one will be startled, in view of Gar-
nett's claims, to note that in none of them does Kant specifically say 
human beings have intellectual intuitions. 
In subsection 1 Kant does say "given the parts"3 and "if a complex 
of substances be given, whether through the testimony of the senses or 
in any other way ,"4 but these passages only allude to the possi-
bility of intellectual intuition and are not Kant's specific endorse-
ment of the notion. In subsection 2 Kant does say that "by embracing 
a plurality you may without difficulty make a whole of representation, 
but not, thereby, the representation of a whole,"5 but this affirms 
lsubsections 1, 2, 16, 17, 25 (in part). 
2Garnett, Philosophical Review, XLVI, 424. 
3aandyside, p. 35. 4Ibid., p. 38. 5Ibid., p. 40. 
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nothing specific about human intellectual intuitions being presupposed. 
The statement is part of a discussion of form (defined as the co-ordi-
nation of substances) considered as a factor in the definition of a 
world. Kant is discussing the difference between a real whole and an ar-
bitrarily determined one. The co-ordination of substances or form is to 
be thought of as real and objective and forming a real whole. This type 
of co-ordination is in contrast to that which is "ideal and dependent 
simply on the choice of the subject, whereby summing up at pleasure 
any aggregate whatever, the subject may fashion [for itself] a whole."l 
The discussion deals with how form, one of the factors in the defini-
tion of a world, is to be conceived. Kant's point is that form as co-
ordination of substances is real and objective and forms a real whole. 
Garnett, however, gives the misleading impression that in this subsec-
tion Kant draws a sharp distinction between two forms of co-ordination 
by human minds, namely, co-ordination of sensory objects and of "real" 
or non-sensory objects. This is not the case, for the two types of co-
ordination of substances which Kant discusses are co-ordination which 
is real and objective (a "whole of representation") as contrasted with 
co-ordination which is ideal and dependent (a "representation of a 
whole"). Garnett, nevertheless, proceeds by an arbitrary argument to 
the claim that "a representation of a whole conforms, in some cases, 
to the conditions of intellectual intuition."2 Subsection 21 however, 
neither supports the claim nor the argument offered for it. 
1Ibid. 2Philosophical Review, XLVI, 428. 
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Subsections 16 and 17 are cited by Garnett as offering evidence 
for the co-ordination of real, intelligible objects. 1 The reader, 
however, who turns to them for evidence again will be disappointed. 
The specific passage in subsection 16 which Garnett probably has in 
mind is the one which reads: "[the concept of space] ••• yet denotes 
only the intuitively given possibility of universal co-ordination."2 
But this does not directly suggest anything about the co-ordination of 
intelligible objects. Kant in this subsection is saying that space in-
dicates only the possibility of there being co-ordination of all objects 
in the same whole called a world. There remains, he says, the question 
of how it is possible that such a plurality of substances should stand 
in mutual interaction and thus belong to the same whole we call a world. 
Here Kant is dealing with the problem "of the principle of the form of 
the intelligible world," as the title of the section says plainly, and 
not with the problem of intellectual intuition in human beings. Human 
intuition of the sensory type is cited only as insufficient to meet the 
problem. Human intuition of the intellectual type is not alluded to 
even indirectly. Nor is there anything suggesting it in subsection 17, 
the burden of which is that the mere existence of a plurality of sub-
stances does not explain the possibility of interaction between them. 
The remaining passage cited by Garnett as proof of human intel-
lectual intuitions is featured by him most prominently of all. Garnett 
1The Kantian Philosophy of Space, p. 157n. Subsection 17 only is 
cited in Garnett, Philosophical Review, XLVI, 428n. 
~andyside, p. 66. 
says: 
Kant's position in the Dissertation based upon the 
assumption that human beings have intellectual in-
tuitions is briefly as follows: 
We rightly suppose that what cannot be 
known through any intuition whatever is 
not thinkable at all, and so is impossi-
ble.! 
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Although this sentence taken from subsection 25 says nothing directly 
about intellectual intuitions in man, Garnett infers that since Kant 
speaks elsewhere in the Dissertation of "real" or non-sensory objects, 
there must be human non-sensory intuitions through which these objects 
are apprehended. However, the very next sentence in subsection 25 ex-
plicitly denies this: 
But since by no effort of the mind can we attain 
even in imagination another kind of intuition than 
that which takes place according to the form of space 
and time, it comes about that we regard as impossible 
all intuition whatever which is not bound by these 
laws (neglecting the pure intellectual intuition which 
is exempt from the laws of the senses, such as the di-
vine intuition which Plato calls an idea), and so subj ect 
all possible things to the sensitive axioms of space 
and time.2 
1Philosophical Review, XLVI, 424. The sentence from the Disser-
tation comprises lines 22-24 on p. 75 of Handyside. 
2nandyside, p. 75, lines 24-32. The parenthesis, "(neglecting 
the pure intellectual intuition which is exempt from the laws of the 
senses, such as the divine intuition which Plato calls an idea)", 
rules out of consideration intellectual intuition possessed by self-
sufficient beings, here, presumably by God. Kant does so because he 
is dealing with the question of human intellectual intuition. It is 
Kant's mature view expressed often in the Critique of Pure Reason that 
human beings have no way of obtaining intuitions apart from passive 
sensibility and do not possess intuitive understanding or intellectual 
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Furthermore, Garnett himself quotes this same sentence later in stat-
ing the possible view that God only, and not .man, has intellectual 
intuitions! 1 The effect is that, according to Garnett, we must convict 
Kant of complete contradiction in successive sentences. A more accurate 
charge, though, would be that Garnett has unfairly quoted Kant out of 
context. 
In fairness to Garnett, however, one must examine with equal care 
the Dissertation passages he cites2 as supporting the view that Kant 
denied human intellectual intuitions. When this is done, it can be said 
that the passages referred to clearly support the doctrine. The portion 
of subsection 25 cited above is the passage which follows immediately 
the sentence Garnett quotes out of context, and, as has been seen, it 
explicitly denies human intellectual intuitions. The main point of sub-
section 10 is that man does not have intellectual intuitions, as is seen 
readily in the first two sentences which Garnett quotes: 
intuition (A5l=B75; A67-8=B92-3; B68; Bl59; A258:B314.) Kant, how-
ever, does not dismiss the possibility of there also being intelligences 
different from ours (B72; Bl35; Bl45). Such "an understanding," he 
says quite clearly in Bl35, "in which through self-consciousness all the 
manifold would eo ipso be given, would be intuitive; our understanding 
can only think, and for intuition must look to the senses." It is to a 
type of intelligence different from ours that Kant is referring paren-
thetically in subsection 25. But he does so only to pass over it while 
considering human intell~gence and the possibility of its possessing in-
tellectual intuition. 
1Philosophical Review, XLVI, 429n. He does not indicate that it 
follows immediately. 0. F. Kraushaar has pointed this out in his review 
of Garnett's book, '~eview of C. B. Garnett, Jr.'s The Kantian Philosophy 
of Space, 11 Journal of Philosophy, XXXVII (1940), 107. 
2subsections 10, 25 (in part). 
No intuition of things intellectual, but only a 
symbolic knowledge of them, is given to man. In-
tellection is possible to us only through universal 
concepts in the abstract! not through a singular 
concept in the concrete. 
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It bas been seen, therefore, that Garnett bas based his case for 
the presence of a doctrine of human intellectual intuition in Kant's 
Dissertation on five passages which analysis reveals do not clearly 
state it. Though Garnett speaks of Kant's "specific contention"2 
for the doctrine, the passage to which he perhaps is referring3 and of 
which he makes the greatest use is denied this interpretation by the 
context from which it is taken without warrant. Actually, then, Gar-
nett's main text supports the view that Kant does not hold a theory 
of human intellectual intuition in his Dissertation.4 Furthermore, as 
Garnett has more successfully shown, Kant elsewhere in the Disserta-
~ specifically endorses the view that human beings do not have in-
tellectual intuitions. Therefore, Garnett's claim that the Disserta-
tion contains two contradictory views on this subject is Without. 
basis. 
428. 
~andyside1 p. 50. See Garnett, Philosophical Review, XLVI, 
2Philosopbical Review, XLVI, 429. 
3§251 lines 22-24 (Handyside, p. 75). 
~raushaar says, "A scrupulous reading of Sections IV and V of 
the Dissertation reveals that Kant's definition of the intelligible 
world did not entail the acceptance of human intellectual intuitions" 
(Journal of Philosophy, XXXVII, 107). 
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We are justified, accordingly, in ruling out human intellectual 
intuition in seeking Kant's semi-Critical definition of category. 
The problem remaining, of course, is to determine exactly the view 
Kant did hold regarding the categories at this particular stage. 
Here the difficulty is not that the key distinction of the real use 
of the intellect is based on a theory later rejected, but rather 
that it is not clearly and fully stated. Garnett even admits this 
when he notes that Kant ndid not give a single example of an intel-
lectual intuition of a real object."l If it be granted that Kant 
denies human intellectual intuitions in the Dissertation, then his 
semi-Critical view seems to be that real or noumenal objects are 
known intuitively by God but known only mediately through intellec-
tual conceptions by human beings. God's knowledge of realities is 
intuitive. Human beings know only the world of appearances by means 
of sensory intuitions. Their knowledge of realities is not based 
on intuition but on conception. Because of its conceptual nature, 
such knowledge of real objects is symbolic and abstract. In its 
real use, therefore, the intellect originates abstract intellectual 
concepts which yield symbolic knowledge of noumenal objects and rela-
tions. 
This appears to be Kant's view of categorial knowledge in the 
Dissertation, but it can hardly be said to be developed fully. Not 
only are no examples given of categorial knowledge of a noumenal 
object, but the whole theory is set forth in only a few sentences, 
lPhilosophical Review, XLVI, 426. 
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as has been seen above.l In addition, ambiguity marks them. For ex-
ample, Kant nowhere makes clear the differences between intellect or 
understanding (intellectus), mind (mens), and soul (anima).2 The 
"understanding" is said to be the superior faculty of the "soul," 
but its distinction from the "mind" is left vague.3 More also needs 
to be said on the subject of the "laws of the mind" and the intellec-
tual concepts supposedly abstracted from them. Kant's sole sentence 
in the Dissertation on this vital subject illustrates both the ambi-
guity of terms and paucity of material: 
Since, then, no empirical principles are to be found 
in metaphysics, the concepts there met with are not 
to be looked for in the senses, but in the very nature 
of pure intellect, not as concepts connate to it, but 
as abstracted (by attention to its actions on the oc-
casion of experience) from laws inborn in the mind, 
and so to this extent as acquired.4 
Kant here is saying in part that the intellectual concepts or 
categories are abstracted by the intellect from laws in the mind, 
but it is not at all clear what "laws inborn in the mind" as dis-
tinguished from intellectual concepts or categories means in this 
context. It may be that Kant is emphasizing that the intellectual 
lwalsh says that in the Dissertation, in contrast to the £!1-
tique of Pure Reason, "we have simply a crude affirmation of the 
distinction between the senses and the intellect and a theory, by 
no means worked out in detail, of how the one gives us knowledge of 
appearances, the other of things in themselves" (Philosophy, XIV, 322). 
2Eckoff throughout translates intellectus as "intellect," mens as 
"mind," and anima as "soul." Handyside varies in translating a'irliiia 
sometimes as "mind" (p. 45) and sometimes as "soul" (pp. 77, 85). 
3§5 (Handyside, p. 45). Cf. N. K. Smith, p. 188. 
4sandyside, pp. 48-49. 
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concepts are not innate ideas but ways of thinking we use and discover 
later by abstraction. But this attractive interpretation suggestive 
of Kant's later thought is not clear and unmistakable to all. Walsh, 
for example, holds that here Kant views the intellectual concepts "in 
very much the same light as Cartesian innate ideas."l 
Ambiguity also marks the statement that "No intuition of things 
intellectual, but only a symbolic knowledge of them, is given to man."2 
Here it is clear that Kant is not claiming any intellectual intuition 
of the intelligible or noumenal world; but it is not clear what "sym-
bolic knowledge" of "things intellectual" means. Perhaps Kant means 
we cannot know a world of things in themselves in its individual de-
tail but can have insight into its general nature. But even this pos-
sible interpretation produces a flood of unawwered questions. What ex- ' 
actly is the status of the things about which we supposedly have . such 
symbolic or general knowledge? And what is the status of the relations 
of which we also have intellectual concepts? Is our knowledge of these 
relations also symbolic? If so, what does this mean? Do we symbolically 
know relations existing only in the non-sensory realm, or between our 
mind and the non-sensory world? On either basis, how is it known that re-
lations are symbolic or grasped only in their general nature? As a whole, 
it may be questioned whether one can legitimately speak of a "concept 
lphilosophy, XIV, 438. 2Handyside, p. 50. 
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of things and relations" as symbolic. If one has a concept of some 
thing or relation, one can be said to know it in some specific sense. 
This feature of conceptual thought, however, seems hardly covered by 
Kant's term "symbolic knowledge" understood as implying general knowl-
edge. Yet if the thing or relation is not known in some specific sense 
at all, how can one be sure one's concepts are accurately symbolic? 
Nevertheless, despite brevity and ambiguity, it may be said with 
some confidence that Kant claims in his Dissertation that there are in 
the intellect certain pure intellectual concepts of things and rela-
tions which it can discover by reflection on its own operations in know-
ing the sensory world. It is because we possess these intellectual con-
cepts that we can know the non-sensory world to some degree. But the 
many unanswered questions which this position provokes make it under-
standable that Kant was not permanently satisfied with it. Indeed, the 
view is both the most interesting and least satisfactory feature of the 
inaugural Dissertation. Hence, it comes as no surprise that this semi-
Critical view of the categories did not survive Kant's subsequent scru-
tiny. 
Thus it is that the ambiguity of terms, the dearth of material 
plus the unanswered questions raised by the Dissertation make it diffi-
cult for anyone to state conclusively how Kant defined a category in 
1770. Still some formal statement is needed here and can be made, pro-
vided the many reservations presented above are kept in mind. There-
fore, the following is offered as representing Kant's semi-Critical 
definition of category according to the Dissertation of 1770: 
1. In brief but ambiguous form, according to Kant's 
Dissertation, a category is an intellectual concept 
of non-sensory objects and relations. 
2. In fuller though not unambiguous form, a category is 
a pure intellectual concept of things and relations 
possessed by the human intellect, discoverable by 
reflection on its operations in knowing the sensory 
world and yielding symbolic knowledge of non-sensory 
objects and relations. 
C. In the Critique of Pure Reason 
The chief source of material for determining Kant's 
Critical definition of category is the Critique of Pure Reason in 
its first and second editions . l There are relevant passages to 
be found in Kant's other writings from his Critical period, as 
will be noted below. But beyond all doubt, the most important 
material on the question of Kant's definition of category is dis-
coverable in his Critique of Pure Reason, particularly in the 
1
of 1781 and 1787, respectively. Following common usage, 
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these will be referred to as A and B, the numbers used in reference 
with these designations being the original paging of the first and 
second editions. Quotations in German are from the Cassirer edi-
tion except where noted. Quotations in English are from the second, 
revised edition of N. K. Smith's translation, unless otherwise in-
dicated. 
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"Transcendental Analytic."l In fact, the material in the Critique of 
Pure Reason overshadows by far that in all of Kant's pre-Critical, semi-
Critical, and other Critical writings. This is true both regarding 
amount and importance. The Transcendental Analytic furnishes a bewil-
dering number of relevant passages when it is approached with the in-
tention of determining Kant's definition of category. Since the Ana-
lytic contains Kant's fullest statements on the problem of the catego-
ries in general, one may anticipate finding in it the most relevant 
data on how Kant defined category in his Critical period. 
Judgment on the last statement should be reserved until all the 
evidence has been cited; but it can hardly be suspended regarding the 
claim of abundance of material in the Transcendental Analytic. The 
most cursory reading with the question of definition of category in 
mind will reveal a wealth of information which creates problems of as-
similation and organization. These difficulties may be handled in var-
ious ways, undoubtedly, but the procedure here will be to note, first, 
what Kant has to say in the Critique of Pure Reason on the general 
1The Critique of Pure Reason is divided, following a "Preface" 
and "Introduction," into two main divisions, namely, a "Transcendental 
Doctrine of Elements" and a "Transcendental Doctrine of Method." The 
first of these main divisions is subdivided into two parts called 
"Transcendental Aesthetic'' and "Transcendental Logic," and the latter 
is further subdivided into "Transcendental Analytic" and "Transcenden-
tal Dialectic," Despite this arrangement, it is readily apparent that 
the heart of the Critique of Pure Reason is found in three subdivisions, 
namely, "Transcendental Aesthetic," "Transcendental Analytic," and 
"Transcendental Dialectic," and not in the larger divisions which bal-
ance Kant's outline and satisfy his liking for orderly arrangement. 
The Transcendental Aesthetic is found in Al9=B33--A49=B73, the Tran-
scendental Analytic in A64=B89--A292=B349, and the Transcendental Dia-
lectic in A293=B349--A704=B732. 
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question of defining categories. When this has been determined, atten-
tion will be given to the various ways in which the categories are de-
fined by Kant in the course of the Critique in both editions. An at-
tempt will be made to determine if any order is discoverable in this 
overwhelming collection of data. This will be done with the intention 
of arriving finally at an accurate statement of Kant's Critical defini-
tion of category. 
This analysis of the Critique of Pure Reason to determine Kant's 
definition of category will reveal certain presuppositions regarding 
the unity of the work and the thought which produced it. This is nei-
ther avoidable nor reprehensible when made clear. An effort will be 
made to point out in passing the assumptions regarding the Critique and 
Kantian thought which underlie the analysis presented. It will be soon 
noted that, in general, among English commentators, for example, H. J. 
Paton's interpretation is preferred over N. K. Smith's. The indebted-
ness to Paton will be obvious, though an independent attempt to evalu-
ate the evidence impartially has been the aim of the investigation. 
1. Kant on Defining Categories 
After introducing his table of categories in the Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant deliberately omits their definitions, hinting that he 
might be able to give them. 1 He recognizes their place in a system of 
pure reason but omits them on the ground that they would create doubt 
111In this treatise, I purposely omit the definitions of the cate-
gories, although I may be in possession of them" (A82=Bl08). 
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and opposition and thus divert attention from his main purpose in writ-
ing the Critique: 
In a system of pure reason, definitions of the cate-
gories would rightly be demanded, but in this treatise 
they would merely divert attention from the main ob-
ject of the enquiry, arousing doubts and objections, 
which, without detriment to what is essential to our 
purpose, can very well be reserved for another occa-
sion.l 
He also claims that a complete glossary of the requisite definitions 
can be easily drawn up, if his divisions and remarks be followed.2 
These statements occur in the first chapter of the Transcenden-
tal Analytic. In its last chapter3 Kant has more to say on the sub-
ject, seemingly in contrast. There, instead of again hinting that be 
might be able to supply definitions of the categories, be says that 
they cannot be defined in any "real~' fashion, apart from space and 
time, the forms of sensibility: 
We cannot define any one of them [the categories 
and the principles derived from them] in any real4 
fashion, that is, make the possibility of their ob-
l A83=Bl09. 
2•~eanwhile, from the little that I have said, it will be obvi-
ous that a complete glossary, with all the requisite explanations, is 
not only a possible, but an easy task. The divisions are provided; 
all that is required is to fill them; and a systematic 'topic,' such 
as that here given, affords ·· sufficient guidance as to the proper loca-
tion of each concept, while at the same time indicating which divisions 
are still empty" (A83=Bl09). 
3A235=B294--A260:B315 titled "The Ground of the Distinction of 
All Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena." 
4The adjective "real" added in B. 
ject understandable,l without at once descending to 
the conditions of sensibility, and so to the form 
of appearances--to which, as their sole objects, 
they must consequently be limited.2 
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If space and time be removed, relation to an object goes also, and the 
categories can no more afford knowledge of the universal character of 
objects.3 This view is elaborated in the next passage in A which is 
omitted in B.4 Kant refers to his previous omission of definitions 
and notes again that they were not required by his purpose.5 He then 
gives another and more important reason for omitting them, namely, we 
are unable to define the categories even if we wished to do so; for 
if we remove all intuition, we become unable to show how they can have 
meaning and objective validity: 
But we now perceive that the ground of this pre-
caution lies still deeper. We realise that we are 
lThe phrase, "that is, make the possibility of their object un-
derstandable," added in B. 
2A240::B300. 
3"For if this condition be removed, all meaning, that is, rela-
tion to the object falls away; and we cannot through any example make 
comprehensible to ourselves what sort of thing is to be meant by such 
a concept" (A24l=B300). 
4 A241-242. 
S"In the above statement of the table of categories, we relieved 
ourselves of the task of defining each of them, as our purpose, which 
concerned only their synthetic employment, did not require such defini-
tion, and we are not called upon to incur any responsibility through 
unnecessary undertakings from which we can be relieved. It was no eva-
sion but an important prudential maxim, not to embark upon the task of 
definition, attempting or professing to attain completeness and preci-
sion in the determination of a concept, so long as we can achieve our 
end with one or other of its properties, without requiring a complete 
enumeration of all those that constitute the complete concept" (A241). 
unable to define them even if we wished. For if we 
remove all those conditions of sensibility which 
mark them out as concepts of possible empirical em-
ployment, and view them as concepts of things in 
general and therefore of transcendental employment, 
all that we can then do with them is to regard the 
logical function in judgments [to which they give 
expression]l as the condition of the possibility of 
the things in themselves, without in the least be-
ing able to show how they can have application to 
an object, that is, how in pure understanding, apart 
from sensibility, they can have meaning and objec-
tive validity. 2 
In other words, we would be unable to give the categories a "real" 
definition which for Kant, as he explains in an important footnote, 
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means making clear not only the meaning of the concept but also its ob-
jective validity or relation and application to experience. 
I here mean real definition--which does not merely 
substitute for the name of a thing other more in-
telligible words, but contains a clear property by 
which the defined object can always be known with 
certainty, and which makes the explained concept 
serviceable in application. Real explanation would 
be that which makes clear not only the concept but 
also its objective reality. Mathematical explana-
tions which present the object in intuition, in con-
formity with the concept, are of this latter kind.3 
Apart from intuition, however, it is still possible to define each pure 
category as the concept of a particular form of judgment which supposed-
ly somehow characterizes all things without exception. But we still 
would not know how they could apply to any object of experience and so 
could offer no "real" definition of them.4 
lsmi th 1 s remark. 2A241-242. 3A24ln.-242n. 
4s. J. Paton, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience (2 vols.; New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1936), II, 434. 
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In A244-246 Kant elaborates on this contention.l He says that 
the pure category "can contain nothing but the logical function for 
bringing the manifold under a concept"2 and that by it alone we cannot 
know in any way what object comes under it.3 Hence the pure catego-
ries must be schematized or restricted to a manifold of intuition 
given under the form of time and space, and when the categories are 
not schematized, they cannot be defined. 
Consequently, the categories require, in addition to 
the pure concept of understanding, determinations of 
their application to sensibility in general (schemata). 
Apart from such application they are not concepts 
through which an object is known and distinguished 
from others, but only so many modes of thinking an ob-
ject for possible intuitions, and of giving it meaning, 
under the requisite further conditions, in conformity 
with some function of the understanding, that is, of 
defining it. But they cannot themselves be defined.4 
As pure concepts of understanding, they contain only the logical func-
tions of judgment; therefore, they cannot be defined without reason-
ing in a circle, since the definition itself would be a judgment and 
already contain these forms. 
The logical functions of judgments in general, unity 
and plurality, assertion and denial, subject and predi-
1Paton (ibid., II, 435n.) says that the passage is repetitious 
and was probably omitted from B for that reason. 
3"By means of this function or form of the concept, thus taken 
by itself, we cannot in any way know and distinguish what object comes 
under it, since we have abstracted from the sensible condition through 
which alone objects can come under it" (A245). 
4A245. 
cate, cannot be defined without perpetrating a circle, 
since the definition must itself be a judgment, and 
so must already contain these functions. The pure 
categories are nothing but representations of things 
in general, so far as the manifold of their intuition 
must be thought through one or other of these logical 
functions .1 
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It is to be observed, therefore, regarding the definition of 
categories that Kant first2 says that be is intentionally omitting 
them and later3 contends that apart from intuition they are impossi-
ble to achieve.4 His reasons for the latter contention are that defi-
nitions framed apart from intuition cannot show that there is any pos-
sible object to which a pure category can apply, and that such defini-
tions are bound to be circular. It would seem, therefore, that the 
definition of a pure category is impossible and that the scope of this 
chapter should be reduced accordingly. Comparison of A and B does not 
relieve the situation; for Kant says more concisely in B30~240-241 
essentially what he says at much greater length in A241-242 and A244-
246, namely, apart from intuition, "real" definitions of the catego-
ries are impossible. 
1A245. Paton (II, 434n.) feels this passage suggests that all 
the forms of judgment are present in every judgment. This, he believes, 
is not only Kant's opinion but actually the case. 
2rn A82=Bl08--A83=Bl09. 3In A240:B300--A246:B303. 
4smith (pp. 195-196) finds these statements to be directly coun-
ter to one another and corroborative of the "patchwork" theory by 
which he (following Vaihinger) explains the differences between parts 
of the Critique. Kant, however, in the earlier passage only hints 
that be may be in possession of definitions of the categories. This 
qualification indicates that the contrast between the two passages is 
not so sharp or as corroborative of his adopted theory as Smith would 
have one believe. 
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Nevertheless, in spite of all these remarks, it still can be said 
what a pure category is. In fact, Kant himself does so in A242,1 and 
in A242=B300--A244=B302 he explains the nature of the separate pure 
categories. Kant's statements about the requirements of a "real" 
definition and his warnings against circularity in definition neither 
prevented him, nor exclude us, from recognizing and describing what a 
pure category is. He does say that the pure categories cannot be de-
fined, but this means only that their definition is not a "real" defini-
tion; that is, it does not show that there is any object of experience 
to which the pure categories apply . It is possible, however, to define 
the pure categories in another manner which, if not "real" in the spe-
cial Kantian sense, will still be genuinely descriptive and informa-
tive. Kant does so himself in a number of places in the Critique, as 
will be noted, and it is thus, with at least the sanction of his own 
practice, that we do not exclude from our investigation a search for 
his definition of pure category. 
Kant has more to say on the question of definition in general. 
The passage is A726=B754--A732=B760, which is near the end of the Cri-
tique.2 Kant takes up again the distinction between mathematical and 
philosophical knowledge dealt with in the "Introduction"3 and treated 
1Kant speaks of viewing the pure categories as "concepts of 
things in general." 
2It is in the chapter on "The Discipline of Pure Reason" in the 
"transcendental Doctrine of Method," the concluding part·· following 
the "Transcendental Dialectic." 
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most exhaustively in the Inquiry of 1764, as has been seen above.l He 
claims once more that the exactness of mathematics rests upon defini-
tions, axioms, and demonstrations. It is his remarks on definitions 
which are most relevant here. 
To define as mathematics does, says Kant, is "to present the 
complete, original concept of a thing within the limits of its con-
cept.112 This is not possible regarding empirical concepts; for we 
are more certain of their denotation than of their connotation. Such 
concepts may be explained, but they cannot be defined.3 An empirical 
concept is always liable to be modified as new observations add or take 
away predicates.4 Exact definition is equally impossible regarding 
a priori concepts such as substance and cause. 
• • • It is also true that no concept given a priori, 
such as substance, cause, right, equity, etc., can, 
strictly speaking, be defined.5 
Since they are not framed by the mind but are given to it, the com-
1 Pp. 117·120. 
3"If this be our standard, an empirical concept cannot be de-
fined at all, but only made explicit. For since we find in it only a 
few characteristics of a certain species of sensible object, it is 
never certain that we are not using the word, in denoting one and the 
same object, sometimes so as to stand for more, and sometimes so as to 
stand for fewer characteristics" (A727=B755) • . 
4r~e make use of certain characteristics only so long as they 
are adequate for the purpose of making distinctions; new observations 
remove some properties and add others; and thus the limits of the 
concept are never assured" (A728::B756). 
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pleteness of our analysis of them can never be guaranteed.l Therefore 
Kant in A729=B757 prefers to use the more guarded term "exposition" 
rather than "definition" regarding both empirical and a priori con-
cepts. The only concepts which allow of definition are arbitrarily 
invented ones.2 Kant, however, recognizes only one kind of factitious 
or arbitrary concept which may be called a priori, namely, the mathemat-
ical concept. 
There remain, therefore, no concepts which allow of 
definition, except only those which contain an arbi-
trary synthesis that admits of a priori construction. 
Consequently, mathematics is the only science that has 
definitions. For the object which it thinks it ex-
hibits a priori in intuition, and this object certain-
ly cannot contain either more or less than the concept, 
since it is through the definition that the concept of 
the object is given--and given originally, that is, 
without its being necessary to derive the definition 
from any other source.3 
Nevertheless, in spite of these remarks, Kant withdraws his re-
striction on the use of the term "definition" and allows it to be ap-
plied to expositions of philosophical concepts: 
111For I can never be certain that the clear representation of a 
given concept, which as given may still be confused, has been complete-
ly effected, unless I know that it is adequate to its 1 object. But 
since the concept of it may, as given, include many obscure representa-
tions, which we overlook in our analysis, although we are constantly 
making use of them in our application of the concept, the completeness 
of the analysis of my concept is always in doubt, and a multiplicity 
of suitable examples suffices only to make the completeness probable, 
never to make it apodeictically certain" (A728=B756--A729=B757). 
211Since, then, neither empirical concepts nor concepts given ! 
priori allow of definition, the only remaining kind of concepts, upon 
which this mental operation can be tried, are arbitrarily invented 
concepts" (A729=B757). 
3A729=B757--A730:B758. 
The German language has for the [Latin]l terms exposi-
~, explication, declaration, and definition only 
one word, Erkllrung, and we need not, therefore, be so 
stringent in our requirements as altogether to refuse 
to philosophical explanation the honourable title, 
definition. We shall confine ourselves simply to re-
marking that while philosophical definitions are never 
more than expositions of given concepts, mathematical 
definitions are constructions of concepts, originally 
framed by the mind itself; and that while the former 
can be obtained only by analysis (the completeness of 
which is never apodeictically certain), the latter are 
produced synthetically.2 
He still insists, however, that "whereas, therefore, mathematical 
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definitions make their concepts, in philosophical definitions concepts 
are only explained."3 From · this Kant draws two conclusions regarding 
definitions found also in the earlier Inquiry. The first is that in 
philosophy we must not begin with definitions in imitation of mathe-
matics: 
In short, the definition in all its precision and 
clarity ought, in philosophy, to come rathe~ at the 
end than at the beginning of our enquiries. 
The second is "that mathematical definitions can never be in er-
lsmith 1 s remark. Kant writes the Latin terms as "Exposition, 
Explikation, Deklaration und Definition" instead of using the usual 
"-io" ending for such third declension nouns. Smith translates them 
into English but retains the German Erkllrung. A better handling of 
the contrast Kant is trying to draw between Latin and German on this 
point would be to give the correct Latin, namely, expositio, explica-
~~ declaratio, and definitio, as well as the German Erkllrung. 
ror."
1 The note to the first conclusion is particularly pertinent. 
Kant says: 
Philosophy is full of faulty definitions, especially 
of definitions which, while indeed containing some of 
the elements required, are yet not complete. If we 
could make no use of a concept till we had defined it, 
all philosophy would be in a pitiable plight. But 
since a good and safe use can still be made of the 
elements obtained by analysis, so far as they go, de-
fective definitions, that is, propositions which are 
properly not definitions, but are yet true, and are 
therefore approximations to definitions, can be em-
ployed with great advantage.2 
In this statement we have Kant's explicit sanction of our efforts to 
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define a pure category. With it, added to Kant's own practice of de-
fining a pure category, the path of our investigation is cleared of 
the obstacles seemingly created by Kant's general remarks on definition. 
To summarize, attention to the Critique of Pure Reason so far has 
been restricted to determining Kant's general attitude on the question 
of defining categories. It has been found that Kant first omitted de-
fining category and later claimed that apart from space and time no 
definition of a pure category was possible. However, Kant's own prac-
tice elsewhere in the Critique makes it plain that the definition of 
category, even of the pure type, is no impossibility. But this defini-
1A73l=B759. Smith notes with justice that Kant's remarks in the 
Inquiry on this point are "more cautious, and also more adequate" (p. 
565n.). The heading, for example, of subsection 3 of the "First Medi-
tation" (Cassirer, II, 181) reads: "In mathematics there are only a 
few inexplicable concepts and indemonstrable propositions, but in phi-
losophy there are innumerable ones" (my translation). 
2 A73ln.=B759n. 
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tion, like others in philosophy he mentions, will not be achieved at 
the outset of an inquiry. Close attention, therefore, must be given to 
all the materials indicating how category is defined by Kant in the 
course of the Critique of Pure Reason in both editions. To this we now 
turn. 
2. Different Definitions of Category in the 
Transcendental Analytic 
The most fertile ground for discovering Kant's definition of 
category is the extensive section of the Critique of Pure Reason titled 
"Transcendental Analytic" comprising A64c:B89--A292:B349. When we exam-
ine this material with such a purpose in mind, it is immediately appar-
ent that Kant often refers to a category as a "concept of understand-
ing." In fact, one readily gathers this from the first two sentences 
of the Transcendental Analyticl to mention the first of many passages. 
Perhaps the most striking instances, though, are the fourteen section 
titles in the Transcendental Analytic where "concept of understanding" 
with various modifiers is used to refer to category.2 Kant, therefore, 
frequently speaks of a category as a concept of understanding. It is 
necessary, however, to determine how accurate is this first impression 
of usage, and such will be done in the following section. Such pro-
cedure presupposes that an investigation of Kant's usage is an in-
escapable preliminary to the more important matter of Kant's mean-
1A64c:B89. 
2see A66:B91, A67=B92, A70:B95, A76=Bl02 (2 instances), A84=Bll6, 
A95, All5, Al28, Bl29 (2 instances), Bl59, Bl65, and Al37=Bl76. 
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ings on the subject of category. 
a. Category as Concept of Understanding 
Examination of the Transcendental Analytic in Norman Kemp Smith's 
English translation reveals that in both singular and plural category 
is spoken of as concept of understanding in a number of different ways, 
as follows: 
Phrase Used Times Used 
1. concept of understanding! 14 
2. pure concept of understanding2 40 
3. concept of the understanding3 4 
4. pure concept of the understanding4 18 
5. primary concept of the pure understandingS 2 
6. elementary concept of the understanding6 1 
1· concept of the pure understanding7 1 
8. concept of pure understandingS 1 
9. concept of our understanding9 1 
1see BllO, A85=Bll81 Bl51, Bl59 1 Bl65, Al32=Bl71, Al38=Bl77, 
Al39=Bl78 1 Al40:Bl79 1 A232=B285 (2 instances}, A247=B304, B309 1 and 
A286:B342. 
2see A84=Bll61 A88=Bl20, A92=Bl24, A95 (2 instances}, A96 (2 in-
stances}, All21 All51 All9, Al281 Al30, Bl44, Bl46, Bl47, Bl48 (2 in-
stances}, Bl50, Bl661 Al35=Bl74 (2 instances}, Al36=Bl75 (3 instances}, 
Al37=Bl76 (2 instances}, Al39=Bl78, Al42=Bl81 (2 instances}, Al81= 
B2241 B2881 A245 1 A246:B3031 B306, Al43=Bl82, Al46:Bl851 Al47=Bl861 
Al48=Bl87, Al49=Bl881 and Al60:Bl99. 
3see Bl6ln., Al42:Bl821 A229:B282 1 and A27l=B327. 
4see A66:B91, A67=B92 (2 instances}, A70:B951 A76:Bl02 (2 in-
stances}, A78=Bl04, A79=Bl05 (3 instances}, Bll31 Bl27, Bl29 (2 in-
stances}, Bl59, Bl68, Al36:Bl75, and B289. 
5see A8l=Bl07 and Blll. 6see Bl09. 7see A267=B323. 
8see A77=Bl02. 9see A288=B345. 
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These nine phrases found in Smith's translation indicate an imposing 
number of variations on the theme of category as concept of understand-
ing. Actually, matters are not quite so complicated, as the German 
text reveals. Hence, a criticism to be noted in passing is that Smith 
has created a false impression of involved usage on Kant's part here. 
Smith's list of nine phrases is both misleading and forbidding, but 
fortunately it can be reduced and simplified. 
A start toward doing so can be made even in the English. Smith's 
first four usages reduce to two, namely, "concept of understanding" and 
"concept of the understanding" used with and without "pure." This is 
corroborated when the appropriate German texts are consulted. Then it 
will be seen that Kant frequently used two different German terms in re-
ferring to category as concept of understanding. He used Verstandesbe-
griff and Begriff des Verstandes both with and wi·thout reine. This re-
duces Smith's list from nine to seven and confirms that his first four 
usages contain two significant ones employed by Kant. 1 But further re-
duction is possible. Examination of the German text will show that the 
1smith appropria·tely translates Verstandesbegriff as "concept of 
understanding" and Begriff des Verstandes as "concept of the under-
standing," but it must be added that he does not do so consistently. 
There are twenty instances in the Transcendental Analytic where he has 
interchanged these translations which do retain some mark of the dif-
ference present in the German. For example, in A85=Bll8 he translates 
Begriff des Verstandes as "concept of understanding" when consistency 
on his part calls for "concept of the understanding." The other nine-
teen cases are A27l=B327 (Verstandesbegriffe rendered "concept of the 
understanding"), Al35=Bl74 (reinen Begriffe des Verstandes translated 
"pure concept of understanding"), and seventeen instances where some 
form of reine Verstandesbegriff is translated as "pure concept of the 
understanding" (A66:B911 A67=B92 [2 instances], A70::B95, A76=Bl02 [2 
instances], A78=Bl04, A79=Bl05 [3 instances], Bll3, Bl29 [2 instances], 
Bl59 1 Bl68, Al36=Bl751 and B289. 
158 
last two phrases listed--"concept of pure understanding" and "concept 
of our understanding"--are actually instances of Verstandesbegriff 
or "concept of understanding" and should be so classified.l 
Our list of nine phrases, therefore, bas been considerably re-
duced. The first four may be reduced to two--Verstandesbegriff (con-
cept of understanding) and Begriff des Verstandes (concept of the 
understanding) used with and without reine. The remaining five phrases 
may be reduced to three; for the last two are really instances of Ver-
standesbegriff. Hence the actual record of Kant's terminology in the 
Transcendental Analytic when he specifically speaks of category as con-
cept of understanding is as follows: 
phrase used times used 
1. concept of understanding (Verstandesbegriff). • 72 
2. concept of the understanding (Begriff des Ver-
standes) • • • • • • • • • • • • • 6 
3. primary concept of the pure understanding 
(Stammbegriff des reinen Verstandes) • • • • • • 2 
4. elementary concept of the understanding 
(Elementarbegriff des Verstandes) •••••• 
5. concept of the pure understanding (Begriff des 
reinen Verstandes) • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
1 
1 
1Tbe German in A77=Bl02 Smith translates "for the concepts of 
pure understanding" is den reinen Verstandesbegriffen and should be 
rendered "for the pure concepts of understanding." Smith has appar-
ently assigned the adjective to the wrong noun. Apparently the same 
error occurred when Smith translated A288=B345. Here the German is 
von unseren Verstandesbegriffen1 and the translation called for is 
of out; concepts of understanding,-" not Smith 1 s "of the concepts of 
our understanding." 
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If we consider the last three phrases listed as forms of the second, 
then it may be said that in the Transcendental Analytic Kant speaks 
of a category as a Verstandesbegriff or "concept of understanding" 
seventy-two times and as a Begriff des Verstandes or "concept of the 
understanding" ten times. 
But before we conclude, a canvass should be made to discover if 
there are passages in the Transcendental Analytic where category is 
spoken of in terms of Verstandesbegriff and Begriff des Verstandes 
but yet not as specifically as in the preceding instances considered. 
Such a survey will show that there are clearly nine such passages 
and three less clear ones. Two of them are instances of the use of 
Verstandesbegriffl and the other ten are cases of Begriff des Ver-
standes.2 This changes our totals on this point of sheer usage and 
leads to the conclusion that in the Transcendental Analytic Kant used 
Verstandesbegriff seventy-four times and Begriff des Verstandes twen-
ty times. Hence, our first impression of Kant's usage in this sec-
tion of the Critique of Pure Reason is confirmed. Kant does often 
speak of category as Verstandesbegriff or "concept of understanding" 
in the Transcendental Analytic, indeed, does so most frequently by 
far. 
b. category as Other Than Concept of Understanding 
The data on Kant's use of Verstandesbegriff and Begriff 
1B234 and B307, both clear cases. 
Zseven are clear cases and found in A65:B90, A67=B92, A79=Bl04, 
A80:Bl05, A8l:Bl07, B307, and A270:B326. The other three are less 
clear instances located in A64=B89, A80:Bl06, and A268=B324. 
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des Verstandes when speaking of category in the Transcendental Analytic 
do not exhaust Kant's usage in that lengthy section of the Critique of 
Pure Reason. They only reveal the most obvious fact. Hence, there are 
other data on the preliminary point of usage to be examined before we 
can determine the main lines of Kant 1 s thought on the definition of a 
category. 
In doing so the Transcendental Analytic is soon found to be a 
most fertile source of definitions of category other than as concept 
of understanding. Once more we are embarrassed with riches--as are 
most investigators of the Kantian works. Recently, when discussing 
moral rationalism, Ralph Barton Perry observed that few who penetrate 
far into the Kantian labyrinth are ever heard from again!l This ob-
servation at least emphasizes the great extent of Kant 1 s work, but the 
risk to which Perry refers must be run if one is to follow the thread 
called category as laid down by Kant. 
Actually there are many passages in the Transcendental Analytic 
where Kant refers to category in ways other than Verstandesbegriff and 
Begriff des Verstandes. The preparatory task of first determining 
Kant's usage does indeed assume labyrinthine dimensions. The procedure 
which seems best in such a situation is to present first those usages 
which seem to be least important before dealing with those that are 
most revealing of Kant's definition of category. Therefore, the fol-
laalph Barton Perry, Realms of Value (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1954), p. 126. Cf. Josiah Royce, The Spirit of Modern 
Philosophy (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1896), pp. 104-
105, describing a German scholar whose commentary on the Critique of 
Pure Reason was still unfinished after more than ten years of work. 
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lowing tabulation will make plain the range of terms used by Kant in 
referring to category in Analytic passages which are perhaps the least 
definitive: 
term used 
1. concepts (Begriffe) 
2. conditions (Bedingungen) ••• 
3. forms (Formen) •• 
4. rules (Regeln). 
5. principles (Prinzipien, GrundsUtze) 
6. functions (Funktionen). • • •• 
7 • grounds ( Grllnde) • • • • • • • • • • 
8. elements (Elemente) • . . . . . . 
9. modes (Arten) • . . . . . . . . 











cognitions (Erkenntnisse) • • • 
predicaments (Pr!dikamente) • 







So far, then, it appears that the terms "concepts" and "condi-
tions" are the ones most favored by Kant in the Transcendental Ana-
lytic next to "concepts of understanding" and "concepts- of the under-
standing." This fact calls for some comment. 
First, it is notable that Kant uses the term "concept" (Begriff) 
elsewhere in the Transcendental Analytic besides the seventy-four in-
stances of "concept of understanding" (Verstandesbegriff) and the 
twenty cases of "concept of the understanding" (Begriff des Verstandes) 
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discussed above. There are eighteen such passages where "concept," 
mostly in the plural, may be found, according to Smith's translation. 
However, one of these instances, namely, Bl49, reads reinen Verstandes-
begriffe, hence is a case of "pure concept of understanding" (though 
translated "pure concept" by Smith) and should be classed with those 
dealt with in the previous section, bringing the total number of such 
cases up to seventy-five. 
Hence, there are seventeen cases where Kant used "concepts" when 
referring to category in addition to his preponderant usage of the term 
coupled with "understanding." Inspection of these seventeen cases re-
veals a wide variety of adjectival modifiers used and no apparent pre£-
erence for any one. Witness the following tabulation: 
phrase used times used 
l. a priori concepts (Begriffe a priori)l. 4 
2. pure a priori concepts (reinen Begriffe a priori)2. 1 
3. pure concepts (reinen Begriffe)3. • • • 1 
4. fundamental concepts (Grundbegriffe)4 • 1 
5. original concepts (Urbegriffe)S 1 
6. original and primitive concegts (ursprUnglichen 
und primitives Begriffe) • • • • • • • • • l 
7. general concept (allgemeinen Begriff)7. 1 
1Al28, Al29, Bl66-167, and A65-66=B90 (which Smith translates 
as "concepts a priori"). 
2Al28. 
7Bl58. 
3 A66=B9l. 4 A8l:Bl07. 5 A8l:Bl07. 
8. elementary concepts (Elementarbegriffen)l 
9. intellectual concepts (intellectuelle Begriffe) 2 
10. concepts of objects (Begriffe von Gegenstftnden)3 
11. concepts which ••• contain a priori the pure 
thought involved in every experience (Begriffe 
• • • welche a priori das reine Denken bei jeder 
Erfahrung enthalten)4 
12. concepts which prescribe laws a priori to appearances 
(Begriffe, welche den Erscheinungen • • • Gesetze 
a priori vorschreiben)S 
13. concepts rendering possible the formal unity of ex-
perience (Begriffe, welche die formale Einheit 
der Erfahrung ••• m8glich machen)6 
14. concept in conformity with the unity of appercep-
tion (der Einheit der Apperzeption gemlss a priori 












3Al23. It is not clear that this refers to the categories, as 
Paton has noted in I, p. 488n. 
6Al25. Paton has rightly observed that it is not certain that 
categories only are referred to here (I, 489n.). 
7Al42=Bl81. Paton indicates this is another ambiguous reference 
when he says the concept mentioned "must be a concept of an object, 
and may be a category" (II, 39n.). 
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These data strengthen the claim that Kant favored the term "concepts" 
most when referring to categories. Omitting the three ambiguous ref-
erences noted in the seventeen abovel and adding the remaining four-
teen to the seventy-five instances of "concept of understanding" and 
the twenty cases of "concept of the understanding," we find that in 
the Transcendental Analytic alone Kant used the term "concepts" one 
hundred nine times when referring to the categories. 
Secondly, as was noted above, Kant frequently refers to the cate-
gories in the Transcendental Analytic as "conditions" (Bedingungen). 
There are sixteen such instances, all but two in the plural. Kant's 
usage under this heading again . presents a variety with no one special 
phrase dominating, as the following shows: 
term used times used 
1. condition (Bedingung)2. . . . . . . . . . . 2 
2. a priori conditions (Bedingungen a priori)3 • . . . 2 
3. conditions of thought (Bedingungen des Denkens)4. • 2 
lNamely, Al23, Al25, and Al42=Bl81. 
2Al32=Bl71 and Al35=Bl74-175. These two uses of the singular 
are fairly questionable references and may, as Paton suggests (II, 
32n.) 1 be references to the way the category contains the schema 
rather than direct statements of what a category is. 
3A89=Bl22; All3-ll4. 4A89=Bl22; Alll. 
4. conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of ob-
jects (Bedingungen der M8glichkeit aller Erkenntnis 
der Gegenstande)l 
5. conditions of the thoroughgoing unity of self-conscious-
ness (Bedingungen der durchglngigen Einheit des 
Selbstbewusstseins)2 
6. conditions upon which all experience depends (!!-
dingungen, von denen alle Erfahrung abhUngt)3 
7. formal and objective conditions of experience in gen-
eral (formale und objektive Bedingungen einer 
Erfahrung Uberhaupt)4 
B. conditions of the possibility of experience (!!-
dingungen der M8glichkeit der Erfahrung)5 
9. conditions of the unity of thought (Bedingungen der 
Einheit des Denkens)6 
10. conditions of the unity of apperception (Bedingungen 
der Einheit der Apperzeption)7 
Total 










4A223=B270-271. It is Paton's opinion that " Kant regards 
the categories as being themselves formal and objective conditions of 
an experience in general" (II, 348n.). 
5A96; Bl61. 6A90:Bl23 (2 instances); Bl43. 
7Al05; Al09-110; Bl36. 
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This list shows the term "conditions" is a significant usage of 
Kant in the Transcendental Analytic. The following samples supplying 
some context make clear that Kant does speak revealingly of the cate-
gories as "conditions." In Alll Kant says: 
Now I maintain that the categories, above cited, are 
nothing but the conditions of thought in a possible 
experience, just as space and time are the conditions 
of intuition for that same experience. 
Then in the title to §20 we find the following: 
All Sensible Intuitions are subject to the categories, 
as Conditions under which alone their Manifold can come 
together in one Consciousness.! 
And in Bl61 Kant makes the following statement identifying the cate-
gories with nconditions": 
All synthesis, therefore, even that which renders per-
ception possible, is subject to the categories; and 
since experience is knowledge by means of connected 
perceptions, the categories are conditions of the pos-
sibility of experience, and are therefore valid a priori 
for all objects of experience. 
But these three instances also make it painfully obvious at even this 
preliminary stage that Kant has no one answer as to that of which the 
categories are the conditions. 
It must not be forgotten that there are ten more terms other than 
"concept of understanding" used in the Transcendental Analytic in addi-
tion to "concepts" and conditions.'' The extent and variety of such ad-
ditional usages must be noted, however briefly, before passing to mate-
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rials in the transcendental Analytic which seem to set forth most defi-
nitely Kant's thought about category. 
As was noted above, Kant also refers to the categories as "forms" 
(Formen). There are nine such instances in the transcendental Analyt-
ic,l all cases of "forms of thought" (Gedankenformen) except for one,2 
according to Smith's trans1ation.3 Inspection of these passages, how-
ever, reveals more than preference for the phrase "forms of thought." 
It is noteworthy, for example, that in B Kant doubled his use of the 
term "forms" as applied to category. Also Kant shows here as elsewhere 
the natural tendency to use a special term like "mere forms of thought" 
several times in close succession, ~-~·' in Bl48-149, Bl50, and Bl50-151. 
But the most important point about this particular usage is the 
emphasis Kant makes in employing it. All nine instances of "forms" 
used for category are found in contexts where Kant is contending that 
apart from sensory intuition the pure categories are of no help to us 
in determining objects, since we possess no intellectual intuition. 
1Bl48-149, Bl49, Bl50, Bl50-151, A230:B283, A248:B305, B305-306, 
A253-254=B309, and B309. 
2the exception is A248=B305 (die reine Form des Verstandesge-
brauchs) which Smith translates as "the pure form of the employment of 
understanding in respect of objects in general, that is, of thought." 
3Three of these are cases where Gedankenformen is not used, 
namely, dieser Gedankenbestimmung in Bl49 (which is perhaps better 
rendered "determination of thought" rather than Smith's "form of 
thought"), die diskursiven [Formen, clearly implied and referring to 
the immediately preceding Formen des Verstandes] des Denkens in A230: 
B283, and die Form des Denkens in A253-254=B309. The remaining five 
instances of category as "forms of thought" are cases where the plural 
Gedankenformen is used, accompanied in four of the five by blosse or 
"mere." 
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There are three main sections in the Transcendental Analytic where Kant 
stresses that our intuition is sensory and not intellectual in charac-
ter, namely Bl44-l51, A246=B303--A256=B312, and B305-309.l It is sig-
nificant that eight of the nine cases of "forms" meaning category fall 
within these sections, and the remaining one in A230:B283 definitely 
supports Kant's denial of intellectual intuition and its bearing on 
the pure categories. It appears, then, that Kant used the term "forms 
of thought,. when he wished to emphasize that the pure categories apart 
from sensory intuition--the only required intuition of which we are 
capable--cannot determine objects for us. This is stated very clearly 
in Bl48-l49 as follows: 
The pure concepts of understanding • • • extend to ob-
jects of intuition in general, be the intuition like or 
unlike ours, if only it be sensible and not intellectual. 
But this extension of concepts beyond our sensible intui-
tion is of no advantage to us. For as-concepts of ob-
jects they are then empty, and do not even enable us to 
judge of their objects whether or not they are possible. 
They are mere forms of thought, without objective reali-
ty, since we have no intuition at hand to which the syn-
thetic unity of apperception, which constitutes the whole 
content of these forms, could be applied, and in being so 
applied determine an object. Only our sensible and em-
pirical intuition can give to them body and meaning. 
The other passages reiterate and support this general contention. 
For example, Kant says more technically in A248=B305 that pure 
categories cannot be employed transcendentally when formal con-
1There are other briefer passages of similar character to be 
found in the Transcendental Analytic, again mostly in B, as follows: 
A67-68=B92, A68=B93, Bl35, Bl38-139, Bl53, Bl55, Bl57, Bl58-159 1 
Bl58n., Bl59, Bl65-166, Al39-Bl78, A230=B283. 
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ditions of sensibility are lacking. And in Bl50 the claim is clearly 
restated with all the force of spacing: 1 
The pure concepts of understanding relate, through 
the mere understanding, to objects of intuition in 
general, whether that intuition be our own or any 
other, provided only it be sensible. The concepts 
are, however, for this very reason mere forms of 
thought, through which alone no determinate object 
is known. 
Kant's usage of blosse Gedankenformen suggests, therefore, it 
is a term he pre~mpted for the pure categories considered apart from 
all intuition. In the absence of both sensory and intellectual in-
tuition, the pure categories are indeed ~ or empty forms of thought 
useless to us in knowing objects. 
Categories as "rules" is another item in our list of particular 
usages in the Transcendental Ar~lytic due for a brief appraisal. 2 
According to Smith's English translation, there are nine places in the 
Analytic where the categories are possibly spoken of as "rules" 
(Regeln). 3 The German text, however, has only eight.4 
1Kant spaced Gedatkeuformen also in B305-306. It must be granted 
however, that Kant used the German equivalent of italics very often. 
2 See p. 161 above. 
3Al06, Al08, Al09-110, All2, Al23, Bl45, Al46=Bl85, A230=B283, 
and A247=B303. 
4smith translates A247=B303 to read "Its principles [Grunds!ltze] 
are merely rules [bloss Prinzipien, not Regeln] for the exposition of 
appearances." This is obviously an example of "principles," not 
"rules." 
These eight passages include one we judge not to involve the 
categories. This passage is in Al06 where Kant claims that all 
knowledge requires a concept universal in form. He illustrates this 
by showing bow the empirical concept "body" serves a s a rule for our 
knowledge of appearances in space. 1 But his remarks do not seem to 
be about category at a11. 2 
Another passage where "rules" appears but probably the categories 
are meant is Al08. 3 Kant says here that the mind could not possibly 
think, and think a prior~ its own identity in the manifold of its 
ideas, unless it had before itself the identity of its own act. This 
would subject all synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity 
and make possible the interconnection of appearances in accordance 
with a priori rules. These rules seem to be the categories, 4 though 
1 
"All knowledge demands a concept, though that concept may, in-
deed, be quite imperfect or obscure. But a concept is always, as re-
gards its form, something universal which serves as a rule [Regel]. 
The concept of body, for instance, as the unity of the manifold which 
is thought through it, serves as a rule [Regel] in our knowledge of 
outer appearances" (Al06). 
2 
Paton says that in Al06 Kant "is still g1.v1.ng us his prima facie 
analysis of experience" and is leading "us up to the unity of apper-
ception and the categories" (Kant's Metaphysic, I, 392). This inter-
pretation supports our claim that here the concepts which serve as 
rules are not the categories. 
3which reads, "For the mind could never think its identity in 
the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think its iden-
tity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its 
act, whereby it subordinates all synthesis of apprehension (which is 
empirical) to a transcendental unity, thereby rendering possible their 
interconnection according to a priori rules [Regeln]." 
4so also Paton, Kant's Metaphysic, I, 413n. 
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this has been denied, 1 and Kant's statement needs elucidation, to be 
sure. 
The remaining six references to category as "rules" are ones we 
comment upon with more confidence. They occur where there is little 
doubt Kant means category . But the difficulty we have viewing them 
as definitive statements takes several forms. First, Kant does not 
elaborate on how a category serves as a rule. This we find true on 
the whole and it is seen especially well in two passages . 2 Secondly, 
Al23 affords the barest reference in the statement that "· •• the 
affinity of all appearances, near or remote, is a necessary consequence 
of a synthesis in imagination \'lhich is grounded a priori on rules 
[Regeln]." Thirdly 1 Kant's discussion of other matters dominates in 
1By Hans Vaihinger who takes "a priori" with "rendering possi-
ble" instead of "rules" in Die transcendentale Deduktion der Kate-
gorien (Halle: Niemayer, 1902), p . 50. H. J. de Vleeschauer agrees 
with Vaihinger on this point and concludes [my translation], "The 
result is that the translation of Regeln by "categories" is not at 
all evident, although the function attributed to these rules coincides 
singularly with that ascribed the categories 11 (La D~duction Trans-
cendentale, II, 292~. 
2one is Al09-1101 reading"· •• all appearances, in so far as 
through them objects are to be given to us, must stand under those 
a priori rules [Regeln] of synthetical unity whereby the interrelat-
ing of these appearances in empirical intuition is alone possible." 
The other is Al12 1 which reads "Thus the concept of a cause is nothing 
but a synthesis (of that which tollows in the time series, with other 
appearances) according to concepts; and without such unity, which has 
its a priori rule [Regel], and which subjects the appearances to it-
self, no thoroughgoing, universal, and therefore necessary, unity of 
consciousness would be met with in the manifold of perceptions.'' 
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the three other passages. 1 We observe in passing, however, that we 
are also impressed by the frequency with which Kant associates category 
as rule with synthesis. 
Kant also calls the categories "principles" in the Transcendental 
Analytic, as we noted. 2 3 To do so he uses Prinzipien in four places, 
GrundsMtze in two, 4 and both terms in another. 5 But it needs to be 
made clear, hCWev~r, that neither term is normally used by Kant to mean 
category. "Principles" is the term he usually reserves for the ulti-
mate synthetic a priori judgments which, according to his metaphysics, 
we are entitled to make about objects of experience. "System of All 
Principles of Pure Understanding••6 is, in fact, the title of the second 
chapter in the Analytic of Principles which comes after Kant's chapter 
1The first is Bl45, where Kant stresses that the categories would 
have no meaning for an intuitive understanding since "they are merely 
rules [Regeln] for an understanding whose whole power consists in 
thought, consists, that is, in the act whereby it brings the synthesis 
of a manifold, given to it from elsewhere in intuition, to the unity 
of apperception • • • " The second is Al46=Bl85, where Kant is empha-
sizing that the schemata restrict the application of categories to ob-
jects of sense and says the categories "serve only to subordinate ap-
pearances to universal rules [Regeln] of synthesis, and thus fit them 
for thoroughgoing connection in one experience." The third, A230:B283, 
occurs in a context where Kant is busy denying intellectual intuition 
and says "The understanding, in accordance with the subjective and 
formal conditions of sensibility as well as of apperception, prescribes 
a priori to experience in general the rules [die Regel, not the plural 
Smith implies] which alone make experience possible." 
2
on p. 161 above. 3Bl42, Bl67, Bl68-169, A250. 
4A246=B303, A248=B304. 5A247=B303. 
6system aller GrundsMtze des reinen Verstandes. 
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on Schematism. The chapter on "System of All Principles" is a large 
block of material1 divided into four sections titled Axioms of Intu-
ition, Anticipations of Perception, Analogies of Experience, and Pos-
tulates of Empirical Thought. Throughout these sections Kant speaks 
of the categories in contrast to the corresponding Principle or syn-
thetic a priori judgment. Nevertheless , this policy in Chapter II of 
the Analytic of Principles did not keep Kant from speaking elsewhere 
in the Transcendental Analytic of the categories as "principles . " 
This is demonstrated by three passages in the second edition 
prior to the chapter on Principles of Pure Understanding and by four 
passages subsequent to it. The distribution suggests also that while 
writing the section of the Transcendental Analytic on the Principles 
Kant observed carefully his distinction between category and principle . 
At any rate, in Bl42 Kant seems to be referring to the categories in 
speaking of "principles [Prinzipien] of the objective determination 
of all representations • • • [or] principles [Prinzipien] which are 
all derived from the fundamental principle [Grundsatze] of the trans-
cendental unity of apperception." Clearly, though, in Bl67 Kant speal~s 
of the categories as "self-thought first principles [Prinzipien] a 
priori of our knowledge . n , .The 'third passage prior to the chapter 
on Principles is Bl68-l69, one in which Kant describes the Transcen-
dental Deduction as "the exposition of the pure concepts of the under-
standing, and therewith of all theoretical a priori knowledge, as 
principles [Prinzipien] of the possibility of experience." It should 
1comprising Al48=Bl87--A235=B294. 
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be added, however, that immediately before in Bl67 Kant has said that 
the categories in their application to experience supply rather than 
~the principles of the possibility of experience. 1 This implies 
the distinction between categories and principles which the very struc-
ture of the Transcendental Analytic suggests. 
The distinction is ignored, though, elsewhere in the Transcen-
dental Analytic in four passages appearing after the chapter on Prin-
ciples. These are places where Kant reverts to speaking of the cate-




A246=B303, where the categories called "pure con-
cepts of understanding" are said to be "the prin-
ciples [Grunds~tze] of pure understanding [that] 
can apply only . to objects of the senses under the 
universal conditions of a possible experience, 
never to things in general without regard to the 
mode in which we are able to intuit them." 
A247=B303, where Kant says that the understanding's 
"principles [Grunds~tze] are merely rules [Prinzipien2] 
for the exposition of appearances," and the context 
suggests he is referring to categories. 
A248=B304, where Kant in stressing that the use of 
the categories is always empirical and never tran-
scendental says that "the principles [Grunds~tze] 
of pure understanding are only of empirical, never 
of transcendental employment ••• " 
111There remains, therefore, only the second supposition ••• 
namely, that the categories contain, on the side of the understanding, 
the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general. How they 
make experience possible, and what are the principles [Grunds~tze] of 
the possibility of experience that they supply in their application to 
appearances, will be shown more fully in the following chapter on the 
transcendental employment of the faculty of judgment." 
2Not Regeln as Smith implies with his rendering of "rules," as 
observed on p. 169n. above. 
4. A250, where Kant says that "the pure modes of 
knowledge yielded by our understanding are 
never anything more than principles [Prinzipien] 
of the exposition of appearancel " 
Our final feeling on all these cases expresses itself in this 
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form--Kant did speak of the categories as "pFinciples," but this fact 
does not indicate usage of major significance. Rather we find Kant 
to have drawn a distinction between "category" and "principle" and 
more inclined touserve the latter term for such basic synthetic 
a priori judgments he feels we can make legitimately about objects of 
experience. 
"Functions" is another of the less significant terms Kant uses 
for the categories in the Transcendental Analytic. 2 He does so six 
times, three in speaking of the categories as "functions of the under-
standing" (Funktionen des Verstandes), 3 two as "functions of thought" 
(Funktionen des Denkens), 4 and one as "functions of judgment" (Funk-
tionen zu urteilen). 5 The term Funktionen is actually one of the 
6 
synonyms for category which Kant used infrequently in the Transcen-
1Kant emended "exposition of appearance" to "synthesis of the 
manifold" in his Nachtrlige, cxxxiii. 
2 See p. 161 above. 3 A89=Bl22, A90:Bl22, Al47=Bl87. 
4 A9l=Bl23, A253. 5Bl43. 
611Functions of the understanding" appears with some of the other 
terms we have been considering. Witness A89=Bl22, reading "The cate-
gories of understanding [Kategorien des Verstandes] ••• do not repre-
sent the conditions under which objects are given in intuition. Ob-
jects may, therefore, appear to us without their being und~ the neces-
sity of being related to the functions of understanding [Funktionen 
des Verstandes]; and understanding need not, therefore, contain their 
a priori conditions [Bedingungen derselben a priori]." For the latter, 
see p. 164 above. 
dental Analytic. In addition, it is an ambiguous term whose precise 
meaning as category is difficult to determine. 1 
We are now halfway through our list of the twelve terms Kant 
uses in referring less significantly to category in the Transcenden-
tal Analytic. Each of the remaining six terms occur only two or 
three times. 2 Thus they probably demonstrate the characteristic range 
of Kant's terminology but not his most revealing thought on the sub-
ject. For the latter it appears we must pass to other materials in 
the Analytic. But before doing so we feel obliged to notice briefly 
how the six terms remaining are used. This means that we must now 
review rapidly the passages in the Transcental Analytic where the 
categories are spoken of as grounds, elements, modes, laws, cognitions, 
and predicaments. 
Categories as "grounds" (GrUnde) appears in Al25, Bl67, and Al46= 
Bl85. The first of these passages is one in which Kant says that em-
pirical recognition contains certain concepts which make possible the 
formal unity of experience. These concepts he then identifies, saying 
3 
"These grounds [GrUnde] of the recognition of the manifold, so far 
1Paton has also complained about the obscurity of "function" as 
used by Kant. See his Kant's Metaphysic, I, 245-246, 435, 443. He 
holds, though, that "Kant, when he speaks of understanding and judg-
ment, uses the word 'function' as synonymous with the form 'form'" 
(ibid., I, 246). 
Zsee p. 161 above. 
3Paton notes that it ismt clear whether "so far" is restrictive 
or not (Kant's Metaphysic, I, 489n.). If so, then only some of the 
concepts mentioned are categories; but if not, then the concepts re-
ferred to are the categories because they make possible the formal 
unity of experience. 
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as they concern solely the form of an experience in general, are the 
categories." Here in Al25, then, the categories are formal grounds 
of recognition of the manifold. But it is said somewhat differently 
in Bl67 that "the categories contain, on the side of the understand-
ing, the grounds [GrUnde] of the possibility of all experience in 
general.n Categories here are grounds of the possibility of experi-
ence. In further contrast, Al46=Bl85 presents the claim that the 
categories are "the grounds [GrUnde] of an a priori necessary unity 
that has its source in the necessary combination of all consciousness 
in one original apperception. 111 The categories in this passage are 
grounds of a priori necessary unity. Admittedly, then, in three places 
Kant does say the categories are grounds, but that of which they are 
grounds is quite variously described as recognition of the manifold, 
possibility of experience, and a priori necessary unity. 
The categories are also called "elements" (Elemente) in the Tran-
2 
scendental Analytic. The places are in A96, A98, and Bl6o, and they 
all show Kant's characteristic variety in phrasing . In A96 he speaks 
1This designation precedes immediately the reference to the cate-
gories as "universal rules of synthesis" in the rest of the sentence 
(quoted on p. 172n. above). 
2A fourth possible instance occurs at the middle of Al25 where 
Elemente appears (translated "fundamental concepts" by Smith). But 
instead of the categories Kant appears to be referring a second time 
to apprehension, association, reproduction, and recognition (so Paton, 
Kant's Metaphysic, I, 490n.). Kant clearly means these four and not 
the categories when he uses Elemente at the beginning of Al25. Final-
ly, the corrupt state of the text in Al25 containing the second occur-
rence of Elemente makes it seem wise to i gnore the instance. 
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of "the elements [Elemente] of all modes of a priori knowledge," and 
there is little doubt he means the categories. 1 In A98 they are re-
£erred to as "these elements [Elemente ] of the understanding," where-
as in Bl66 he says explicitly that "the pure concepts of understanding 
are elements in knowledge • found in us a priori." Thus Kant calls 
the categories "elements" and, once again in a minor usage, he does so 
in no uniform manner. 
Another designation of the categories in the Transcendental Ana-
lytic is "modes" (Arten). Kant uses the term in A245, B306, and A253-
254=B309 while discussing pure, unschematized categories. Taking 
these passages in order, we confront such varied descriptions of cate-
gory as "modes [Arten] of thinking an object for possible intuitions," 
"mode of combining [Verbindungsart] the manifold," and "mode [Art] of 
determining an object for the manifold of a possible intuition." In 
these phrases Kant's preference for varied statement presented without 
correlation is unmistakably clear. 
"Laws" (Gesetze) is another term Kant uses for the categories in 
the Transcendental Analytic. For example, in All3-114 Kant says that 
" ••• all appearances stand in thoroughgoing connection according to 
lin the same sentence in A96 Kant says these "elements" must al-
ways "contain the pure a priori conditions of a possible experience 
and of an empirical object." This is the reference to the categories 
as conditions of the possibility of experience cited on p . 165 above. 
Paton has observed that "Kant says indifferently that the categories 
'are' or 'express' or 'contain' the conditions of experience" (ibid., 
I, 35ln.). 
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necessary laws (Gesetzen] • In Bl59-160 vTe are presented with 
two instances of the use of "laws" applied to the categories. Kant 
speaks of knowing a 'priori (by means of categories) any objects pre-
sented to our senses "in respect of the laws [Gesetzen] of their com-
bination." He then says that everything presented to our senses "must 
be subject to laws [Gesetzen] which have their origin a priori in the 
understanding alone." These three instances exhaust his use of Ge-
setze for category in the Analytic. 2 They also demonstrate a fact 
very familiar to us by now--Kant's sparing use of another desi gnation 
for category. 
Kant shows the same tendency in designating the categories as 
"cognitions113 (Erkenntnisse) and "predicaments" (Pr!idikamente). He 
uses each term only twice in the Transcendental Analytic. The cate-
gories are called pure "cognitions" of the understanding in All94 and 
1Paton's comment on this statement is that it is part of an ap-
pendix in which Kant "endeavours to show that by his methods it is 
possible to demonstrate such universal laws as are implied in all the 
categories and particularly in the category of causation" (Kant's 
Metaphysic, I, 446). 
2
"Laws of the understanding" (Gesetze des Verstandes) appears 
twice in A76=Bl01, and "laws of understanding" (Verstandesgesetzen) 
occurs once in A257=B312-313; but these seem to be cases where Kant 
is referring to the laws of logic, not the categories. 
3A translation we prefer to Smith's "modes of knowledge •11 
4 
"In the understanding there are then pure a priori cognitions 
which contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of imagination 
in respect of all possible appearances. These are the categories, 
that is, the pure concepts of understanding." 
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A2501 and "predicaments" in A8l=Bl07 and A82=Bl08. 2 Infrequency alone 
places these designations at the very bottom of our list of less im-
portant usages in the Analytic. 
We pause at this point to summarize our findings on the Transcen-
dental Analytic presented so far. We have seen that Kant speaks of 
category most frequently as a "concept of understanding." But there 
are many other terms used for category in the Analytic, and these we 
have divided into a more important and a less important group. The 
latter has been surveyed first and found to embrace a wide range of 
varied designations. Categories, as a matter of fact, are said to be 
other concepts, conditions, forms, rules, principles, functions, 
grounds, elements, modes, laws, cognitions, and predicaments. 
Our judgment, though, is that these numerous statements do not 
reveal how Kant defined a category as explicitly as do others in the 
Transcendental Analytic. We feel that Kant in this central part of 
the Critique of Pure Reason has defined a category not in one major 
way but in four. Each represents an aspect of his thought about the 
concept assigned a role in his highly articulated philosophy. This 
should become clearer as we proceed, and at this stage we merely 
state our findings in the briefest form. We find that in the Tran-
111 
••• the pure cognitions yielded by our understanding [Ver-
standeserkenntnisse] are never anything more than principles of the 
exposition of appearance " This passage was quoted above on 
p. 175 as an instance of the categories referred to as principles. 
2"Predicaments11 is used quite incidentally as a synonym for 
categories in the course of Kant's discussion of Aristotle's table 
of categories. 
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scendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant defines a 
category in four major ways. He defines a category to be (1) a 
function of judgment1 (2) a concept of necessary synthetic unity1 
(3) a concept of pure synthesis 1 and (4) a concept of an object in 
general. But before we evaluate these claims or compare them with 
Aristotle's on the subject1 we must first establish the grounds for 
advancing them. To this we now turn1 seeking first the evidence for 
the claim that Kant defines a category to be a function of judgment. 
c. Category as Function of Judgment 
The initial statements which support this claim are to be met 
with in the first part of the Transcendental Analytic. It is common 
usage to call this partl the ''Metaphysical Deduction," though Kant 
did not attach such a title2 and generally did not use it.3 The Meta-
physical Deduction is presented in three sections.4 In the first of 
these occur the remarks initially suggesting the view of category as 
1A67=B92--A69:B94. 
2The ''Metaphysical Deduction" comprises Chapter I in the Analytic 
of Concepts and is titled "The Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Con-
cepts of the Understanding." 
~e refers to "the metaphysical deduction" once in Bl59. 
~hey are headed "The Logical Employment of the Understanding 
in General" (A67=B92--A69=B94), "The Logical Function of the Under-
standing in Judgments" (A70::B95--A76::Bl01), and "The Pure Concepts 
of the Understanding, or Categories" (A76::Bl02--A83=Bl09). To the 
latter section Kant in B added §ll and §12 comprising Bl09-ll6. 
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function of judgment. 
It will be helpful to make clear the context in which these state-
ments are found. This can be done in part if we are careful to sum-
marize what Kant has to say in the area where his revealing statements 
occur. We should then be able to see his claims less in isolation and 
more in context. This is indeed desirable, else we fall victim to 
stringing quotations on a thread of thought of our own devising and 
claiming our creation is the genuine article. We resist this tendency 
by offering next a summary of what Kant says in the first section of 
the Metaphysical Deduction. We recognize the difficulty of trying to 
compress Kant but see also the greater danger of neglecting the setting 
of his claims. 
Kant begins the first section1 of the Metaphysical Deduction with 
the claim that understanding is a power of knowing by concepts. To 
known by means of concepts is to judge. To judge, however, is essen-
tially to unite our ideas. In judging we refer a concept to an object 
and do so by means of intuition, since no idea is immediately related 
to an object. Since there is a distinction between subject and predi-
cate in a judgment, a predicate-concept is referred to the object by 
means of the subject-concept, which, however, refers directly to the 
intuition involved and indirectly by means of it to the object. In 
the judgment "All bodies are divisible," the concept of divisibility, 
which is applicable to things other than bodies, is referred particu-
1A67=B92--A69=B94. 
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larly to the concept of body1 which itself refers to certain intuitions 
which are presented. Taking this example as typical of all judgments, 
Kant asserts that every judgment is basically an act which produces 
unity in our ideas. Instead of using a more immediate idea (here the 
subject-concept "body") to know the object, a judgment uses a "higher" 
one (liere the predicate-concept "divisibility") which comprehends 
under it the subject-concept and other concepts. Thus many possible 
cognitions are gathered into one. Accordingly, if the essence of judg-
ment is to unify1 the different forms of judgment will be the different 
ways of unifying. The different ways in which judgment unites our 
ideas are the forms of judgment as set forth by formal logic. The con-
elusion of this first section, consequently, is Kant's assertion that 
the complete list of the forms of judgment is a complete list of the 
different ways in which understanding unites ideas by means of judgment 
or, as Kant terms it, a complete list of the functions of the under-
standing. 
Three passages in this first section of the Metaphysical Deduc-
tion suggest that Kant considered a category to be a concept serving 
as a function of judgment when used by the mind or understanding in 
knowing. The first of these passages follows his initial claim that 
understanding is a power of knowing by concepts. Kant says, 
Concepts are based on the spontaneity of thought, sen-
sible intuitions on the receptivity of impressions. Now 
the only use which the understanding ern make of these 
concepts is to judge by means of them. 
1 A68=B93 . 
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This is Kant's way of saying that for the understanding to know by 
means of concepts is to judge. 
As we noted, Kant next claims that to judge is to unite our ideas. 
After explaining in some detail what he means by this, Kant adds , 
Now we can reduce all acts of the understanding to 
judgments, and the understanding may therefore be 
represented as a faculty of judgment. For, as stated 
above, the understanding is a faculty of thought. 
Thought is knowledge by means of concepts. But con-
cepts, as predicates of possible judgments, relate fo 
some representation of a not I!! determined object. 
This is the passage where Kant says that the understanding acts by 
judging and is accordingly a faculty of judgment . Since, in view of 
the foregoing, judging is uniting our ideas , we are partially prepared 
for his conclusion that a list of the forms of judgment is also a list 
of the ways in which the understanding functions to unite ideas in 
judging. In Kant's words, 
The functions of the understanding can, therefore, be 
discovered if we can give an exhaust~ve statement of 
the functions of unity in judgments. 
1 A69=B94. 
2Ibid. Support for our interpretation is found in the statement 
of Paton that "Kant, when he speaks of understanding and judgement, 
uses the word 'function' as synonymous with the word 'form.' The func-
tions of understanding are the same--at any rate in their denotation--
as the forms of understanding; and the functions of judgement, or the 
functions in judgement, are the same as the forms of judgement. The 
general function of the understanding, namely judgement, is supposed to 
differentiate itself into the necessary forms of judgement, and these 
are identified with the functions of the understanding." (Kant's Meta-
physic, I, 246-247.) 
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The second section1 of the Metaphysical Deduction then follows 
this conclusion. The purpose of this next section is to present the 
list of the forms of judgment as established by formal logic and re-
vised by Kant. The section begins with the contention that if we 
leave out of consideration the content of any judgment and attend only 
to its form, nwe find that the function of thought in judgment can be 
brought under four heads, each of which contains three moments."2 
Kant then gives a table of judgments 3 differing somewhat from the tra-
ditional list. 
After a discussion of these differences, Kant passes to the third 
section of his Metaphysical Deduction. It is here that we find sup-
port for his definition of category as function of judgment. The par-
ticular passage we have in mind contains the crux of the Metaphysical 
Deduction, though stated in two extremely concentrated sentences. In 
the first of these Kant says, 
The same function which gives unity to the various repre-
sentations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere syn-
thesis of various representations in an intuition; and 
this unity, in its most general ex~ression, we entitle the 
pure concept of the understanding. 
1 A70=B95--A76=Bl01. 2 A70=B95. 
~nt's table of judgments 
headings as follows: 






















The function mentioned here is the work of the understanding, namely, 
thinking or judging, and is alleged to do two things. The first is 
to give "unity to the various representations in a judgment." This 
seems to be Kant's doctrine of the first section that in judging we 
unite intuitions of different objects under a concept, a procedure 
which is described as analytic and present in all judgment. The other 
thing which judging does is to give "unity to the mere synthesis of 
various representations in an intuition." Kant seems to be saying 
that the understanding gives unity to the synthesis of imagination 
and thus indirectly to the manifold synthesized. He is claiming that 
thought in judgment does more than unite or separate different objects 
by analysis and abstraction under concepts of their common character-
istics. Thought also imposes unity upon the synthesis of imagination 
by which given intuitions are combined into individual objects. 
The second sentence in Kant's concentrated summary of the Meta-
physical Deduction is more difficult, though equally important: 
The same understanding, through the same operations by 
which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it pro-
duced the logical form of a judgment, also introduces a 
transcendental cont ent into its representations, by means 
of the srnthet~c unity of the manifold in intuition in 
general. 
Here Kant seems to be describing further the two aspects of judging 
with which he has been dealing . He says that the same understanding 
by the same acts produces two results. First, in producing judgments, 
1 A79=Bl05. 
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the understanding also produces the form of judgment. It does so by 
means of analytic unity, which must be the unity referred to in the 
preceding sentence t hat thought gives to different ideas i n a judgment. 
Secondly, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition 
in general, the understanding introduces a transcendental content into 
its ideas. Here the synthetic unity must be that which thought gives 
to the synthesis of different impressions in an intuition. In speaking 
of transcendental content, Kant is probably referring to how the pure 
categories can receive content from the synthesis of space and time and 
thus become schematized categories applying to all obj ects of human ex-
perience. 
Nevertheless, Kant draws a revealing conclusion at this point. He 
concludes that there are just as many pure concepts of the understand-
ing or categories as there are forms of judgment: 
In this manner there arise precisely the same number of 
pure concepts of the understanding which apply a priori 
to objects of intuition in general, as, in the preceding 
table, there have been found to be logical functions in 
all possible judgments. For these functions specify the 
understanding completely, and yield an exhaustive inven-
tory of its powers . These concepts we shall, with Aris-
totle, call categories, for our primary purpose is the same 
as his, although widely diverging from it in manner of 
execution. 1 
In the light of these statements and the argument which has pre-
ceded them in the Metaphysical Deduction, it seems fair to say that 
1 A79=Bl05--A80:Bl05. 
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Kant considered a category to be a function of judgment. His argument 
has emphasized that every judgment unites concepts into an analytic 
unity obtained by abstraction of the common characteristics shared by 
the objects to which the concepts refer. Every judgment, however, as 
formal logic shows, must unite its concepts in certain necessary ways 
which are independent of the particular nature of the concepts involved. 
Furthermore, every judgment that affords knowledge imposes unity upon 
the synthesis of imagination whereby given intuitions are combined in-
to individual objects. Kant contends in the Metaphysical Deduction 
that the functions of judgment, which unite concepts in different ways, 
also impose different kinds of unity on the synthesis of imagination 
and thus impose different kinds of synthetic unity on the objects judged. 
These different kinds of synthetic unity are also independent of the 
particular nature of the intuitions given to sense and combined into 
objects. Thus the forms or functions of judgment not only are used 
in the manner described in formal logic but also play a part in deter-
mining the character of the objects judged. Considered in the latter 
role, they are to be thought of as "categories" and constitute a com-
parable table. 1 
1Kant's table of categories presented in the third section of 
the Metaphysical Deduction has the same format as his table of judg-
ments. He distinguishes twelve categories arranged in equal groups 
under the same four headings as follows: 





Quality Relation Modality 
Reality Inherence and Subsistence Possibility-





The next passage in which Kant associates category and function 
of judgment is outside the Metaphysical Deduction. The statement is 
also somewhat indirect and occurs in Bl28 as part of the last para-
graph in Kant's introduction to the Transcendental Deduction. 1 Kant 
says the categories are "concepts of an object in general, by means 
of which the intuition of an object is regarded as determined in 
respect of one of the logical functions of judgment." While these 
remarks do connect the categories with the functions of judgment, 
they identify the categories most explicitly with something else. 
What this is, however, we reserve for consideration later. 
We consider next §20 or Bl43, a statement whose bearing is much 
more direct. Here Kant clearly defines the categories as functions 
of judgment. The section embraces his summary of the Transcendental 
Deduction on its objective side, 2 which is where he seeks to show 
that our intuitions must conform to the categories if they are to be 
1In A Kant divided the second part of the Transcendental Analyt-
ic, which is titled "The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understand-
ing" and commonly called the ttTranscendental Analytic," into three 
sections. They are an introduction in A84=Bll6--A95=Bl29, a provi-
sional exposition in A95-114, and an authoritative exposition in AllS-
130. In B the latter two sections were replaced by a new statement in 
Bl29-169. 
2
rn Bl44-146 or §21 of his new version of the Transcendental De-
duction in the second edition, Kant draws a distinction between the 
parts of the Deduction before and after §22. It is also true that 
the argument as a whole divides into two separate parts--that which 
deals with pure categories and that with schematized categories. It 
is plausible, therefore, to consider Kant's distinction between the 
two halves of the Transcendental Deduction in B to be one between ob-
jective and subjective sides of the Deduction. 
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intuitions of an object. With notable clarity Kant summarizes the 
essence of his Objective Deduction in these words comprising §20 or 
Bl43: 
The manifold given in a sensible intuition is neces-
sarily subject to the original synthetic unity of ap-
perception, because in no other way is the unity of 
intuition possible (§17). But that act of understand-
ing by which the manifold of given representations 
(be they intuitions or concepts) is brought under one 
apperception, is the logical function of judgment (cf. 
§19). All the manifold, therefore, so far as it is 
given in a single empirical intuition, is determined 
in respect of one of the logical functions of judg-
ment, and is thereby brought into one consciousness. 
Now the categories are just these functions of judg-
ment, in so far as they are employed in determination 
of the maniiid of a given intuition (cf. §13). Conse-
quently, the manifold in a given intuition is neces-
sarily subject to the categories. 
Kant is here claiming that the manifold of every intuition must 
be subject to the synthetic unity of apperception. Only thus can the 
intuition have the unity necessary for it to be an intuition of an ob-
ject. Judgment is the act whereby the manifold of all given intui-
tions and objects is brought under the unity of apperception. There-
fore, all the manifold, so far as it is given in one intuition, is 
determined by judgment and consequently determined in relation to one 
of the functions of judgment . The categories are the functions of 
judgment so far as the manifold is determined in relation to these 
functions. Hence the manifold of given intuition must be subject to 
the categories, if the intuition is to have the unity necessary for 
it to be intuition of an object. The categories thus necessarily apply 
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to all objects given in sensory intuition. They are objectively 
valid, and this is what Kant's Objective Deduction had to prove. 
We add here that Vleeschauwer agrees with our interpretation in his 
remark that Kant's summary in §20 "is governed by judgment and by 
the identity of the categorial act with the act of judgment."1 
Subsequent s.ta tements in Kant's Transcendental Analytic confirm 
our opinion that he considered a category to be a function of judg-
ment . Three of these are not too widely separated in the Analytic, 
and we present them as follows before noting their bearing on our 
claim: 
1 . This peculiarity of our understanding, that it 
1La D~duction Transcendentale, III, 151 [my translation]. His 
commentary on Kant's key statement in §20 that "the categories are 
just these functions of judgment, in so far as they are employed in 
determination of the manifold of a given intuition" also supports 
our citation of the passage as well as the Metaphysical Deduction. 
Vleeschauwer says that " · •• the Metaphysical Deduction consisted 
in showing the formal identity of category and form of judgment. 
The only difference resides in the moder of application. The judg-
ment assumes complete concepts . But the category is a factor consti-
tutive even of the concept. It is by the same act that we join con-
cepts in a judgment to objective pretentious (§19) and that we bind 
a sensory manifold to the unity of a concept of an object . There-
fore the same function, which when applied to cognitions present in 
the judgment obtains for them objective character, is active in the 
construction of the cognition, that is to say, in the determination 
of intuition as an object . It follows that the sensory manifold, 
brought under the unity of apperception so as to become conscious, 
is subject to functions which in their essence are conformed to the 
logical functions of judging" (ibid . , III , 153). 
can produce a priori unity of apperception solely 
by means of the categories, and only by such and 
so many, is as little capable of further explana-
tion as why we have just these and no other func-
tions of judgment, or why space and time are the 
only forms of our possible intuition. (Bl45-146) 1 
2. In the metaphysical deduction the a priori origin 
of the categories has been proved through their 
complete agreement with the general logical func-
tions of thought; (Bl59) 2 
3. Now there certainly does remain in the pure con-
cepts of understanding, even after elimination of 
every sensible condition, a meaning; but it is 
purely logical, signifying only the bare unity of 
the representations. The pure concept can acquire 
no meaning which migzt yield a concept3 of some 
object. (Al47=Bl86) 
The first of these passages equates the categories with the 
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functions of judgment of .which the understanding is capable. This is 
done without elaboration in a context where, as we have seen, 5 Kant is 
primarily occupied with rejecting the possibility of human intellectual 
intuition. 
1This passage is the last sentence of §21, which in turn is the 
last section of the Objective Deduction and one in which Kant restates 
his conclusion, reviews the argument as a whole, and makes a transi-
tion to the Subjective Deduction in §§22-27. 
2These words are the first ones in §26, the section containing 
the essence of the Subjective Deduction, and they begin another of 
Kant's usual introductions summarizing what has gone before. 
3Altered by Kant to "knowledge" (eine Erkenntnis) in NachtrUge 
lxi. 
~his passage is from Kant's chapter on "The Schematism of the 
Pure Concepts of Understanding" in Al37=Bl76--Al47=Bl87. 
Son pp. 167-168 above. 
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The second passage states in summary fashion what we have pointed 
out above1 is the distinctive and controversial claim of the Metaphysi-
cal Deduction, namely, that there are just as many categories as there 
are forms or funcFions of judgment. 2 
The third passage reflects Kant's view that schemata give objec-
tive reference to the categories while restricting their application 
to objects of sense. The passage seems to convey that the pure cate-
gories in abstraction from the schemata have a "logical" meaning, 
that is, they are concepts of the unity of ideas which are implicit 
in the forms of judgment. But no object is given for them, and they 
have no "meaning," which is to say that we cannot indicate the nature 
of any object to which they apply. Hence they are not a source of 
knowledge, particularly of things as they are in themselves. So un-
schematized pure categories are to be viewed, according to Kant in 
Al47=Bl861 and his statement does not sever their connection with the 
logical functions of judgment. 
The remaining six passages 3 in the Transcendental Analytic which 
1 Pp. 184-187. 
2our view of the passage coincides with Paton's restatement of 
it, which reads: "In the Metaphysical Deduction the a priori origin 
of the categories is established by their perfect agreement with the 
universal logical functions (that is, forms) of thought •••• More 
precisely, the Metaphysical Deduction is concerned with determining 
the list of the categories and explaining their origin in the nature 
of the understanding" (Kant's Metaphysic, I, 240). 
3A239=B2981 A242 1 A244-245, A2451 A247=B3041 and B305-306. 
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describe category as function of judgment are all in Kant's chapter 
1 
on Phenomena and Noumena. The first of these presents Kant discussing 
the transcendental use of concepts in a manner making apparent that he 
has categories in mind. Kant speaks of the "logical function" which 
pure concepts retain and implies his general claim that categories 
f . f . d 2 are unct1ons o JU gment. Consider how this is said in A239=B298: 
We demand in every concept, first, the logical form of 
a concept ~f thought) in general, and secondly, the pos-
sibility of giving it an object to which it may be ap-
plied. In the absence of such an object, it has no mean-
ing and is completely lacking in content, though it may 
still contain the logical function which is required for 
making a concept out of any data that may be presented. 
The same connection between pure categories and functions of 
judgment is reiterated in A242 as part of an elaborating passage 
omitted in the second edition. Kant repeats that pure, unschematized 
categories still express functions of judgment. 
in A242 is: 
3 His wording of this 
For if we remove all those conditions of sensibility which 
1comprising A235=B294--A260cB315 and referred to on p. 145 above. 
2our interpretation is in line with Paton's to the effect that 
"when Kant says, as he does repeatedly, that the pure categories are 
without sense and without meaning (ohne Sinn und Bedeutung), he is 
not denying that the pure concepts have as their content the prin-
ciples of synthesis contained in the forms of judging; he is only 
asserting that we have no means of showing their objective validity, 
that is, of showing how they can apply to any real object" (Kant's 
Metaphysic, I, 304n.). 
3Quoted on pp. 146-147 in another connection . above. 
mark them out as concepts of possible empirical em-
ployment, and view them as concepts of things in 
general and therefore of transcendental employment, 
all that we can then do with them is to regard the 
logical funltion in judgments [to which they give 
expression] as the condition of t he possibility of 
the things themselves, without in the least being 
able to show how they can have application to an 
object, that is, how in pure understanding, apart 
from sens~bility, they can have meaning and objective 
validity. 
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A244-245 is the next place in the chapter on Phenomena and Nou-
mena Kant speaks of the pure category as containing the logical func-
tion of judgment. The context of this passage embraces A244-246, 
which as a whole is a repetitive section omitted from the second edi-
tion . 3 Kant repeats his claims about pure categories in a manner now 
familiar to us when he says in A244-245: 
Now when this condition [of sensibility] has been 
omitted from the pure category, it can contain 
nothing but the logical function for bringing the 
manifold under a concept . By means of this function 
or form of the concept, thus taken by itself, we 
cannot in any way know and distinguish what object 
comes under it, since we have abstracted from the 
sensible condition through which alone objects can 
come under it. 
1
smith's explanatory addition . 
2Paton's paraphrase of the passage supports our citation of it 
under the heading of category as func t ion of judgment. Paton r estates 
A242 as follows: "If we remove--as for pure categories we must remove 
--all reference to those conditions of sensibility which mark out the 
categories as concepts whose use is empirical, if in short we regard 
the categories as concepts of things in general and so as having a 
transcendental use, what are we left with? Only the logical forms of 
judgement consider ed as somehow conditions of the possibility of 
things themselves" (Kant's Metaphysic, II, 434). 
3As we noted on p. 148n. above. 
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This passage is followed almost immediately by another statement 
in A245 which also illustrates the identification of category and 
function of judgment. Kant states that "the pure categories are 
nothing but representations of things in general, so far as the mani-
1 fold of their intuition must be thought through one or other of these 
logical functions [of judgment]." 
The two remaining passages in the chapter on Phenomena and Nou-
mena are A247=B304 and B305-306. Both of these likewise show that 
for Kant a category involves a function of judgment as we have de-
scribed. In the first of them, A247=B3041 Kant explicitly says the 
employment of a concept involves a function of judgment: 
Now the employment of a concept involves a function of 
judgment whereby an object is subsumed under the concept, 
and so involves at least the formal condition under which 
something can be given in intuition. If this condition of 
judgment (the schema) is lacking, all subsumption becomes 
impossible. For in that case nothing is given that could 
be subsumed under the concept. 
Kant's mention of schema here suggests that he is speaking of a cate-
2 gory, which as a concept for Kant therefore is a function of judgment. 
1The preceding sentence states that "the logical functions of 
judgment in general ••• cannot be defined without perpetrating a 
circle," as we quoted above on p. 149 in noting Kant's views about 
defining categories. 
2Paton 1 s comment on this passage is notable for his conviction 
that Kant is referring to category here. Paton says, "If we do not 
have this schema, which is the condition of all judgment, all subsump-
tion under the category is impossible; for there is amply nothing 
given which can be subsumed under the category. Hence the transcen-
dental use of the category, which professes to have no reference to 
sense or conditions of sense, is in fact no use at all; or at any 
rate no use whereby anything can be known" (Kant's Metaphysic, II, 
437). 
The last passage is B305-3061 one in which Kant says: 
As a matter of fact they [the categories] are nothing 
but forms of thought, which contain the merely logical 
faculty of uniting a priori in one consciousness the 
manifold given in intuition; and apart1 therefore, 
from the only intuition possible to us, they have even 
less meaning than the pure sensible forms. Through 
these forms an object is at least given1 whereas a mode 
of combining the manifold--a mode peculiar to our under-
standing--by itself, in the absence of that intuition 
wherein the manifold alone can be given1 signifies noth-
ing at all. 
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Here Kant states that pure categories contain the logical faculty of 
uniting a priori an intuited manifold . To speak of a category in this 
fashion is for him to suggest it is a function of judgment.1 
In the face of all this evidence, it is not surprising that Kant's 
principal commentators in recent years --Norman Kemp Smith, H. J. Paton, 
Herman J. de Vleeschauwer1 and H. W. Cassirer--are agreed that Kant 
connected the categories with the functions of judgment. Smith ex-
pounds Kant to this effect at several places in his A Commentary to 
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason1 saying1 for example, "As Kant has been 
insisting, • • • the pure forms of understanding, taken in and by them-
selves, apart from the forms of intuition, have no relation to any ob-
ject1 and are more logical functions without content or determinate 
meaning112 and "The categories apart from the manifold of sensibility 
1 Paton confirms this in commenting on B305-306 that "the cate-
gories in themselves are mere forms of thought or of judgment. They 
contain no matter or manifold in themselves, and so cannot by them-
selves give us knowledge of any object. All that they contain is 
the logical power of uniting a priori in one consciousness a manifold 
which must be given in intuition" (Kant's Metaphysic, II, 450). 
2commentary, p. 340. 
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are merely logical functions without content."1 
H. J. Paton has many more statements in his significant two-
volume commentary, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, which support a 
Kantian identification of categories and functions of judgment. To 
the Paton passages cited already in this section, we add these: "In 
the Metaphysical Deduction the a priori origin of the categories is 
established by their perfect agreement with the universal logical 
functions (that is, forms) of thought112 ; "The categories are there-
fore said to be the forms of jud~ent--I think it would be better to 
say concepts of the forms of judgment-- so far as the manifold of a 
3 given intuition is determined in conformity with them" ; "The forms 
of judgment are categories only in so far as the manifold of intui-
tion is determined in relation to them."4 
Vleeschauwer has even more statements to the same effect in his 
massive, three-volume commentary he titled La D~duction Transcendentale 
dans l 10euvre de Kant. The following represents only a small sample: 
"The identity of the function of understanding in the judgment and in 
the pure concept is the 'clue' of the discovery of the a priori con-
cepts"5; "The principle to which appeal is made consists of the formal 
equivalence of the judging function and the objectifying function, and 
1 Ibid. 1 p. 404. 
291, and 410. 
2Ibid . , I, 240. 
4 Ibid., I, 299. 
pp . 213, 2201 228n. 1 
Volume II on p. 338. 
For other similar statements, see pp. 2871 290-
3Ibid., I, 259. 
See also similar statements in Volume I on 
239n., 279, 2931 341, 524, 532-5331 5551 and in 
5La D~duction Transcendentale, II , 70 (my translation). 
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it leads to a perfect analogy between the forms of the two functions"l; 
"Between the logical form of judgment and the category abstractly con-
sidered, the difference is nil in itself; the difference begins to 
manifest itself with their matter of application."2 
H. W. cassirer also recognizes Kant's connection of category and 
function of judgment. The fullest statement of this is on page 58 of 
his recent Kant's First Critique, a passage which reads: 
The a , pttori concepts of understanding can be discovered 
by referring, first of all, to the basic forms of judg-
ment which are dealt with in Formal Logic, where we find 
a complete list of them. Secondly, we derive, or deduce, 
from these forms of judgment the pure forms of understand-
ing; and we are thus provided with an exhaustive table of 
categories which corresponds to the table of forms of 
judgment. 
Briefer statements of cassirer elsewhere in his volume3 also do not 
oppose our claim that Kant did define category as a function of judg-
ment. 
d. Category as Concept of Necessary Synthetic Unity 
We have claimed4 that a second way of major significance Kant 
1Ibid . , II, 124. 
2Ibid., III, 82. See the following for other statements of 
VleeschaUWer in similar vein: Volume I, 172, 228, 229, 232, 240; 
Volume II, 74-75, 125, 128-129, 135-136, 138-139, 404-405; Volume 
III, 141, 153, 173, 175, and 231-232. 
3on pp. 59, 83, 92, 109, 235, and Q·41. 
4on p. 181 above. 
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defines category in the Transcendental Analytic is as concept of neces-
sary synthetic unity. We find this meaning attached to category in 
ten passages. Their distribution is shown by the following listing to 
be throughout the Transcendental Analytic which itself comprises A64= 
B89--A292=B349: 
A79=Bl04, A79=Bl04-lOS, AllO, Al24-125, Bl44-145, Bl61, 
Al38=Bl77, Al46=Bl85, B234, and B308. 
Examination of these texts shows that in some category is more 
unmistakably defined as concept of necessary synthetic unity than in 
others. This is to be expected in almost any writer and quite natural 
for Kant. The clearest cases are the following seven passages: 
1. The concepts which give unity to this pure synthe-
sis, and which consist solely in the representation 
of this necessary synthetic unity, furnish the third 
requisite for the knowledge of an object; and they 
rest on the understanding. (A79=Bl04) 
2. The same function which gives unity to the various 
representations in a judgment also gives unity to 
the mere synthesis of various representations in an 
intuition; and this unity in its most general ex-
pression, we entitle the pure concept of understand-
ing. (A79=Bl04-l05) 
3. Actual experience ••• contains in recognition, the 
last and highest of these merely empirical elements 
of experience, certain concepts which render possible 
the formal unity of experience, and therewith all ob-
jective validity (truth) of empirical knowledge. These 
grounds of the recognition of the manifold, so far as 
they concern solely the form of an experience in gen-
eral, are the categories. (Al24-l25) 
4. In what follows (cf. §26) it will be shown, from the 
mode in which the empirical intuition is given in 
sensibility, that its unity is no other than that 
which the category (according to §20) prescribes to 
the manifold of a given intuition in general. 
(Bl44-145) 
5. The concept of understanding contains pure syn-
thetic unity of the manifold in general. (Al38= 
Bl77) 
6. In the end, therefore, the categories have no 
other possible employment than the empirical. As 
the grounds of an a priori necessary unity that 
has its source in the necessary combination of all 
consciousness in one original apperception, they 
serve only to subordinate appearances to universal 
rules of synthesis, and thus to fit them for thor-
oughgoing connection in one experience. (Al46=Bl85) 
7. But the concept which carries with it a necessity 
of synthetic unity can only be a pure concept that 
lies in the understanding, not in perception; (B234) 
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The remaining three passages are less clearly expressive of the 
notion that a category is a concept of necessary synthetic unity: 
8. • •• all appearances, in so far as through them 
objects are to be given to us, must stand under 
those a priori rules of synthetical unity whereby 
the interrelating of these appearances in empirical 
intuition is alone possible. (AllO) 
9. This synthetic unity can be no other than the unity 
of the combination of the manifold of a given intui-
tion in general in an original consciousness, in ac-
cordance with the categories, in so far as the com-
bination is applied to our sensible intuition. (Bl6l) 
10. For the categories have meaning only in relation to 
the unity of intuition in space and time; and even 
this unity they can determine, by means of general ~ 
priori connecting concepts, only because of the mere 
ideality of space and time. (B308) 
We would not convey the impression that these texts are free 
from ambiguity; 1 for among them is A79=Bl04-105 which we cited as 
1on p. 185 above. 
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an extremely concentrated sentence. It is needed, then, that some-
thing be said to make clearer than do these isolated passages what 
Kant means when he suggests a category is a concept of necessary syn-
thetic unity. 
A brief examination of Kant's provisional exposition1 of the 
Transcendental Deduction in A will prove helpful on this point. Par-
ticularly illuminating is the material in A97-110, which begins with 
a d~ussion of the threefold synthesis. For the latter Kant has pre-
pared his readers--or at least those with patience and good memories--
in his Metaphysical Deduction. There he claimed that for knowledge 
there must be (1) a given sensory manifold, (2) a synthesis of this 
manifold by imagination, and (3) a bringing of this synthesis to con-
cepts by understanding. 2 It is this general theory which is restated 
with additional complications in Kant's provisional exposition in A. 
Kant first asserts that ideas or representations need to be com-
bined if we are to have anything that can be said to be knowledge. 3 
Sense alone will not produce knowledge . It does contain a manifold 
which is given in intuition, 4 but sense does not unite or combine the 
manifold. Hence there is required in addition an active synthesis to 
unite the manifold. This Kant proceeds to describe as a threefold 
synthesis required for knowledge, namely, (l) synthesis of the appre-
hension of ideas in intuition, (2) synthesis of the reproduction of 
1 A95-ll4. 2 A76=Bl02--A79=BlU4 . 
4A97. Kant states this by saying that sense has a synopsis. 
Cf. A94. 
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ideas in imagination, and (3) synthesis of their recognition in a con-
cept. Kant's account of the threefold synthesis in A98-104 has its 
complications, but in simplest terms it claims that the knowing mind 
apprehends the given manifold of sense, reproduces it in imagination, 
and recognizes or judges it by means of concepts, thus bringing to-
gether the reproduced material. These acts of the mind are necessary 
if an object is to be known. Kant thus seems to contend that in order 
to recognize any object as an object, we must unite the manifold which 
we have intuited in successive moments and reproduced in imagination 
and also be aware of the unity of the synthesis whereby the manifold 
is combined into one object. 
In his first edition Kant followed this account of the subjective 
side of the Transcendental Deduction with an account of the nature of 
the object known in recognition.1 Kant immediately moves beyond his 
first suggestion that the object must be thought of as an unknown "some-
2 thing in general" to which our ideas supposedly correspond. Reflec-
tion reveals that our thought of the relation between our ideas and 
the object involves necessity of some sort. The object is thought of 
as preventing our ideas from being haphazard or arbitrary; it is con-
sidered a source of necessary agreement among our ideas. Ideas referred 
to an object must agree among themselves or possess unity. This leads 
1In 104-110. This account presents the objective side of the 
Transcendental Deduction, as does also section 4 located in All0-114. 
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to the conclusion that the concept of an object is essentially the 
f h h . . f 'd 1 concept o t e necessary synt et1c un1ty o our 1 eas. The latter is 
the concept of the essential characteristic of all objects, regardless 
of differences in their given matter. In fact 1 for Kant what dis-
tinguishes a real object from an imaginary one is that its components 
are necessarily connected. Thus when we judge that an idea we possess 
is an idea of a real object, we are judging that the elements of which 
it is composed are bound together in a necessary unity. To know an 
object is to recognize the presence of this necessary synthetic unity 
in our ideas. 
According to Kant's provisional exposition, then, the essential 
characteristic of an object is necessary synthetic unity. On Kantian 
principles, however, this characteristic must have its origin in the 
nature of the mind if it is to be regarded as necessary. This Kant pro-
ceeds to show by first asserting that the necessary synthetic unity is 
simply "the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the mani-
2 fold of representations." This is followed by the statement that we 
know the object when we have produced synthetic unity in the manifold 
of intuition. Here Kant seems to identify the unity of the object with 
the formal unity of consciousness, which is presumably the unity of ap-
perception. However, it is easier to regard the unity of apperception 
and the unity of the object as correlated and interdependent rather 
than identical, and so Kant views the matter elsewhere. 3 At any rate, 
section 3 of Kant's provisional exposition in A issues in the formula-
1Al04-105. 3see Bl34, Bl431 and A250. 
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tion of a "transcendental law" to the effect that all appearances, so 
tar as they are appearances of an object, must conform to the neces-
sary unity of apperception and to all the conditions which it implies. 1 
Kant's more complicated statement2 speaks of these conditions as "a 
priori rules of synthetical unity," and these may be taken as the cate-
gories officially presented in section 4 which follows immediately. 3 
Thus Kant argues that the essential characteristic of any and 
every object of knowledge is its necessary synthetic unity. But any 
synthetic unity if necessary must be due to the knowing mind, not to 
some unknown thing-in-itself. Hence this necessary unity is grounded 
upon the unity of apperception necessary for knowledge of an object. 
The unity of apperception, according to Kant, involves the categories 
as its conditions, since they are the conditions or forms of thought 
necessarily present in experience . From this perspective, the cate-
gories may be considered to be the relating activities of the under-
standing by which unity in the manifold of appearances is achieved. 
The categories are ways in which the understanding connects the mani-
fold so as to achieve the necessary synthetic unity which must be 
present when we judge objects by means of concepts and which for Kant 
is also the essential character of experience itsel£.4 This they do 
1Al09-110. 
2Quoted in the eighth passage above on p. 201. 
3rn All0-114. 4see All2 . 
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because they are the conditions of1 or related to the unity of apper-
ception which is necessary in itself and for knowledge of an object. 
In wording Kant prefers, the categories are concepts of necessary syn-
thetic unity. 
At this point it should be both wise and instructive to see if 
Kant's chief recent commentators corroborate the preceding interpreta-
tion. Do Smith, Paton, Vleeschauwer, and Cassirer agree that Kant de-
fined a category in terms of necessary synthesizing activity, or is 
there significant dissent among them from this view? With regard to 
Norman Kemp Smith, it appears that he would not dissent. This seems 
the import of the frequent references to the categories in his Com-
mentary as "relational categories,"2 as "relational factors,"3 and 
as !'forms of relation, "4 and of his statement, for example, that 11 . . . 
it is with the relational categories, and consequently with the various 
types of relational judgment to which they give rise, that the Critique 
is alone directly concerned."5 More significant, though, are the nu-
merous passages found throughout the volume which refer in different 
ways to aspects of the contention that a category is a way the under-
standing connects the manifold to achieve necessary synthetic unity. 
1Paton says this is presumably an objective genitive when used 
by Kant in AllO and Alll and refers to A105 (cited on p. 165 above) 
where the categories are spoken of as "conditions which make unity of 
apperception possible" (Kant's Metaphysic, I, 432n.). 
2Pp. xxxivn., x1ii, 37, 42, 108, 126, 181, and 184. 
3pp. xxxvi, xxxviii, x1iii, 39, 257, and 268. 
4pp. 287, 290-291, 325, and 330n. 5p. 37. 
Smith says in his Introduction, for example, 
• • • Kant further argues • • • that the formal, re-
lational elements are of a synthetic nature. The 
significance and scope of this conclusion can hardly 
be exaggerated. No other Kantian tenet is of more 
fundamental importance. With it the main conse-
quences of Kant's Critical teaching are indissolubly 
bound up. 
207 
The following are other noteworthy passages selected from a sizable 
list: "In the Analytic1 judgment in all its possible forms is shown 
to be a synthetic combination of a given manifold in terms of rela-
tional categories"2; "A category is always a function of unity where-
by contents are interpreted. It is not a content, but a form for the 
. . • Kant's fundamental Copernican dis-organisation of content"3; " 
covery that the categories are forms of synthesis, and accordingly ex-
press functions or relations •••• the categories are recognised as 
being of an altogether relational character"4 ; Kant, says Smith1 
points out that as the given is an unconnected mani-
fold, its unity can be obtained only by synthesis, and 
that such synthesis must conform to the conditions 
prescribed by the unity of apperception. That these 
conditions coincide with the categories he does not1 
however, attempt to prove. He apparently believes that 
this has been already established in the metaphysical 
deduction. The forms of unity demanded by appercep§ion1 
he feels justified in assuming, are the categories. 
1commentary1 p. xxxv. 2 Ibid., p. 42. 
3Ibid. 1 
5 Ibid. 1 
p. 178. 4Ibid., p. 191. 
pp. 252-253. 
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Smith also observes that "• •• the categories which are simply the 
possible functions of unity in judgment are valid for any and every 
consciousness that is sensuously conditioned and whose knowledge is 
therefore acquired through synthesis of a given manifold1 "
1 and that 
"apperception is the ground of the possibility of the categories, and 
these latter on their side represent only the synthetic unity which 
that apperception demands."2 It is statements such as these that per-
mit us to claim Norman Kemp Smith's support for our interpretation of 
category in terms of necessary synthesizing activity. 
It will be no surprise to learn next that our interpretation is 
also in line with H. J. Paton's as expressed in Kant's Metaphysic of 
Experience, his valuable two-volume commentary on the first half of 
the Critique of Pure Reason . Our debt to his judgments on Kant's 
thought is quite deep1 as we have sought to show1 and this topic is 
no exception. Many of Paton's statements bear out our judgmenc that 
Kant defines a category as a concept of necessary synthetic unity in 
a manner emphasizing the activity of the understanding in knowledge. 
We will demonstrate this without elaboration by quoting some of Paton's 
most revealing passages and alluding to others. Consider, then1 what 
Paton says in these quotations from his commentary: 
l Ibid. 1 p. 291. 
2Ibid. 1 p. 326. Other especially notable passages in Smith's 
Commentary are to be found on pp. 30n. 1 38 1 176-1771 2211 258 1 2871 
3341 and 398. Briefer but clear allusions to this view of category 
are to be found also on pp. xxxvi1 xxxviii1 xlii1 1771 1781 1791 1861 
1961 242-2431 2441 2521 2571 2641 2871 290, 3331 3431 359, 443, and 
634. 
1. When we consider what an object in general essen-
tially is 1 we shall find that it consists of a 
sensible matter held together in a necessary syn-
thetic unity. It is this necessary synthetic unity 
which constitutes the universal and necessary charac-
ter of any and every object; the matter may vary 
indefinitely. Hence the most exact description of 
a category is that it is a pure concept of the neces-
sary synthetic unity which is present in every ob-
ject of experience. (I, 258) 
2. • •• Kant believes that ••• the categories are 
the sources or grounds of the unity of the pure 
synthesis which is necessarily present in knowing 
any empirical object. (I, 277) 
3. Since the categories are concepts of the necessary 
synthetic unity which is the essential characteris-
tic of all objects, the transcendental ground of 
necessary synthetic unity is also the transcendental 
ground of the categories; and indeed necessary syn-
thetic unity is imposed on the manifold only by means 
of the categories. (I, 396n.) 
4. The categories are concepts of the necessary syn-
thetic unity which is necessary for every experience 
and for every object. (I, 489-490) 
5. The necessary synthetic unity which must belong to 
all the manifold of human intuition, if the manifold 
is to be combined in one space and time, is identical 
with that necessary synthetic unity of the manifold 
of a given intuition in general which is involved in 
the transcendental unity of apperception and thought 
in the pure categories. (I, 541-542) 
6 . The pure category is a concept of the pure synthetic 
unity of a manifold in general; (II, 28-29) 
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These are the clearest statements in Paton's commentary in which 
the meaning of category is identified with a concept of necessary syn-
thetic unity. In addition, there are numerous other places in both 
volumes where the same notion is conveyed. We cite specifically re-
marks found in Volume I on pages 259, 279, 285, 287, 290-291, 29ln., 
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293, 293n., 384n., 385n., 420, 423-424, 438, and in Volume II on pages 
63, 229, and 453. 
Next we inquire whether Herman J. de Vleeschauwer judged Kant to 
have defined category in terms of necessary synthetic unity. The main 
source to consult in determining this is, of course, Vleeschauwer 1 s 
monumental three-volume commentary titled La D~duction Transcendentale 
dans l'Oeuvre de Kant. We find this work to contain many statements 
in basic agreement with our claim. Witness the following samples we 
translate and quote here to support our statement. Vleeschauwer says, 
for example: "The categories are these synthetic functions and • 
can accomplish their functions of unification only by relation to ap-
perception • • Ill. 
. ' 
"The categories are the forms of experience or 
those of unifying the intuited manifold when it is given. When this 
diversity happens to be lacking, the categories remain the general 
forms of unifying a manifold"2; 
There is in the pure understanding pure modes of 
knowledge (concepts) of which the essence is to ex-
press the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of 
the imagination. • • • This identity of function be-
tween the synthetic unity and the pure concept per-
mits Kant therefore to int3oduce the categories [in 
All9] by the adverb "Thus" ; 
"The categories or a priori concepts are necessary for the knowledge 
of phenomena because they are of them the principles of unification"4 ; 
"The ensemble of categories constitutes the possible total of the forms 
11a D~duction Transcendentale, II, 139. 
2Ibid., II, 227. 3Ibid., II, 342-343. 4rbid., II, 388. 
of synthetic unity • • 
The category in itself is a concept expressing an in-
tellectual function of synthetic unity in conscious-
ness which, as such, constitutes the general form of 
an object and without which no object can be an ob-
ject determined by some positive predicate.2 
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"The theoretical categories were the diverse modes of synthetic unity 
acquired by an intuited manifold, thanks to its submission to the 
unity of consciousness113 ; "The category is a synthetic function which 
has no other reason for being save unification of the sensible ••• 114 
There are other places5 where Vleeschauwer speaks of category in 
similar terms, and the cumulative effect of these plus the statements 
we have quoted is to suggest that Vleeschauwer is in basic agreement 
with our claim. For Vleeschauwer, too, category for Kant in the 
Transcendental Analytic expresses necessary synthetic unity. 
Whether H. W. Cassirer holds this same opinion remains to be 
established. Those readers familiar with his Kant's First Critique 
know that Cassirer rejects many of Kant's claims. For example, he 
dismisses Kant's Metaphysical Deduction as valueless. 6 More impor-
tant is his rejection of Kantian convictions on the nature of cate-
1Ibid., III, 188. 
3Ibid., III, 326. 
2Ibid., III, 189-190. 
4Ibid., III, 656 . 
Sin particular we cite his statements in Volume II of La D~duction 
Transcendentale on pp. 90-91, 91, 134-135, 136, 137, 140, 167, 279, 298, 
308 1 343, 344, 368, and in Volume III on pp. 1561 158, 1591 229, 2391 
334-3351 337, and 506. 
6see Kant's First Critique, p. 13, where he says, 11 • the ar-
gument of the so-called Metaphysical Deduction of the categories seemed 
to me to be without any value." Other expressions of the same judg-
ment are found on pp. 58, 82-83, ~o, 92, 1u7, 109, and 137. 
gory, Cassirer doing so in words such as these: 
••• Kant seems to me wholly mistaken ••• suggest-
ing that the sense-given does not by itself exhibit 
the fundamental connections thought of in the cate-
gories, that the human mind imposes these connections 
upon what is sensibly presented to it, and that, apart 
from the mind, they would not be there at all.l 
Here disagreement with Kant's conception of category is both unmis-
takable and serious. Moreover, confirmation is found in Cassirer's 
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own view of the synthesis of data required for knowledge, a view quite 
different from Kant's. As Cassirer sees it, 
••• Kant's reasoning must be corrected in the follow-
ing manner. That a spontaneous activity, on the part 
of the knower, is required, if certain connections are 
to be recognized, cannot be seriously doubted. Yet this 
does not imply that they have been manufactured by us, 
and that they are not actually to be found in sensible 
reality. 2 
We will not elucidate the implications of Cassirer's statement 
because that is not our purpose . The question we wish to raise is 
not whether Cassirer agrees with Kant's view of category as concept 
of necessary synthetic unity. We wish to determine whether Cassirer 
considers Kant to have viewed category in this manner. On this point 
we offer, perhaps surprisingly, an affirmative answer. We consider 
Cassirer to be in basic agreement with Smith, Paton, and Vleeschauwer. 
Our judgment is based primarily on statements of Cassirer in his Kant's 
First Critique. This recent book3 is no full-scale commentary as the 
1 Ibid., p. 96. 
3published in 1954 by George Allen and Unwin Ltd. in London and 
by the Macmillan Company in New York. 
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other three men have written. Nevertheless, it stands as a serious, 
stimulating study aptly subtitled "an appraisal of the permanent sig-
nificance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason." In this book Cassirer 
agrees that Kant conceived of category in terms of necessary synthetic 
unity and suggests so in these statements: 
1 . The categories are declared to contain rules of 
synthesis through the instrumentality of which we 
are enabled to construct physical objects out of 
sense-presentations, the suggestion being that the 
latter, taken by themselves, fail to display the 
connection required for objectivity.l 
2. [Kant] frequently maintains that unity, or con-
nectedness, in objects is entirely due to the hu-
man intellect. He goes so far as to imply that, 
apart from our understanding and its various con-
ceptions of synthetic unity, phenomenal reality 
lacks unity altogether, and no real connections 
are to be found anywhere; in other words, if 
there is such unity and its various manifestations 
in the reality confronting us in experience, this 
is because they are imposed by the human mind upon 
the sense-given.2 
3. • •• Kant may be right also in holding that a 
priori concepts, or categories, underlie perceptual 
awareness strictly speaking. This would be so in 
the event of its being found that nothing sense-
given could acquire an objective status except by 
having applied to it some category or other, the 
function of the category being to predicate a cer-
tain kind of unity in respect of the sense-given.3 
4 . The bringing of sense-impressions before conscious-
ness in general depends on our presentations zeing -
synthesized under the guidance of categories. 
5. [As regards the categories,] the sole task they are 
1
rbid ., p. 61 . 
4rbid., p. 118 . 
2Ibid., pp. 75-76 . 3Ibid., pp. 83-84 . 
capable of performing is to establish unity among 
what is sensibly given to us in space and time.l 
214 
We conclude this section by summarizing the support we have been 
presenting for our claim. Texts in the Transcendental Analytic con-
sidered with interpretation by four recent commentators do confirm our 
judgment that Kant defines a category as a concept of necessary syn-
thetic unity. 
e. Category as Concept of Pure Synthesis 
We find two other main definitions of category in Kant's Tran-
scendental Analytic. One of these, as we noted above on p. 181, is 
category defined as concept of pure synthesis. Kant's definition of 
category in these terms finds expression in the subjective form of 
his transcendental deduction, but this we will not elucidate until 
we have cited his statements suggesting a category is also a concept 
of pure synthesis. 
Those statements appear to be the following seven passages in 
the Transcendental Deduction: 
A78=Bl04, A78=Bl04, A80=Bl061 All9, Bl511 Bl57n., and A246. 
In this list of excerpts from Kant again there is variety both in 
length and clarity. This may cause dismay but surely no surprise in 
the reader who has toiled this far with us in our investigation. Thus, 
we find Kant speaking naturally in the following varied form in the 
1Ibid., p. 226. 
following varied parts a£ the Transcendental Analytic: 
1. Pure synthesis, represented in its most general 
aspect, gives us the pure concept of the under-
standing. (A78=Bl04) 
2. What transcendental logic, on the other hand, 
teaches, is how we bring to concepts, not repre-
sentations, but the pure synthesis of representa-
tions. (A78=Bl04) 
3. This [the table of categories] then is the list 
of all original pure concepts of synthesis that 
the understanding contains within itself a priori. 
(A80:Bl06) 
4. The unity of apperception in relation to the syn-
thesis of imagination is the understanding; and 
this same unity, with reference to the transcen-
dental synthesis of the imagination, the pure 
understanding. In the understanding there are 
then pure a priori modes of knowledge which con-
tain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of 
imagination in respect of all possible appearances. 
These are the categories, that is, the pure con-
cepts of understanding. (All9) 
5. This synthesis of the manifold of sensible intui-
tion, which is possible and necessary a priori, 
may be entitled figurative synthesis (synthesis 
speciosa), to distinguish it from the synthesis 
which is thought in the mere category in respect 
of the manifold of an intuition in general, and 
which is entitled combination through the under-
standing (synthesis intellectualis). Both are 
transcendental, not merely as taking place a priori, 
but also as conditioning the possibility of other 
a priori knowledge. (Bl51) 
6. In every act of attention the understanding deter-
mines inner sense, in accordance with the combina-
tion which it thinks, to that inner intuition which 
corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the 
understanding. (Bl57n.) 
7. Thus the categories, apart from the condition of 
sensible ~ntuition, of which they contain the syn-
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thesis, have no relation to any determinate object, 
cannot therefore define any object, and so do not 
in themselves have the validity of objective con-
cepts. (A246) 
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To be fully intelligible, excerpts such as these should be con-
sidered in their original setting. This we have recognized and sought 
to offset by offering connected statements of Kant's thought. In our 
judgment the argument in the so-called Subjective Deduction1 in B 
helps express and explain Kant's statements that a category is a con-
cept of pure synthesis. In elucidation of this latter definition, 
then, we offer next a summary of the argument in Kant's Subjective De-
d . 2 uct~on. 
In the tirst part of §24 Kant addresses himself to the special 
problem of the Subjective Deduction. The passage is Bl50 and under-
takes to explain how the manifold given in human intuition must con-
form to the pure categories involved in the nature of thought. His ex-
planation turns on the fact that the manifold of intuition in human ex-
perience must be given under the form of time. The universality and 
necessity of the form of time will enable us to understand how the 
1 See p. 189n. above for an explanation of this description of 
a portion of Kant's argument in the Transcendental Deduction as re-
vised in the second edition. 
2The Subjective Deduction in Bl46-169 includes §§ 22-27 of the 
Critique, the most important being §24 and §26. The content of §22 
and §23 is largely introductory, but does make plain that for us the 
categories apply not to things-in-themselves but only to objects of 
experience, that is, to objects given in empirical intuition under 
the forms of space and time. 
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activity of the mind, in accordance with the synthetic unity of apper-
ception, can determine the manifold which is given in inner sense. 
When we grasp the part played by time as the form of all human intui-
tions, we shall be able to understand how the necessary synthetic 
unity of the manifold of intuition in general (which we think a priori 
in the pure categories) can be the condition to which all objects of 
human intuition must necessarily conform . We shall also be able to 
understand how pure categories can acquire objective reality, that is, 
how they can apply to objects of human intuition. The latter objects, 
Kant repeats, are appearances and not things-in-themselves. 
Kant writes in Bl50 as if understanding itself determined or 
synthesized the manifold of inner sense in accordance with the unity 
of apperception and the categories. He explains next in Bl51 that 
this synthesis of the manifold under the form of time is due to imagi-
nation. This synthesis he calls, as we quoted, 1 a "figurative11 one. 
He views it as distinct from the purely intellectual synthesis present 
in the form of judgment and thought in the pure category. The figura-
tive synthesis, like the intellectual one from which it is distinguished 
but to which it conforms, is also a transcendental synthesis. It is 
not only a priori but is also the condition of the possibility of a 
priori knowledge . As transcendental it is not concerned with dif-
ferences in the given manifold but is directed only to the unity 
thought in the categories. An important point to glean from BlSl, 
1on p. 215 above. 
though, is that the transcendental synthesis of imagination works 
through the medium of time. It determines sense in accordance with 
time and does so in conformity with the unity of apperception and 
accordingly with the categories. 
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In writing in this manner Kant is assigning imagination to an 
intermediate position between sense and understanding. He speaks of 
imagination as the power to represent an object in intuition even 
when the object is not present. Thus it is connected with sensibili-
ty since human intuitions are sensible. Still the synthesis of imag-
ination is an expression of spontaneity, for it is what determines, 
not what is determinable, as is sense. Imagination is in the service 
of understanding when it synthesizes the manifold in accordance with 
concepts. The transcendental synthesis of imagination serves pure 
understanding when it synthesizes the manifold in time in accordance 
with the categories. It is the first working of understanding upon 
sensibility and is the first application of understanding to objects 
of human experience. Nevertheless, as a figurative synthesis, it is 
to be distinguished from the purely intellectual synthesis which is 
found in the pure categories independently and belonging to under-
standing. The transcendental synthesis of imagination is also said 
to be productive and not reproductive. It is governed by the cate-
gories, whereas the synthesis of reproductive imagination is governed 
by the empirical laws of association. 
The essence of the Subjective Deduction is contained in Bl59-1611 
which is the first part of §26. Kant offers first1 his usual intro-
1In Bl59-160. 
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duction summarizing what has preceded. The argument then begins with 
the synthesis of apprehension, which is defined as the combination of 
the manifold in one empirical intuition whereby sense perception or 
empi~ical . consciousness of the intuition (as appearance) is possible. 
Sen~e perception by itself gives us consciousness of appearances, not 
of objects. Yet it is in close relation to objects since it involves 
sensation; for sensation, though only a subjective modification of 
the mind and not the idea of an object, presupposes the actual presence 
of the object. The synthesis of apprehension, furthermore, gives unity 
to our intuitions. It is conditioned by the transcendental synthesis 
of time and, when brought to concepts or judged, affords knowledge of 
objects. 
The point next made is that apprehension involves both space and 
time. Space and time are forms of all human intuition; hence the 
synthesis of apprehension, since it combines the given manifold in one 
intuition, must do so in conformity with space and time. Here Kant 
seems to say that the given manifold appears to us as combined in space 
and time only because of our act of synthesis. The synthesis of appre-
hension must conform to space and time because unless it does it cannot 
take place at all. 
If the synthesis of apprehension combines the manifold in space 
and time, it presupposes a transcendental synthesis of the one space 
and time in which the manifold is combined. Kant proceeds to make this 
point without any explicit reference to the transcendental synthesis 
of imagination. Space and time as forms of human intuition are a mere 
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multiplicity without unity. It is only as pure intuitions that they 
possess unity. This necessary unity was treated in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic as if it belonged to space and time in their own right. But, 
says Kant in a note, space and time as pure intuitions possess unity 
only because they presuppose a synthesis which does not belong to sense 
at all. This synthesis is presumably the transcendental synthesis of 
imagination. Unity, therefore, is given along with the pure intuitions 
of space and time, but it is not given in these intuitions. This unity 
of space and time is an a priori condition of the synthesis of appre-
hension. Everything that is to be represented determinately in space 
and time must conform to this necessary unity or combination which is 
involved in the nature of space and time themselves. Because there is 
only one space and time, the manifold given must be synthesized in such 
a way that it can appear in one space and time. 
The contention on which the whole argument of the Subjective De-
duction rests is next stated in one sentence: 
This synthetic unity can be no other than the unity 
of the combination of the manifold of a given intui-
tion in general in an original consciousness, in ac-
cordance with the categories, in so far as the com-
bination is applied to our sensible intuition.l 
This appears to mean that the synthetic unity which must belong to all 
the manifold of human intuition, if the manifold be combined in one 
space and time, is identical with that synthetic unity of the manifold 
of a given intuition in general which is involved in the transcendental 
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unity of apperception and thought in the pure categories. Kant's con-
tention seems to be another form of the doctrine that the transcenden-
tal synthesis of imagination, which is the condition of synthesizing 
the given manifold in one space and time, is a synthesis in accordance 
with the unity of apperception and the categories. If this be true, 
then the synthesis of apprehension necessary for sense perception must 
conform to the categories. And since human experience is knowledge by 
means of connected sense perceptions, the categories are a priori con-
ditions of the possibility of such experience. Consequently they are 
valid a priori for all objects of human experience. Kant's argument, 
however, is not at an end. He intends to show ,that corresponding to 
each pure category there is a schema or transcendental determination 
of time. He also believes he can prove that these schemata are neces-
sarily involved in all experience of objects in one common space and 
time. 
We return now to our claim that Kant defines a category as a con-
cept of pure synthesis. What we have learned from the complex argu-
ment of the Subjective Deduction should aid us. One effect of this 
argument is to suggest that category as concept of pure synthesis 
means category as schematized or related to space and time. We have 
seen that Kant discerns a transcendental synthesis of imagination and 
subordinates it to a purely intellectual synthesis. The latter is 
said to be expressed in the pure category which, accordingly, does 
seem suitably described as a concept of pure synthesis. However, the 
synthesis thought in the pure category is the synthesis of the manifold 
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of intuition in general . So understood, the pure category has in it-
selt no specific reference to ~pace and t~me. But Kant's statements 
in the Subjective Deduction and elsewhere refer to category as a syn-
thesis of a manifold of human intuition, which as such is given under 
the forms of space and time. Such a synthesis , while of a manifold 
more specific than intuition in general, may still be described as 
pure . It imposes synthetic unity on the pure manifold of space and 
time in general while also imposing synthetic unity on the concrete 
manifold given under the forms of space and time. And as our quota-
tions reveal, Kant persists in speaking of a category so schematized 
as a concept. We are led to believe, then, that Kant does not always 
view category solely in terms of functions of judgment or necessary 
synthetic unity. Instead he may consider a category in terms of its 
synthesis of both a pure and specific manifold given in space and time. 
When he does so, he designates it as a concept of pure synthesis. 
This definition admittedly could be clearer. It might conceiva-
bly refer to both pure and schematized categories. But by this word-
ing Kant seems preferably to designate the category which synthesizes 
a content given in terms of space and time. Such a category is a 
schematized category, though Kant st~ely never uses such a descrip-
tion. There is no mystery, however, that for Kant pure categories 
must receive a content if they are to be more than empty forms of 
judgment and have as their meaning those universal and necessary 
characteristics of objects in human experience. This content cate-
gories obtain from human intuition under the forms of space and time 
and accordingly synthesize in relation to those forms of intuition. 
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So viewed a schematized category may be defined as a concept of pure 
synthesis . 
This may become more understandable if next we restate briefly 
what appears to be Kant's general conception of a pure and a schema-
tized cat egory . A pure category for Kant seems to be the concept of 
a synthesis fa lling into several types . In each of the latter, the 
principle of synthesis involved is implied in a function of judgment . 
The manifold which is synthesized is the manifold of intuition in 
general; for the pure category in i tself has no reference to space 
and time . And it is to be understood that unless the manifold is 
synthesized in accordance with categories, there can be no knowledge 
of objects. 
A schematized category for Kant is also the concept of a syn-
thesis admitting of several types . All types, however, apply to a 
manifold of intuition given not in general but more specifically 
under the forms of space and time . The principle of synthesis in a 
schematized category is the same as in a pure category, but applica-
tion is restricted to a limited manifold given in space and time. 
The category thus schematized features synthesizing a manifold which 
can be considered to be a specific part of the pure manifold of space 
and time as well as part of the concrete manifold of intuition ac t u-
ally given under the forms of space and time. 
The difference between the pure and schematized category, then, 
lies mainly in the manifold synthesized . The pure category synthe-
sizes a manifold of intuition in general apart from space and time. 
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The schematized category synthesizes a specific manifold of intuition 
in both its pure form and its concrete form given in space and time . 
Our contention in this section has been that category defined as 
concept of pure synthesis means category specifically schematized. 
We consider next whether this claim can be verified in the four au-
thorities we have been consulting, namely, Smith, Paton, Vleeschauwer, 
and Cassirer. Regarding Smith, it must be admitted that we can claim 
his vote only with qualifications. In his Commentary Smith never once 
uses "concept of pure synthesis" for category, either pure or schema-
tized. However, he might be suggesting categories in schematized form 
when he refers to them as synthetic concepts, 1 forms of synthesis, 2 
forms of synthetic thinking, 3 synthetic principles, 4 and synthetic, re-
lational factors . 5 But their context confirms that these terms are 
used to stress the synthesizing function of catego~y and not the na-
ture of the manifold united. 
We d9 not mean to imply that Smith sees no procedure of specifi-
cally schematizing categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. Quite 
to the contrary, Smith alludes frequently to schematization and its 
results. 6 For example, he speaks of "the schematised categories" 
and distinguishes between "the categories strictly so called, that 
is, the pure forms of understanding, and the schemata."7 What we do 
1commentary, p. 184. 
~bid., p. xxxv . 
2Ibid . , p. 191 . 
5Ibid., p . xxxviii. 
3Ibid., p. 185. 
6Ibid . , p. 326. 
7Ibid. , p. 327 . Other passages where Smith refers in his Com-
mentary to schematization and/or schematized categories occur on 
pp . 1iii, 20, 108, 195, 213, 257, 265, 276, 290-291, 334, 335, 335-
336, 339 1 344, 4041 and 467n. 
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wish to convey is that Smith regards the specifically schematized cate-
gories simply as schemata and not as concepts of pure synthesis or any-
thing else. This reveals his conviction that Kant's paraphernalia of 
pure categories, schematized categories, and transcendental schemata 
are unduly elaborate. In such constructions Smith sees the baneful 
effects of Kant's love for architectonic and calls for drastic revi-
sion. Thus we encounter Smith in familiar vein contending that 
Kant's manner of employing the term category is a 
typical example of his characteristic carelessness in 
his use of his technical terms. Sometimes it signifies 
the pure forms of understanding. But more frequently 
it stands for what he ••• entitles schemata, namely, 
the pure conceptual forms as modified through relation 
to time •••• Had Kant restricted the term category 
to denote the pure forms, and invariably employed the 
term schemata to signify their more concrete counter-
parts, many ambiguities and confusions would have been 
prevented. • • • For what Kant usually means when he 
speaks of the categories ~the schemata; 1 
The latter claim is open to serious question. 2 Without elaborat-
ing on this, we observe that this contention of Smith helps explain 
why he never speaks of Kant's schematized categories as concepts of 
pure synthesis. According to Smith, schematized categories ~ sche-
mata, and this Kant meant but did not consistently say. Such an in-
terpretation of Kant is bound to lead to neglect of the statements in 
!commentary, pp. 339-340. 
2As Paton has observed, noting cogently that "the names by which 
Kant alludes to the different schemata are other than the names by 
which he alludes to the schematized categories" (Kant's Metaphysic, 
II, 69n.). 
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the Cri t ique we have cited. No wonder, then, Smith does not consider 
the schematized categories to be concepts of pure synthesis. However, 
we conclude by claiming Smith's vote for our contention that Kant does 
schematize the categories in terms of a specific manifold of human in-
tuition given under the forms of space and time. We differ with Smith, 
though, on what Kant called the result of this procedure. 
In contrast, we are much more in agreement with Paton, whom we 
consult next . We feel no hesitancy in claiming his support for our 
asserti on that Kant defines schematized categories as concepts of 
pure synthesis. Many passages in Paton's commentary could be quoted 
with full approval . But again we must be content with quoting a se-
lected few and citing the numerous remainder. First, then, we s~e 
agreement with our interpretation most clearly in the following state-
ments .. of Paton: 
1 . Every pure category may be described as the concept 
of the synthesis of x, where x serves to indicate the 
special nature of the synthesis . The principle of 
the synthesis is supposed to be implicit in the form 
of judgement . The manifold synthetised is the manifold 
of intuition in general, and the pure category has in 
itself no reference to space and time. Unless the given 
manifold is synthetised in accordance with the category, 
there can be no knowledge of objects • • •• The schema-
tized category may be described as the concept of the 
synthesis of x in time. The principle of synthesis is 
the same as that of the pure category, but its applica-
tion is restricted to a manifold of intuition given 
under the form of time and space. (II , 42-43) 
2 . The imaginative synthesis which is controlled by the 
forms of judgment is essentially a synthesis of the 
pure manifold of time and space: because it imposes 
synthetic unity on the manifold of time and space, it 
also imposes synthetic· unity on the manifold given 
under the forms of time and space. Consequently the 
category is described as a concept of pure syntheN 
sis. (I, 259) 
3. If the synthesis in question is the synthesis of 
the manifold of intuition in general, Kant is speak-
ing of the pure category; if, on the other hand, 
it is the synthesis of the pure manifold of time and 
space, he is speaking of the schematised category, 
as in A78=Bl04. (I, 287n.) 
4. The pure category, it is true, is the concept of the 
synthesis of a manifold in general (without reference 
to the pure manifold of time). But this concept has 
no validity except as schematised with reference to 
the manifold of time. (I, 347n.) 
5. The pure category contains the form (function of 
unity) of this synthesis in abstraction from all 
restricting sensuous conditions; that is, it conN 
tains the form of this synthesis as a synthesis of 
the manifold in general (not as a synthesis of ap-
pearances in time). (II, 18ln.) --
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In addition to these passages, we cite also with approval many 
others in both volumes of Paton's Kant's Metaphysic of Experience. 1 
What these numerous statements as a whole reflect is the distinction 
between pure and schematized categories and the suggestion that for 
the latter we pre-empt the designation "concept of pure synthesis. " 
We confront a different outlook in considering whether Vleeschau-
wer judges Kant to have defined a schematized category as a concept of 
pure synthesis. On this question Vleeschauwer is closer to Smith 
than to Paton and, consequently, further from agreement with our con-
lspecifically, we have in mind statements of Paton found in VolN 
ume I on pp. 274, 275, 276, 276n., 277, 277n., 278, 278n., 279, 287, 
34ln., 353, 374n., 432-433, 433n., 435, 450, 471, 47ln., 472-473, 
501, 535 1 537, 555 1 555n., 559 1 and in Volume II on pp. 32, 38 1 38n., 
339n., 346, 392, 400, 430n., and 455. 
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tention. Vleeschauwer•s divergence springs in large measure from a 
different conception of the structure in the argument of the Tran-
scendental Analytic. He does not agree with Paton's rejection of 
the "patchwork" or layers theory of Adickes and Vaihinger regarding 
the Analytic. But no one can say Vleeschauwer wholly endorses the 
"patchwork" theory after witnessing remarks such as the following: 
Without exaggerating the fragmentation of the [tran-
scendental] deduction and without wishing to speak of 
a mosaic, it is indisputable that its parts marshal 
themselves in a certain number of repetitions of which 
Kant personally has indicated certain points of de-
parture. We ourselves hold to three classic deductions. 
Despite this attitude, perhaps too conservative in cer-
tain eyes, we do not believe that the dividing up car-
ried out by Adickes and Vaihinger ought to be rejected 
in an absolute manner.l 
In this manner Vleeschauwer recognizes not only a Metaphysical 
Deduction but also a subjective and objective form of the Tran-
scendental Deduction2 and, we add, a schematization procedure. 3 
His divergence from Paton, however, is not over the structure of A 
but over that of B. In sum, Vleeschauwer sees in B only one form 
11a D~duction Transcendentale, II, 216-217 (my translation). 
2vleeschauwer notes, for example, that the structure of the Tran-
scendental Deduction "allowed for, in 1781, two parts clearly cotlr-
dinated, designated in the preface of the Critique as subjective and 
objective parts" (ibid., III, 19). See also ibid., II, 208, 300, 317, 
326, and 448. 
3vleeschauwer speaks of "the schematism not having undergone 
change" in B (ibid., III, 37n.) and of the Analytic of Principles as 
"enriched nevertheless by the results of the [transcendental] deduc-
tion and of the schematism" (ibid., III, 166). 
229 
of the Transcendental Deduction, not two, 1 and claims that in B the 
subjective deduction has been suppressed. 2 He sees the suppression 
as the most remarkable, unifying feature in a recasting of the Ana-
lytic "destined to avoid idealism by the suppression of the subjec-
tive deduction and by the empirico-phenomenalist orientation. 113 Fur-
thermore, Vleeschauwer considers the one form of the Transcendental 
Deduction in B to center on the nature of judgment rather than on 
synthesis.4 
This different view of B is not to be construed as meaning that 
Vleeschauwer sees no necessity in Kant's thought for schematizing 
1As Paton finds. Vleeschauwer says that "· •• in his recent 
work H. J. Paton ••• finds in turn two deductions in the second 
edition, one which operates with the categories, another which pro-
ceeds with the categories schematized. The regroupment coincides 
at base with ours but relates them, contrary to us, to the objective 
and subjective deductions of 1781" (ibid., III, 28n.). 
2
"The subjective deduction ••• has been suppressed •••• 
Kant considers in 1787, the nature and not the kinds of synthesis 
out of fear of falling again into his former psychological analyses" 
(ibid., III, 86). See also ibid., III, 19, 20, 20-21, 34, and 279. 
3Ibid., III, 41. 
~ence it is understandable why Vleeschauwer considers §20 or 
Bl43 to be no summary of the Transcendental Deduction on its objec-
tive side, as we have said above on p. 189. In contrast, Vleeschau-
wer contends that §20 "distinguishes itself from the deduction of 
the first edition in that the categories are not deduced in it as 
synthetic forms of apperception (subjective deduction) and as a pri-
ori forms of objects (objective deduction). It is governed by judg-
ment and by the idea of the identity of the categorial act with the 
judging act" (ibid., III, 151). See also ibid., III, 35, 35-36, 131, 
153, and 162. 
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the categories, hence cannot be expected to speak of them as we do. 
Unmistakably, Vleeschauwer agrees that for Kant a category must be 
schematized or provided with a content of empirical intuition if it 
is to furnish knowledge of an empirical object. He repeatedly insists 
that the category must be schematized in this fashion if Erkenntnis 
is to result. Accordingly, Vleeschauwer is found saying that "the 
category, factor of spontaneity, and the sensory given, factor of 
receptivity, have to meet one another, in order to realize knowledge 
of a determinate object,"1 and elaborating that 
• • • the synthesis and the category presuppose a 
manifold given antecedent to and independent of 
them. Why? The reason follows from the nature of 
the understanding itself. The understanding is, 
according to its nature, synthetic: it is the act 
of relating the synthesis of a manifold to the unity 
of consciousness; it is the act of liaison, of order-
ing. Consequently, it presupposes a matter to syn-
thesize, to bind, to order. The result is that the 
categories have no meaning in an understanding whose 
function goes beyond that of synthesis, in an under-
standing which, for example, would itself create the 
data and produce them by its own activity.2 
We also find in Vleeschauwer's commentary numerous assertions 
that for Kant a category in its pure form apart from sensory intui-
tion does not yield knowledge of an empirical object. Witness these 
remarks on page 164 of Volume III: 
1Ibid., III, 190. 
2Ibid., III, 159-160. Other statements by Vleeschauwer recog-
nizing that for Kant a category must be schematized are located in 
ibid., II, 167; III, 155, 162, 165, 178, 182-183, 189-190, and 192. 
• • • knowledge in the critical sense of the term re-
quires a concept of an object and a given intuition, 
without which the concept would be a pure form of 
thought. But all intuition is sensory in the human 
realm. Therefore knowledge restricts itself to the 
domain of sensory intuition. But sensory intuition 
can be intuition a priori or intuition a posteriori 
or empirical. The application of the concept of an 
object to a priori intuition produces only the general 
form of the object, which therefore does not suffice 
for realizing the idea of Erkenntnis or of the knowl-
edge of a real object. The latter limits itselfi con-
sequently, to the domain of empirical intuition. 
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This insistence that a category is restricted to empirical intuition 
if empirical knowledge be obtained is a characteristic expression of 
Kant's phenomenalism and likewise of Vleeschauwer•s interpretation 
in many passages. Thus we find Vleeschauwer expressing both the 
limitation in using and necessity of schematizing categories in this 
clear, summary statement: 
the categories give us an Erkenntnis of ob-
jects only when their matter is given in perception 
or in empirical intuition. • • • The objectivity in 
the usage of categories is restricted, consequently, 
to empirical intuition. Their usage is confined to 
empirical knowledge. Such knowledge is called ex-
perience. Hence the categories have objective usage 
only by relation to objects of experience.2 
In view of so many passages recognizing Kant's connection of 
a category with a sensory manifold of intuition thereby synthesized, 
one might expect V1eeschauwer to subscribe to our restriction of the 
l See also~., II, 227; III, 153-154, 156-157, 165, 165-166, 
and 166. 
2 Ibid., III, 172. See also ibid., III, 153-154, 154, 1751 and 
192. 
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definition "concept of pure synthesis" to category as schematized. 
But it must be admitted that this expectation is not fulfilled. Vlee-
schauwer recognizes no such terminological preference in Kant nor our 
claim that the synthesis effected in a schematized category is a syn-
thesis of both a pure and specific manifold given in space and time. 
We concede this sadly as further proof that Vleeschauwer is more akin 
to Smith than to Paton and accordingly no close relative on our side. 
We have yet to determine on which side H. W. Cassirer falls. In 
discussing his opinions previously1
1 
we noted that Cassirer differs 
with Kant on several fundamental points. Yet he continues to view 
himself as in considerable agreement with Kant. For example, Cassirer 
makes the broad claim that "both in the Transcendental Deduction and 
in the Analytic of Principles, Kant proceeds along lines which are es-
sentially correct. 112 However, when one examines his evaluations of 
Kant's specific claims, the extent of his disagreement is surprising. 
Hence we find Cassirer insisting against Kant that knowledge 
cannot contain an element of making the reality to be known, saying 
• • • we made the point that knowledge could never 
be allowed to contain an element of making: it is 
inconceivable that the reality to become known should 
have to suffer alteration in the very act of our ac-
quiring knowledge of it.3 
1 On pp. 211-212 above. 
2Kant 1s First Critique, p. 214. See also ibid., pp. 1491 220-
221, 2221 2351 and 241. 
3 Ibid., p. 61. See also ibid., pp. 1441 1451 and 146. 
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Further, Cassirer can be seen recognizing that perceptual knowledge 
requires a priori concepts but denying that they are to be found in 
the list Kant derives with the aid of Aristotelian logic: 
••• we have expressed our sympathy with Kant's sug-
gestion that perceptual consciousness proper requires 
certain a priori concepts which are as such wholly in-
tellectual in character. On the other hand, we have by 
no means conceded to Kant that anything has been proyed 
so far, as regards the particular concepts involved. 
Then we discover to our surprise that cassirer largely ignores the 
Subjective Deduction in B on grounds stated as follows: 
Moreover, while it is, generally speaking, easy enough 
to re-state his position, and to substitute epistemo-
logical terms for psychological ones, I fail to see how 
this could be done at all in the case of the Subjective 
Deduction, and more particularly, ~n the case of Kant's 
theory of the threefold synthesis. 
Such basic disagreements with Kant over his Transcendental De-
duction are formidable despite Cassirer 1 s endorsements and serve to 
prepare us on how our own particular claim will fare with Cassirer. 
Our suggestion is that for Kant a category is considered to be a con-
cept of pure synthesis when it synthesizes a specific manifold of in-
tuition (in both pure and concrete form) given in space and time. 
This we do not find Cassirer recognizing. In surmising why, aside 
from basic disagreement, we are inclined to stress again the limited 
1Ibid., p. 107. See also ibid., pp. 132-133, 223-224, and 235. 
2Ibid., p. 105. See also ibid., p. 124. 
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scope of cassirer's study in his Kant's First Critique, a work making 
no pretension to being a complete summary. More important, we feel, 
is cassirer's studied neglect of the Subjective Deduction in B. This 
portion has given rise to conflicting opinions, undoubtedly, but 
nevertheless was shown above1 both to state and elucidate the view of 
the schematized category we are proposing. Small wonder, since the 
Subjective Deduction in B is completely passed over because of its 
psychological wording, cassirer should not see Kant to speak of a 
schematized category as a concept of pure synthesis. 
We would not infer, though, that Cassirer does not see Kant as 
schematizing the categories. This is far from the case. Cassirer 
actually says that "there is a good deal of sense in Kant's distinc-
tion between pure categories and categories referred to the sense-
given."2 He sees in Kant's distinction the means of bringing to focus 
the error to which rationalistic metaphysicians in their unwarranted 
speculations are prone.3 And cassirer acknowledges that transcendental 
schemata introduce reference to time in the pure categories4 which as 
a whole lack any real content.5 
lon pp. 215-223. 2Kant 1s First Critique, p. 93. 
311lt is the schematized categories which are involved in our con-
sciousness of things. The metaphysician tends to substitute pure cate-
gories for schematized ones. This may seem to serve his purposes very 
well. Yet, in actual fact, the position is that1 once this process of 
abstraction has been carried out, the categories retain only their for-
mal significance, while their real or factual one is made to vanish al-
together" (ibid., p. 94). 
4 See ibid., p. 92. 
5see ibid., pp. 891 2151 220-221, 223-2241 and 226. 
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But these admissions do not deny the fact that Cassirer attaches 
no special meaning to the phrase "concept of pure synthesis." He 
does not recognize that in so speaking of a schematized category Kant 
means one supplied a specific manifold of intuition given in both 
pure and concrete form which it synthesizes in space and time. Cas-
sirer1s attempts to be the constructive critic have not led him to 
see what Paton and I find Kant saying in the Transcendental Analytic 
about categories which are not pure and empty. 
Before proceeding, we pause to summarize the results of survey-
ing the opinions of our chosen four commentators--Smith, Paton, Vlee-
schauwer, and Cassirer. Whereas all four recognize that Kant sche-
matizes the categories, calling for a manifold of human intuition 
supplied in space and time, only Paton sees Kant defining as "concept 
of pure synthesis" the category schematized in terms of a pure and 
concrete manifold. Our contention along these lines, then, has the 
full support of only one authority. It remains to be seen whether we 
are as much alone in our last major claim regarding category in the 
Transcendental Analytic, namely, that Kant also defined a category as 
a concept of an object in general. 
f. Category as Concept of an Object in General 
We wish to contend next that Kant considers a category to be a 
concept of an object in general. This definition we rank with the 
major meanings shown in the Transcendental Analytic so far, namely, 
category as function of judgment, concept of necessary synthetic 
unity, and concept of pure synthesis. Judging alone from the fre-
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quency with which Kant speaks of category as concept of an object in 
general, this definition appears to be one he considered important. 
In searching out the passages in the Transcendental Analytic 
where category is spoken of as concept of an object in general1 once 
more we find ourselves embarrassed with riches. We are again forced 
to settle for presenting certain passages of particular clarity and 
merely citing t he large remainder. Accordingly, we quote t he follow-
ing passages as showing how Kant views a category to be a concept of 
an object in general. We do so prior to our own exposition of what 
Kant means by such a definition. Consider first, then1 t hese quota-
tions: 
1. The question now arises whether a priori concepts 
do not also serve as antecedent conditions under 
which alone anything can be1 if not intuited, yet 
thought as object in general . In that case all 
empirical knowledge of objects would necessarily 
conform to such concepts, because only as thus 
presupposing them is anything possible as object 
of experience. (A93=Bl25-126) 
2. Now all experience does indeed contain, in addition 
to the intuition of the senses through which some-
thing is given, a concept of an object as being 
thereby given, that is to say1 as appearing. Con-
cepts of objects in general thus underlie all em-
pirical knowledge as its a priori conditions . The 
objective validity of the categories as a priori 
concepts res t s, therefore, on the fact that1 so far 
as the form of thought is concerned, through them 
alone does experience become possible. They relate 
of necessity and a priori to objects of experience, 
for the reason that only by means of them can any 
object whatsoever of experience be thought . (A93= 
Bl26) 
3. But first I shall introduce a word of explanation 
in regard to the categories . They are concepts of 
an object in genera11 by means of which the intui-
tion of an object is regarded as determined in 
respect of one of the logical functions of judg-
ment. (Bl28) 
4. The concepts which thus contain a priori the pure 
thought involved in every experience, we find in 
the categories. If we can prove that by their 
means alone an object can be thought, this will 
be a sufficient deduction of them, and will justi-
fy their objective validity. (A96-97) 
5. They [the categories] are fundamental concepts by 
which we think objects in general for appearances, 
and have therefore a priori objective validity. 
(Alll) 
6. To think an object and to know an object are thus 
by no means the same thing:--Knowledge involves 
two factors: first, the concept, through which an 
object in general is thought (the category); and 
secondly, the intuition, through which it is given. 
For if no intuition could be given corresponding 
to the concept, the concept would still indeed be 
a thought, so far as its form is concerned, but 
would be without any object, and no knowledge of 
anything would be possible by means of it. (Bl46) 
7. Now, as the Aesthetic has shown, the only intui-
tion possible to us is sensible; consequently, 
the thought of an object in general, by means of a 
pure concept of understanding, can become knowledge 
for us only in so far as the concept is related to 
objects of the senses. (Bl46-147) 
8. [Concerning the categories] in the transcendental 
deduction we have shown their possibility as a 
priori modes of knowledge of objects of an intui-
tion in general (cf. §§201 21). We have now to ex-
plain the possibility of knowing a priori, by means 
of categories, whatever objects may present them-
selves to our senses, not indeed in respect of the 
form of their intuition, but in respect of the laws 
of their combination, and so, as it were, of pre-
scribing laws to nature, and even of making nature 
possible. For unless the categories discharged 
this function, there could be no explaining why every-
thing that can be presented to our senses must be 
subject to laws which have their origin a priori in 
the understanding alone. (Bl59-160) 
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9. The possibility of experience is, then what 
gives objective reality to all our a priori 
modes of knowledge. Experience, however, rests 
on the synthetic unity of appearances, that is, 
on a synthesis according to concepts of an ob-
ject of appearances in general. (Al56:Bl95) 
10. I cannot think it [the transcendental object] 
through any category; for a category is valid 
for empirical intuition, as bringing it under a 
concept of object in general. A pure use of the 
category is possible, that is, without contra-
diction; but it has no objective validity, 
since the category is not then being applied to 
any intuition so as to impart to it the unity of 
an object. For the category is a mere function 
of thought, through which no object is given to 
me, and by which I merely think that which may 
be given in intuition. (A253) 
11. The categories accordingly extend further than 
sensible intuition, since they think objects in 
general, without f~gard to the special mode (the 
sensibility) in which they may be given. But 
they do not thereby determine a greater sphere 
of objects. (A254=B309) 
12. As the categories are the only concepts which re-
fer to objects in general, the distinguishing of 
an object, whether it is something or nothing, 
will proceed according to the order and under the 
guidance of the categories. (A290:B346) 
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In addition to these twelve passages which we consider specially 
instructive, we cite eighteen others in the Transcendental Analytic. 
In them also we see Kant saying or implying that a category is a 
concept of an object in general. This occurs in portions of the 
Analytic designated as 
A79=Bl041 A88=Bl20, A92=Bl251 A92-93:Bl25, Bl251 Al061 
Bl46, Bl47-1481 Bl481 Bl54, Bl58, Bl65, A2451 A247-248= 
B304, A248-249 1 A251 1 A253=B309 1 and A283-284=B340. 
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It is obvious that there is need for some connected statement 
of what is implied by these various statements in different portions 
of the Analytic. Grouping them under a heading has limited value in 
explaining what Kant means. We next provide some explanation, taking 
our cue from preceding portions of this chapter. 
We have found it instructive to restate the argument in portions 
of the Transcendental Analytic which particularly illustrate the 
definitions of category we discern. Thus we restated1 the argument 
of the Metaphysical Deduction to show how category is considered a 
function of judgment. Then we presented2 the thought of Kant's pro-
visional exposition of the Transcendental Deduction in A as showing 
how he also considered ~ category to be a concept of necessary syn-
thetic unity. Next, in considering how Kant defines a category as 
concept of pure synthesis, we restated3 the so-called Subjective De-
duction4 in B. 
Now in seeking to elucidate what Kant means by category defined 
as concept of an object in general, we wish to restate what is called 
the Objective Deduction in B. This portion of the Analytic located 
in Bl29-146 contains many of the passages we have quoted or cited 
above in this section, and it serves well to bring out the range of 
implications Kant packed into the phrase "category as concept of an 
1on pp. 181-188 above. 
3on pp. 216-221 above. 
2on pp. 202-205 above. 
4see p. 189n. above for the justification of this designation. 
object in general." Hence, we consider next what Kant says in his 
Objective Deduction comprising the first half1 of his restatement 
of the Transcendental Deduction2 in B. 
Kant begins his Objective Deduction by claiming in Bl29 that 
synthesis of the manifold of ~ntuition is necessary for knowledge 
of objects and is due to the understanding. All synthesis is an 
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act of the mind and cannot be ascribed to sense, which is passive. 
Synthesis also may be of various kin~ either of pure or empirical 
intuitions or of concepts. Furthermore, we may or may not be con-
scious of the act of synthesis. But in all cases, the synthesis is 
an act of the understanding, and this seems to imply that it is an 
act of judgment. In the case of a given manifold of intuition, the 
act of synthesis must be one act if it is to unite the manifold, and 
it must be the same act regardless of the differences in the manifold 
united. Analysis always presupposes it, though it is supposed to be 
its opposite, because we cannot analyze anything unless we are hold-
ing it together before the mind. Synthesis also involves not only 
the unity of the act of synthesis but also the unity of the manifold 
synthesized. 
Every judgment, therefore, is a synthesis not only of concepts 
but also of the manifold thought under these concepts. In every 
judgment we think that the manifold is united or combined in accord-
1In Bl29-146. 
2The second half is the Subjective Deduction in Bl46-169. 
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ance with the concepts used. The unity of the manifold, consequently, 
is thought in every judgment so far as it gives us knowledge of ob-
jects. This unity, though, is not the blank material unity thought 
in the category of unity. It is a synthetic unity of different ele-
ments and is involved in every form of judgment; for in them we think 
the unity of different concepts and consequently of the manifold con-
ceived under these concepts. The manifold has to be united in accord-
ance with all the categories, and its synthetic unity is to be sought 
not merely in one category or in one form of judgment but in the ul-
timate ground of all judgment and thought. 
Hence, Kant's first step in his Objective Deduction has been to 
observe that synthesis of the manifold of intuition is necessary for 
knowledge of objects and is due to the understanding. The next stage 
of the argument seen in Bl31-136 is to contend that the unity of ap-
perception is necessary for synthesis of the manifold of intuition and 
is itself impossible apart from such a synthesis. It is Kant's con-
tention that the ultimate ground of all judgment and thought is pure 
or original apperception. This is described as an act of spontaneity 
and identified with the idea "I think" which must be able to accom-
pany all my ideas, though Kant also describes it as that self-con-
sciousness which produces the idea "I think." The reason why the 
"I think" must be able to accompany all my ideas is that otherwise 
they would not be ideas of anything or would not be ideas of any ob-
ject. Unless my ideas are ideas belonging to one and the same self-
consciousness, they could not produce unity and so be ideas of objects 
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in one objective world. It is this fact which enables Kant to say 
that although intuitions are ideas which can be given prior to all 
thought, they still have a necessary relation to pure apperception. 
The latter involves self-consciousness, at least potentially. It is 
consciousness of the act of thinking in abstraction from the matter 
of thought and is thus distinguished from empirical apperception. 
Pure apperception is also original and not derivative, producing the 
idea "I think" which is one and the same in all consciousness and 
must be able to accompany all my ideas, though not derived from any 
of them. Kant also believes that the unity of apperception is tran-
scendental in being the ultimate condition of knowledge, and that it 
is the source of further a priori knowledge. 
So far Kant has pointed out that if ideas are to be ideas of an 
object, they must be united in one potentially self-conscious think-
ing, that is, be related to the unity of apperception. This relation-
ship is now looked at from the other side in Bl33 with Kant's conten-
tion that the unity of apperception is itself impossible apart from 
synthesis of the given manifold and consciousness of this synthesis. 
The unity of apperception and the unity of the manifold, therefore, 
mutually condition one another. The unity of apperception is the 
condition of the possibility of knowledge. But it is not to be found 
in the fact that every idea is accompanied by consciousness. It is 
to be found, rather, in the fact that I add one idea to another and 
am conscious of this act of synthesis. It is only because I can com-
bine the manifold of ideas in one consciousness that I can represent 
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to myself the identity of consciousness in these ideas. The conclu-
sion which Kant reaches in Bl34 is that the synthetic unity of apper-
ception is the ground of the necessary synthetic unity of the mani-
fold, and vice versa. The synthetic unity of apperception, however, 
is actually ultimate or original, since the synthetic unity of the 
manifold is not given in or through the objects. Synthesis for Kant 
is the condition of that analysis which is involved in conception as 
such, and so in judgment. This means that the synthetic unity of 
apperception is the ultimate condition of all knowledge, including 
logic and transcendental philosophy . 
Kant has argued so far in the Objective Deduction that synthesis 
of the manifold of intuition due to understanding is necessary for 
knowledge of objects and that the unity of apperception is necessary 
for synthesis of the manifold. He has now to draw the obvious con-
clusion that the synthetic unity of apperception is the condition 
of knowledge of objects. He begins the passage in Bl36-139 with the 
usual introduction. Understanding, Kant then defines, is a power or 
faculty of knowing, and knowledge always involves a determinate re-
lation of our ideas to an object. An object is that in the concept 
of which the manifold of a given intuition is united. Our intuitions, 
pure as well as empirical, must be united or synthesized if they are 
to be intuitions of an object, and such union or synthesis is impos-
sible apart from the unity of apperception. Consequently, the syn-
thetic unity of apperception is the condition under which alone ideas 
can have reference to an object. It constitutes the objective validity 
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of ideas. The synthetic unity of apperception, accordingly, is the 
condition of all knowledge, and the possibility of the understanding 
itself depends on it. 
The next development of the Objective Deduction in B deals with 
an objection. In Bl39-l40, a short but difficult section, Kant claims 
that the unity of apperception is an objective unity involving the 
unity of the object known and one which must be distinguished from a 
merely subjective unity which ideas have because they happen to be 
associated in our minds. Kant's argument is that the transcendental 
unity of apperception is an objective unity because it is the source 
of unity in objects. 
The next stage in the argument of the Objective Deduction fol-
lows from what has preceded. Kant contends in Bl40-142 that the syn-
thesis of the manifold of intuition under the unity of apperception--
a synthesis essential to our knowledge of objects--takes place by 
means of judgment. Here he is concerned with the logical form of 
judgments and attempts to connect the Transcendental Deduction with 
what has been said on this subject in the Metaphysical Deduction. He 
refuses to define judgment as the idea of a relation between two con-
cepts. Such a definition has two faults, in his opinion. It refers, 
in the first place, only to categorical judgments, and, secondly, it 
fails to indicate the nature of the relation. Ideas may be related 
by mere association in the mind, and certainly this is not judgment. 
The first fault in this definition Kant corrects by substituting 
"cognitions" for "concepts." "Cognitions" is a general word cover-
ing both concepts and judgments. It is preferable because hypotheti-
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cal and disjunctive judgments assert a relation of judgments, not of 
concepts. The second fault he corrects by insisting that the rela-
tion asserted in judgment is an objective relation. Judgment is the 
way or manner to bring cognitions to the objective unity of appercep-
tion. When I say, "This body is heavy," I am not saying merely that 
two ideas are associated in my mind or have been frequently given 
together in intuition. I am saying that they are connected in the 
object regardless of what my state of mind may be. This is what is 
meant by the copula "is"; it distinguishes the objective unity from 
the subjective. The objective unity of ideas is the unity of ideas 
in an object. This unity involves necessity, but it must not be 
thought that the necessity is to be found in the ideas themselves as 
these are given in empirical intuition. The necessity is imposed 
upon them by the nature of thought. Such ideas belong to one another 
not in themselves but in virtue of the necessary unity of appercep-
tion in the synthesis of intuitions. This implies that such ideas 
belong to one another, or are combined with one another, in accord-
ance with certain principles which are necessary for knowledge of 
objects. These principles are derived from the unity of appercep-
tion. Since apperception is understanding, and understanding is the 
power or faculty of judgment, these p~inciples are based on the forms 
of judgment, which are the ways in which given ideas are necessarily 
combined by thought. 
In §20 found in Bl43 Kant sets forth the essence of the Objec-
tive Deduction. The manifold of every intuition must be subject to 
the synthetic unity of apperception. Only thus can the intuition have 
the unity necessary for it to be an intuition of an object. Judgment 
is the act whereby the manifold of all given intuitions and concepts 
is brought under the unity of apperception. Therefore, all the mani-
fold, so far as it is given in one intuition, is determined by judg-
ment and consequently determined in relation to one of the forms of 
judgment. The categories are the forms of judgment so far as the 
manifold is determined in relation to these forms. Hence, the mani-
fold of given intuition must be subject to the categories, if the 
intuition is to have the unity which is necessary for it to be in-
tuition of an object. The categories thus necessarily apply to all 
objects given in sensory intuition. They are objectively valid, and 
this is what the Objective Deduction had to prove.l 
Our restatement should make clear that . the Objective Deduction 
is aimed primarily at showing that the categories have application 
to given intuition and not at presenting their formal definition. 
However, the tenor of the Objective Deduction shows the justification 
for defining a category as a concept of an object in general. Kant 
has led us to believe that experience upon analysis reveals not only 
given intuitions but also the concept of an object. It is the latter 
which makes a series of intuited sensations into an experience. For 
when we have experience, our intuitions of color, shape, size, etc. 
are always thought as intuitions of some thing or object. 
1The last section of the Objective Deduction covers Bl44-146 
and is devoted to restating Kant's conclusion and reviewing the ar-
gument as a whole. 
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Accordingly, we may say with Kant that the concept of an object 
in general is necessarily present in our experience. Kant also con-
tends that the concept of an object in general necessarily involves 
a variety of different concepts. For example, to be an object in-
volves possessing quantity and quality, involves being a permanent 
substance interacting causally with other substances, and so on. 
Thus, we may speak of the concept of an object in general differen-
tiating itself into concepts of an object in general, just as judg-
ment differentiates itself into the forms of judgment. These concepts 
of an object in general are the categories. 
If, then, the concept of an object in general is necessary for 
experience, and if this concept differentiates itself in an a priori 
manner into the categories, the objective validity of the categories 
is established; since it is through them alone that experience of 
objects is possible. Every object to be an object of experience must 
be thought by means of the categories. The latter thus render experi-
ence possible but only as concerns the form of thought, not the form 
of intuition or given matter. 
From this perspective, therefore, the categories make the object 
possible in the sense that they enable us to have experience, or knowl-
edge of the object as an object. Our epistemological situation is 
such that we must think the object by means of the categories, if it 
be known by us. In so doing our thinking imposes upon the object 
certain categorial characteristics which the object as object known 
by us must have. In this manner it is possible for us to have a priori 
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knowledge of objects by means of the categories. Furthermore, because 
thinking imposes these characteristics upon objects, the objects known 
are not things as they are in themselves but rather are things as they 
must appear to human minds, which are able to know objects by combin-
ing sense and thought. 
In this portion of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant has been oc-
cupied with questioning how the categories of human understanding can 
apply to an object given to intuition which is independent of thought. 
His first reply, found in the Objective Deduction of B, is that the 
categories must apply if any object is to be known.l Appropriately, 
then, a category may be defined as the concept of an object in general. 
Keeping to our pattern, we next inquire whether our four commen-
tators would admit this. Do Smith1 Paton, Vleeschauwer, and Cassirer 
recognize that Kant also defined a category as a concept of an object 
in general? So far we have found Smith both agreeing and disagreeing 
with our interpretations . He recognizes that Kant does connect the 
categories with the functions of judgment2 and with necessary syn-
thetic unity3 but only with reservations agrees that a schematized 
category is a concept of pure synthesis4 Qualified acquiescence is 
again the conclusion when determining Smith's opinion of our fourth 
1How the categories do apply is what Kant considers in the Sub-
jective Deduction of B and in the chapters devoted to Schematism and 
Principles of Understanding. 
2As we noted on p. 197 above. 
3see p. 206 above. 4see p. 224 above. 
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and final claim about category in the Transcendental Analytic. 
Smith makes statements in his Commentary which convey the im-
pression that Kant did not define a category to be a concept of an 
object in general. Thus one may find Smith interpreting Kant to as-
sert that "· •• the pure forms of understanding ••• are not in-
tellectual concepts of objects"l and saying that 
The categories can no longer be viewed, in the manner 
of the Dissertation, as yielding concepts of objects. 
• • • the categories are recognized as being of an al-
together relational character. Though a priori, they 
are not, in and by themselves, complete objects of 
consciousness, and accordingly can reveal no object. 
They are functions, not contents.2 
But actually it is incorrect to say that Norman Kemp Smith dif-
fers fundamentally with our contention. Despite these statements, 
he recognizes that Kant identified a schematized category with the 
concept of an object. The evidence for this we find in several places 
in Smith's Commentary, such as the following: 
1. Since the argument of the [transcendental] deduc-
tion has shown that judgment is the indispensable 
instrument both for reducing a manifold to the 
unity of apperception and also for conferring upon 
representations a relation to an object, it follows 
that the categories which are simply the possible 
1 Commentary, p. 326. 
2Ibid., p. 191. See also ibid., p. 410, where Smith says, "The 
pure categories are, Kant declares, incapable of yielding the concept 
of an object. Apart from the data of sense, they are altogether lack-
ing in content or meaning." 
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functions of unity in judgment are valid for any 
and every consciousness that is sensuously con-
ditioned and whose knowledge is therefore acquired 
through synthesis of a given manifold. Though such 
consciousness may not intuit in terms of space and 
time, it must none the less apprehend objects in 
terms of the categories. The categories thus ex-
tend to objects of sensuous intuition in general. 
They are not, however, valid of objects as such, 
that is, of things in themselves. As empty rela-
tional forms they have meaning only in reference 
to a given matter; and as instruments for the 
reduction of variety to the unity of apperception 
their validity has been ~roved only for conscious 
and sensuous experience. 
2. When these conditions [of sensibility] are omitted, 
the categories are without relation to any object 
and consequently without meaning. They are no 
longer concepts of possible empirical employment, 
but only of "things in general." •• • In abstrac-
tion from sense data, the categories still remain 
as concepts or thoughts, logically possible; but 
that is not to be taken as signifying that they 
still continue to possess meaning, !·~· reference 
to an object.2 
3. Kant insists more strongly than in the first 
edition upon the unknowableness of the self, and on 
the difference between thought and knowledge. The 
pure forms of thought are not, Kant now declares, 
concepts of objects, that is, are not categories, 
but merely logical functions.3 
It is statements such as these as well as others4 that show Smith 
to recognize a Kantian category as a concept of an object. We ad-
mit, thought, that he does not emphasize this definition to the de-
gree we consider required. 
1Ibid., pp. 290-291. 
3Ibid., p. 467. 
2Ibid., pp. 404-405. 
4see also ibid., pp. 2501 3421 4081 and 415-416. 
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We have no such reservations when it comes to whether or not 
Paton considers Kant to define a category as a concept of a thing 
in general. Paton assuredly does, and we again are encouraged by 
such distinguished support. There ,are1 in fact, numerous statements 
in Kant's Metaphysic of Experience which corroborate our claim. Once 
more, though, we content ourselves with quoting some passages and cit-
ing the rest. Paton, then, unmistakably endorses the claim that Kant 
defines a category as a concept of an object in general in the follow-
ing passages : 
1. These pure concepts of the understanding are called 
"categories." They are a priori in the sense of be-
ing necessary and universal. If concepts are proper-
ly called categories, they must apply to all objects 
without exception; and to speak as if categories 
could apply to some objects, and not to others, is a 
contradiction in terms.l 
2. This is why they [the categories] are said to contain 
the form of thinking of an object in general. Indeed 
we shall find that they may be called concepts of an 
object in general.2 
3 . Kant believes that it is impossible to have a priori 
knowledge of the universal and necessary character 
of things, if we suppose these things to be things-
in-themselves. We can have a priori knowledge by 
means of the categories, only if the categories are 
due to the nature of the mind and are imposed by the 
mind on the objects which it knows. Kant's meta-
physic therefore, while retaining many of the ideals 
of the older metaphysics, ceases to be a speculative 
metaphysic concerned with reality as such. It becomes 
instead a Metaphysic of Experience and is concerned 
with the universal and necessary characteristics of 
1Kant 1 s Metaphysic of Experience, I 1 pp. 225-226. 
2Ibid. 1 I 1 225n. 
objects of experience, so far as they are objects 
of experience. Hence for him the categories are 
pure concepts, not of a thing in general, but of 
"an object in general."! 
4. The question now arises whether there may be pure 
concepts or categories which, although they are 
not (like space and time) conditions under which 
alone anything can be intuited, are nevertheless 
conditions under which alone anything can be 
thought as an object in general. If thought as 
well as intuition is necessary for knowledge or 
experience of an object, and if there are certain 
conditions or forms necessary to such thought, 
then our empirical knowledge of objects must con-
form to these conditions of thought as well as to 
the conditions imposed by our sensibility; for 
unless it did so, there could not be such a thing 
as an object of experience.2 
5. No doubt we have had ••• many hints that cate-
gories are concepts of an object in general. In 
particular the conclusion of the Metaphysical De-
duction was that the categories apply a priori to 
objects, and that through them alone can we think 
an object of intuition. Nevertheless the exposi-
tion would have gained greatly in clarity, if Kant 
had asserted explicitly that the categories must 
therefore be regarded as concepts of an object in 
general.3 
6. • •• the categories are pure concepts whose con-
tent is the conditions (or forms) of the thought 
necessary to experience; and so all objects must 
conform to the categories. The essential charac-
ter of any and every object as an object of experi-
ence is this conformity with the categories: its 
character as an object of a particular kind (such 
as a house or a table) is determined by the nature 
of intuitions given in space and time. The cate-
gories are therefore concepts of objects in general 
(not concepts of a particular kind of object), and 
they must apply to all objects, or in other words 
they must have objective reality; for apart from 
conformity to them there can be no object--in the 
strict sense--at all.4 
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1 Ibid., I, 257-258. 2Ibid., I, 339-340. 3Ibid., I, 341-342. 
4rbid., I, 431. 
7. • •• the categories are the necessary forms of 
thought in which the unity of apperception is 
manifested. As Kant says, they constitute the 
thought of an object in general: they are indeed 
concepts of the combination of a manifold of in-
tuition in general in one act of apperception, 
and it is this combination which constitutes the 
essential nature of an object qua object. But in 
themselves the categories do not give us knowl-
edge of any object. To know an object different 
from myself, I require more than the concept of 
an object in general (which I think in the cate-
gories): I require also an outer spatial intui-
tion to give content and determination to my con-
cept.l 
8. This does not prevent us from recognizing that 
every pure category is a form of judgment con-
sidered as determining the combination of a mani-
fold of intuition in general, and so as the con-
cept of an object in general. Kant would have 
made the Kritik much easier to understand, if he 
had given this explanation at the beginning of 
the Analytic, instead of at the end. He himself 
does so, if not too clearly, in the second edi-
tion.2 
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In addition to these passages, there are numerous other state-
ments in Kant's Metaphysic of Experience where Paton also recognizes 
that Kant defines a category as a concept of an object in general. 
These statements we find on the following pages: 
Volume I: pp. 51, 193n., 225n., 259 1 287, 304, 326n., 
329, 3321 341n., 342-343, 342n., 343n., 384n., 392n., 
3961 396n., 417n., 472, 501 1 533; Volume II: pp. 43n., 
3921 437, 444, 446n., 4471 and 456. 
Paton's decided emphasis on this definition of category leaves nothing 
to be desired from our viewpoint. 
1Ibid., II, 402-403. 2Ibid., II, 434-435. 
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The third of our four authorities being consulted is Herman J. 
de Vleeschauwer. So far we have had his support on two of our major 
claims but not on the third. We have shown how he recognizes that 
Kant defined the categories in terms of functions of judgmentl and 
of necessary synthetic unity. 2 But we were unable to claim Vlee-
schauwer for our side when it came to contending that Kant defines a 
schematized category as a concept of pure synthesis.3 We are pleased 
now to note that once more we have his backing. Vleeschauwer makes 
many statements in his commentary which sanction the notion that for 
Kant a category also may be defined as a concept of an object in 
general. Witness the following passages we select from a lengthy 
list: 
1. • •• a category is not an empty form or a pure 
function, for it determines the essence of an ob-
ject in general. It represents in sum the object 
in its necessary, eternal, invariable structure, 
while the actual diversity, which determines the 
~pir~cal object, is contingent, transitory, rela-
t1ve. 
2. In spite of several divergent text~ the categories 
ought to be conceived in reality as concepts of 
objects, but concepts of objects considered as 
1 
a priori synthetic functions of the understanding 
and not as borrowed or abstracted from what we com-
monly call external reality. They are intellectual 
functions which are the laws of the constitution of 
objects of knowledge.S 
On pp. 198-199 above. 2on pp. 210-211 above. 
3see pp. 227-232 above. 
41a D~duction Transcendentale, II, 136 (my translation). 
5rbid. 1 II, 141. 
3. • •• the concept of an object "in general" is the 
definition of the category.l 
4. • •• the category is the concept of an object in 
general which determines the corresponding intui-
tion by relation to a logical, judging function.2 
5. Let us consider a moment the category separated 
from all content. What does it represent? Nothing 
more than the form of unity in accordance with which 
the understanding represents to itself an object in 
general, consequently, a form of thought or a syn-
thetic function.3 
In addition, we find similar passages on the following pages 
of La D~duction Transcendentale: 
Volume I: p. 236; Volume II: pp. 971 134-1351 1361 
1411 1421 189; Volume III: pp. 161 25n., 731 821 831 
151, 161, 164, 164-165, 186, 188, 189-190, 229, 230, 
3371 3521 4721 and 580. 
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In view of all these statements, it appears quite warranted to claim 
that Vleeschauwer sees Kant considering a category to be a concept 
of an object in general. 
Whether H. W. Cassirer does is the question next to be answered. 
Up to this point his support for our claims has been similar to Vlee-
schauwer's. With the latter, Cassirer recognizes Kant's connection 
of category with functions of judgment4 and with necessary synthetic 
unity.5 And like Vleeschauwer also, Cassirer does not see that Kant 
libid., II, 293. 
4see p. 199 above. 
2Ibid. 1 III, 82. 
3Ibid. 1 III, 165. 
5see pp. 212-214 above. 
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defined a schematized category as a concept of pure synthesis.l The 
question to ask now is whether he follows Vleeschauwer in admitting 
that Kant defines a category as a concept of an object in general. 
Our answer is a qualified yes. For the affirmative aspect we 
point to some fairly explicit statements in Cassirer's book. Spe-
cifically, we mean where cassirer states that "our understanding is 
said throughout to bestow only one characteristic upon the given, 
viz., that of being an object in general,"2 refers to nKant's descrip-
tion of the categories as concepts required by the mind if it is to 
become conscious of objects as objects,"3 and claims that the funda-
mental idea underlying the categories is "that of an object in gen-
eral.114 
However, we must qualify Cassirer 1s supposed endorsement of our 
claim. We need to note that he does not use the specific terminology 
we are stressing. He prefers other ways of describing the objectify-
ing function of category expressed in the above definition. Consider 
the different modes of expression in the following passages: 
1. consciousness of the objective is essentially 
a function of the intellect. Now the human intellect 
is a faculty of mere thought. It is discursive and 
not intuitive; and t his is why it can express itself 
in no other way than by the formation of concepts. 
We have every right to presume, therefore, that the 
general criteria of objectivity required by knowledge 
will have to be a special set of concepts, to be en-
titled pure concepts of understanding or categories.5 
1see pp. 233-235 above. 2Kant 1 s First Critique, p. 61. 
3
rbid. 4Ibid., p. 219. 5Ibid., p. 57. 
2. • •• no awareness of objects can come about in 
percipient subjects, unless they impose the cate-
gories upon what is sensibly presented to them; 
and this is how we know that the a priori concepts 
of understanding have, of necessityi to be exhib-
ited by every object of experience. 
3. For it is the categories alone which can provide 
us with the means of laying down reliable criteria 
of objectivity, so that we should be enabled to 
distinguish conditions in which sense-presentations 
are to be considered wholly private impressions from 
those in which such presentations may be thought of 
as manifestations of a real object.2 
4. • •• the human mind has recourse to the categories, 
in order that they may serve as criteria of objec-
tive reality.3 
5 . so long as the a priori functions of under-
standing are ignored, and we concentrate solely upon 
what constitutes the element of givenness in percep-
tual knowledge, the mind is considered on a level 
where any consciousness of the objective is excluded.4 
6. we have expressed our agreement with his 
[Kant's] view that sense-experience cannot be satis-
factorily accounted for except on the assumption that 
the human intelligence gives rise to certain a priori 
concepts, by means of which what is, in the first in-
stance, not properly recognized at all is transplanted 
into something lending itself to being described in 
objective terms. Our capacity for becoming aware of 
the objective results from the fact that the given is 
approached under the guidance of certain general prin-
ciples basing themselves upon a number of a priori 
concepts which are evolved by the mind in an entirely 
spontaneous manner.5 
7. The fundamental functions of discursive understanding, 
i.e. the categories, are concepts which lay down the 
conditions of objectivity in genera1.6 
8. . . • we went on to argue that perceptual knowledge 
1Ibid., p. 60. 2rbid. 1 p. 62. 
3
rbid., p. 89. 
4rbid., p. 133. 5rbid., p . 214. 6rbid., p. 229. 
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involved, apart from sensation, a factor of in-
telligent interpretation, and that intelligence, 
in addition to its other uses, had the function 
of evolving certain a priori concepts which might 
serve as criteria of objectivity in general.l 
These statements as well as others in Kant's First Critique2 
which we will not quote reveal Cassirer's preference for speaking 
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of the categories as "criteria of objectivity," "criteria of objec-
tive reality," using variants other than "concept of an object in 
general." But such a difference is merely a matter of terminology. 
It should not obscure the fact Cassirer sees as we do that Kant held 
category to be indispensable for humans to have experience or knowl-
edge of an object as an object. We are agreed that Kant claimed the 
categories must apply if any object is to be known. Cassirer, in 
his modern restatement, simply does not put this in the form of say-
ing that Kant defined a category as a concept of an object in general. 
Nevertheless, we would not leave the false impression that Cas-
sirer does not disagree fundamentally with many of Kant's claims, in-
eluding those about category. We have tried to underscore their dis-
agreements previously3 and attempt once more by quoting two other pas-
sages. First, discussing the Transcendental Deduction, Cassirer says, 
It makes good sense to say that any and every sensible 
manifold which is made subject to judgment, and which, 
1
.!E!!!., p. 233. 
2Found on pp. 601 62 1 75-761 83-84, 931 108, 1321 146, 147, 173, 
175, 177, 215 1 and 224. 
3 See pp. 211-212 and 232-235 above. 
in being judged, is recognized as representing some-
thing objective, is nothing more, in the last analysis, 
than simply a complex of presentations brought before the 
unity of consciousness . However, once one goes a step 
further, and supposes that such an account of sensible 
realities contains everything that is to be said about 
them, one finds oneself committed to a most unplausible 
view, namely, that the real is by itself completely 
disorderly and chaotic: a view which would have the 
objectionable implication that, if unity and orderliness 
are displayed by the sense-given, this is solely because 
they have been introduced into reality by the human mind, 
which, by virtue of transcendental apperception and the 
various rules of synthesis deriving from it, bestows an 
orderly structure upon that which as such is wholly un-
organized . l 
In his chapter on "The Principle of Substance,'' cassirer states, 
Our contention is that consciousness of objects as ob-
jects presupposes the a priori concept of thinghood. 
This does not imply that, in having recourse to this con-
cept, the mind imposes a characteristic upon sensible pre-
sentations which they would not otherwise possess, or that 
we can be sure, prior to experience, that such objects 
will be encountered. Yet it seems to us that, should the 
relation constituting thinghood be actually manifested in 
sensible phenomena, it can be discovered by the mind, only 
on condition that, under the guidance of the concept of ' 
thinghood, it is on the look-out for the relation in ques-
tion. • • • we consider the principle of thinghood to be 
nothing more than a rule of direction, laying it down that 
sense-presentations are to be approached in a special way, 
and that a certain question is to be asked concerning them. 2 
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The differences separating Cassirer and Kant as shown by these 
quotations are apparent . We conclude by repeating that, despite such 
differences, cassirer recognizes Kant to ascribe an objectifying func-
tion to category. Th~s fact we see expressed in Kant's definition of 
category as concept of an object in general. 
1Kant 1 s First Critique, p. 76. 
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3. Elsewhere in the Critique of Pure Reason 
Our next undertaking is to examine the remainder of the Critique 
of Pure Reason. This means considering those portions of A and B 
which Kant titled the Preface, 1 Introduction,2 Transcendental Aes-
thetic,3 Transcendental Dialectic,4 and Transcendental Doctrine of 
Method.s We need to determine whether Kant referred to category with 
the variety of terms and meanings used in the Transcendental Analytic. 
Most important of all, we must discover whether he anticipated and 
adhered to the four main definitions of category we have witnessed in 
the Analytic. 
It may be recalled that we first surveyed Kant's usage regarding 
category in the Transcendental Analytic before going on to an exposi-
tion of his main meanings for the term. This survey, occupying pp. 155-
180 above, was reported with the aid of five tables . 6 The complexity 
of this presentation was due to the high frequency and variations with 
which Kant speaks of the categories in the Analytic. Now that we are 
beyond the Analytic and dealing with material in which our subject is 
presumably not so central, a simpler presentation seems desirable. Ac-
cordingly, we will present only one table listing all our findings on 
Kant's usage elsewhere in the Critique . Then we will pass judgment on 
1Avii=Bvii--Axxii=Bxliv. 2Al=Bl--Al6:B30. 
3Al9=B33--A49=B73 . 4A293=B349--A704=B732. 
5A705=B733--A856=B884. 
6Found on pp . 1561 1581 161, 162-1631 and 164-165 above. 
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whether the meanings expressed in his four chief definitions may be 
seen in the Critique outside of the Analytic. 
We find Kant referring to category in the Critique of Pure Reason 









concepts of understanding (Verstandesbegriffe)l 
pure concepts of understanding (reinen Ver-
standesbegriffe)2 
concepts of the understanding (Begrtffe des 
Verstandes)3 
pure concepts of the understanding (reinen Be-
griffe des Verstandes)4 
concepts of the pure understanding (Begriffe des 
reinen Verstandes)S 
elementary concepts of the understanding (Ele-








~xxv, Bxxvii1 Bxxxviii1 A299=B356, A310:B3661 A3ll=B367, A320: 
B3771 A326=B383, A335=B3921 A338=B396 (2 instances), A4031 B431, 
A409=B435 1 A486=B514 (3 instances), A489=B517, A499=B527, A529=B5571 
A530:B558, A567=B595 1 A644=B672, A665=B693 (2 instances), A674=B702, 
A678=B706, A68l=B709 1 A736-737=B764~765, A762=B7901 and A854=B882. 
2Axvi, Bxxviii, A63=B88, A3ll:B3~8, A327=B3831 A369 1 A416=B444 (2 instances), A515=B5431 A525=B553, A567=B595, and A725=B753. 
3Al9=B331 A22=B36 1 A305=B362, A313=B3701 A529=B5571 A583=B611 1 A648=B676, A664=B6921 A665=B693, and A783=B811. 
4A320:B377, A408=B435, and A547=B575. 
6Bxxiin. 
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concepts (Begriffe)l 16 
a priori concepts (Begriffe a priori)2 6 
pure concepts (reinen Begriffe)3 2 
pure a priori concepts (reinen Begriffe a priori)4 1 
pure intellectual concepts (reinen intellectuel1en 
Begriffe)S 1 
original concepts (ursprUnglichen Begriffe)6 1 
fundamental concepts (Stammbegriffe)7 1 
rules (Regeln)8 4 
rules of understanding (Verstandesregeln)9 1 
rules of the understanding (Regeln des verstandes)lO 2 
general rules of thought (allgemeinen Re~eln des 
Denkens)ll 1 
universal and necessary rules of the understand-
ing (allgemeinen und notwendigen Regeln des 
Verstandes)l2 1 
laws of the understanding (Gesetze des Verstandes)13 6 
1 BS, A3::B6, B23, Al9=B33, A22=B36, A5l=B75, A305=B362, A329= 
B385, A48l=B509, A678=B706, A679=B707 (3 instances), A737=B765 (2 in-
stances), and A845=B873. 
2Axvi, Bxvii, Bxviii, Al4=B28, A720=B748, and A748=B756. 
3A5l=B75 (2 instances). 4A32l=B377• 
8 A302=B359, A306=B363, A648=B676, and A720:B748. 
9A295=B352. 10Bxvii and A415=B442. 11A59=B84. 
12A59=B83-84. 
13A56=B801 A57=B81, A59=B84, A294=B350 (3 instances). 
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phrase used times used 
20. laws of understanding (Verstandesgesetze)l 1 
21. cognitions (Erkenntnisse)2 1 
22. a priori cognitions (Erkenntnisse a priori)3 1 
23. pure cognitions (reinen Verstandeserkenntnisse)4 1 
24. universal cognitions (allgemeinen Erkenntnisse)S 1 
25. notions (Notionen)6 2 
26. elements for knowledge (Elemente zur Erkennt-
nisse)7 1 
27. elements of the pure knowledge yielded by under-
standing ~Elemente der reinen Verstandeser-
kenntnis) 1 
28. universal conditions of possible empirical 
knowledge (allgemeinen Bedingungen einer 
mtlglichen empirischen Erkenntnis)~ 1 
29. acts of pure thought (Handlungen des reinen 
Denkens)lO 1 
Some observations are called for by this collection of data. 
We will make them in relation to our summary statement on the similar 
collection compiled from the Transcendental Analytic. The first point 
in that statement found above on p. 180 was that in the Analytic Kant 
speaks of the categories most frequently as Verstandesbegriffe or 
"concepts of understanding . " The table just presented shows this to 
1A29 3=B350. 
4 
2 A2=B6 and A3=B6. 
A63=B87. .?A2. 
8 A62:B87. 
6A320:B377 (2 instances) • 
9 A600:B628. 10A57=B81. 
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be true also of the remainder of the Critique of Pure Reason. We can 
now conclude that as far as usage of terms meaning category is con-
cerned, Verstandesbegriffe translated "concept of understanding" is 
the term which Kant preferred far more frequently than all others. 
The term actually appears in the Critique of Pure Reason 118 times. 
Begriff des Verstandes ('concept of the understanding") is its nearest 
but outdistanced rival with only 35 instances. 
Secondly, we noted in our summary on usage in the Transcendental 
Analytic that Kant also calls the categories Begriffe or "concepts" 
in ways other than Verstandesbegriffe or Begriffe des Verstandes. 
Our last table shows that this is the case also in material before 
and after the Analytic. In fact, our latest listing of categories 
as concepts further specified as a priori, pure, intellectual, orig-
inal, or fundamental is a repetition in part of Analytic usages we 
cited previously. Once more we are impressed with how frequently 
and variously Kant speaks of the categories as "concepts." By actual 
count, he does so in 195 places in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Thirdly, we concluded in our summary on Analytic usage that Kant 
used many other designations for categories besides "concepts" of 
one type or another. We observed on p. 180 that in the Analytic he 
spoke of categories as conditions, forms, rules, principles, func-
tions, grounds, elements, modes, laws, cognitions, and predicaments. 
Many, though not all, of these terms appear in our table of usage out-
side the Analytic. In the latter table we noted that Kant says the 
categories are rules, laws, cognitions, notions, elements, and con-
ditions. Other differences from Analytic usage are that Kant called 
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categories "acts111 before the Analytic and "notions"2 afterwards in 
the Dialectic. 
Finally, we observe that Kant ' s predilection for a variety of 
terms to designate category in the first Critique continued unabated 
throughout his magnum opus . This cosmopolitan taste for terms , how-
ever, did not match his decided affinity for speaking in various ways 
of the categories as "concepts . " Nor did it overpower his definitive 
preference for calling the categories "concepts of understanding." 
So much for terminology . We now pass to the more decisive mat-
ter of meanings . Our specific inquiry at this point concerns whether 
in writing the material he placed before and after the Transcendental 
Analytic Kant clung to his four main definitions of category. We can 
state our present purpose in this way--does the remainder of the 
Critique of Pure Reason corroborate that Kant variously defined a 
category as a function of judgment, concept of necessary synthetic 
unity, concept of pure synthesis, and concept of an object in gen-
eral? 
We will give a specific answer first before noting the evidence 
on which it is based and drawing some conclusions. Our answer to 
the above question is yes . However, we do not imply that Kant stressed 
all four conceptions of category equally in material outside of the 
Analytic. But this is a point to which we had best return after view-
1
rn A57=B81. See p. 263 above. 
2rn A320:B377• Seep . 263 above. 
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ing the evidence. 
First1 we find Kant writing in the Transcendental Dialectic so 
as to suggest category defined as function of judgment. We read1 
for example1 such a statement as this in A3491 "In the absence of 
this manifold1 they [pure categories] are merely functions of a judg-
ment1 without content." Further on in the Dialectic at B4291 Kant 
says "· •• the categories are those functions of thought (of judg-
ment) as already applied to our sensible intuition1 such intuition 
being required if I seek to know myself." Then he adds in B430 that 
II 
• it is to this intuition that the thinking self would have to 
look for the conditions of the employment of its logical functions 
as categories of substance1 cause, etc •••• " Statements such as 
these and others1 imply with varying degrees of directness that the 
categories still are for Kant functions of judgment. It may be added 
that there is no denial of this either asserted or implied in any 
material surrounding the Analytic. It appears, then1 that Kant clung 
to his identification of category and function of judgment elsewhere 
in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Secondly, we cite the evidence which suggests that Kant also 
maintained his conviction expressed in the Analytic that a category 
may be considered to be a concept of necessary synthetic unity. With 
one exception12 all of the instances about to be mentioned may be 
found in the Dialectic. We consider Kant to suggest that a category 
lwe cite in addition two others to be found in A306-307=B363 and 
A406. 
267 
also is a concept of necessary synthetic unity in the following quo-
tations, whose key sections we underline for emphasis: 
1. As a matter of fact , multiplicity of rules and 
unity of principles is a demand of reason, for 
the purpose of bringing the understanding into 
thoroughgoing accordance with itself, just as 
the understanding brings the manifold of intui-
tion under concepts and thereby connects the 
manifold of intuition. (A305=B362-363) 
2. Reason concerns itself exclusively with absolute 
totality in the employment of the concepts of 
the understanding, and endeavours to carry the 
synthetic unity, which is thought in the category, 
up to the completely unconditioned. (A326=B383) 
3. In the analytical part of the Transcendental Logic 
we have sho~qn that pure categories, and among them 
that of substance, have in themselves no objective 
meaning, save in so far as they rest upon an in-
tuition, and are applied to the manifold of this 
intuition, as functions of synthetic unity.! 
(A348 -349) 
4. Apperception is itself the ground of the possi-
bility of the categories 1 which on their part 
represent nothing but the synthesis of the mani-
fold of intuition, in so far as the manifold has 
unity in apperception. (A401) 
Other passages which we consider relevant but will not quote under 
this heading may be found in A302=B359, A356, A409=B346, A644=B672, 
and A796=B824 . These taken with the above quotationspersuade us 
that Kant did not abandon his stress on a category expressing neces-
sary synthetic unity, once this claim was advanced in the Analytic. 
Thirdly, we point to some evidence in the Transcendental Dia-
lAt this point there follows our first quotation supporting 
category as function of judgment and found on p. 266 above. 
I 
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lectic and after it suggesting also that Kant continued to view a 
schematized category as a concept of pure synthesis. Admittedly, 
these statements do not make that claim very explicitly; but it 
must be realized that Kant does not discuss his schematism doctrine 
very much at all after the Analytic. At any rate, we quote the fol-
lowing passages (with our underlining added for emphasis) as ones 
compatible with Kant's view of a schematized category: 
1. • •• it is of the understanding to connect the 
manifold of the appearances by means of concepts, 
and to bring it under empirical laws. But the 
acts of the understanding are, without the schema-
ta of sensibility, undeterminedl; ••• the ap-
plication of the concepts of the understanding to 
the schema of reason does not yield knowledge of 
the object itself (as is the case in the applica-
tion of categories to their sensible schemata). 
• • • (A664-665=B692-693) 
2. Now an a priori2 concept, that is, a concept which 
is not empirical, either already includes in it-
self a pure intuition (and if so, it can be con-
structed), or it includes nothing but the synthesis 
of possible intuitions which are not givena priori. 
In this latter case we can indeed make use of it 
in forming synthetic a priori judgments, but only 
discursively in accordance with concepts, never 
intuitively through the construction of concepts. 
(A719-720=B747-748) 
We call attention also to what Kant says in A306=B363, A326=B383, 
A334:B391, and A767=B795. These passages likewise contain indirect 
1This underlining expresses Smith's italics by which he renders 
Kant's spacing for emphasis. 
2This underlining expresses Smith's italics in which he regu-
larly renders such phrases as "a priori" and "a posteriori." Under-
lining of these terms in other quotations from Smith's translation 
should be so understood. 
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allusions to schematized categories viewed as concepts of pure syn-
thesis. We recognize, however, that the chief basis for the latter 
definition is found in the Transcendental Analytic and not in these 
later materials. 
Fourthly, we see Kant unmistakably speaking of category as con-
cept of an object in general in the Critique of Pure Reason apart 
from many statements in the Transcendental Analytic. There is a 
large number of such corroborative passages found before and after 
the Analytic. From the imposing list we make the following selec-
tion for quotation, adding our underlining again for emphasis: 
1. Since I cannot rest in these intuitions if they 
are to become known, but must relate them as 
representations to something as their object, 
and determine this latter through them, either 
I must assume that the concepts,l by means of 
which I obtain this determination, conform to 
the object, or else I assume that the objects, 
or what is the same thing, that the experience2 
in which alone, as given objects, they can be 
known, conform to the concepts. In the former 
case I am again in the same perplexity as to 
how I can know anything a priori in regard to 
the objects. In the latter case the outlook 
is more hopeful. (Bxvii) 
2. For experience is itself a species of knowledge 
which involves understanding; and understand-
ing has rules which I must presuppose as being 
in me prior to objects being given to me, and 
therefore as being a priori. They find expres-
sion in a priori concepts to which all objects 
of experience necessarily conform, and with 
1The underlining expresses Smith's italics by which he conveys 
Kant's spacing for emphasis. 
2see preceding note. 
which they must agree. (Bxvii -xviii) 
3. Pure intuition, therefore, contains only the 
form under which something is intuited; the 
pure concept only the form of the thought of 
an object in general. Pure intuitions or pure 
concepts alone are possible a priori, empirical 
intuitions and empirical concepts only a pos-
teriori. (A50-5l=B74-75) 
4. Concepts of understanding are also thought a 
priori antecedently to experience and for the 
sake of experience, but they contain nothing 
more than the unity of reflection upon appear-
ances, in so far as these appearances must 
necessarily belong to a possible empirical con-
sciousness. Through 'them alone is knowledge and 
the determination of an object possible. They 
first provide the material required for making 
inferences, and they are not preceded by any a 
priori concepts of objects from which they could 
be inferred. On the other hand, their objective 
validity is founded solely on the fact that, 
since they constitute the intellectual form of 
all experience, it must always be possible to 
show their application to experience. (A310: 
B366-367) 
5. These attributes are nothing but pure categories, 
by which I do not think a determinate object but 
only the unity of the representations--in order 
to determine an object for them. In the absence 
of an underlying intuition the category cannot 
by itself yield a concept of an object; for by 
intuition alone is the object given, which there-
upon is thought in accordance with the category. 
(A399) 
6. Modi of self-consciousness in thought are not by 
themselves concepts of objects (categories), but 
are mere functions which do not give thought an 
object to be known, and accordingly do not give 
even myself as object. (B406-407) 
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To this considerable list confirming the view of category as concept 
of an object in general , we add the following passages also: 
Bxxv-xxvi, Al2, A55=B801 A59=B81, A308=B364-365, 
A335=B392, A336=B393 1 A567=B595, A642=B670, A676-
677=B704-705, A696=B724, and A845=B873. 
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We are quite impressed that both before and after the Transcendental 
Analytic Kant held to the definition of category which equates cate-
gory and concept of an object in general. 
Finally, in support of our statement that Kant can be seen ad-
bering to his four views of category discernible in the Analytic, we 
quote one passage we have saved for last. This passage is singularly 
appropriate as it contains !<ant's own summary of the Analytic which 
he offers in the Dialectic. It is also notable that the statement 
gives expression to all four definitions of category. This feature 
we may point out mare clearly, perhaps, by inserting a bracketed 
number after each significant statement we underline.l The passage 
is the introductory summary found in A32l=B377-378 which, with the 
addition of our marks for emphasis, appears as follows: 
The Transcendental Analytic has shown us how the mere 
logical form of our knowledge may in itself contain 
original a priori concepts [1], which represent objects 
prior to all experience [4], or, speaking more correct-
ly, indicate the synthetic unity which alone makes pos-
sible an empirical knowledge of objects [2]. The form 
of judgments [l] (converted into a concept of the syn-
thesis of intuitions [3]) yielded categories which 
direct all employment of understanding in experience. 
1Following the order in which we have considered the four main 
definitions, we will use "[1]" for function of judgment, "[2] 11 for 
concept of necessary synthetic unity, "[3]" for concept of pure syn-
thesis, and "[4]" for concept of an object in general. 
The reference to all four views of category in one statement frankly 
intended to summarize the Transcendental Analytic is most instructive . 
The passage is particularly corroborative of our judgment on Kant's 
definitions of category in the Analytic . 
4. Conclusions 
We offer next some concluding observations on this body of data1 
and on our findings in the Critique of Pure Reason as a whole. The 
first point is one which may have been noticed in some of the quota-
tions presented in the previous section. It is the fact that within 
a passage Kant may allude to more than one definition of category. 
Illustrating this, we pointed out the appearance of all four views 
in our last quotation on the preceding page. But there are other 
passages in which two or more views of category are expressed. One 
can see this in considering again those passages quoted above which 
are designated A348-349,2 A349,3 A399,4 and A664-665=B692-693.5 
Thus in following what Kant himself calls "the guiding-thread of 
the categories,"6 we find no large blocks of material outside of the 
Analytic in which one of the four views of category is preferred to 
the absolute exclusion of others. Regarding the categories, then, 
we are not rearing a Four-Definition Hypothesis of the first Critique 
1As promised on p. 265 above. 2Quoted on p. 267 above. 
3Quoted on p. 266 above. See also our note on p. 267. 
4Quoted on p. 270 above. 5Quoted on p. 268 above. 
6A335=B392. 
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comparable to the documentary theory explaining differences within 
the biblical Hexateuch. It is notable also that scholars prone to 
stratify the Critique of Pure Reason as do Vaihinger and Smith have 
not used Kant's views of category as a main key to the existence 
and order of layers of material. Actually, Kant appears in the 
Critique of Pure Reason to employ his conceptions of category as 
the context required. Frequently this meant using them in conjunc-
tion with one another. Such a procedure does not suggest pronounced 
evolution by Kant from one view to the others. 
Our second conclusion should guard against a false impression. 
We do not mean to imply that Kant in freely employing his four views 
of category did so equally. This we have mentioned beforel but with-
out substantiation. In the first place, it has now emerged from our 
study of the remainder of the Critique of Pure Reason that Kant re-
fers most frequently to category considered as concept of an object 
in general and as concept of necessary synthetic unity. The expres-
sions of these two views of category exceed considerably in number 
those of category as function of judgment and .as concept of pure 
synthesis. Secondly, expressions of the latter two views generally 
have been more indirect and oblique. These facts suggest that on 
the whole Kant put more emphasis on the connection of category with 
object in general and synthetic unity than with judgment and schema-
tism. 
1 On pp. 265-266 above. 
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Our third conclusion here deals with the whole Critique of Pure 
Reason also. We feel confirmed now in our impression that Kant con-
siders himself to have spoken definitively on category in the Tran-
scendental Analytic. There are no statements in the rest of the 
first Critique in which he withdraws or contradicts his statements 
in the Analytic on the subject. Such a discovery is no mere modicum 
of corroborative value. We are now able to assert with confidence 
that Kant's definitive statements on category in the Critique of Pure 
Reason are to be found in the Transcendental Analytic. To this we 
can also add that Kant's four views of category in the Analytic are 
ones he considered definitive throughout the rest of the first Cri-
tique. 
D. Evaluation 
The goal set for this chapterl was to discover and state Kant's 
Critical definition of category. It is understandable how this might 
have been lost to sight while traversing the broad expanse of the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason. Unsympathetic students are inclined to find the 
latter more arid and less rewarding than the Sahara Desert. They would 
probably consider this chapter merely more of the same, at least as 
far as aridity is concerned. Be that as it may, our purpose has been to 
discover what Kant said in definition of category during his Critical 
period. This we found to be stated most authoritatively in the Critique 
of Pure Reason, particularly in the Transcendental Analytic in four main 
lsee pp. 4 and 144 above. 
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ways--category as function of judgment, concept of necessary synthetic 
unity, concept of pure synthesis, and concept of an object in general. 
We also promised as far back as p. 181 to evaluate these findings 
and compare them with those on Aristotle found in the first chapter. 
This is the task remaining _to be completed in our chapter on Kant. 
There are, of course, several ways of making such a proposed evalua-
tion and comparison. Our choice here is to recall the main points made 
in our evaluation of Aristotle's treatment of the definition of cate-
gor~and then to see whether they apply to Kant as well. This will pro-
vide opportunity for comparing the two philosophers in relation to our 
topic and also for introducing criticism of Kant's claims which has oc-
curred to us during our study. 
First of all, then, we recall our claim about Aristotle that his 
category doctrine appears to have passed through a process of develop-
ment which is neither completed nor described fully in his extant works.2 
The question now is whether the same may be said of Immanuel Kant. As 
regards development, we reply in the affirmative. It is apparent that 
Kant's thinking about category evolved. However, we can trace the de-
velopment with much more detail and assurance in Kant than in Aristotle. 
As a matter of fact, this is what we were able to do with reasonable 
success in this chapter. It has been possible to contrast Kant's views 
on the subject in three rather well-defined periods commonly labeled 
pre-Critical, semi-Critical, and Critical. Specifically, it was possi-
1Found on pp. 109-112 above. 2see pp. 109-111 above. 
ble to delineate a development from the pre-Critical stage showing 
neglect of our subject to the semi-Critical period revealing interest 
in the topic as seen in the Dissertation of 1770. We were not handi-
capped seriously in tracing Kant's evolution by the fact that his 
position in the Dissertation is not fully worked out1 and .that in par-
ticular the "real use" of the intellect is not clearly and fully ex-
plained.2 In fact, it was possible to present with some confidence 
a statement of Kant's semi-Critical definition of category as an in-
tellectual concept of non-sensory objects and relations.3 Most im-
portant of all, we were able to demonstrate that in his Critical 
period as reflected in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant abandoned 
this view of category. Despite a multitude of designations, category 
was found to be defined tn four major ways. And whereas these four 
might be viewed as different aspects of the role played by the mind in 
knowledge, still none were considered by Kant to involve the claim of 
noumenal knowledge. Non-sensory objects and relations were no longer 
said to be known by the categories, or as Kant definitely preferred to 
call them, concepts of understanding. Kant advanced beyond the semi-
Critical stage of the Dissertation to the mature Critical position of 
the Critique of Pure Reason, and what he said about the categories in 
the latter document clearly demonstrates this development. No similar 
statement can be made as confidently about Aristotle after comparing 
the early Categories and the late Metaphysics. One can only postulate 
1see pp. 125-126 and 138-141 above. 
2see p. 138 above. 3see pp. 141-142 above. 
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evolution in Aristotle's thought about category, not show it as in 
Kant's. Further in contrast, we are able to locate Kant's most im-
portant statements about the categories within one work, the Critique 
of Pure Reason. Aristotle's category doctrine, we concluded,l is not 
fully described in any of his surviving works, including the Categories 
and the Metaphysics. Hence, we ourselves were forced into a survey of 
the many inconclusive expressions of his doctrine scattered through 
many books. In sharp contrast, Kant devoted many years to developing 
his Critical doctrine of the categories before presenting it formally 
and fully in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Rea-
son. This is our justification, in sum, for concentrating on the 
first Critique as the locus classicus of his Critical definition of 
category. But no similar procedure can be applied to Aristotle's 
material because, in contrast, it contains no full statement of his 
category doctrine. 
In the next place, we call to mind our second criticism of Aris-
totle which charged that what he does say about category is not very 
precise.2 Under this general charge we specifically criticized him 
for not offering any formal definition, not using technical terms to 
express his category doctrine, and as a whole not writing fully and 
clearly on the subject. Now these specific criticisms do not fit Kant, 
but the general charge does. Like Aristotle, what Kant says about 
1on pp. 110-111 above. 2see pp. 111-112 above. 
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category is not so precise as could be desired. There is no one com-
plete, exact statement in Kant's writings of all that he means by 
category. What we meet, rather, are numerous statements of different 
aspects of category using many different terms. We were able to group 
many of these partial statements under four main headings, but doing 
so did not erase their variegated incompleteness. No matter how much 
one might desire otherwise, the truth is that Kant did not make his 
terminology precise and uniform in discussing his category doctrine. 
To correct this now is probably impossible. So it must remain lamenta-
ble that Kant did not restrict himself to a more precise vocabulary 
when speaking of the categories. The term "notion" with proper defini-
tion might have served him, but he saw fit to use it only twice in the 
Critique of Pure Reason.l Instead he chose to bombard his readers with 
a barrage of different terms filling our many lists.2 His special 
favorite was Begriffe used with almost every variation. It is prac-
tically an affront to our readers to mention this again, so frequently 
has it been said before. 
Kant's linguistic assault makes it most difficult, in Paton's 
phrasing, to "penetrate beyond the grammar of Kant's thought to the 
reality he is attempting to describe."3 One may easily suspect from 
Kant's writing that he is dealing with a careless, untidy mind that 
1As was noted on pp. 263-265 above. 
~ound above on pp. 128, 156, 158, 161, 162-163, 164-165, and 
261-263. 
3Kant 1s Metaphysic of Experience, I, 498. 
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may also be confused. But with such a suspicion we are inclined to 
disagree. Our general attitude is well expressed in the following 
statement of Paton whose persuasive defense of Kant against charges 
of contradiction and confusion has won us to his side: 
When Kant's expressions seem unnecessarily elaborate, 
we must always, I think, ask ourselves whether a deeper 
insight into his meaning might not enable us to under-
stand why he expresses himself in this elaborate way. 
On the other hand we cannot ignore the possibility that 
his expression is unnecessarily elaborate, because he 
has failed to see the shortest way to his goal.l 
This more charitable approach to Kant will spare him both hasty 
dismissal and caustic criticism. But when Kant's statements are 
judged by Paton's rule, in our opinion, Kant would not emerge unscathed. 
It cannot be successfully denied that Kant is unnecessarily elaborate 
in his statements about category. We do not wish to be construed, 
however, as meaning that it is impossible to grasp Kant's general 
meanings on the subject. We felt warranted in trying to state them in 
this chapter. Our complaint is that Kant made the task unnecessarily 
difficult by not being more uniformly precise in his statements. 
"Aristotle leaves many questions unanswered" was our third and 
last general criticism2 on the way in which the famous Stagirite dis-
cusses the categories. Some of these questions, we noted, became press-
ing to Immanuel Kant. He particularly wondered if Aristotle's list 
could be arranged systematically and contemplated the role of the mind 
1 Ibid., I, 469n. 2see p. 112 above. 
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in the employment of categories. We have considered to some extent 
what Kant has said on these topics. Freely we admit that he did much 
to provide adequate statements about such matters and succeeded re-
markably in developing the doctrine of the categories beyond the in-
cipient stage provided by Aristotle. Nevertheless, there are points 
about Kant's discussion of the subject which create dissatisfaction. 
There is probably no philosopher about whom something similar could 
not be said. Kant is certainly not one of the few exceptions. So 
we echo again what we have said about Aristotle by claiming here that 
"Kant leaves many questions unanswered." 
This generalization could be supported by many different points, 
of course. Kant's critics have always been numerous and vocal. But 
we have restricted ourselves to consideration of Kant's category doc-
trine and, still further, to the search for his definition of cate-
gory.l So we may rule out here many of the charges which have been 
leveled at the great K8nigsberger and concentrate on those which his 
treatment of category specifically has brought to our mind. We feel 
that Kant's work, indeed, raises questions about his definition of 
category, and we present some in concluding this chapter. 
The first of the questions we raise may be put in this form: 
Does Kant assume too narrow a definition of definition? We are in-
clined to answer in the affirmative, at least regarding some of his 
statements. It may be recalled from our remarks on the Inquiry of 
1764 that Kant early insisted on definitions coming last in philosophy. 2 
1see pp. 4-5 above. 2see pp. 118-120 above. 
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In the Critique of Pure Reason he was insistent in both editions not 
only on this point1 but also on the claim that the categories cannot 
be defined in any "real" sense apart from space and time.2 As we 
noted, 3 Kant elaborated on this claim in A244-246. He stated that the 
pure categories must be schematized or related to a manifold of intui-
tion if they are to be defined. Pure categories, he argued, contain 
only the logical functions of judgment; therefore, they cannot be de-
fined without reasoning in a circle, since the definition itself would 
be a judgment and already contain these functions. Now we question 
whether this is a valid argument for banning definition of pure cate-
gories. The pure categories as concepts of understanding do not con-
tain merely logical functions of judgment. By Kant's own admission, 
they embody other aspects, for example, synthesis. Further, is it ac-
tually true that in defining a pure category we would be reasoning in 
a circle? Does Kant actually mean that in defining a pure category one 
will be forced into employing all the functions or forms of judgment to 
do so? He himself does not seem to do this, judging from his state-
ment of what he considers a pure category to be in A2424 or from his 
1see p. 153 above. 2see pp. 145-148 above. 3on p. 148 above. 
4The passage in A242 reads: "For if we remove all those condi-
tions of sensibility which mark them out as concepts of possible em-
pirical employment, and view as concepts of things in general and 
therefore of transcendental employment, all that we can then do with 
them is to regard the logical function in judgments as the condition 
of the possibility of the things themselves, without in the least 
being able to show how they can have application to an object, that 
is, how in pure understanding, apart from sensibility, they can have 
meaning and objective validity." 
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explanation of the nature of the several pure categories in A242:B300--
A244c:B302.1 
Kant's demurrer against defining a pure category seems to derive 
from his assumption that a "real" definition must refer to some ob-
ject which has empirical warrant, else the definition will lack exact-
ness in its reference. This desire for exactness reveals Kant's ad-
miration for the exactitude of mathematics, which he considers beyond 
the grasp of philospphy. His ban on defining pure categories, though, 
appears to result from applying the criterion of exactness used in 
mathematics to philosophical concepts. Hence, Kant considered himself 
in the predicament of being unable to define pure categories whose lack 
of content (because not schematized) precludes the exactness of defini-
tion which a standard of mathematical exactitude demands. 
But if we recognize that there is no real warrant for applying 
such a yardstick to attempts at defining such philosophical entities 
as the categories, and if we see that we may speak intelligibly about 
such organizing principles of the mind apart from the material they 
synthesize, then we are free to continue our search for their defini-
tion. It is to Kant's credit, however, that in effect he saw this. 
Also in the Critique of Pure Reason he withdrew his ban on definitions 
in philosophy, as we have pointed out,2 although warning again that 
we must not start with them. 
Despite this, however, the material he allowed to stand in the 
Critique of Pure Reason is surprising because it reflects the view of 
1see p. 150 above. 2on pp. 152-154 above. 
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definition espoused in the early Inquiry. Such a conception of defini-
tion, showing the influence of mathematics, was too narrow for one of 
the tasks Kant set himself, namely, defining the categories. 
The second question we wish to raise about Kant's treatment of 
category can be stated in this way: Does Kant imply two different ways 
of viewing the categories in defining them as functions and as concepts? 
We have been able to establish that Kant indeed spoke of category using 
both of these terms. The instances have been noted above where func-
tion of judgment is stated or implied and also the more numerous cases 
where concept--of necessary synthetic unity, pure synthesis, or object 
in general--appears. In collating the differences in terminology and 
distinguishing the meanings to which they point, we have gained the im-
pression of a possible displacement in Kant's thought about category. 
We consider Kant to have conceived of a category dynamically as an !£! 
of the mind by which data are combined. We ourselves are inclined to 
affix the label "organizing principle" to a category so considered, 
though we recognize that this is not terminology Kant preferred. Be 
that as it may, it seems conclusive to us that Kant recognizes the 
presence of factors within the human mind in terms of which that mind 
actively synthesizes intuition given to it. Nol-T we are inclined to 
say that when a category is so considered, stressing its active role 
in the knowing mind, Kant should define such a category as a function. 
The designation is one which properly denotes the active part which 
Kantian epistemology assigns to the categories. We wish to point out, 
however, that Kant by no means consistently speaks of the categories 
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as functions, even as functions of judgment. Quite to the contrary, 
he most often calls them concepts. This we consider inappropriate, 
not merely from the standpoint of terminology, but from the viewpoint 
of meanings as well. We judge that the term "concept" is better 
suited for conveying the meaning of the results of an act of the mind, 
rather than the act itself . Yet this is apparently not how Kant 
viewed the matter; for he felt no reticence in speaking of the cate-
gories as "concepts," despite his own association of them with such 
notions connoting activity as "necessary synthetic unity" and "pure 
synthesis . " We are suggesting that a realignment of terms would bet-
ter convey the meanings which Kant seems to have in mind. One may 
think of a category in terms of a unifying !£! of the mind and appro-
priately refer to a category as a "function" or "act" of the mind. 
But one may also think about the results or end of a categorial func-
tion of the mind, and in this case designate such properly as a "con-
cept" or "form" of the mind . But such a distinction between category 
as a function or act and category as result of a function or act seems 
to have gone unstressed by Kant . 
We may place our readers in a better position to judge this mat-
ter if we consider what Paton has to say . The distinguished Kantian 
scholar does not seem to feel the tension in Kant's thought which we 
are claiming is indicated by the latter's use of terms . This, of 
course, is good cause to look askance at our supposed criticism. In 
part, however, Paton's attitude is due to the fact that he equates 
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function and form, not only in Kant's thought! but also in his own. 2 
The question being raised here, however, is not whether Kant does 
equate function and form (as he plainly does) but whether he is en-
titled to do so. Paton as a defender of the Kantian view exposes him-
self to the same query. Thus we find Paton saying that the "function" 
of a power such as understanding may mean "the way of working common 
to all its different acts" and that "the phrase 'function of under-
standing' seems to be used for what is common to different acts of 
judgment, namely their form."3 But the question to be asked Paton is, 
how does "way of working" mean common form, or, using his other formula-
tion, is form what is common to different acts of judgment? Contrary 
to Paton, it seems to us that it is activity which is primarily common 
to different acts of judgment, not their form. Ever since Aristotle's 
work in logic, the activity of judging has been held to follow certain 
distinguishably different patterns or forms, not one pattern or form. 
The Aristotelian table sets forth the forms of judgment as items dif-
ferent from one another; hence, what the different forms of judgment 
have in common primarily is not form but the activity of judging itself. 




1He says in his Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, I, 2461 that 
• Kant, when he speaks of understanding and judgment, uses the 
'function' as synonymous with the word 'form."' 
2
"The function is then a common nature, or a common form, pres-
ent in the separate acts" (ibid . ). 
3Ibid. 1 I 1 436. 
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aligned as suggested. "Function" and "act" directly indicate the ac-
tivity of judging whereas "concept" and "form" suggest the results or 
end of such activity. There appears, then, to be a dynamic difference 
between the functions of judging and the forms it follows. Paton, fol-
lowing Kant here, understandably has overlooked this. 
The question we are raising about Kant, therefore, is one which 
points to two modes of viewing and defining a category. We are sug-
gesting that Kant abundantly recommends that a category be considered 
an a priori, intellectual function synthesizing an intuitive manifold. 
Such activity of the mind or understanding may appropriately be defined 
as a function or act. But the same synthesizing procedure may be 
viewed from the standpoint of that to which it leads, namely, its re-
sults or end. In this case, categorial activity of the mind is bet-
ter defined as a concept or form. Our contention, however, is that 
Kant did not present his terms and meanings so as to suggest this dif-
ference in outlook on category. We consider category viewed as func-
tion or act of the understanding in synthesizing a manifold to be the 
true Critical conception. In contrast, category viewed as concept or 
form of the understanding is more the usual logical conception. Judg-
ing from his usage of both terms and meanings, does it not appear that 
Kant was not as loyal to his Critical conception of category as he is 
believed to be? It is with temerity that we raise such a question. 
Perhaps we will see better just how rash we are after our chapter on 
Bowne, to which we now pass. 
CHAPTER III 
THE DEFINITION OF CATEGORY IN BOWNE 
We began the preceding chapter on Kant with a justification for 
considering his pre-Critical writings. We begin this chapter on Bowne 
with a justification for considering Bowne at all. Perhaps a better 
way of putting this is to say that we feel the necessity of first ex-
plaining who Bowne is. Many on hearing "The Definition of Category 
in Aristotle, Kant, and Bowne" are mystified by the last word and in-
variably ask who "Bowne" is. This reveals something of the general 
lack of knowledge concerning Bowne. 
The "Bowne" here, as the formal Readers of this dissertation well 
know, is Borden Parker Bowne, the American philosopher who taught at 
Boston University from 1867 until his death in 1910. He is considered 
to be the first American philosopher to give systematic expression to 
the form of pluralistic idealism known as personalism. This he did in 
teaching large classes for many years and in publishing many articles 
and books. In addition, since his death there have been numerous state-
ments in print calling attention to his thought. 1 Yet the fact remains 
1
chief among those in this country are Francis J. McConnell's Bor-
den Parker Bowne, His Life and Philosophy (New York: Abingdon Press;-
1929), Albert C. Knudson's The Philosophy of Personalism (New York: Abing-
don Press , 1927), and articles appearing in The Personalist, a quarterly 
founded in 1920 and edited by Ralph Tyler Flewelling at the University of 
Southern California, and in The Philosophical Forum, annual journal pub-
lished since 1943 by the Boston University Department of Philosophy and 
the Boston University Philosophical Club. Special mention is deserved 




that Bowne's thought has not been widely studied in this country and 
continues to be largely ignored by American philosophers. 
The persistent neglect of this pioneer among American persona-
lists has been a subject of reflection for some whom Bowne has influ-
enced.1 We join their ranks with the following remarks, ones which 
may also provide background for an appreciation of Bowne's statements 
on category. 
One possible reason why Bowne is seldom cited in contemporary 
discussion is that he is a member of a past philosophical generation. 
This, of course, does not explain why his influence was not wider 
during his lifetime. There are several other reasons, though, which 
combine to explain his restricted influence both then and now. The 
first of these we mention is the tone of his writings. Bowne in print 
often appears hostile, sarcastic, impatient of opposing views. A po-
lemical tone is strong in many passages, creating the appearance of 
dogmatism repellent to many readers, especially those in sympathy 
with the view under Bowne's caustic attack. The effect of this severe 
tone in so much of his writing contrasts with the lasting impressions 
which Bowne's charming, modest personality made on his students. 2 
lEspecially the late Edgar s. Brightman in his early article on 
"Personalism and the Influence of Bowne," Personalist, VIII (1927), 
25-32, and more recently Warren E. Steinkraus in "From an Old Note-
book," Personalist, XXXIV (1953) 1 372-379. 
2see James T. Carlyon's "Bowne in the Classroom," Personalist, 
XXVIII (1947), 266-272. Dr. Carlyon, who studied under Bowne, pays 
high tribute to his teacher in these closing words of the article: 
"His patience, his sense of respect for every man's person, his easy 
familiarity with the great minds of the ages, his sure footed logical 
thinking, his aptness of metaphor and of illustration, and his deep 
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Nevertheless, this is a case where the printe4 page outreached and 
outlasted the spoken word. 
Another reason for Bowne's limited influence is the type of book 
he wrote . By and large, they were either textbooks or popularizations . 
Knudson has recorded that Bowne dictated Personalism, a book of 326 
pages, in only six periods of about two hours each! 1 The implication 
is unjust to the actual content of Personalism, but the book does con-
tain lectures delivered by Bowne at Northwestern University in 1907. 
Still it is fair to say that if Bowne had spent his time writing 
technical monographs, he would have deepened his influence, especially 
among philosophers . 
There is another aspect of Bowne reflected in his writings which 
helps explain why he is relatively unknown . Bowne was a philosopher 
Christian religious living combined to make him the Master, of whom 
some of us were privileged to be humble disciples" (p. 272). Carlyon 
does observe, however , that Bowne "had little patience • • • with 
students who spoke to air their own views or to give themselves a tem-
porary recognition. As there was no falseness in his fiber of soul, 
so he had no hesitancy to ridicule and make forever marked the hypocri-
sy that now and then cropped out in the student group" (pp . 267-268). 
111Bowne in American Theological Education," Personalist, XXVIII 
(1947), 250. Knudson adds, "The dictation was, of course, later re-
vised . But, as he himself told me, the original structure and phras-
ing of the lectures remained essentially unchanged. As a single in-
tellec tual feat I doubt if there is anything comparable to this in 
the history of American philosophy" (pp . 250-251) . 
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interested in religion and a churchman concerned with the teachings 
of the Methodist Church. Brightman described this by saying of 
Bowne that " ••• his religious environment and nature led him to be 
fundamentally an apologist."1 Consequently, Bowne wrote six books 
dealing with Christian doctrine. Furthermore, many of his published 
articles appeared in church periodicals of restricted influence such 
as The Methodist Review and Zions Herald. 2 None ever appeared in the 
leading philosophical journals of his day such as Mind, The Philosophi-
cal Review, and The Journal of Speculative Philosophy. This fact alone 
restric t ed his influence in philosophical circles. 
Another reason why Bowne made so little impression on his con-
temporaries is easy to state, though hard to justify. He largely ig-
nored his professional colleagues and was in turn generally ignored by 
them. It is recognized that his circle of friends and correspondents 
included such philosophers as Lotze, Ulrici, Eucken, Bergson, and James. 
But rarely did he quote them or otner philosophers of his day and then 
usually for polemical purposes. Bowne never joined the American Philo-
sophical Association, had litt le interest in organizations of profes-
sional philosophers, and seldom attended their meetings. Thus he limited 
his influence considerably and stands, we may add, i n marked contrast to 
Edgar S. Brightman, his successor at Boston University . 
1Personalist, VIII (1927), 32. 
2steinkraus count s practically nalf (sixty-eight) of Bo,vne •s one 
hundred and tnirty-four l<nown art~cles on philosophical and religious 
matters as published in denominational publications (Personalist, XXXIV 
[1953], 372). 
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A final reason we advance to account for Bowne's limited in-
fluence is his studied neglect of the history of philosophy. To many 
of his contemporaries this was a repelling source of weakness. But 
to Bowne it was quite the opposite. He considered it a virtue for 
the philosopher to ignore the historical development of his disci-
pline. He reasons that just as "a history of mathematics as an intro-
duction to mathematics would not tend to edification,"1 so 
equally inverted pedagogically is the history of 
philosophy as an introduction to philosophy ••• 
The men who have helped philosophy forward have sel-
dom been men learned in the bibliography of the 
science, bu2 men who grappled with the problems 
themselves. 
But Bowne's well-known students--A. C. Knudson, E. s. Brightman, F. J. 
McConnell, and R. T. Flewelling--saw the matter differently and sought 
to remedy the deficiency of the teacher in their own writings. The 
damage was done, however, in Bowne's day and in his books in a manner 
no disciple could alter. 
We are not contending, therefore, that in investigating the de£-
inition of category in Bowne we are taking up a philosopher with either 
the reputation or influence of Aristotle and Kant. But as we said in 
our Introduction,3 Bowne is a recent thinker who was influenced by the 
doctrine of the categories and endeavored to accommodate it to a per-
sonalistic metaphysics . Admittedly, the day in which he did this has 
1Personalism (New York: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1908), 
p. 16. 
2Ibid. 3on p . 4 above . 
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quite passed, for Bowne died in 1910; but because Bowne was a member 
of a past generation and a philosopher whose influence always has been 
eclipsed does not strip him of significance. Those who sat under his 
teaching and have studied his writings tend to deny this strenuously. 
Perhaps the best statement from this group is the luminous tribute paid 
Bowne by the late Albert c. Knudson. The Dean Emeritus of the Boston 
University School of Theology was asked to provide a brief characteriza-
tion of Borden Parker Bowne and described him as 
••• one of the great thinkers of his day, brilliant 
in wit, profound in thought, luminous in exposition, 
rich in his literary output, author of a system of 
philosophy of enduring worth, vigorous defender of the 
faith, possessed of extraordinary power of excitation 
as a teacher, of towering nobility of soul, an· ideal-
ist of idealists, unforgettable . 1 
A statement like this presents Bowne not merely as an interesting per-
sonality but also as a notable thinker in whose rescue from obscurity 
we may be able to assist. 
We feel mainly justified in considering Bowne because of what he 
has written about the categories. Bowne devoted a good deal of space 
in his many books to discussion of the categories. Therefore, in turn-
ing our attention to him we are not focusing on a thinker for whom the 
doctrine of the categories does not bulk large. We are not suggesting, 
by any means, that the amount of material on categories in Bowne's 
writings approaches anywhere near what is found in Kant's. Neverthe-
less, it is considerable enough in its own extent, as we will see. So 
lpersonalist, XXVIII, 256. 
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we center now on the work of Borden Parker Bowne, the first systematic 
personalist in America, and one who concerned himself with categories. 
We need hardly add that our target will be determining how he defines 
category. But, as we said earlier,l we are also interested in seeing 
how Bowne reacted to and compares with Aristotelian and Kantian views 
on the subject. 
We have anticipated that not all of the writings of our three 
philosophers would prove to be equally important for our investiga-
tion,2 and this was quite the case with both Aristotle and Kant. It 
is no surprise, then, that we concentrate on only some books by Bowne, 
give others only brief mention, and ignore those in which category is 
not mentioned. To be specific about this, we anticipate looking most 
closely at three of Bowne's most important books, namely, his Meta-
physics published in 1882, his Theory of Thought and Knowledge which 
appeared in 1897, and the second edition of the Metaphysics which he 
revised for publication in 1898 . An effort will be made first to pre-
sent the evidence about the definition of category in each of these 
books. Then we will seek to state what we consider Bowne's meaning 
about category to be as shown in each book. After this, some compar-
ison with both Aristotle and Kant will be offered to an appropriate ex-
tent. By following this procedure, we hope to be in a position for a 
final evaluation section in this chapter in which our findings are 
critically scrutinized. But before we reach that stage, we plan to 
1on pp. 4 and 6 above. 2see p. 6 above. 
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survey rapidly other books by Bowne in which category is discussed but 
at less significant lengths. We consider these to be five in number. 
In order of publication, they are the Introduction to Psychological 
Theory of 1887, Philosophy of Theism of 1887, Theism of 1902, Per-
sonalism of 1908 from which we have already quoted, 1 and Kant and 
Spencer of 1912. Our first step, therefore, is to ascertain the evi-
deuce furnished by the first edition of Bowne's Metaphysics which ap-
peared in 1882. 
A. In the Metaphysics of 1882 
Bowne's Metaphysics in its first edition2 was a substantial work 
of 534 pages which he subtitled "A Study in First Principles." After 
an Introduction of twenty-three pages, he presented its fifteen chap-
ters under the headings of Ontology, Cosmology, and Psychology. We 
find six chapters3 under Ontology, five4 under Cosmology, and fourS 
under Psychology. No one chapter was titled The Categories. But the 
reader first scanning the list of chapters with subheadings on pp. xxi-
1 On p. 291 above. 
2Published in New York by Harper and Brothers in 1882. 
3Titled The Notion of Being, The Nature of Things, Change and Be-
coming, Action and Interaction, The Finite and the Infinite, and The 
Nature of the Infinite. 
4Titled Space, Time, Motion, Matter and Force, and The Cosmos as 
Mechanism . 
STitled The Soul, The Process of Knowing; Realism, Idealism, and 
Phenomenalism; and Apriorism and Empiricism. 
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xxv might expect the subject of category to be mentioned, though Bowne 
does not use the word in this Table of Contents. 
This turns out definitely to be the case in the Metaphysics of 
1882. Bowne has no chapter on categories as such in his first major 
writing, but he does allude to the subject almost immediately and re-
peatedly throughout the book. Particularly in the last chapters under 
the heading of Psychology does the subject arise. As a matter of fact, 
we face once more a situation akin to that which Kant's writing created. 
Bowne, like Kant, speaks frequently of the categories in many different 
ways. He has neither the range nor variation in terms which Kant used, 
but his list is not meager. It seems called for, then, that we survey 
his usage before considering those key passages in the first Metaphys-
ics which convey more fully Bowne's thought about category. 
1. Evidence Furnished by the Metaphysics of 1882 
If one pores over Bowne's first Metaphysics to discover how he re-
fers to category, some interesting findings will be made. A task like 
this is not so unrewarding as one might think. Usage of terms does pro-
vide important data about thought, but it also may shed interesting 
light on facets of the writing process which even may have escaped the 
author himself. Thus we find Bowne preferring one particular term for 
a page or so before changing to some other.l Probably all writers do 
this at one time or other, and a surprising amount gets past editors 
into print. Bowne definitely shows his preferences for favored terms. 
lFor example, he speaks of "intellectual first principles" only 
on pp. 141 and 142 and then of "thought-laws" only on pp. 142 and 
143. 
296 
This is one point to be gleaned from the following table of phrases 
Bowne used to refer to the categories in his Metaphysics of 1882: 
phrase used 
1. laws 
a. laws of thoughtl 
b. thought-laws2 
c. laws of formal thought3 
d. laws of mind4 
2. notions 
a. notions5 
b. fundamental notions6 
c. basal notions7 
d. class-notions 
3. principles 
a. mental principles9 
b. rational principleslO 
c. a priori principlesll 














1 Pp. 11 271 741 1431 1441 1521 1711 239 1 3721 3791 4101 4531 4931 
4961 499 1 5001 5011 5031 5041 and 526. 
2Pp. 142 and 143. 3P. 209. 4pp. 239 1 3111 446. 
5 Pp. 21 31 23 1 401 411 551 1481 and 435. 
6Pp. 21 31 and 12. 7p. 479. Bp. 59. 9Pp. 4971 511 1 and 512. 
10Pp. 1-2. 12Pp. 141 and 142. 
e. universal principlesl 
f. principles of interpretation2 
4. activity 
a. constructive activity3 
b. immanent activity4 
c. thought-activity5 
d. activity of the mind6 
5. forms 
a _. forms of thought7 
b. form of our thoughtS 
c. forms of intellect9 
d. forms of the understandinglO 





rational elements of knowledgel2 
a priori elements of know1edgel3 
universal e1ementl4 
7. molds of our thoughtl5 
8 . data of thought16 
9. factorsl7 
10. ideas18 
lp. 526. 2p. 410. 3pp. 411, 429, 440, 
5P. 429. 6P. 432. 7Pp. 214 and 503. 





















and 492. 4p_ 
69-70 and 493. 
450 and 505. 
13pp. 503 and 508. 14p. 11. 15Pp. 36 and 153. 16P. 486. 




Judging by such a tabulation, Bowne seems to have alluded to the 
categories most often as laws, notions, principles, activity, forms, 
and elements and less frequently as molds, data, factors, and ideas. 
It is further apparent that in terms of sheer usage "laws of thought" 
is the, phrase he used more than any other to mean the categories in 
his Metaphysics of 1882. 
Next we must consider those key passages in the first Metaphysics 
which shed more light on Bowne's definition of category. These pas-
sages will, of course, embrace some of the designations we have just 
listed. But, more importantly, they contain some connected account 
of Bowne's thinking about our topic. It is indispensable to ascertain 
this before we make any final statements or pass any judgments. Our 
procedure here will be first to present key quotations without com-
menting. We consider, then, that the following selected passages 
from Bowne's Metaphysics of 1882 shed most light on our topic: 
1. Indeed, the ontological categories are themselves 
nothing but shadows of the living realities of per-
sonal experience; at least, they have a represent-
able meaning nowhere else. Only in our own activi-
ty does the category of action acquire any concrete 
significance. Only in the unity of consciousness 
can the category of unity be realized. In the con-
sciousness of self as identical throughout change we 
have the only example of identity in change. Apart 
from their realization in experience, none of these 
categories have more than a formal meaning; and 
they defy all attempts to conceive them in their ab-
stract significance. The Kantian schemata, which 
were invented to make this possible, distort the 
categories rather than represent them. Instead, 
then, of interpreting personality from the side of 
ontology, we must rather interpret ontology from the 
side of personality. Only personality is able to 
give concrete meaning to those ontological categories 
by which we seek to interpret being.l 
2. The mind is not limited by the laws of thought; 
but realizes itself in and through those laws. 
Apart from them it is nothing; and they apart 
from it are also nothing. The laws are simply 
expressions of the essential nature of mind.2 
3. • •• reality in action is the basal fact; and 
that by abstraction from the direction of this 
action we come to the notion of laws of mind and 
of nature. The mind is not something which obeys 
laws of thought; but it exists as a thinking 
being, and thus founds laws of thought. These 
laws express nothing but the modes of mental ac-
tion, and are simply abstractions from these 
modes.3 
4. Knowledge is not passively imported into the soul, 
but is developed by the soul within itself. Just 
as we perceive another's thought by constructing 
it in our own minds, so we perceive the universe 
by a similar act of construction. The process is 
active, and not passive. It is constructive rather 
than receptive; or rather it is reception only 
through construction. Only in this way can knowl-
edge enter the mind. Only by building the uni-
verse in thought can we perceive it. To the ques-
tion, How is perception possible? we answer, Per-
ception is possible only as the mind constructs 
its objects within itself.4 
5. Inasmuch as by common consent the soul communicates 
with the outer world only through these signs, and 
never comes nearer to the object than such signs 
can bring it, it follows that the principles of in-
terpretation must be in the mind itself, and that 
the resulting construction is primarily only an 
expression of the mind's own nature. All reaction 
is of this sort; it expresses the nature of the 
reacting agent, and knowledge comes under the same 
head.5 
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1Pp. 99-100. 2 Ibid., p. 144. 3Ibid., p. 239. 4rbid., p. 407. 
5 Ibid., pp. 409-410. 
6. Thus we have sought to justify the claim that per-
ception is an active and constructive process on 
the part of the mind, and that the norms of this 
process are laws of the mind itself. We have seen 
that a simply sensitive mind could never attain to 
rationality or even to externality, and that a 
comparing, discriminating, and relating activity 
is the basis of all thought, and hence the basis 
of all knowledge. We conclude that knowledge is 
not a process in the mind, but an act of the mind.l 
7. • •• even the categories themselves admit of no 
deduction or construction by thought, but have 
rather to be accepted by thought as something given. 
Being, change, cause, space, time, etc., are data 
of thought, not constructions by t hought. They 
are as impenetrable in their possibility and con-
nection as they are necessary in their affirmation. 
The sensitive and emotional side of our nature is 
equally inaccessible to a thought-construction. 
Here thought but recognizes and gives form to a 
content which it could never generate of itself. 
Both the categories of thought and the content of 
the sensibility are data of the rational process, 
and are by no means its products. The understand-
ing supplies the name and the logical form of these 
elements, but for the meaning we have always to 
fall back upon an immediate experience or intui-
tion.2 
8. • •• there are elements in the mental life which 
no amount or modification of sensibility can ever 
·produce. These are the rational elements of knowl-
edge. If, then, we view sensation as a first order 
of mental reaction, a reaction against external 
action, we must view the rational forms of activity 
as a second and higher order of mental reaction, a 
reaction against the sensitive states themselves.3 
9. Allowing the world to be real, and to produce sen-
sations in any desirable order in the mind, it is 
still possible to transcend sensation by sensation 
alone. In order to rise above the sentient plane, 
the mind must react against its sensitive states 
with a special rational activity, and bring into 
them the ideas of substance and quality, cause and 
effect, identity and continuity, space and time. 
libid., p. 446. 2Ibid., p. 486. 3Ibid., p. 505. 
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This thinking, judging, differentiating activity 
of the mind is evoked, but only evoked, by sensa-
tion; and these ideas are norms of this activity 
and not deposits of sensation in us. At every 
step of mental movement, the mind appears as or-
ganic. It does not passively receive and simply 
retain what is put into it, but it reacts against 
the external contribution as an organism against 
its food, modifying, assimilating, and working it 
over into the forms required by its own nature. 
That which gives the empirical view such plausi-
bility with the uncritical is the fact that these 
mental principles are so inwoven with all mental 
action that we take them for granted, and even 
seem to find them given in sensation itself. 
That experience, in the common-sense of the term, 
is impossible except through these principles is 
something undreamed of; and the statement, when 
made, seems like a needless complication of a very 
simple matter.l 
2. Bawne 1 s Meaning 
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If we are correct that these are the most revealing passages in 
Bowne's first Metaphysics, then the following remarks are in order. 
In the first place, it is obvious that these passages contain no formal 
definition of category. Presumably, then, Bowne offers none in the 
Metaphysics of 1882. What we are provided in the portions quoted and 
in the others we have cited are brief descriptions and nominal refer-
ences to what a category does. Such statements, as a whole, leave the 
reader to do his own judging on how Bowne defines a category. 
This remark could imply a desperate situation for the interpreter, 
but this is not so here. We are actually able to fathom with consid-
erable assurance what basic conception of category Bowne has in mind. 
1Ibid., pp. 511-512. 
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In the second place, the~we are able to remark that the definition of 
category which Bowne implies is that a category is a type of activity 
of thought • . 'This seems unmistakably conveyed in several of the pas-
sages we quoted. In particular, we mean the third onel where the laws 
of thought are said to "express nothing but the modes of mental action," 
the sixth quotation2 where Bowne asserts that "perception is an active 
constructive process on the part of the mind, and that the norms of 
this process are laws of the mind itself," and the last quotation3 in 
which it is said that "the mind must react against its sensitive states 
with a special rational activity, and bring into them the ideas of sub-
stance and quality, cause and effect, identity: and continuity, space 
and time." The stress in these passages is that a category is a type 
of activity transpiring in the human mind which shares in the construc-
tion of objects. To this we add the remark that Bowne also has made 
it plain in this ensemble of passages that the categories are not de-
rived from sensation. The categories are the rational elements of 
lcnowledge "which no amount or modification of sensibility can ever 
produce.u4 
3. Comparison with Aristotle and Kant 
Bo~roe does not discuss Aristotle's view of category as such in 
his own Metaphysics of 1882. His remarks on Aristotle largely concern 
lFound on p. 299 above. 2Found on p. 300 above. 
3Found on pp. 300-301 above. 
4Part of the eighth quotation found on p. 300 above. 
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the doctrine of potentiality and express disagreement, though with re-
spect.l So we are left to infer that Bowne would notconcede the merit 
of defining a category in the fashion of the early Categories as an 
ultimate predicate which could be predicated of namable entities. 
Hardly would he admit, either, that a category is a type of essential 
being, as Aristotle claims in his own Metaphysics. Bowne's stress on 
the activity of the mind in knowledge is felt in what he says about 
the categories. The tenor of these remarks is incompatible with the 
outlook one finds in Aristotle. 
We confront a different situation, however, when we compare Bowne 
and Kant. There are many references to Kant in the Metaphysics of 
18821 as a good index to the book, which lacks one, would show. In 
these statements Bowne makes plain his divergences from Kant's views. 
Notable among these are his disagreement with Kant's denial of nou-
menal knowledge2 and his assertion that space and time are not forms 
of sensibility but categories.3 But whereas these differences are con-
siderable, Bowne and Kant are both impressed with the active role of 
the mind in knowing objects. We need not re-emphasize Kant's views 
on this but rather quote this statement of Bowne: 
1
see pp. 72 and 92. 
2Bowne says on p. 4831 "The idealism which we have expounded is 
essentially that of Kant, although we differ from Kant in his denial 
of noumenal knowledge." 
3This may be seen in the seventh quotation on p. 300 above, in 
the ninth quotation on p. 300 above, and on p. 178 in Bowne's Meta-
physics. 
The glory of Kant is by no means that he, first of all 
men, conceived that thought might modify its objects, 
but that he first made it a definite princille, . and 
consistently and systematically applied it. 
304 
The chief difference between Bowne and Kant as regards our sub-
ject, judging on the basis of Bowne's Metaphysics of 1882, is on the 
point of explanation. Bowne does not elaborate on exactly what is in-
volved in the activity of thought he calls category when it is opera-
tive in the knowing process. None of the passages from the Metaphysics 
quoted above meet this objection. In contrast, Kant's statements in 
the Critique of Pure Reason take one much futther toward an adequate 
grasp of the categorial function of the mind. Admittedly, it is some-
what unfair to compare Bowne's first Metaphysics with Kant's Critique 
of Pure Reason, since so much more effort and time was spent on the lat-
ter. Yet one cannot ignore the fact that Bowne's book does not pre-
sent the categories as fully and systematically as possible. Thus, the 
reader searching for the view of categories in Bowne's first volume on 
metaphysics is left dissatisfied. One can understand somewhat why the 
author offered another statement in the book we consider next. 
B. In the Theory of Thought and Knowledge 
Bowne's Theory of Thought and Knowledge was published2 in 1897, 
fifteen years after the first edition of the Metaphysics. It is a 
1Ibid., p. 378. See also ibid., pp. 492 and 508. 
2In New York by Harper and Brothers also. 
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shorter work by comparison to its predecessor, though hardly to be con-
sidered a small book. It runs to 389 pages, which is only 145 less 
than the Metaphysics, and would make a substantial paperback on the 
modern market. Bowne divided his Theory of Thought and Knowledge 
into two unequal parts following a brief Introduction of five pages. 
Two-thirds of the book is devoted to eleven chaptersl under the head-
ing of Theory of Thought. The remaining third is occupied by six chap-
ters2 on Theory of Knowledge. As we have noted, one of his chapters 
was on The categories. We approach this treatise on epistemology, 
then, with every expectation of a fuller treatment of our subject than 
we found in the Metaphysics of 1882. 
Bowne has not disappointed us, at least when it reduces to the 
question of how frequently he alludes to the categories in his Theory 
of Thought and Knowledge. We meet with a greater number of passages 
where there .is some mention or discussion of category. The problem of 
how to handle them is greater than ever. So for the sake of both uni-
formity and convenience, we will keep to the same method of presenting 
evidence that we used in dealing with the Metaphysics. This means, 
first, stating the facts about Bowne's usage of terms when he referred 
1These he titled The General Nature of Thought, General Condi-
tions of Thought, How Does the Mind Get Objects?, The categories, The 
Notion, The Judgment, Inference, Proof, Deduction and Induction, Ex-
planation, and Some Structural Fallacies. 
2Titled Philosophic Scepticism, Thought and Thing, Realism and 
Idealism, Apriorism and Empiricism, Knowledge and Belief, and The 
Formal and Relative Elements in Thought. 
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to the categories and, second, noting those passages where he wrote re-
vealingly about them. 
1. Evidence Furnished by the Theory of Thought and Knowledge 
Bowne shows considerable variety in the way in which he refers 
to the categories in his Theory of Thought and Knowledge. There is 
hardly any more compact way to be specific in supporting this claim 
than to present his usage of terms in the following table: 
phrase used times used 
1. principles 
a. principles! 12 
b. immanent principles2 4 
c. immanent mental principles3 1 
d. immanent principles of intelligence4 1 
e. principles immanent in intellectS 1 
f. principles immanent in the mind6 1 
g. principles immanent in the understanding7 1 
h. mental principles8 1 
i. thought princip1es9 1 
j. formal principles10 1 
1Pp. iv, 59, 601 61 1 621 87, 112, 113, 116, 307, 344, and 364. 
2Pp. 59, 61, 99, and 112. 3p. 59. 4p. 61. Sp. 364. 
6P. 351. 7p. 113. 8P. 60. 9P. 81. lOp. 59. 
387. 
k. formal principles of thoughtl 1 
1. a priori principles2 1 
m. logical principles3 1 
n. organic principles4 1 
o. implicit principles5 1 
p. self-evident principles6 1 
q. determining principles of intelligence7 1 
r. elementary and essential principles8 1 
2. laws 
a. laws9 
b. laws of thoughtlO 
c. laws of our thoughtll 
d. laws of the thought processl2 
e. laws of mental synthesisl3 
f. laws of nature immanent in the under-
standingl4 









lp. vi. 2p. 364. 3p. 117. 4p. 61. 5P. 60. 6p. 278. 
7p. 60. 8p. 115. 
9Pp. 9, 18, 31, 58, 68, 116, 267, 280, 307, and 355. 
lOPp. 66, 107, 243, 244, 277, 285, 286, 297, 348, 384, 386, and 
llPp. 32 and 309. 12p. 17. 13pp. 70 and 74. 14p. 114. 











forms of thought2 
forms of intelligence3 
forms of mental activity4 
forms of experienceS 
rational forms6 
general forms7 
general forms of mental actionS 
4. truths 
a. necessary truths9 
b. eternal truths of reasonlO 
5. ideas 
a. ideasll 
b. abstract ideasl2 
6. classifications 
a. fundamental classificationsl3 
b. primal classificationsl4 
7. norms15 
8. unpicturable notions of intelligencel6 


















2Pp. 7, 116, 280, and 296. 3pp. ll and 56. 4p. 116. 
sP. 112. 6p. 346. 7p. 99. 8 p. 115. 9Pp. 307 and 308. 
lOp. 308. 11pp. 10 and 99. l2p. 112. 13p. 120. l4p. 140. 
15Pp. 59 and 61. 16Pp. 10 and 81. 
9. factors of thoughtl 
10. contents of the pure reason2 
11. moulds of thought3 
12. outlines within which alone 
possible4 








This tabulation shows that in his Theory of Thought and Knowl-
edge Bowne spoke most frequently of the categories as "principles," 
particularly as "immanent" ones. He continued to show decided pref-
erence for "laws," especially "laws of thought" so strongly favored 
in the previous Metaphysics. This table shows also that Bowne used 
much less frequently such highly varied designations for categories as 
truths, ideas, classifications, norms, notions, factors, contents, 
moulds, outlines, and framework. 
Before commenting further, we present next evidence in the form 
of selected passages in the Theory of Thought and Knowledge which do 
far more than name a name for category. We find more of these in this 
study of epistemology, partly because it contains a separate chapter6 
devoted to the categories. The passages in Bowne 1 s "TTK" we consider 
to say most about how he defined a category are the following: 
1 p . 37. 2 p. 59. 3p. 296. 4p. 194. 
6comprising pp. 59-116. 
l. The root thought of the work is that thought is 
an organic activity which unfolds from within, and 
can never be put together mechanically from with-
out.l 
2. The conclusion is that a world of things can exist 
for us only as the mind reconstructs it as a world 
of thought. If we prefer to say that the real 
world is already a world of thought, then the con-
clusion is that the world of objective thought be-
comes anything for us only as we rethink it and 
thus constitute it our object. However real or 
ideal the world may be, it becomes an object for 
us only as the mind builds up in consciousness a 
system of conceptions, and relates their contents 
under the various forms of intelligence.2 
3. We have now to study those immanent mental prin-
ciples which underlie articulate experience and 
make it possible. They are the norms by which the 
mind proceeds, implicitly or explicitly, in fixing, 
defining, and relating its objects. They consti-
tute the framework of thought, and form the con-
tents of the pure reason. These principles, in ac-
cordance with a philosophic tradition of long stand-
ing, we call the categories; but any other name 
will do as well, provided the thing be understood.3 
4. There seems to be a demand that the categories as 
principles should reveal themselves as such in con-
sciousness. This is a mistake. As we walk in en-
tire ignorance of our muscles, so we often think in 
entire ignorance of the principles which underlie 
and determine thinking. But as anatomy reveals 
that the apparently simple act of walking involves 
a highly complex muscular activity, so analysis re-
veals that the apparently simple act of thinking 
involves a system of mental principles.4 
5. The categories are such immanent principles. They 
are nothing which can be shown to the senses; they 
are manifested in the mental product. They are not 
principles which the mind uses to know with, but 
they determine the form of knowing. They are not 
empty forms of the pigeon-hole type into which the 
mind sorts its experience; but they are the organic 
1 P. i. 2 P. 56. 3 P. 59. 4 P. 60. 
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principles by which experience is built up. They 
are as necessary to the understanding of experi-
ence as the law of growth is necessary to the 
understanding of organic form, and they are equally 
unpic tura ble .1 
6. Thought is to a very great extent a relating ac-
tivity, and the progress of thought consists largely 
in establishing rational relations among the raw 
materials of our experience. Indeed, our objects 
are so largely defined and constituted by their re-
lations that nothing articulate would remain if the 
element of relation were eliminated. • • • The re-
lations of things, so far as they exist for thought, 
are instituted by thought, and the relations insti-
tuted can only be viewed as objective expressions 
of principles immanent in thought itself.2 
7. The metaphysical categories, such as being, iden-
tity, causality, cannot be presented in sense at 
all. They are rather the unpicturable notions of 
intelligence, and are the chief means whereby the 
mind transforms the fleeting and unintelligible im-
pressions of sense into an abiding object for 
thought. Of course, formal logic insists on turn-
ing these categories over to metaphysics, on the 
ground that they concern existence rather than 
thought. But it is plain that they concern ex-
istence for us only because they are primarily 
thought principles. In the articulate conception 
of objects they are the leading factor.3 
8. These are the categories which underlie our ele-
mentary objective experience. Experience becomes 
experience, or becomes articulate, only as these 
categories appear in the flux of impressions. 
1 
They are not applied to a something given to con-
sciousness, but the mind gets objects or conscious-
ness acquires definite contents only as they are 
applied to the raw material of impressions. Of 
course they are not to be viewed as primarily con-
scious possessions of the mind, but rather as im-
manent principles. They become conscious posses-
sions at a later date, when the mind, by reflec-
tion on its own work, finds that it has been con-
p. 61. 2 p. 62. 3p. 81. 
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stituting its objects under the categories, and 
then, by abstraction, gets them in the form of 
ideas. 
These categories also give the form or frame-
work of elementary experience. If we conceive 
the specific contingent contents of experience re-
moved, there would remain in the framework of space, 
time, number, quantity, quality, substance and at-
tribute, cause and effect, etc., and all possible 
experiences would necessarily take on some of these 
general forms in becoming anything for us.l 
9. Thus we have sought to give a hint of the funda-
mental categories and relations of pure thought. 
They constitute the framework of intelligence, and 
when experience is built into them they give the 
form of experience. As immanent principles, they 
underlie experience. As abstract ideas, they are 
reached by abstraction from that experience which, 
as principles, they make possible.2 
10. The forms of knowledge are primarily forms of 
thought, and we can have no knowledge which is not 
determined by those forms. Hence it follows that 
our apparent knowledge can have no objective va-
lidity unless our objects themselves are cast in 
the moulds of thought, or unless the laws and cate-
gories of thought are also laws and categories of 
being. Without this essential identity, or, at 
least parallelism, between our thought and things, 
there must be a parallax between the conception and 
the reality, and a resulting failure of knowledge. 
Without assuming, at least implicitly, that the 
laws of thought are valid for reality, knowledge is 
impossible~ and the theory of knowledge vanishes in 
absurdity. 
11. That articulate experience is impossible without a 
constitutive action of the mind whereby the sense 
elements are given a rational form is clear. That 
this activity must proceed according to principles 
immanent in intellect itself is equally plain. 
That the source of these principles cannot be found 
in anything external to the mind is likewise mani-
fest. They are not conscious possessions of the 
mind prior to all experience, but they reveal them-
selves in and through the experience which they alone 
make possible.4 
lp. 99. 2 P. 112. 3pp. 296-297. 4p. 364. 
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2. Bowne's Meaning 
The above key passages and facts of usage lead us to comment in 
the following vein. In the first place, it is apparent once again 
that Bowne offers his readers no single, formal definition of category. 
He continues his practice of using many terms as synonyms descriptive 
of category and its function . In fact, we confront more of these in 
the Theory of Thought and Knowledge, although the book has a chapter 
on the categories in which a precisely defining statement might be 
expected to appear. 
We are faced, therefore, with essentially the same situation 
as in the earlier Metaphysics. We have to judge from nominal defini-
tions and descriptive designations offered somewhat unsystematically. 
Nevertheless, it appears that there is no marked change in thought from 
the Metaphysics of 1882. Bowne continues to think of a category as a 
type of activity of thought. The category plays an active role in the 
process by which the mind constructs its objects or has experience. 
This claim for an active role played by the categories in knowledge 
is variously expressed in each of our quotations from the Theory of 
Thought and Knowledge, except the fourth one. 1 The latter, instead, 
brings out another notable emphasis by Bowne in this later work, name-
ly, categories are immanent , that is, may not be consciously known by 
the mind in which they are active.2 
lFound on p. 310 above. 
2see also our third, fifth, eighth, ninth, and tenth quotations 
found on pp . 310-312 above. 
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3. Comparison with Aristotle and Kant 
In his Theory of Thought and Knowledge Bowne makes only a few re-
marks about Aristotle. But their implications far exceed their number. 
After pointing outl that he is adopting the term "categories," Bowne 
adds, "In adopting this name, however, we assume no responsibility for 
any historical scheme of the categories such as that of Aristotle or 
Kant."2 The reader is prepared for further disagreement in Bowne's 
chapter on the categories, and it appears on p. 112 in the remark that 
"Aristotle picked up his categories empirically, if not at random, in 
the field of grammar; and his conception of their function has little 
in common with the modern one." Without elaboration Bowne plainly 
considers his view of category different from Aristotle's. We heartily 
concur. 
As regards Kant and Bowne in the Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
we observe frequent reference by Bowne to features of Kant's system. 
Just as before in the Metaphysics, Bowne both agrees and disagrees. 
We have already noted one disclaimer in the paragraph just above, and 
others could be added.3 We will observe that Bowne sees little point 
to Kant's schematism procedure4 and continues to oppose Kant's doctrine 
1In our third quotation on p. 310 above. 
2Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 59. 
3see ibid., pp. 104-105, 1101 112-1131 281-283, and 285-287. 
4see ibid., pp. 234-235. 
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of unknowable noumena.l Nevertheless, Bowne again shows remarkable 
agreement with Kant in regard to the function of the categories. 
Bowne could just as well be making this statement about himself: 
It was reserved for Kant to show that such an experi-
ence can never be, or become, anything articulate 
without an organizing activity on the part of the 
mind according to principles immanent in the under-
standing.2 
In fact, it is remarkable how many passages there are in which Bowne 
describes Kant's view of the categories in terms Bowne uses to state 
his own view. Consider what results if one imagines it is Bowne being 
spoken of instead of Kant in the following passages from the Theory of 
Thought and Knowledge: 
He showed, once for all, that experience itself is 
possible only through formative and constructive 
principles inherent and immanent in the nature of 
reason. 3 
He showed that perception is no passive reception 
of ready-made knowledge, but involves a complex 
constructive activity on the part of the mind, 
whereby the object is put before consciousness. 
The object we perceive is really the object we 
1For example, Bowne says, "At most, all that follows from experi-
ence, or from the Kantian premises, is that things are external to 
our thought; that is, are independent of our thought. It does not 
follow that they are independent of all thought, or that they are. in-
commensurate with our thought. But the independence of our thought 
was mistaken for an independence of all thought, and the doctrine of 
the unknowable followed as a matter of course" (ibid., p. 303). 
2Ibid., p. 113. 3Ibid., pp. 274-275. 
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mentally construct.l 
• • • Kant said that we do indeed have an articu-
late experience, but that it is possible only be-
cause the ideas supposed to be abstracted from it 
are immanent in the mind as conditions of experi-
ence. We may1 then1 abstract the categories as 
formal ideas from experience, but only because the 
categories are the immanent principles which make 
experience possible.2 
Whether Bowne's view of category is actually the same in essence 
as Kant's is the important question. An affirmative reply seems re-
quired. Bowne does differ with Kant in viewing time and space as cate-
gories, in distinguishing3 between ontological categories4 applicable 
to the metaphysical world and phenomenal categories5 which apply to the 
physical world1 and in not deriving the list of categories from the ta-
ble of the forms of judgment. But when it comes to recognizing that 
the mind possesses active factors in terms of which data are synthesized 
into objects, Bowne and Kant see eye to eye. 
c. In the Revised Metaphysics of 1898 
In a letter to a former student6 written on December 251 18971 
1Ibid., p. 280. 2Ibid. 1 p. 346. 
3see ibid. 1 pp. 80-811 and note our seventh quotation on p. 311 
above. 
4The ontological or metaphysical categories for Bowne are being, 
quality, identity, causality, purpose, with necessity and possibility 
as doubtful additions (ibid. 1 pp. 82-112). 
5Time1 space, number 1 motion1 and quantity are phenomenal cate-
gories for Bowne (ibid. 1 pp. 66-80). 
~rs. John L. Dearing. It is included in her article, "Reminis-
cences of Borden Parker Bowne," The Philosophical Forum, XV (1957) 1 
51-55. 
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Bowne provides a good description of what we may expect to find in his 
revised Metaphysics.! Bowne wrote: 
I have just finished the revision of my Metaphys-
ics--! sent off the MS to the printers Dec. 22nd. 
The work is considerably shorter than the old one; 
as the publication last spring of the Theory of 
Thought and Knowledge made it unnecessary to re-
produce the epistemological matter; and besides 
I have condensed in the putting. The new form is 
a great improvement on the old. With this I have 
said my say on the leading problems of specula-
tion.2 
The new edition of the Metaphysics is shorter by 105 pages. It rep-
resents a rather substantial rearrangement and restatement of the 
first edition. The Introduction is reduced from twenty-three pages 
to nine and the number of chapters from fifteen to thirteen. The same 
major headings--Ontology, Cosmology, and Psychology--are used, but the 
grouping and titling of the chapters under them shows some change.3 
Conspicuously absent is the chapter on The Process of Knowing, since, 
as Bowne says in his letter and in the new · Introductio~4 epistemology 
1Published in New York as a revised second edition by Harper and 
Brothers in 1898. 
2The Philosophical Forum, XV, 55. 
lunder Ontology in the revised Metaphysics, Bowne placed five 
chapters instead of six and titled them The Notion of Being, The Nature 
of Things, Change and Identity, Causality, and The World-Ground. Un-
der Cosmology appear four chapters, not five as before, titled Space; 
Time; Matter, Force, and Motion; and Nature. Under Psychology he 
grouped four also but retitled as The Soul, Soul and Body, Of Mental 
Mechanism, and Freedom and Necessity. 
4 p. 1. 
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had been discussed in the Theory of Thought and Knowledge. Further, 
Bowne claims to offer the same thought of the earlier Metaphysics but 
in a different manner of presentation. He says in the new Preface: 
This work is a revision of my earlier work on the 
subject. For "substance of doctrine" the teaching is 
the same. The chief changes are in the form and 
exposition. The fundamental doctrine is more sys-
tematically set forth, and is unfolded into more 
detailed inferences; but the general view is un-
changed.! 
We approach the revised Metaphysics of 1898, therefore, prepared by 
its author for meeting with no change in his thought about category. 
1. Evidence Furnished by the Metaphysics of 1898 
We plan to treat the evidence in the revised Metaphysics in the 
same manner as we did the first edition. This means first tabulating 
Bowne's usage of terms employed to suggest category in the following 
manner: 
phrase used times used 
1. laws 
a. laws2 7 
b. laws of thought3 2 
c. laws of formal thought~ 1 
d. thought 1aws:5 3 
1rbid., p. i. 2Pp. 108, 109, 110, 111, 119, 268, and 414. 
3Pp. 44 and 110. 4P. 155. 5Pp. 71, 109, and 110. 
e. mental lawsl 1 
2. principles 
a. principles2 2 
b. principles of thought3 2 
c. first principles4 2 
d. intellectual first principles5 1 
e. mental principle6 2 
f. formal principles7 1 
g. abstract principles8 1 

















forms of thoughtl5 













1 p. 124. 2Pp. 108 and 109. 
6Pp. 124 and 125. 
3 Pp. 1 and 2. 4pp. 108 and 109. 
5 p. 108. 7 8 p. 2. p. 67. 
lOpp. 13, 27, 94, 95, and 409. llp. 2. 12p. 14. 13p. 29. 
14Pp. 40 arid 138. 15P. 161. 16P. 119. 17P. 138. 18p. 139. 
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5. conceEtions 
a. general conceptionsl 1 
b. abstract conceptions2 1 
6. fundamental philosophical conceEts3 1 
7· modes of intellectual manifestation4 1 
8. intellectual moulds5 1 
9. constitutive elements6 1 
10. first truths7 1 
11. factors8 1 
This table makes plain that in the new edition of the MetaEhysics 
Bowne preferred to refer to the categories as laws, principles, and 
notions, and only incidentally as forms, conceptions, concepts, modes, 
and moulds. Some comparison with his preferences in terminology as 
tabulated above may be instructive at this point. In the Theory of 
Thought and Knowledse published the year before in 1897, Bowne decided-
ly favored principles and laws.9 In the first MetaEhysics of 1882 he 
preferred laws, notions, and principles.10 To summarize usage in the 
three main books, by far Bowne preferred most to speak of the cate-
gories as "laws," especially as "laws of thought." Next more frequent-
ly he referred to them as "principles." 
lp. 1. 3p. vi. 4p. 424. Sp. 60. 
7p. 109. Bp. 244. 9see pp. 306-307 and 309 above. 
lOsee pp. 296-297 and 298 above. 
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The second step in the procedure we have adopted for surveying 
the evidence in Bowne's books most important to us is to note what 
he says at length in the most important passages. These in the Meta-
physics of 1898, in our judgment, are the following: 
1. But when we seek to understand intelligence itself 
we find that intelligence cannot be understood 
through its own categories, but rather, conversely, 
the categories must be understood through our ex-
perience of intelligence itself. Apart from this 
they are purely formal, or else mere shadows of 
living experience. Only in the unity of conscious-
ness can the category of unity be realized. In the 
consciousness of self as identical throughout 
change we have the only example of identity in 
change. The conception of a permanent thing with 
changing states is founded as conception, as well 
as realized in being, in the fact of the conscious 
self. Apart from this personal reference, the 
categories defy all attempts to give them any meta-
physical significance •••• Instead, then, of in-
terpreting personality from the side of ontology, 
we must rather interpret ontology from the side of 
personality. Only personality is able to give con-
crete meaning to those ontological categories by 
which we seek to interpret being.l 
2. The mind is not limited by the laws of thought; but 
realizes itself in and through those laws. Apart 
from them it is nothing; and they apart from it 
are also nothing. The laws are simply expressions 
of the essential nature of mind.2 
3. • •• the categories are nothing which precede in-
telligence and make it possible; they are rather 
the categories of intelligence, and for their con-
crete meaning we are referred, not to a formal 
analysis of abstract ideas, but to our experience 
of living intelligence.3 
4. All the categories of reason manifest themselyes, 
at least implicitly, even in the crude products of 
2 P. 110. 3p. 186. 
spontaneous thought. Space, time, matter, motion, 
and force seem to supply all the materials for ob-
jective thought and speculation. They are the 
factors into which, apparently, experience resolves 
itself upon analysis, and out of which experience 
must be built.l 
5. Logic shows that experience arises only as the cate-
gories of thought are applied to the raw material 
of the sensibility; and that a mastery of experi-
ence is possible only as phenomena are subject to 
fixed laws. The mind, then, in its effort to ra-
tionalize, comprehend, and control experience, must 
reflect upon the categories of its procedure and 
must look for the laws of phenomena.2 
6. • •• intelligence cannot be understood through the 
categories, but that the categories must be under-
stood through intelligence. Active intelligence is 
the only illustration of the concrete meaning of 
the metaphysical categories.3 
7. In our study of the categories we have made another 
discovery, namely, that they are either purely 
formal, and hence phenomenal, or else that they ad-
mit of being truly conceived only in the forms of 
living experience. Here we come upon what may be 
called a transcendental empiricism, in distinction 
from the traditional sense empiricism. That is 1 
instead of testing our fundamental experience by 
the categories, we must rather find the meaning of 
the categories in experience. This experience, how-
ever, is not the passive experience of sense, but 
the active self-experience of intelligence.4 
8. And the case of the categories is really worse than 
Kant represented; for when abstractly taken, they 
not only defy conception, but they contradict them-
selves; and they continue to do so until they are 
brought out of their abstraction and are looked 
upon as modes of intellectual manifestation. As 
1 
we have so often said, intelligence cannot be under-
stood through the categories, but the categories 
must be understood through our living experience 
of intelligence itself. Intelligence is and acts. 
P. 244. 3pp. 340-341. 4pp. 423-424. 
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This is the deepest fact. It is not subject to any 
laws beyond itself, nor to any abstract principles 
within itself. Living, acting intelligence is the 
source of all truth and reality, and is its own and 
only standard. And all the categories, as abstract 
principles, instead of being the components of the 
mental life, are simply shadows of that life, and 
find in that life their only realization.l 
9. Our earlier contention that knowledge arises in the 
mind only through its own activity remains unshaken 
and unshakable; but if we try to explain knowledge 
in its essential nature, or to justify it by any-
thing beyond itself, we soon find the task hopeless.2 
2. Bowne 's Meaning 
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We will come away disappointed from the revised Metaphysics of 
1898 if we approach it expecting to find within its pages a revised 
conception of category. In fact, we will be somewhat disappointed 
with the attention paid the general subject of the categories. The 
above list of quotations will bear out this judgment. They contain 
no formal definition as such, though Bowne had opportunity in the re-
vision to supply one. Furthermore, the collection of passages leaves 
a good deal to be desired when compared to those excerpted from the 
first Metaphysics on pp. 298-301 above. The latter passages are 
longer and meatier and do more to describe categorial function. This 
judgment is not due to a prejudicial selection from the revised Meta-
physics. There are no longer, meatier passages on the subject than 
those selected. It seems instead that Bowne in his revision did not 
become more explanatory on the subject of category but rather less so. 
lpp. 424-425. 
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This statement is not to be interpreted to mean that Bowne with-
drew his definition of category as type of activity of thought. This 
is not explicitly done, by any stretch of the imagination, and one 
may see supporting statements in four of the passages we quoted . l The 
latter also convey an emphasis on the claim that the ontological cate-
gories have meaning only when considered in relation to conscious, 
personal intelligence . 2 
3. Comparison with Aristotle and Kant 
Bowne does not mention Aristotle ' s view of category in his re-
vision of the Metaphysics. This fact plus the sparser statements on 
category furnish no basis for revoking our previous judgment. 3 This, 
it may be recalled, was that Aristotle ' s and Bowne's views of category 
are incompatible . 
Kant appears rather frequently in the pages of the revised Meta-
physics but with this significant change . Bowne's statements about 
his views are more polemical in tone . 4 There are fewer passages prais-
ing Kant and recognizing his contributions in the style of the one we 
quoted above on p . 304 . Instead we read remarks such as these: 
lspecifically, the fourth , fifth , eighth, and ninth ones on pp . 
321-323 above. 
2see our first , third, seventh, and eighth quotations on pp . 321-
323 above . 
~ound on p . 303 above . 
4see the revised Metaphysics, pp . 7, 8, 138, 146, 161, 175, 244-
245, 332- 335, and 424 . 
• • • the categories are primarily principles of 
thought. Kant claimed that they are only such 
principles, and have no significance for reality 
in itself. In this way he overturned his own 
system; for reality becomes only a form of words 
when the categories are denied all objective va-
lidity} 
But even such words show similarity between Bowne and Kant on the 
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score of recognizing principles of thought . However, we are left dis-
satisfied with the revision of Bowne's Metaphysics. It provides less 
basis for a fruitful comparison with Kant on the definition of category 
than did its predecessor whose shortcomings on this point we have noted . 2 
D. Elsewhere in Bowne 
Our plans for this chapter as stated on pp. 293 and 294 called for 
concentration on three main books by Bowne followed by a rapid survey 
of five others. We turn now to the remaining five . These are Bowne ' s 
Introduction to Psychological Theory, Philosophy of Theism, Theism, 
Personalism, and Kant and Spencer . Our grouping of them is due to the 
fact that they do speak of category but less frequently than the three 
we have examined . This will be brought out in the following report on 
a survey of their content made with our subject in mind . 
1 . Introduction to Psychological Theory 
In 1887 Bowne ' s Introduction to Psychological Theory was pub-
2see p . 304 above . 
326 
lished. 1 The work is of the textbook type and runs to 329 pages. It 
contains seven chapters and two appendices grouped as The Factors of 
the Mental Life plus five chapters on The Factors in Combination. The 
categories appear as a subheading in a chapter titled The Thought Fac-
tor. 
Bowne, however, alludes rather frequently to the categories 
throughout the book. He serves notice, though, that his inquiry "will 
have to do with their psychological nature and origin, rather than with 
their metaphysical significance."2 We witness once more his penchant 
for referring to the categories as princip1es 3 and laws4 and less fre-
quently as forms,5 notions,6 norms,7 elements, 8 idea1s,9 ideas, 10 and 
conceptions.l1 In fact, Bowne shows his indifference toward a precise 
designation in saying, 
Hence a study of the thought activity demands some no-
tice of those general relations which thought finds, or 
establishes, among its objects. They have been various-
ly called the categories of thought, norms of distinction 
and comparison, regulative ideas, etc. Some of these 
expressions may be better than others, but the meaning is 
the same in a11.12 
1Pub1ished in New York by Harper and Brothers. 
2Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 126. 
3Ibid., pp. 147, 150, 153, 165, 170, 280, 281, and 290. 
4Ibid., pp. 132, 150, 165, and 297. 5Ibid., p. 280. 
6Ibid., p. 159. 7Ibid., p. 126. 8Ibid., p. 157. 
9Ibid., p. 115. 10Ibid., p. 126. 11Ibid., p. 297. 
12Ibid., p. 126. 
327 
This passage is instructive also on Bowne ' s thinking about cate-
gorial function . To it we wish to add three others as the most reveal-
ing on the latter point in this textbook on psychology . Speaking of 
the categories on p . 174, Bowne says, 
We do not regard them as existing primarily as ideas, 
but as being determinative principles of mental pro-
cedure, or as constitutive principles of intelligenc~ . 
• • • there are certain directive and constitutive 
principles in the developed mentallife, which can only 
be viewed as expressing the fundamental build of the 
mind itself . 
Then, discussing perception and the factors which enter into it, Bowne 
states, 
Thought contributes its categories, and the sensibili-
ty furnishes the raw material •••• Essentially, per-
ception is a process of rationalizing sensation, or an 
application of the categories to the raw material of 
sensation . l 
Finally, after noting that the thought process presents a spontaneous 
stage and a reflective stage, Bowne says , 
In the former stage the laws and categories of thought 
are implicitly present as principles of our constitu-
tion; in the latter, they are explicit as formal rules 
of mental procedure . This constitutional activity 
furnishes the basis of reflective thought . 2 
All of these quoted passages are harmonious with a view of category 
which emphasizes its constitutive, active role in the mind--a view we 
1rbid ., p . 253 . 2rbid ., p . 280 . 
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have come to regard as Bowne's. 
2. Philosophy of Theism 
We may quickly dispose of Bowne's Philosophy of Theism. This book 
of 269 pages published in 18871 was rewritten and enlarged as Bowne's 
Theism. Besides, there is scant mention of the categories in the Phi-
losophy of Theism. They appear only on pages 65, 79, 82, 83, and 261. 
None of these passages contains more than brief mention of the cate-
gories. It is not devoid of significance, though, that in only five 
passages, Bowne refers to the categories under such various rubrics as 
laws of thought,2 principles of cosmic being,3 necessary truths of 
reason, 4 and laws of reason.s Thus the evidence that Bowne designated 
the categories in manifold ways continues to mount. 
3. Theism 
For the Deems Lectures of 1902 at New York University, Bowne re-
wrote his Philosophy of Theism of 1887. The published result is the 
volume he titled Theism.6 In the Preface to this new work of 323 pages, 
he says that he enlarged on the arguments from epistemology and meta-
1By Harper and Brothers in New York. 
2Philosophy of Theism, p. 65. 3Ibid. 
4Ibid., p. 82. 5Ibid., p. 261. 
6Published in New York by the American Book Company in 1902. 
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physics. 1 Consequently, we anticipated possibly more to be said about 
the categories. 
We are not disappointed at least as far as number of references 
to category is concerned. They appear on far more than five pages as 
in the Philosophy of Theism. And once more we find the categories 
variously designated. They are called forms,2 principles,3 notions,4 
laws, 5 molds,6 and conceptions.7 
But one finds few passages where Bowne in these lectures on theism 
discusses what a category does. This is not too difficult to under-
stand, considering the circumstances. Yet one can point only to the 
brief remark that "in a very real sense the mind in knowing things is 
simply manifesting itself by putting its own laws and forms into and 
upon its experience. 118 All the other notable statements express the 
claim, familiar to anyone who has read Bowne on the categories, that 
the categories have meaning only on the personal plane of active in-
telligence. Witness these three passages in the Theism: 
1. Indeed, the meaning of the categories, as meta-
physics shows, is revealed only in the living 
self-experience of intelligence~ and here their 
only concrete reality is found. 
1 Theism, p. iii. 
2Ibid., pp. 45, 100, 130, and 321. 
3 Ibid., pp. 131 and 132. 4rbid., pp. 100 and 140. 
5 Ibid., pp. 117 and 130. 6Ibid. 1 p. 130. 7Ibid., 
8Theism1 p. 130. 9Ibid., p. 99. 
p. 99. 
2. Metaphysics shows that active intelligence alone 
fills out the true notion of being, unity, iden-
tity, and causality. On the impersonal and me-
chanical plane these categories all vanish or 
contradict themselves.l 
3. • • • there can be no philosophizing on the im-
personal pL.,ne, because all the categories of the 
understanding, when impersonally taken, are only 
forms of thought without contents. They can be 
realized and made intelligible only when viewed 
as forms of living experience.2 
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Statements such as these lend general support to our contention 
that for Bowne a category is a type of activity in the mind. 
4. Personalism 
We consider Bowne's Personalism a rewarding one for our investiga-
tion. It is a work with many other merits and a justly famous product 
of Bowne's pen. It was published in 19083 as a book with 326 pages 
comprising the Harris Lectures at Northwestern University. The subject 
of category comes up rather frequently, and we have more to consider 
than a variety of terms. The latter is present, however, for Bowne 
shows himself as speaking of the categories most frequently as laws4 
and principles5 but also as forms,6 modes,7 notions, 8 and concepts.9 
1 Ibid., p. 140. 2Ibid., p. 321. 
3In Boston by Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 
4Personalism, pp. 57, 66, 69, 75, 83, 89, 128, and 205. 
5Ibid., pp. 55, 63, 69, 83, 128, and 218. 
6Ibid., 
8Ibid., 
pp. 75, 100, and 139. 7Ibid., pp. 105 and 254. 
p. 236. 9Ibid., p. 218. 
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A number of passages, though, reveal more of Bowne's thought on the 
subject than these or any designations can. 
We note, for example, the recurrence of Bowne's insistence that 
the categories be considered in relation to personal experience if 
they are to acquire meaning. Turning the pages of personalism, we 
meet this emphasis repeatedly stated. Firs~ on pp. 101-102, he says, 
• • • the categories have simply the function of form-
ing and expressing some matter which is directly ex-
perienced or which can be assimilated to experience, and 
apart from that relation they are formal and empty. 
They must always be brought into contact with experience 
in some way in order to acquire reality, or to make sure 
they represent any possible object for thought. Thus 
if we talk of the categories of being, unity, identity, 
causality, substance, etc., in abstraction from any 
given experience, they are utterly vacuous, so that we 
cannot tell whether there be any corresponding fact or 
not; and it is only as we find these categories re-
alized in living self-experience that they acquire other 
than a formal meaning, or pass for anything more than 
purely verbal counters. 
Then on pp. 104 and 1051 he says, 
The categories themselves are not something which pre-
cede the mind and found its possibility. They are 
rather modes of mental operation. They are the forms 
which the mind gives to its experience, but the mind is 
not to be understood through them. Rather they are to 
be understood through the mind's living experience of 
itself. 
Again, on p. 254, the point is made in these words: 
• • • the various categories of thought, apart from 
their formal character as modes of intellectual pro-
cedure, get any real significance only in the concrete 
and self-conscious life of the living mind. 
Finally, on p. 261, he says the categories 
• o o may easily be defined in such a way as to in-
volve contradictions or make them worthless, but phi-
losophy is not concerned over the fate of such ab-
stracti ons ; it cares only to know the forms the cate-
gories take on in living experience. 
In this last statement particularly Bowne helps explain why he has 
steered clear of offering formal definitions of the categories. 
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We also wish to note that Personalism contains several statements 
in which emphasis is placed upon the activity of the mind in knowing 
with possibly the implication that a category is a type of such ac-
tivity. Bowne remarks that "The principles of knowing are primarily 
immanent laws of mental activity'.'l; that "knowledge is nothing which 
can be imported ready-made into a passive mind, but the mind must ac-
tively construct knowledge for itself"2; that he has nspoken of the 
mind as imposing its laws and forms upon experience and thus reaching 
objects"3; and that "the categories in themselves are simply forms 
of mental arrangement and merely prescribe the form in which experi-
ence is to be ordered when it is given . "4 Statements stressing ac-
tivity in a book published two years before Bowne's death show a last-
ing emphasis in his thought. 
5o Kant and Spencer 
It is perhaps true that a similar claim may be made about Bowne's 
1Ibido, p. 57. zibid . , Po 64. 3Ibid., Po 75. 4 Ibid., p. lOOo 
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Kant and Spencer. This last book in our list was published posthu-
mously in 1912. 1 The book was derived from Bowne's lecture notes and 
put in its present form by other hands. Therefore, it is perhaps to 
be viewed as not the primary source which Bowne's books published be-
fore his death in 1910 are. 
However, in this large book of 440 pages,2 there are several re-
vealing passages as regards Bowne's thought about category. If we 
felt fully certain that the statements as presented would have passed 
Bowne's critical eye, much could be made of them. Because of their 
cloudy position, we are able here only to point them out in passing. 
The passages in Kant and Spencer we have in mind are, first, a 
restatement of Kant's doctrine of experience presented in a form to 
which Bowne gives approval . The passage emphasizes the constructive 
action of the mind in accordance with its immanent principles, which 
are presumably the categories, as follows: 
• • • experience is possible only through the con-
structive action of the mind according to principles 
immanent in it; and thus we see that knowledge in 
general is possible only in the same way. The early 
notion of a passive mind passively receiving impres-
sions made upon it must be definitely and finally set 
aside, and in its place must rather be put the notion 
of a mind active, constructive, constitutive, a mind 
which by its own action according to its own rational 
nature attains to knowledge and systematized experi-
ence. 
lrn Boston by Houghto~Mifflin and Company. 
2Divided into two parts, The Philosophy of Kant in pp. 3-213 and 
The Philosophy of Spencer in pp. 217-440. 
This was not Kant's way of putting his doctrine of 
experience, but it represents the essential thought of 
his doctrine and escapes many of the difficulties into 
which his own exposition falls.l 
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Secondly, after observing that Kant included some questionable cate-
gories and omitted others of great importance, Bowne says, 
All that we can allow, then, is that the mind itself 
actually proceeds according to principles immanent in 
itself in the attainment of consciousness and knowl-
edge.2 
The third passage rejects any schematism doctrine and insists on the 
categories being viewed in relation to actual, personal experience: 
Hence we might raise the question, What do the cate-
gories really mean; are they anything more than mere-
ly verbal forms without contents? And clearly they must 
be regarded as such forms unless we find somewhere in 
our total experience something which will illustrate 
these categories and assure us that they have some real 
meaning; and for this we need not a doctrine of schema-
tism, but an examination of experience in order to see 
the forms these categories take on in the concrete. 
Then it appears that when abstractly taken the cate-
gories not only defy conception, but contradict them-
selves, and they continue to do so until they are 
brought out of their abstraction and are looked upon as 
modes of intellectual manifestation. Thus if we talk 
of the categories of being, unity, identity, causality, 
substance, etc., in abstraction from any given experi-
ence we find them utterly vacuous, so that we cannot 
tell whether there be any corresponding fact or not, 
and it is only as we find these categories realized in 
living self-experience that they acquire other than a 
formal meaning or pass from anything more than purely 
verbal counters •••• The categories, then, are simply 
abstractions from self-conscious life . They are the 
lKant and Spencer, pp. 16-17. 2rbid., p. 77. 
modes of operation of the intellect and derive their 
meaning only from that self-conscious life as they 
find their only realization in it.l 
335 
Finally, we quote a passage critical of the Kantian conception of the 
categories but notable for a sentence (which we underline) identify-
ing the categories as forms of mental activity: 
When we pass to the unpicturable notions of the under-
standing, that is, the categories in the Kantian 
sense, we have no security that they are really any-
thing but verbal except in the form which we give them 
in experience: that is, the categories have to be 
viewed as functions of conscious intelligence, and 
when they are not taken in this sense then they are 
entirely empty and really apprehend no objects what-
ever. In case the categories acquire an object they 
are not masks or forms imposed upon something that 
exists apart from them. They are simply forms of 
mental activity whereby the intellect builds up ex-
perience. They are not something out of which the 
intellect is built up. They are the forms for the 
conceptual apprehension of existence, but this con-
ceptual apprehension is empty until it is realized 
in living experience. Hence the intellect is not to 
be understood through the categories, but the cate-
gories are to be understood through the intellect, 
and ultimately the intellect grasps itself in its 
own living experience, which is the logical prius 
of all conceptual understanding.2 
E. Evaluation 
We conclude this chapter on the definition of category in Bowne 
with the final evaluative section we promised.3 We have been passing 
judgment on some of his views in our survey of his materials _ as surely 
has been noted. But here we wish to present some general critical ob-
1rbid., pp. 85-86. 2Ibid., p. 142. 3on p. 293 above. 
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servations which began and developed during our study. In doing so 
we keep to the pattern established in the treatment of Aristotle and 
Kant in preceding chapters. 
Our first evaluative statement about Bowne's definition of cate-
gory may be phrased in this manner: Bowne has been too loose in his 
use of terms to designate category. By this judgment we imply the 
point, frequently noted in this chapter, that he offers nowhere a pre-
cise, formal definition of a category. Instead his readers are met 
with a variety of descriptive terms used even more variously with modi-
fiers in descriptive phrases. This is a fact which could easily escape 
the reader of portions in Bowne's books but hardly of this chapter. 
Our tabulations of terms used for category in his three main books re-
veal some notable facts. We learn that ten terms were used in the 
first Metaphysics, six new ones were supplied by the Theory of Thought 
and Knowledge, and three more added by the revised Metaphysics. Thus 
we can write the awesome sentence that in his main books Bowne called 
the categories laws, notions, principles, activity, forms, elements, 
molds, data, factors, ideas, truths, classifications, norms, contents, 
outlines, framework, conceptions, concepts, and modes. Now, of course, 
he does not do so all at once, and the cumulative statement is somewhat 
unfair. But it serves to point out what is easily overlooked in the 
context in which these terms are found. This is the point that hardly 
all of these designations are equally suited for expressing the idea--
to pick one of Bowne's terms--that a category is a type of mental ac-
tivity. Describing the latter as data, contents, classifications, or 
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outlines is surely not the most illuminating procedure. We consider 
Bowne to have been loose in his choice of terms to express the philo-
sophical idea of category. One may grant that Bowne wrote books of 
a somewhat popular cast and that in many places he could hardly avoid 
less precise synonyms. But these excuses go only so far. We con-
sider, then, that a more restricted use of terms for designating cate-
gory is to be desired in Bowne's writing. 
Our second evaluative statement on Bowne's definition of cate-
gory is more favorable to him. It may be put this way: Bowne's im-
plied definition of category as type of mental activity shows the in-
fluence of the Critical conception of category. A statement such as 
this suggests several of the points which have been noted above. We 
are convinced that Bowne's many statements about category point to 
the definition, never officially sanctioned, of a category as a type 
of activity in the human mind. This we feel Bowne understood to imply 
activity whereby data are constructed into objects. We see no dis-
cernible difference between this view and Kant's, which defines a 
category as a function or act of the understanding in synthesizing 
a manifold of intuition. The latter definition we judge to be the 
true Critical conception of category. Despite statements of Bowne 
dissociating himself from Kant, we are impressed with the essential 
similarity on our topic between the two philosophers. Bowne writes 
of Kant's view of category using the same, manifold terms in which 
he sets forth his own. He does this repeatedly and strikingly. 
Since we praise Kant for his stress on synthesis in defining a cate-
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gory, we laud Bowne, then, for echoing what appears to be the same es-
sential interpretation of category. 
Our third statement of evaluation on Bowne falls on the negative 
side again. We state the shortcoming we see in this manner: Bowne 
needs to offer more support for his claim that a category is a type 
of mental activity. We could be interpreted to mean that Bowne needs 
~to prove conclusively that, in the first place, there are categories 
in the mind. This we would admit, but it raises a topic of investiga-
tion that we put aside at the very beginning of this dissertation. 
What we are referring to by our statement is that Bowne's remarks, 
though numerous, do not elaborate sufficiently on what is involved 
exactly in the activity of thought he calls category. His statements 
smack of unsupported assertions and not of conclusions to a carefully 
reasoned theory of categorial function. Judged by the test of time, 
Bowne has ·not fared well on this point; for, at present, there is no 
widely-held developed theory of categories credited to Bowne. 
CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our intention in this final chapter is to state the findings we 
have reached in our study of the definition of category in Aristotle, 
Kant, and Bowne and to note in more compact form the conclusions we 
have made in various parts of the preceding chapters. 
We began with Aristotle as the original source of the concept of 
category, which in subsequent centuries developed into one of the tra-
ditional problems in metaphysics. 1 Our study first was of the Cate-
gories whose authenticity we debated2 at length before concluding from 
considerations of style, tone, terminology, and doctrine in favor of 
its authenticity.3 We judged the writing to be the earliest document 
by Aristotle relevant to the question of his definition of category.4 
The book proved to offer no one clear definition of category but con-
veys evidence that the following points are made within it: (1) There 
are two types of verbal expressions--single words and more complex 
sentences; (2) Verbal expressions fall into four groups--classes of 
substances, individual qualities, types of qualities, and individual 
substances; (3) Simple verbal expressions which signify substance, 
quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, 
1see p. 1 above. 
4see pp. 22-23. 
2see pp. 8-21 above. 
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3see pp. 21-22 above. 
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and affection are the categories; (4) Substance exists in two types--
primary substances, that is, individual particulars, and secondary 
substances, that is 1 species and genera in which such individual par-
ticulars may be included; (5) Secondary substance is characterized 
by being an essential but not an accidental attribute, being unam-
biguously predicable, and possessing neither contrary nor degrees; 
and (6) Primary substance is never either an essential or an acciden-
tal attribute, is individual, possesses neither contrary nor degrees, 
and, uniquely among all the categories, admits contrary qualities.l 
In pressing for exactly what "category" meant to Aristotle when 
he made such points in the Categories, we investigated first Trendelen-
burg1s theory that Aristotle derived his categories from grammatical 
considerations.2 Our conclusion called for rejection of the full sweep 
of the theory but with the reservation that it does appear that Aristotle 
derived a small part of his list of categories from grammatical con-
siderations . 3 We next considered the possibility of considering the 
doctrine of the categories in the Categories to mean a classification 
of namable entities. We were able to conclude after investigation 
that "category" for Aristotle at this stage meant the ultimate type 
of predicate which is predicable of namable entities.4 This implies 
that beginning with the Categories Aristotle gave to the term a 
technical meaning not entirely divorced from its natural import of 
"predicate." Study of the text in Cat. lb25-2a4 showed a particular 
1see pp. 33-34 above. 2see pp. 26-39 above. 
3see p . 40 above. 4see p. 46 above . 
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individual man being described in order to illustrate wider predicates. 
We were able to discern a serial order in the predicates.! The ordered 
list of predicates presented an individual man as a namable entity who 
is a going concern in a changing environment. Our feeling was that by 
this means Aristotle refuted the claim that many predicates could not 
be asserted of the same thing and showed that these particular predi-
cates fall under broader headings. The latter are the categories which 
we felt justified in defining at the stage of the Categories, therefore, 
as ultimate types of predicates attachable to namable entities.2 In 
this manner we rejected the possible definition of category as classifi-
cation of namable realities. 
We questioned next if Aristotle retained this definition of cate-
gory in subsequent writings and focused on the Metaphysics as the most 
important source for an answer. Other works of earlier date but less 
value on our topic we treated briefly later.3 A survey was made of 
the greater amount of the evidence furnished by the Metaphysics, which 
we recognized was no single, connected treatise. Aristotle's use of 
l<t.i\T~¥ry> (q and f<~Th(op(t.J suggested four groups of instances where 
Aristotle's meaning is: (1) not clear; (2) predicate, though not 
clearly of ultimate type; (3) genus, both as highest and proper; and 
(4) type of essential being.4 We consider the last two to represent 
major meanings for category in the Metaphysics. Our study of instances 
1see pp. 50-51 above. 2see pp. 51-52 above. 
3see pp . 85-107~above. 4see pp. 59-60 above. 
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under No . 3 showed a view of category essentially similar to the ear-
lier definition in the Categories, as ultimate type of predicate.l 
The main passage where category as a type of essential being appears 
is 1017a22-30. Here the categories are presented as the ten most ul-
timate answers to the question, '~at kind of thing is such-and such?" 
Thus they are ultimate kinds of essential being as distinguished from 
expressions of the other types of being (accidental, truth, potential, 
and actual). 
Our survey of eleven other books by Aristotle in which category 
is mentioned revealed two points . Firs; the phenomena noted in the 
Categories and Metaphysics reappeared . 2 This means we were able to 
see instances of the Categories definition of category as ultimate 
type of predicate attachable to namable entities, and of the three 
types of definition of category in the Metaphysics--category as predi-
cate but not of ultimate type, category as genus, and category as type 
of essential being . Secondly, no new phenomena appear in the other 
books surveyed . 3 No new definition of category nor full discussion 
of those in the Categories and Metaphysics were found . 
In the light of our findings about Aristotle, we drew three evalu-
ating conclusions . First, Aristotle 1 s category doctrine seems to have 
undergone a process of development which i s neither completed nor de-
scribed fully in his surviving works . 4 Aristotle seems to have moved 
slowly from an early conception of ca t egory seen in the Categories 
1see p . 83 above . 2see p . 108 above. 
4see pp . 109- 111 above . 
3see pp . 108- 109 above . 
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toward a view found in the Metaphysics which emphasizes ultimate forms 
of being. Secondly, we judge that what Aristotle does say about cate-
gory is not very precise . l Finally, we considered that Aristotle 
leaves many questions unanswered.2 
In the chapter on Kant's definition of category, we began with a 
defense of considering his writings from the pre-Critical period of 
1747 to 1769.3 It was brought out that the question of the definition 
of category was not even mentioned in the twenty-six documents con-
sidered pre-Critical . 4 Kant was occupied with other problems in ra-
tionalism, particularly the rationalist ·: account of sufficient reason 
and of space . Yet in the Inquiry of 1764 Kant did argue that defini-
tions are to be introduced last in philosophy and not first as in 
mathematics . s 
Among the semi-Critical writings from 1769-1781, the only docu-
ment of importance for our subject was the Dissertation of 1770 . In 
this work which links his pre-Critical and Critical doctrines, we find 
Kant contending that in sense experience we know a world which is in-
vestigated regarding its matter in the empirical sciences and regard-
ing its form in mathematics . However, we are also possessed of a dis-
tinct source of knowledge of noumena in certain pure intellectual con-
cepts which are a part of our mental equipment. These give us insight 
into another world, a world not of appearances but of reality, and be-
1see pp . 111-112 above. 
3see pp . 113-114 above. 
5see pp . 118-119 above . 
2see p . 112 above. 
4see p . 114 above . 
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cause of this another science is necessary. Presumably this science is 
metaphysics 1 the culmination of which is the attainment of a conception 
of God. 1 We found Kant to call a category an "intellectual concept" in 
the Dissertation where "category" does not appear.2 An investigation 
of Garnett's claim about the Dissertation occupied us next. Garnett 
contends that Kant superimposed a doctrine of intellectual intuition 
upon the Dissertation and only created confusion.3 We found this to be 
without basis after analyzing the five passages he cites. Further in-
vestigation showed that it was difficult to be final about how Kant de-
fined a category in 1770. We concluded1 though1 that such a statement 
would be that a category is a pure intellectual concept of things and 
relations possessed by the human intellect1 discoverable by reflection 
on its operations in knowing the sensory world and yielding symbolic 
knowledge of non-sensory objects and relations. More simply1 according 
to Kant's Dissertation1 a category is an intellectual concept of non-
sensory objects and relations. 
The material we centered upon to determine Kant's Critical defi-
nition of category was the Critique of Pure Reason in both editions. 
Note was taken first on what Kant says about defining categories. He 
was seen laying down requirements for a "real" definition and warning 
against circularity in definition to the point where he banned the 
definition of the pure categories.4 But Kant was found elsewhere in 
the first Critique to sanction efforts to define a pure category and 
lsee pp. 121-127 above. 
3see pp. 130-132 above. 
2see pp. 127-130 above. 
4see pp. 144-150 above. 
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actually did so himself. So we felt our way clear to attempt to do so 
ourselves. 1 
Analysis of different definitions of category in the Transcenden-
tal Analytic was the next task. We were able to show that Kant speaks 
of a category most frequently as a "concept of understanding." But 
many other tenms are used for category in the Analytic. These we di-
vided into a more important and a less important group. The latter 
was surveyed first and found to embrace a wide range of varied designa-
tions. Categories in the Transcendental Analytic are said to be other 
concepts, conditions, forms, rules, principles, functions, grounds, 
elements, modes, laws, cognitions, and predicaments.2 
It was our conclusion, however, that the numerous statements we 
surveyed do not reveal how Kant defined a category as explicitly as do 
others in the Transcendental Analytic. We felt that Kant in this cen-
tral part of the Critique of Pure Reason has defined a category not in 
one major way but in four. We stated, first, before presenting the 
evidence for our claims, that Kant in the Analytic defines a category 
to be (l) a function of judgment, (2) a concept of necessary synthetic 
unity, (3) a concept of pure synthesis, and (4) a concept of an object 
in general.3 The Metaphysical Deduction was found to be a source of 
passages in which category is identified with the function of judgment, 
although others elsewhere in the Analytic were noted.4 We felt con-
lsee pp. 150-155 .above. 
3see pp. 180-181 above. 
2see pp. 155-180 above. 
4see pp. 182-197 above. 
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firmed in our claim about this definition by the fact that Kant's lead-
ing commentators in recent years--Norman Kemp Smith, H. J. Paton, H. J. 
de Vleeschauwer, and H. W. Cassirer--are ~greed that Kant connected 
the categories with the functions of judgment.l 
Category defined as a concept of necessary synthetic unity we 
found expressed in ten passages within the Transcendental Analytic. We 
found it helpful in understanding what Kant means by necessary synthet-
ic unity . to state the argument of his provisional exposition , of the 
Transcendental Deduction in A.2 On consulting the four authorities we 
selected, we found corroboration in all four that a facet of category 
for Kant is necessary synthetic unity. 3 
category defined by Kant as concept of pure synthesis we saw im-
plied in seven passages in the Transcendental Analytic. Elucidation 
of the meaning of this definition we found in the argument of the Sub-
jective Deduction, which we endeavored to state.4 One effect of this 
argument is to suggest that category defined as concept of pure syn-
thesis means for Kant category as specifically schematized or related 
to space and time. By this definition we understand him to view a 
category in terms of its synthesis of both a pure and specific manifold 
given in space and time. On this interpretation, we were able to claim 
Paton's unqualified vote only. Whereas all four authorities we con-
sulted recognize that Kant schematizes the categories, calling for a 
manifold of human intuition to be supplied in space and time, only 
lsee pp. 197-199 above. 
3see pp. 207-214 above. 
2see pp. 202-206 above. 
4see pp. 219- 221 above. 
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Paton sees Kant defining as "concept of pure synthesis" the category 
schematized in terms of a pure and concrete manifold.l 
Category defined as concept of an object in general we found im-
plied by very many passages in the Transcendental Analytic. At this 
point we found it helpful to state the argument of the Opjective De-
duction in B. 2 In this portion of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant 
is occupied with questioning how the categories of human understanding 
can apply to an opject given to intuition which is independent of 
thought. His reply found in the Objective Deduction in B is that the 
categories must apply if any object is to be known . In the light of 
this, a category appropriately may be defined as the concept of an ob-
ject in general. Smith and Cassirer furnish a qualified endorsement 
to our claim, whereas . Paton and Vleeschauwer have no reservations 
whatsoever . 3 
Our procedure called for us next to examine the remainder of the 
Critique of Pure Reason . Our purpose was to determine whether Kant re-
ferred to category with the variety of terms and meanings used in the 
Analytic . Above all, we were concerned to discover if he anticipated 
and adhered to the four main definitions we have seen in the Analytic. 
A survey of terminology occupied us first and enabled us to present 
some findings on terms used for category in the Critique of Pure Reason 
as a whole: (1) "concept of understanding" (Verstandesbegriffe) is 
lsee pp. 224-235 .• above . 
3see pp. 248-259 above . 
2see pp . 239-246 above. 
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used 118 times, far more frequently than any other term, including 
"concept of the understanding" (Begriff des Verstandes) appearing 35 
times; (2) Kant calls the categories "concepts" in 195 places using 
other adjectives such as a priori, pure, intellectual, original, and 
fundamental; (3) Kant used many other designAtions for categories be-
sides "concepts" of one type or another, using such terms as condi-
tions, forms, rules, principles, functions, grounds, elements, modes, 
laws, cognitions, predicaments, notions, and acts; and (4) Kant's 
taste for terms to designate category was shown throughout the first 
Critique, though by far "concepts of understanding" was his favorite. 1 
We turned then to question if the four main definitions of cate-
gory in the Analytic appeared in material before and after that sec-
tion of the Critique. Our answer was yes, and we sought to demonstrate 
it.2 
Some concluding observations were presented next: (l) within a 
passage Kant may allude to more than one definition of category; (2) 
Kant put more emphasis on the connection of category with object in 
general and synthetic unity than with judgment and schematism; (3) 
Kant's definitive statements on category are to be found in the Tran-
scendental Analytic.3 
A section on evaluation completed our chapter on Kant's defini-
tion of category.4 Recalling the criticisms we had advanced about 
Aristotle, we observed first that Kant's thought about category had 
1rp. 260-265 above. 2Pp. 265-272 above. 
3see pp. 272-274 above. 4see pp. 274-286 above. 
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evolved also but could be traced more easily than Aristotle's. Nou-
menal knowledge is not claimed for the category in the Critical period 
whereas it is in the Semi-critical period of the Dissertation. Sec-
ondly, we charge that what Kant says about category is not so precise 
as could be desired . No one complete, exact definition of all that he 
means by category is to be found in his writings . Thirdly, we noted 
that Kant leaves many questions unanswered. We put some of these in 
this form: (1) Does Kant assume too narrow a definition? and (2) 
Does Kant imply two different \v.ays of viewing the categories in defin-
ing them as functions and as concepts? 
Our third chapter dealt with the thought of Borden Parker Bowne, 
whom we identified as the first American philosopher to give system-
atic expression to personalism . An effort was made to explain Bowne's 
limited influence among philosophers . 1 Our chief reason for includ-
ing him in our study is that he wrote about the categories frequently 
in his books . We approached his work with a desire to ascertain his 
definition of category and compare his thought with that of Aristotle 
and Kant.2 
The decision was made to concentrate on three of Bowne's books--
the Metaphysics of 1882, the Theory of Thought and Knowledge of 1897, 
and the revised Metaphysics of 1898 ; this was followed by a survey of 
five others in which category appears. The procedure adopted for the 
three main volumes was (1) present the evidence about definition of 
lsee pp. 287-291 above . 2see p . 293 above. 
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category, (2) ascertain Bolme 1 s meaning about category, and (3) offer 
some comparison with Aristotle and Kant. 
As regards the Metaphysics of 1882 on the point of terms used for 
category, our tabulation revealed that Bowne alluded to the categories 
most often as laws, notions, principles, activity, forms, and elements 
and less frequently as molds, data, factors, and ideas. The phrase 
"laws of thought" is used most frequently to mean the categories.! 
Next we quoted nine passages from the first Metaphysics as ones most 
revealing of Bowne's thought about the categories. 2 We observed next 
that the quotations contained no formal definition of category, but 
that the definition which seems implied is that for Bowne a category 
is a type of activity of thought, one which transpires in the human 
mind and shares in the construction of objects. Our judgment was that 
such a view of category is not compatible with Aristotle's. In con-
trast, Bowne and Kant, we noted, were both impressed with the active 
role of the mind in knowing objects. However, we felt that Bowne did 
not elaborate sufficiently in his Metaphysics of 1882 on what is in-
volved in the activity of thought he calls category. 
Bowne's Theory of Thought and Knowledge of 1897 mentions or dis-
cusses category much more often. Tabulation of usage of terms for cate-
gory revealed that in this book on epistemology, Bowne spoke most fre-
quently of the categories as "principles," especially as "immanent" 
ones. He showed strong preference for "laws," especially "law of 
thought." Less frequently appear such designations for categories as 
lsee pp. 296-298 above. 2see pp . 298-301 above. 
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truths, ideas, classifications, norms, notions, factors, contents, 
moulds, outlines, and framework.l Eleven passages from the Theory of 
Thought and Knowledge were presented,2 and the following comments 
made on them: (1} Bowne offers no single, formal definition of cate-
gory; (2} Bowne continues to conceive of a category as a type of ac-
tivity by which the mind constructs objects; and (3) Bowne emphasizes 
that the categories may not be consciously known by the mind in which 
they are active. In the section on comparison with Aristotle and Kant, 
we observed that Bowne considers his view of category different from 
Aristotle's. Bowne in the Theory of Thought and Knowledge expressed 
both disagreement and agreement with Kant, but notably describes Kant's 
view of the function of the categories in terms he uses elsewhere to 
state his own view.3 We were inclined to affirm that Bowne and Kant 
have much the same view of categorial function, despite the fact that 
Bowne recognizes a distinction between ontological and phenomenal cate-
gories. 
Bowne's Metaphysics of 1898 is a shorter restatement claiming to 
be unchanged in thought content. Its data on usage of terms for cate-
gories show that in this later work Bowne preferred laws, principles, 
and notions, and only incidentally as forms, conceptions, concepts, 
modes, and moulds.4 We now could summarize that in the three main 
works dealing with categories Bowne preferred most to speak of the 
1see pp. 306-309 above. 2see pp. 310-312 above. 
3see p. 315 above. 4see pp. 318-320 above. 
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categories as "laws," especially as "laws of thought," and next he pre-
ferred "principles."l Nine passages were then set forth as evidence 
of his connected statements about the categories.2 We were someWhat 
disappointed by the revision of the Metaphysics as far as our subject 
is concerned. No formal definition of category is offered, and Bowne 
seems less explanatory about category than before while still retaining 
his implied definition as type of mental activity. We noted that no 
mention is made of Aristotle's view of category, Bowne is more caustic 
in his remarks about Kant, and the revised volume offered little basis 
for comparison of our three philosophers. 
According to plan, we next surveyed five other books by .Bowne--
his Introduction to Psychological Theory, Philosophy of Theism, Theism, 
Personalism, and Kant and Spencer.3 All of these books had these 
points in common: (1) they spoke of category less frequently than the 
three examined, (2) they continue to manifest Bowne's penchant for 
many varied terms to designate category, and (3) they lend support in 
varying ways to Bowne's stress on the activity of mind, which has led 
us to infer that his definition of category is type of mental activity. 
An evaluation section completed our chapter on Bowne .4 Three 
judgments were made on his treatment of category: (1) Bowne has been 
too loose in his use of terms to designate category. (2) Bowne's 
implied definition of category as type of mental activity shows the in-
fluence of the Critical conception of category, and (3) Bowne needs to 
lsee p. 320 above. 2see pp. 321-323 above. 
3see pp. 325-335 . above. 4see pp. 335-338 above. 
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERtATION 
The problem of this dissertation is to determine how Aristotle, 
Kant, and Bowne defined a category. This question is one which has 
neither been answered previously nor approached through an exhaustive 
analysis of relevant texts. 
The dissertation examines first Aristotle's Categories. This 
early document suggests that simple verbal expressions signifying sub-
stance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, ac-
tion, and affection are the categories. The doctrine implied may mean 
a classification of namable entities. It is argued, however, that at 
this stage "category" for Aristotle meant the ultimate type of predi-
cate which is predicable of namable entities. 
Whether Aristotle retained this definition is disclosed by an 
examination of the Metaphysics. Aristotle's usage there suggests 
that a category is a (l) predicate, though not clearly of ultimate 
type; (2) genus, both highest and proper; and (3) type of essential 
being. 
Eleven other books by Aristotle reveal two points. First, the 
phenomena about category noted in the Categories and Metaphysics reap-
pear. Instances may be seen of the definition of category in the~­
gories and of the three definitions in the Metaphysics. Secondly, no 
new phenomena appear. No other definition or full discussion of the 
above four are found. 
Three evaluations follow. First, Aristotle's doctrine of cate-
gory appears to have evolved in a manner neither completed nor described 
fully in his extant works. Secondly, Aristotle's statements about cate-
gory are not very precise. Thirdly, Aristotle leaves questions unan-
swered about category, though ones which later thinkers found stimulat-
ing. 
Kant does not mention the question of the definition of category 
in his pre-Critical period. He contends in the Inquiry of 1764, how-
ever, that definitions are to be introduced last in philosophy and not 
first as in mathematics. 
In the semi-Critical period, the only document of importance is 
the Dissertation of 1770. It suggests that a category is an intellec-
tual concept of non-sensory objects and relations. 
The Transcendental Analytic in the Critique of Pure Reason is the 
main source of Kant's Critical definition of category. In the Analytic 
he designates a category most frequently as a "concept of understand-
ing." Yet many other terms are used also. But so far as meaning is 
concerned, Kant defines a category in four major ways, namely, as a 
(l} function of judgment, (2) concept of necessary synthetic unity, 
(3) concept of pure synthesis, and (4} concept of an object in general. 
Conclusions drawn are that (1) Kant's thought about category 
evolved and can be traced more easily than Aristotle's, (2} what Kant 
says about category is not so precise as desired, and (3) Kant raises 
many questions, such as (a} does Kant assume too narrow a definition 
of definition? and (b) does Kant imply two different ways of viewing 
the categories in defining them as functions and as concepts? 
The third philosoph~r investigated is Borden Parker Bowne, 
pioneer American personalist who wrot frequently of the categories. 
Three of his books are of primary importance, namely, the Metaphysics 
of 18821 the Theory of Thought and Knowledge of 18971 and the revised 
Metaphysics of 1898. 
The following points about Bowne's writing on category are sub-
stantiated: (1) the absence of any single, formal definition of cate-
gory; (2) the presence of many varied terms with which Bowne speaks 
of the categories; and (3) his implied definition that a category is 
a type of mental activity in terms of which objects are constructed in 
thought. 
Three evaluations of Bowne's position are offered. First, he 
was too loose in using terms to designate category. Secondly, Bowne's 
implied definition of category as type of mental activity shows the in-
fluence of Kant. Thirdly, Bowne does not offer sufficient support for 
his implied definition of category. 
BRIEF AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE CANDIDATE 
Benjamin Aby Petty was born in New Orleans, Louisiana on April 15, 
1921, the son of Maurice Fletcher Petty and Myrtle Aby Petty. He was 
educated in public schools of New Orleans, La Salle Grammar School and 
Alc~e Fortier High School. Upon graduation from the latter in 1938, he 
enrolled in Tulane University from which he was graduated with honors in 
English in 1942 and where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. He immedi-
ately enrolled in the Candler School of Theology of Emory University 
where he finished all requirements for his B.D. degree by the end of 
the summer, 1944, the degree being awarded the following June. On No-
vember 16, 1944, he became a member in full connection of the Louisiana 
Annual Conference of the Methodist Church. He returned to New Orleans 
for a few months as an Associate Pastor in one of the Methodist churches 
and Director of the Wesley Foundation at Tulane. In January, 1945, he 
entered Boston University Graduate School for work toward his doctor's 
degree in Philosophy. While in Boston, he was ordained an Elder in The 
Methodist Church by Bishop Lewis 0. Hartman in a ceremony in which 
Dr. Edgar s. Brightman shared. He remained in Boston until the fall of 
1947 when housing problems forced him and his family to leave and return 
to New Orleans where he again was an Associate Pastor in a Methodist 
Church until 1953. At that time he was appointed to teach in the Re-
ligion Department of the College of Arts and Sciences of Southern 
Methodist University, the position which he presently holds. 
He was married on September 1, 1942, to the former Mary Endt 
Pearce, also of New Orleans, and a graduate of Newcomb College of 
Tulane University. They are the parents of Benjamin Pearce Petty 
(born on November 15, 1944) and Ann Elizabeth Petty (born on June 30, 
1948) . 
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